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Extensive international evidence has shown that a considerable number of patients are 
harmed by medication errors every year. This is the first study to investigate medication 
errors within cancer services in Sudan.    
The first aim of this study was to investigate patient safety culture in a large cancer centre 
in Khartoum, Sudan. Focus groups using the MaPSaF were conducted with staff from the 
medical, nursing and pharmacy teams. The findings revealed lack of knowledge regarding 
patient safety systems among research participant. Participants implied that the study 
hospital has a low priority for patient safety.  
The second aim of the study was to investigate the frequency, nature and potential causes 
of prescribing errors associated with chemotherapy. A mixed methods study was designed, 
composed of a quantitative prescription analysis followed by Critical Incident interviews and 
focus groups. During the study period, 10% of prescriptions contained at least one error, of 
which, nearly 90% of which had the potential to cause serious and life threatening harm. 
Errors were more likely with prescriptions containing cisplatin (chi-square test p <0.001) or 
carboplatin (chi square test P <0.05). Participants attributed errors to a culture where they 
were unable to ask questions, poor clinic organization, lack of knowledge and lack of 
essential equipment and resources.  
 The third aim study was to identify the nature and frequency of errors associated with 
administration of chemotherapy to patients and to explore their potential causes. The study 
was composed of mixed methods, using observation and critical incident interviews. More 
than 300 intravenous doses were observed, none of which were correctly prepared and 
administered to patients. None of the nurses wore appropriate protective clothing or 
adhered to aseptic technique. More than one third of intravenous doses were calculated 
inaccurately and more than one fifth of the doses were withdrawn inaccurately. Nurses 
attributed the errors to lack of training, supervision and resources. In conclusion, findings 
show that patient safety is of a low priority at the study hospital which is leading to a high 
risk of harm to both patients and HCWs. A set of four interventions were recommended as 
a result of findings from the current work and mapped to the COM-B model of the Behaviour 
Change Wheel. The intervention aim to change healthcare worker behaviour, through 
centralisation of chemotherapy preparation, standardisation of chemotherapy prescribing, 
implementation of incident reporting systems and standardisation of care. These 
interventions are also aimed at creating legislation and guidance to regulate the practice of 
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Evidence from developed nations suggests that a considerable number of patients are 
harmed by unsafe medical care and that between 44,000 and 100,000 patients die every 
year as a result of medical care in the United States of America (USA) (Kohn, 2000). These 
figures, published by the Institute of Medicine (IOM), are the result of extrapolating two 
studies conducted in the USA during the late 1980s and early 1990s; the Harvard Medical 
Practice Study (HMPS) (Brennan et al., 1991) and the Utah and Colorado study (Gawande et 
al., 1999). Before these were published, the harm to which patients were exposed was 
infrequently studied and prominent doctors were reluctant to draw the attention of the 
media and the public alike to medical harm (Vincent, 2010). Although, most of the evidence 
for patient harm is obtained from studies conducted in higher income countries, there is 
growing evidence of patient harm due to unsafe medical care in countries with low to 
middle incomes (Jha et al., 2010). The documented risks associated with medical care have 
placed it among other high risk industries such as aviation, a service that has achieved very 
good safety records. Ignoring harm associated with medical care is no longer an option for 
healthcare institutions and authorities who need to take forward steps in prioritizing patient 
care or otherwise be considered negligent (Vincent, 1989).   
1.2 The Patient Safety Movement  
In response to the IOM report, healthcare organizations, around the world, initiated 
research to identify the scale and type of harm to which patients were exposed. The findings 
from these retrospective record review studies revealed that 2.9 to 18% of hospitalized 
patients were harmed by unsafe medical care (Table 1-1). The studies can be considered 
comparable because of similar methodologies, however, the use of different definitions, 
criteria and the potentially different levels of healthcare quality may have led to the wide 
variation in the incidence of harm. Most of the work was large-scale, studying adverse 
events in up to 51 hospitals and involved obtaining records from a substantial number of 
hospitals (de Vries et al., 2008).   




Table 1-1 The frequency of adverse events from landmark studies 




Rate of AEs 
(% if not stated 
otherwise) 







Leape 1995 USA 51 30,195 3.7 8.1 6.9 not reported 
Wilson et al 1995 Australia 28 14000 16.6 13.6 4.9 51.2 
Gawande et al 1999 USA 28 15000 3 9.4 5.6 54 
Vincent et al 2000 UK 2 1014 11.7 6 8% 48 
Davis et al 2002 New Zealand 13 6579 12.9 10.2 4.5 40 
Baker et al 2004 Canada 20 3745 7.5 15.9 5.2 36.9 
Michel et al 2007 France 71 8754 6.6 per 1000 days 1.5 0.6 35 
Zegers 2009 et al The Netherlands 21 7029 10.7 5 7.8 39.6 
Aranez-Andres 2008 Spain 24 5908 9.3 N/R 4.4 42.60 
Soop et al 2009 Sweden 28 1967 12.3 10.8 4.1 70 





26 15548 8.2 14 30 83 




The landmark Harvard Medical Practice Study (HMPS) was originally intended for litigation 
purposes and identified the extent of patient harm caused by both negligent and non-
negligent medical interventions (Hiatt et al., 1989).  
The researchers investigated the type and incidence of adverse events in a group of acute 
non-psychiatric hospitals in New York, USA in 1984. 
 In this study, an Adverse Event (AE) was defined as: 
 “an injury that was caused by medical management (rather than the underlying 
disease) and that prolonged the hospitalization, produced a disability at the time of 
discharge, or both” (Brennan et al., 1991) p 370 
The HMPS involved the review of 30,121 patient records revealing that 3.7% of patients 
suffered a medical adverse event (AE) (Brennan et al., 1991). However, the vast majority of 
those did not result in serious disability, with 70% achieving complete recovery in less than 
six months. However, 0.4% suffered permanent disability and 1.7% died. A sub analysis of 
the medical causes of these AEs revealed that nearly half occurred due to a number of 
complications during the intra-operative or post-operative period , but that medicines as a 
single common causation were responsible for almost a fifth of those events (Leape et al., 
1991). Among the medicines that led to AEs, antibiotics were the most common (16.2%) 
and anti-tumour agents (15.5%) the second most common (Leape et al., 1995).  
Findings from this study prompted the lead researcher to publish the seminal paper “Error 
in Medicine” (Leape, 1994) which eventually led to the formation of the Committee of 
Quality of Healthcare in America by the Institute of Medicine.  
In response to the high rate of surgery-associated AEs reported in the HMPS, Gawande and 
colleagues (1999), later undertook a similarly designed retrospective review of 15,000 
medical records in hospitalized patients in Colorado and Utah. They reported that 3.2% of 
surgical patients suffered an AE, half of which were preventable (Gawande et al., 1999).   
Subsequently, similar large-scale studies were conducted across the world. The method 
developed by the HMPS was adopted in all but one (Michel et al., 2007) of the major studies 
which were carried out in European countries (Vincent et al., 2001;Michel et al., 
2007;Aranaz-Andres et al., 2008;Soop et al., 2009;Zegers et al., 2009;Jha et al., 2010), 
Australia (Wilson et al., 1995), New Zealand (Davis et al., 2002;Davis et al., 2003), Canada 
(Baker et al., 2004) and those commissioned by the WHO in developing and emerging 
countries (Aranaz-Andres et al., 2011;WHO, 2011a). The method entailed a two-step 




process that consisted of an initial record screening by a trained researcher followed by 
separate screening by two trained doctors. The first step involved screening a sample of 
records and identifying those that contained at least one criterion associated with an AE 
from a predefined list. Examples of such criteria were admission into the intensive care unit 
(ICU), death and readmission into hospital (Hiatt et al., 1989).  Records positively screened 
were then separately reviewed by two trained doctors in the second step, using a checklist 
for AE analysis. Record review is an established method in patient safety research and is 
important because it allows for screening when little is known about the situation, however, 
it has the potential for underestimating AEs and preventability (Michel, 2003). 
The studies from Australia (Wilson et al., 1995), New Zealand (Davis et al., 2002), England 
(Vincent et al., 2001), Canada (Baker et al., 2004) and European countries (Aranaz-Andres 
et al., 2008;Michel et al., 2007;Schioler et al., 2001;Soop et al., 2009;Zegers et al., 2009), 
confirmed these findings and reported higher rates of AEs.  
The Australian study reported a fivefold higher rate of AEs (16.6%) when compared to that 
reported in the US literature. The study reviewed a sample of 14000 medical records from 
28 hospitals across two states in Australia using similar methodologies to those previously 
described by Leape and colleagues (1991). Half of the AEs were associated with surgery; 
4.9% resulted in death, 13.7% resulted in permanent disability and half were judged to be 
preventable. There are several explanations for the differences in findings between the 
Australian and American studies. Most importantly, the Australian study was inclined in 
favour of identifying AEs because the objective of the study was to improve quality of care 
rather than identifying negligent cases for insurance and litigation claims (Thomas et al., 
2000). This was seen with a much earlier American study intending to identify untoward 
outcomes in hospitalized patients which reported a similarly higher incidence (20%) of AEs 
(Schimmel, 1964). Differences in the level of detail contained in the Australian medical 
records, quality of Australian healthcare, the use of specialists in the study and differences 
in diseases between the two countries could further explain these differences. However all 
studies outside the USA reported higher frequency of AEs, mostly because the researchers 
used less restrictive definitions for an adverse event (Jha et al., 2010). 
Research in the UK, also, confirmed findings from US studies. Vincent and colleagues 
reviewed 1014 medical records from two London NHS hospitals. Although this figure was 
not representative of patients admitted to London hospitals or even hospital patients 
around the UK, this study served as a foundation for further work. The study revealed that 




a little more than 10% of admissions were associated with AEs. Although more than half of 
the patients recovered completely, but 34% sustained moderate disability, 6% had 
permanent disability and  8% died (Vincent et al., 2001). Similar to work conducted outside 
the US, this study reported a higher number of incidents than the US studies but this could 
be due to different interpretations of the criteria for identifying records with AEs. 
Furthermore, more records (26%) were chosen at the first stage in the UK in comparison to 
16.6% in the US studies. 
In response to these studies, governments and healthcare organizations published guidance 
on patient safety. The publication of the landmark report “To Err is Human”(Kohn, 2000) 
was a direct consequence of these studies. The report recognized that although individuals 
in healthcare systems need to be vigilant and aware, blaming individuals involved in errors 
was not the solution. The majority of errors were due to human factors but were both 
inevitable and preventable.  In recognition of this, the report recommends that systems 
should be designed in order to standardize processes, reduce violations and deviations and 
offer safer healthcare. An important element in designing those processes was 
identification of service gaps that allow errors to take place. Hence, the key 
recommendation from this report was the creation of a national anonymous voluntary error 
reporting system, to allow identification of error-prone systems and thus focus on 
interventions to strengthen them.  
The UK government, in turn, published the report “An organization with a memory” which 
focused on learning from errors(Department of Health, 2000b). Plans to implement the 
recommendations made in this report were set out in the landmark report, Building a Safer 
NHS. Similar to the US and central to the plan was the establishment of a mandatory 
reporting scheme for all mistakes that occurred within healthcare workplaces, with the aim 
of collating, analysing and assessing this information to identify areas of poor practice and 
to seek ways of avoiding common errors. Furthermore, the report aimed to establish a 
blame-free culture where lessons are learnt from errors to promote patient safety  
(Department of Health, 2000a).  The National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) was established 
for this purpose; to “lead and contribute” to improving patient safety within health services. 
The NPSA offered incident reporting services through the National Reporting and Learning 
service (NRLS), a system that collects and analyses patient safety incident reports supplied 
from staff in the NHS. Collected information is subsequently used to provide feedback and 
guidance to healthcare organizations to improve patient safety. 




Worldwide,  the fifty-fifth World Health Assembly adopted a resolution that urged member 
state countries to  place an emphasis on strengthening safety in health care delivery and 
develop systems to monitor patient safety incidents (WHO, 2002b). 
1.2.1 The World Alliance for Patient Safety  
The World Patient Safety Alliance was launched in 2004 as a body of expertise to provide 
support to member states with the aim of improving the quality of medical care and 
reducing the incidence and severity of iatrogenic injury (WHO, 2005a).The alliance chose six 
areas of priority for action (WHO, 2005a) outlined in Table 1-2. 
One of the first issues identified was the lack of AEs data from transitional and developing 
countries (Donaldson, 2005). With the exception of a limited number of small-scale studies, 
there was no published national work on the incidence of AEs in medical care (Carpenter et 
al., 2010). Furthermore, studies were limited in scope and tended to examine specific areas 
of medical practice (Carpenter et al., 2010). A review of studies in transitional and 
developing countries identified 23 studies on AEs, mostly conducted in a single hospital, 
with the exception of two that were large scale (Carpenter et al., 2010).For example, in 
Mexico a retrospective review of 836 records in a respiratory diseases hospital showed a 
9.1% incidence of adverse events, 74% of which were preventable (Herrera-Kiengelher et 
al., 2005) and in Iran, a review of 70 postmortem reports of trauma patients showed that 
26% of all trauma deaths was preventable (Zafarghandi et al., 2003).   
Consequently, the WHO conducted a series of six awareness workshops across its regional 
offices; Asian region (WHO, 2007b), American region(WHO, 2007c), African region (WHO, 
2007d) and Eastern Mediterranean Region (EMRO) (WHO, 2007e). 
The workshops aimed to raise awareness about patient safety, prioritise areas of concern 
and provide training and a framework for health institutions in these regions to conduct 
patient safety studies in healthcare institutions. Subsequently a study (The Eastern 
Mediterranean and Africa Study- The EMAS) was carried out in the WHO African Regional 
Office (AFRO) and the Eastern Mediterranean Regional Office (EMRO) in 2007-2008 and 
published in 2011 (WHO, 2011a). 
 
 




Table 1-2 World Patient Safety Alliance Priority Areas 
Priority area Action 
The Global Patient Safety 
Challenge 
 
Formulation of a two to three-year patient safety 
challenge which has been identified by an expert panel to 
pose a significant healthcare problem relevant to all 
member states. The first challenge chosen was “clean 
care”, promoting infection control systems across the 
globe and the second is “safe surgery”. 
Patients for patient safety This initiative was planned to empower patients to take 
leadership and advocacy roles to report and highlight 
patient safety incidents. 
Taxonomy for patient 
safety 
The WHO has developed an internationally accepted 
nomenclature and definition for adverse events. This 
serves to enable countries and researchers to report 
errors and near misses in a standardized manner. 
Research for Patient Safety Recognizing the role of research in providing the impetus 
of the patient safety movement, the WHO co-ordinates 
patient safety research in countries with developing and 
transitional economies. In addition, the alliance produces 
a methodological tool kit to enable other countries to 
conduct patient safety research. 
Patient Safety Solutions The WHO produced a booklet which contains a set of nine 
evidence-based solutions that have been shown to 
improve patient safety. 
Reporting and Learning 
Systems 
The WHO has launched an International Reporting and 
Learning Systems Community of Practice which is a body 
of experts from around the world who are charged with 
sharing learning, solutions, innovations and best practice. 
 
The work used the two step retrospective review of medical records developed by the HMPS 
on 18,146 patients hospitalized in 2005, drawn from 26 hospitals from 7 countries, including 
Sudan (WHO, 2011a). The study revealed that 8% of hospital patients were harmed by 
adverse events, a finding similar to hospitals in the UK (Vincent et al., 2001), Australia  
(Wilson et al., 1995) and  some European countries (Soop et al., 2009;Aranaz-Andres et al., 




2008). Most importantly half of AEs were preventable (50%) but caused considerable 
permanent disability (14%) and one third of patients died as a consequence(Wilson et al., 
2012).This, however, is possibly an underestimation because the study design stated that if 
one patient had multiple AEs, only the most serious would be reported. The authors also 
recognized that there were limitations due to incomplete medical records which prevented 
proper detection of AEs. Inadequate record keeping in transitional and developing countries 
is a well-known and widespread issue (WHO, 2010). Nevertheless, the findings indicated 
that patient harm was evident and had more devastating effects than the reported data 
from developed nations.  
Results from this study identified that therapeutic error was the leading cause of adverse 
events among hospitalized patients (Wilson et al., 2012). The contributory causes were not 
lack of resources, as previously revealed in maternal mortality studies conducted in the 
region (Sundari, 1992) but inadequate supervision followed by failure in  implementation of 
treatment protocols. 
With the exception of a small cross-sectional study conducted  in Jordan (Hayajneh et al., 
2010) to identify AEs associated with healthcare, most other studies emerging from 
developing and transitional countries have focused on medication errors. The Jordanian 
study used questionnaires with a combination of open-ended and close-ended questions to 
assess the frequency of errors and their contributory factors. Nurses reported that adverse 
events occurred in 28% of all inpatient admissions, with medication errors, wrong diagnosis, 
infections, bed sores and falls being the most commonly encountered.  The study showed 
that  more than half the adverse events were associated with drugs,  which was similar to 
previous studies conducted in developed countries (Leape et al., 1991).  
1.3 Adverse Drug Events 
Adverse Drug Events (ADEs) are:  
 “injuries due to a medication” (Morimoto 2004 p307) 
Medications were the second leading cause of hospital-related AEs in a number of studies 
(Baker et al., 2004;Leape et al., 1991;Michel et al., 2007;Soop et al., 2009;Wilson et al., 
1995;Zegers et al., 2009)  and the leading cause of AEs in Spain (Aranaz-Andres et al., 2008). 
The HMPS identified that drugs were the single most common cause of AEs, amounting to 
almost 20% of the total (Leape et al., 1991).  




ADEs are common, affecting up to 6.5 in 100 hospital admissions (Bates et al., 1995b) and 
have the potential to prolong hospital stay by up to 4 days (Bates et al., 1997). More 
importantly ADEs have the potential to increase hospital cost and patient mortality, 
resulting in a 100% increase in expenditure and  three times as much in the risk of mortality  
when compared with controls (Classen et al., 1997).  
In hospitals, patients in medical wards (Bates et al., 1995a) and patients in ICUs (Cullen et 
al., 1997) have been shown to have a higher incidence of ADEs than in other wards. 
Furthermore, older patients and those who stay longer in hospitals were at an increased 
risk of more severe ADEs (Bates et al., 1999a). ADEs were found to occur mostly at the 
prescribing stage (Morimoto et al., 2004;Runciman et al., 2003;Kaushal et al., 2001). 
Medicines associated with ADEs were commonly antibiotics, cytotoxics, cardiovascular 
agents (Leape et al., 1991), anticoagulants (Bates et al., 1993), analgesics (Classen et al., 
1997), anti-epileptics (Gurwitz et al., 2005)  and anti-diabetic drugs (Mills et al., 2008).  
A study of US death certificates during 1983-1993 indicated that medication-related deaths 
increased during that period by 2.57 times and the rise in deaths was higher among 
outpatients compared with inpatients (Phillips et al., 1998). The authors found that this was 
not related to an increase in the use of prescription drugs, rather the change in healthcare 
strategy where patients were cared for in the outpatient setting. Other risk factors for 
medication-related death were gender and race, with males and those of black origin at 
highest risk.  In contrast, findings from inpatient studies had negative associations with 
gender and race. A survey on patients presenting to four primary care centres in the USA 
showed that 25% of patients reported an ADE, much higher than inpatients (Gandhi et al., 
2005a). The drugs more commonly implicated in outpatient-related ADEs were 
antidepressants and anti-hypertensives in comparison with antibiotics and cardiac drugs in 
inpatients (Bates et al., 1993).  
Preventability and seriousness of ADEs has been confirmed in published research. Studies 
have shown that up to half of ADEs among inpatients (Gurwitz et al., 2005) and up to 90% 
among ambulatory care patients (Taché et al., 2011) are preventable. Previous research has 
shown that preventable ADEs can be serious, leading to life-threatening consequences in 
almost a fifth of affected patients (Bates et al., 1993). The majority of serious, life 
threatening and fatal ADEs are preventable (Gurwitz et al., 2005). Unpreventable ADEs are 
always caused by an Adverse Drug Reaction (ADR) but preventable ADEs may be caused by 
an ADR or a medication error (Bates et al., 1995a). ADRs are a subset of ADEs and according 




to the WHO, they are untoward events suffered by patients when drugs are prescribed and 
administered using standard doses and methods (WHO, 2005b).  ADRs are not rare, not 
always preventable and can have serious consequences. Therefore medicines were 
between the fourth and sixth leading  cause of death in the USA (Lazarou et al., 1998). 
Similarly, wrong medication was identified as one of the leading causes of anesthetic AEs in 
early studies (Cooper et al., 1984). More specifically, dosing errors have been identified as 
the leading cause of ADEs among children (Kaushal et al., 2001). 
The potential for ADEs is great considering the many stages which encompass the 
medication process, and conversely the potential for intercepting medication errors at each 
stage presents an important opportunity for preventing ADEs. 
A prospective study detected ADEs in two large hospitals in the US (over 1500 beds in total), 
using self-reports by nurses and pharmacists as well as daily medication chart reviews. 
Extrapolated results from the findings indicated that about 6 ADEs occur per 100 non-
obstetric hospital admission. Of the ADEs, 1% were fatal, 12% life-threatening, 30% serious 
and 57% significant. The rate of ADEs was highest among ICU patients, and more 
importantly, among the serious and life-threatening ADEs, 42% were preventable. Among 
the preventable ADEs, the most (56%) occurred at the prescribing stage, 34% occurred 
during medicine administration, 6% and 4% were identified at the transcription and 
dispensing stages, respectively. The authors estimated that  1900 ADEs can occur in a 
hospital per year, with varying severity (Bates et al., 1995b) 
Errors occurring at the prescribing stage were often more preventable and because they 
occurred earlier in the medication process, they were more likely to be intercepted.  
Prescribing errors can be both errors of omission and errors of commission. In a review of 
ADEs reported in Australia, the leading cause of hospital admission was failure to prescribe 
anticoagulants leading to deep vein thrombosis (Runciman et al., 2003). On the other hand, 
a systems analysis of the medication errors identified in the ADE prevention study was 
conducted by Leape and colleagues (Leape et al., 1995), identified that overdose was the 
most common type of medication error. Similarly, Classen and colleagues found that 
overdoses were often related to deterioration in renal or hepatic function (Classen et al., 
1997). Other medication errors reported included; wrong dose, wrong choice, wrong drug, 
drug allergy, missed dose, wrong time and inadequate monitoring. The authors identified 
that there were four main causes for the above errors: lack of knowledge of the drug, lack 
of information about the patient, rule violations and slips. Since most of these errors 




occurred at the prescribing stage, a rational step was to develop interventions that assisted 
doctors in prescribing decisions.  
Leape and colleagues (1995) identified that system failures caused many medication errors 
and hence isolated interventions such as training and education were ineffective (Mills et 
al., 2008). Interventions showing some benefit in reducing the incidence of medication 
errors include: the involvement of pharmacists at the prescribing stage, intravenous 
systems,  protocols and guidelines, Computerised Physician Order Entry (CPOE) and support 
systems for clinical decision making (Manias et al., 2012).  
1.4 Medication errors in the EMRO region 
Published data on medication error research in the EMRO region, is limited. For example, a 
review of medication error studies identified only 45 published articles from 15 countries 
(Alsulami, 2013). The authors listed 13 criteria for assessing the quality of published work 
and none of the articles included in the review met all criteria. One quarter of the studies 
failed to specify the type of medication error under focus and more than one quarter did 
not specify whether or not ethical approval had been obtained. Almost half the studies 
focused on prescribing errors, whilst others studied administration errors or focused on 
errors in paediatrics. The studies were heterogeneous in their study design and how they 
presented rates of error. Hence, the authors reported that they experienced difficulties in 
comparing medication error rate. Nevertheless, medication error rates associated with 
prescribing varied from 7.1% to 90% and those associated with administration of medicine 
varied between 9.4% and 80%.  Similar to research conducted in western studies (Leape et 
al., 1995), the most common errors were dose errors, wrong frequency, wrong strength of 
drug and wrong duration of therapy. Most of the errors were related to antihistamines, 
antibiotics and anti-coagulant drugs. Similar to previous studies in western countries 
(Classen et al., 1997) researchers in the EMRO region reported that poor knowledge was a 
major contributor to medication errors and a small number of studies reported clinical 
severity of errors with one study attributing 26 deaths among nearly 3000 patients to 
medication errors.  
Although the findings from this review indicate that medication errors in the EMRO region 
are widespread, comparison with western research is difficult, for two reasons. None of the 
identified studies used previously validated study designs and medication errors were 
poorly defined. 




1.5 Safety using cytotoxic chemotherapy   
Cytotoxic chemotherapy for cancer management was discovered during the second world 
war when nitrogen mustard used by bomber planes led to remission of lymphoma among 
affected pilots. These observations inspired the development of alkylating agents and later 
other drugs currently in use to treat cance. However, these medicines are non-specific  and 
target both healthy and cancerous cells, leading to numerous side effects  (Chabner, 2011). 
They have the potential to cause substantial long term and short term complications that 
may lead to poor quality of life, disability and death. Short term complications are easier to 
monitor and manage because they occur within a few days of the start of the 
chemotherapy. However, long term complications may occur anytime from the completion 
of the course of cytotoxic chemotherapy to decades after completion. 
Short term side effects usually resolve within a few months from occurrence but can be 
severe enough to require hospitalization (Nurgalieva et al., 2009). Bone marrow 
suppression, notably neutropenia, can be life-threatening when patients become 
immunocompromised and contract infections (Crawford et al., 2004). Thrombocytopenia 
and anaemia requiring therapeutic intervention and dose modification are also seen 
(Nurgalieva et al., 2011).  
Perhaps the most devastating of all complications for patients are nausea and vomiting 
(Hesketh, 1999) which can lead to dehydration and leave a strong psychological impact 
resulting in anticipatory emesis (Hesketh, 2008). Cytotoxic chemotherapy can lead to organ 
damage; renal failure (de Jonge et al., 2006), neuropathies (Windebank et al., 2008), 
mucositis and diarrhoea (Sharma et al., 2005) among other complications. The majority of 
chemotherapy-related complications are manageable, for example the administration of 
granulocyte colony stimulating factors to reduce the risk of neutropenia (Crawford et al., 
2004) and the use of anti-emetics to reduce the severity of nausea and vomiting (Hesketh, 
2008).Complications from cytotoxic chemotherapy often require dose limitation to mitigate 
the effects (Krischer et al., 1997) because it has been shown that lower doses are associated 
with a lower incidence of side effects (Partridge et al., 2001). 
 In contrast long term complications  are not as easy to control and these include cognitive 
impairment (Tannock et al., 2004) cardiotoxicity  (Krischer et al., 1997) and infertility in both 
males (Dohle, 2010) and females (Barton et al., 2013). 




Most notably, cytotoxic chemotherapy causes an increased risk of carcinogenicity and 
teratogenicity via their mutagenic activity on mammalian chromosomes (Sieber et al., 
1976), posing risks to patients and healthcare staff who are exposed to them. Consequently, 
the International Agency for Research in Cancer (IARC) has classified 24 cytotoxics as 
carcinogens or possible carcinogens, with all of them classified as teratogenic (Briggs et al., 
2011). Decades ago, evidence emerged showing that the urine of nurses exposed to 
cyclophosphamide has mutagenic activity (Falck et al., 1979).  
Cytotoxics can enter the systems of nurses and pharmacy personnel through accidental 
ingestion, aerosol inhalation  (Hirst et al., 1984)  and through dermal exposure (Fransman 
et al., 2004;Bos et al., 1997) via skin contact with contaminated surfaces. Isolated reports 
of primary cancers have occurred in Health Care Workers (HCWs) exposed to cytotoxics. 
Bladder cancer  has been reported in a 39 year old pharmacist who had no other risks except 
the exposure to cytotoxics for a period of 20 years (Levin et al., 1993). Bladder cancer is a 
disease of older men but has been associated with occupational exposure to carcinogens 
such as cigarette smoking, rubber, chemicals and textiles (Wynder et al., 1977).   
Most of this evidence came from an era when health and safety legislation was not in place 
and nurses would prepare cytotoxics on the bench in clinical areas without appropriate 
personal protection.  
The body of evidence on occupational risks associated with handling cytotoxics poses 
challenges to both HCWs and their managers. It became obvious that HCWs should be 
protected from these risks. In the 1980s the US, UK and European bodies developed 
guidelines for the handling of hazardous chemical which requires workplace risk 
assessments to be conducted to identify substances that are hazardous to health and hence 
provide protection to employees. Guidelines were developed in the US, UK, Ireland, 
Denmark, Germany, Finland, Sweden and Australia (Carrington et al., 2010b;Jacobson et al., 
2009;Allwood et al., 2002). 
Subsequently, specific guidelines for the handling of cytotoxics were developed (ISOPP, 
2007a;ASHP, 2002), in order to provide protection for HCWs. Guidelines stated that HCWs 
should be offered training in handling cytotoxics and use Personal Protective Equipment 
(PPE). Furthermore, they recommended that specific guidelines for preparation and written 
standard operating procedures (SOPs) should be developed and implemented. Further 
guidelines on prescribing, dispensing, administration and waste disposal were 
recommended (ASHP, 2002;Carrington et al., 2010b). In addition, detailed guidance on 




prescription verification have also been recommended (Williamson, 2010;Kalyn et al., 
2011). 
Currently, chemotherapy prescribing is guided by strict protocols (ASHP, 2002) and verified 
by a pharmacist, nurse or another doctor (Cohen et al., 1996), before administration to 
patients. HCWs involved in the cytotoxic chemotherapy process ideally should be certified 
or appropriately trained in order to handle these drugs (Fischer et al., 1996). All doses for 
cytotoxic chemotherapy should  be prepared in a centralised pharmacy (Allwood et al., 
2002), where risks of preparation error (Anderson et al., 1983) and occupational exposure 
are reduced (Mason et al., 2005). The inherent toxicity of these agents leaves a very small 
margin for error and medication errors have the potential to cause disastrous consequences 
for the patients’ lives as well as incurring significant costs in negligence claims and additional 
healthcare, required to mitigate the outcomes. 
1.5.1 Adverse Drug Events associated with cytotoxic chemotherapy 
Although less commonly prescribed than other medicines, cytotoxic chemotherapy agents 
are the second most common drugs associated with AEs (Leape et al., 1991), can cause 
death (Fyhr et al., 2012) and are among the top ten medicines involved with preventable 
ADEs (Kanjanarat et al., 2003), causing up to 11.2% of ADEs (Mills et al., 2008). 
Until the early 1990s, the only information regarding medication errors and adverse events 
associated with cytotoxic chemotherapy were from case reports and national voluntary 
reporting systems. In the USA, Wiengart investigated adverse events associated with the 
use of oral cytotoxic chemotherapy during a five year period (Weingart et al., 2010). The 
authors collected information from two US national error databases, incident reports from 
16 academic cancer centres and a literature search. They identified 508 incidents, of which 
one fifth were associated with adverse events. Of the incidents associated with adverse 
events, most resulted in minimal harm but 12 resulted in death, 1 resulted in permanent 
disability and 26 patients required hospitalization. 
One highly publicized case  occurred in a prominent cancer centre in the US and one of the 
victims was  a health journalist for the Boston Globe who died suddenly after receiving high 
dose chemotherapy for breast cancer (Altman, 1995).  Investigations two months later 
revealed that the patients received four times the intended doses of an cytotoxic drug as 
part of a phase I research trial (Grant, 1999). The news was highly publicized and made the 
headlines of 28 newspapers over 3 years (Conway et al., 2005). 




This incident, along with others, especially those involving the inadvertent intrathecal 
administration of vincristine, led the WHO to propose changes in how cytotoxic 
chemotherapy should be processed. Vincristine, a vinca alkaloid, works by arresting the cells 
during mitosis by binding to the mitotic spindle (Chabner, 2011). Vincristine can be used in 
combination therapy to treat lymphomas, leukaemias and solid tumours (Schulmeister et 
al., 2004). One of the major limitations of vincristine is neuropathy and its vesicant effect 
which means it can only be given via the intravenous route (Sullivan et al., 1977). When 
administered intrathecally, vincristine causes severe and irreversible CNS damage, followed 
by ascending paralysis, coma and death (Gilbar et al., 2007). Between 1968 and 2007, 38 
cases where reported, from different countries, where vincristine was given in error via the 
intrathecal route (Noble et al., 2010). Although rare, such incidents had devastating 
consequences with some patients experiencing permanent nerve damage (Qweider et al., 
2007), however, most died (Reddy et al., 2011) 
In the UK, because of similar errors, an external inquiry was held into the case of a patient 
who died because of inadvertent administration of vincristine in a cancer centre in 
Nottingham. The report concluded that the error occurred as a result of 40 system failures 
that encompassed organizational errors at the national and the institutional level. The 
report recommended changes to the National Acute Lymphoblastic Leukaemia guidelines 
by scheduling intrathecal medicines on different days to intravenous medicines. In addition, 
changes were recommended for labelling, transport, storage, ordering, administration, 
training, and the involvement of a third party, including patients and their relatives, for extra 
verification prior to any administration taking place (Toft, 2001). In response to these 
reports, the DoH and the NPSA issued guidance on the safe prescription, dispensing, 
transport and administration of vinca alkaloids, which among other, included the 
recommendation that they should be prepared in a mini-bag rather than a syringe (NPSA, 
2008). This measure was introduced to serve as an alert to doctors administering intrathecal 
medicine which are always prepared in small volume syringes. A recent review of vincristine 
incidents in the UK revealed that this specific error has not been recorded since the issuance 
of this guidance(Franklin et al., 2014). 




1.5.2 Incidence of medication errors and adverse events associated with cytotoxic 
chemotherapy  
Few studies on chemotherapy-associated medication errors or adverse events have been 
published (Schwappach et al., 2009). Moreover, the findings from these studies are not 
comparable for several reasons. Studies often use different definitions of error (Table 1-3) 
or study design or different settings (Table 1-4).  Furthermore, some studies focused on 
paediatrics whilst others studied adults or had limited scope and studied one aspect of the 
chemotherapy process. Consequently, a common finding amongst all studies was the 
limited generalisability of data, as it was usually collected from single hospitals or cancer 
centres, involving small sample sizes. For example, a study conducted by Pichon et al (2002), 
which aimed to identify transcription and omission errors in prescriptions among 22 
oncology patients. A total of 89 out of 150 prescriptions were found to contain either a 
transcription error or omission error (Pichon et al., 2002). 
Nevertheless, these studies show the evidence that medication errors associated with 
chemotherapy are common and occur mostly at the prescription stage (Ranchon et al., 
2011). Ranchon and colleagues (2011) analysed reported errors occurring in more than 
22,000 cytotoxic chemotherapy prescribed to cancer patients in a cancer hospital in France, 
over a period of one year. The study design involved mixed methods, prescription review, 
observation of pharmacy preparation errors and voluntary reporting of administration and 
follow up of errors. The authors reported that 5.2% of drugs were associated with an error, 
with 91% occurring at the prescription stage, 8% at the preparation stage and 1% at the 
administration stage. This is unlike other medication error research which involved record 
review and identified higher rates of administration errors (Bates et al., 1995b). Most of 
these errors resulted in potential ADEs because the vast majority of errors were 
intercepted, with only 13 reaching patients, mostly causing no harm. The authors calculated 
that if the intercepted errors had reached patients this would have resulted in an increase 
in hospital stay by 219 days, which would in turn increase expenditure by over 92,000 Euros 
in hospital stay and additional drugs. 
Medication errors causing potential ADEs are a significant concern when dealing with 
chemotherapy as they can also happen among ambulatory patients (Gandhi et al., 2005a). 
Similar to previous medication error research (Bates et al., 1999a;Bates et al., 1995b) 
Gandhi and colleagues (2005) undertook a large study at a major cancer centre in the US 
involving record review, in addition to incident self-reports from nurses, pharmacists and 




doctors. The authors reviewed more than 10,000 prescriptions of cytotoxic chemotherapy, 
in both paediatric and adult outpatients receiving both oral and intravenous medicines 
(Gandhi et al., 2005a).  They found the medication error rate was 3% (306 in 1000 
prescriptions) in both paediatrics and adults, of which 2.5% had the potential to cause ADEs. 
A higher rate of errors was reported from a larger study in Germany, that showed 17.1% 
hospital in-patients receiving cancer chemotherapy were affected (Markert, 2009). This 
high incidence can be explained because the authors included in their analysis medication 
errors, administrative errors, ADRs and all cause AEs, which were not necessarily related to 
the use of cytotoxic chemotherapy. Markert and colleagues (2009) undertook a mixed 
method approach, both prospective cohort study and analysis of incident report databases 
over three years. The study included a larger study sample (2,337 patients and 22,216 
chemotherapy prescriptions) than Gandhi’s et al (2005) work. The actual incidence of 
chemotherapy error was similar (3.8%) but they detected a larger number of errors in 
administrative details. A considerable number of those medication errors were intercepted, 
because only 0.079% of errors had reached patients, mostly causing no harm. Other errors 
were missing patient details (4.5%) and missing written consent forms (8.7%).  
Un-intercepted medication errors associated with chemotherapy have the potential to 
cause serious consequences to patients. An analysis of medication errors associated with 
chemotherapy reported to  a Swedish error reporting system revealed that prescribing 
errors cause most harm (Fyhr et al., 2012). Over a period of twelve years, 60 medication 
errors were reported to the Swedish error reporting system. Among these, prescribing 
errors (n=25) caused death among 6 patients and harm among 15 patients, whilst pharmacy 
preparation errors (n=25) caused harm among 5 patients and administration errors (n=10) 
caused harm among 4 patients.  
Similar to findings from the Swedish error reporting system, a review of chemotherapy-
associated medication errors reported to the United States Pharmacopeia Medication Error 
Reporting Program (USP-MER), reported a high incidence of AEs associated with 
prescribing. The analysis showed the most common cytotoxics associated with adverse 
events in patients were platinums (Mehta et al., 1998). In their report, Mehta and 
colleagues (1998) identified that among 40 errors reported to the USP-MER, 28 had reached 
the patient. The authors were able to find circumstances associated with the 28 incidents 
and identified that look-alike, sound-alike drugs was the most common cause of medication 
errors. In these cases, the wrong drug would be prescribed, transcribed or interpreted from 
the prescription, resulting in an overdose in most instances.





Table 1-3 Definitions of medication errors/adverse drug events in research conducted on medication errors involving chemotherapy 
Reference Definition of a medication error/adverse drug event 
Escoms et al., 1996 Lack of data or error in the preparation stage, labelling stage or arrangement stage according to the procedure at the 
studied setting.  
Flynn et al. 1997 A deviation of the actual compounding process from specification in the pharmacy’s patient-specific intravenous label 
or the hospital policies and procedure for intravenous compounding 
Limat et al., 2001 The error involves all aspects of the preparation according to local procedure at the setting under study. 
Pichon et al., 2002 Incompleteness of a prescription or incompleteness of transcription. There is no specification of what comprises a 
complete prescription. 
Womer et al., 2002 Errors in the ordering or administration of chemotherapy 
Gandhi et al., 2005 A medication error is any error in the medication process. A potential adverse drug event is a medication error that 
has the potential to cause patient harm. 
Slama et al., 2005 All avoidable errors that could lead to the inappropriate use of medication or cause harm to patients according to 
the guidelines of the American Health Systems Pharmacists. 
Ford et al., 2006 A medication administration error (MAE) is a preventable mistake during drug administration due to errors in 
ordering, dispensing and administration. An adverse drug event is a significant patient injury or discomfort resulting 
from an MAE. 
Robinson et al., 2006 Modification, clarification and omission of items on a cytotoxic chemotherapy prescription 
Taylor el al., 2006 Administration error in the home, prescribing error by the doctor or dispensing error by the pharmacist 
Voeffrey et al., 2006 Errors in the prescribing, dispensing, administering or monitoring of a drug. 
Rinke et al., 2007 The failure of a planned action to be completed as intended or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim 
Serrano-Fabia et al.,2009 An error that occurred during prescribing, pharmaceutical validation, preparation, dispensing, administration, and 
follow up. 
Markert et al., 2009 A medication error is an error in the chemotherapy, co-medication, patient data and missing consent forms. A severe 
adverse event was an event leading to unexpected fatality, referral to ICU, an extravasation, an unscheduled 
operation and other serious events not related to the side effects of the drugs. 
Walsh et al., 2009 An error in drug ordering, dispensing, administering or monitoring 
Weingart et al., 2010 The failure of a planned action to be completed as intended of the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim 
  




Table 1-4 Characteristics of research conducted on medication errors involving chemotherapy 
Reference* Setting Population Data collection 
period (months) 
Data collection method Sample 
size  
Incidence rate (% 
unless stated) 
Gandhi et al., 2005 OP Adults/Paediatrics 9  Chart review 1606 3 
Limat et al., 2001 CRU Cytotoxic preparations 18  Observation 30,819 0.45 
Markert et al., 2009 IP/OP Adults 24 Observation 22,216 17.1 
Pichon et al., 2002 IP Paediatrics NR Chart review 20 11.9 
Rinke et al., 2007 D Paediatrics 60 Analysis of database NA 0.01 
Robinson et al., 2006 IP Paediatrics 12  Chart review ~10,000  P- 0.73 A- 0.06 
Schulmeister 1999 IP/OP/H NR NA Questionnaire survey 1240 63 
Serrano-Fabia et al., 2009 IP Adults 24 Observation 1311 20.9 /1000 patient 
days 
Slama et al., 2005 IP Prescriptions 6 Observation 2862 27.6 
Taylor el al., 2006 OP Paediatrics 2 Chart review/survey 92 9.9 
Voeffrey et al., 2006 IP Prescriptions 15 NR 940 15 
Walsh et al., 2009 OP Paediatrics  9 Chart review 1,379 8.2 
Weingart et al., 2007 IP Adults 7 Survey 202 2.5 
Weingart et al., 2010 IP/OP/H Paediatrics 60 Analysis of error 
database 
NA NA 
Womer et al., 2002 IP Adults NR Observation  NR 6.2 per 1000 
A: actual errors; CRU: Cytotoxic reconstitution unit, D: Database for reporting error, H: Home setting, IP: inpatient, OP: outpatient, NA: Not Applicable, NR: Not 
reported; P: potential errors 




An example of these was when carboplatin was misinterpreted as cisplatin; the latter is 
more potent and is given at doses which are usually around one quarter of the carboplatin 
dose. Hence such errors potentially carry the risk of giving the patient a considerable 
overdose. Six cases were reported, with 5 deaths and one patient who sustained renal 
failure and irreversible hearing loss. The second most common cause of errors was giving 
the total required drug over one day rather than splitting the dose over a number of days. 
For example, a prescription of cyclophosphamide 4g/m2 over four days misinterpreted and 
given as cyclophosphamide 4g/m2 given daily on days 1-4. 
1.5.3 Factors contributing to Adverse Drug Events occurrence in chemotherapy 
In the reports submitted to US based adverse events databases, the two most common 
contributing factors to ADEs associated with cytotoxic chemotherapy were human factors 
and miscommunication (Weingart et al., 2010). In a survey conducted among oncology 
nurses in US hospitals, the respondents attributed these errors to lack of experience (76%), 
unclear prescription (66%), stress (57%) and fatigue (29%) (Schulmeister, 1999). Poor 
knowledge and lack of confidence were reported to be a considerable cause for concern 
when prescribing chemotherapy among junior doctors in a qualitative study in Nigeria 
(Ajemigbitse et al., 2013a). 
Other factors contributing to errors when using cytotoxic chemotherapy, reported in the 
literature, include the use of verbal orders (Fischer et al., 1996)  the use of a large variety of 
cancer regimens (Gandhi et al., 2005a), shared care (Gilbar, 2001),  lack of information 
about the cytotoxic chemotherapy (25%) and unclear labelling (1%), the use of central 
intravenous catheters (Mehta et al., 1998) and  look-alike, sound-alike drugs (Kovacic et al., 
2011).  
Among patients, a considerable risk factor was the requirement for dose reduction due to 
co-morbidities and toxicities associated with cytotoxic chemotherapy when used with organ 
impairment (Ranchon et al., 2012).  
Although, to date, there is little known about the impact of medication errors associated 
with chemotherapy in developing countries, findings from western countries indicate that 
they may be common and are expected to have tangible implications for patients. Patients 
often have multiple co-morbidities such as tuberculosis where the use of medications can 
affect the pharmacokinetics of cytotoxic chemotherapy , patients are malnourished, have 




different pharmacogenomics (Magrath, 2003), present with very advanced disease and 
compromised organ function (Hamad, 2006). 
1.5.4 Preventability of medication errors associated with cytotoxic chemotherapy 
Given the complexity of chemotherapy regimens, and in order to provide safe, evidence-
based cost-effective therapies, the use of these agents should follow agreed protocols or 
international guidelines (Kalyn et al., 2011, WHO, 2002a). Tumour-specific protocols have 
been published by a number of national and international agencies, usually modified or 
adopted by specialist cancer centres, to guide prescribers in decision making and 
standardize treatment among patients (Goldspiel et al., 2000). Furthermore, guidelines on 
the prescribing process (NPSA, 2010b), validation of prescriptions (Williamson, 2010), 
preparation of cytotoxics (ISOPP, 2007a) and administration of these drugs (Jacobson et al., 
2009) have been developed to ensure their safe use. Although most cancer centres now 
prescribe chemotherapy according to these guidelines and protocols, the impact of these 
measures has not been formally assessed. Other interventions to improve the use of 
cytotoxic chemotherapy have been introduced but the data on reduction of medication 
error is contentious. 
Although medication errors associated with chemotherapy are frequent, the vast majority 
are intercepted before they reach the patient. The comparatively high incidence of 
prescribing errors associated with cytotoxic chemotherapy meant that many interventions 
targeted the prescription process. The involvement of a team of HCWs is important for 
prevention of errors. It is more likely that most prescribing errors will be intercepted 
because the prescription in most cases is seen by at least two more HCWs before it reaches 
the patient (Garzás-Martín de Almagro et al., 2008). Hence, these subsequent steps may be 
regarded as defenses against errors.  
This was confirmed in a  prospective cohort study conducted in Spain (Serrano-Fabia, 2009). 
A multi-disciplinary team identified errors associated with the cytotoxic chemotherapy 
medication process among 1311 patients, over a one year period (Serrano-Fabia, 2009). The 
authors identified 276 medication errors (20.9 per 1000 patient days), of which most 
occurred at the prescribing stage (75.7%). Pharmacists contributed substantially to 
prevention of errors because only 4.3% of prescribing errors reached the patient. Nurses 
administering the drugs acted as the final defence against errors and they were able to stop 
most pharmacy preparation errors, with only 14.5% reaching patients. 




The importance of HCWs as a team to detect and intercept errors was confirmed in an 
earlier Spanish study that analysed errors reported to a hospital incident reporting 
database. During a three-year period, 268 medication errors were reported, most of which 
were detected by nurses and pharmacists (54.1% and 39.6% respectively). The remainder 
were detected by doctors and other HCWs, with one detected by patients.   
In addition to input from HCWs, and to further improve the prescription process, many 
cancer centres have adopted standard prescription templates These forms contain all the 
chemotherapy protocol particulars that a prescriber needs to complete in order to prescribe 
chemotherapy, accurately (Gilmore et al., 1998;Dinning, 2005;Goldspiel et al., 2000). These 
have printed spaces for laboratory data obtained from the patient, patient details, names 
and standard doses of the chemotherapy agents required and supportive therapy. An 
example where these standardized templates have shown benefit can be described from 
data published in the US. A multidisciplinary team was involved in creating standardized 
prescription templates for cytotoxic chemotherapy in an oncology hospital in the US 
(Dinning, 2005). The authors reported that the uptake of the standardized prescription 
templates increased to 70% in the span of one year, which may infer their ease of use and 
acceptability. Although not formally assessed, the authors reported that omissions and 
ambiguities with prescriptions were decreased substantially after implementing the 
standardized templates (Dinning, 2005). Following a similar intervention in another US 
oncology centre, the use of prescription templates was reported to contribute to a 36% 
reduction in errors associated with omissions, look-alike, sound-alike drugs and ambiguities 
in the prescription (Dumasia et al., 2006). Further improvements to prescribing were 
achieved when Computerized Prescriber Order Entry (CPOE) was introduced. Early studies 
in general medicine have recognized the impact of CPOE on prescribing errors (Bates et al. 
1999) and before/after interventional studies have shown that these systems reduce 
prescribing errors and pharmacy interventions (Donyai et al., 2008). CPOE are computerised 
systems that standardise prescribing and ensure legibility and completeness of 
prescriptions (Kaushal et al., 2003). They have varying degrees of inbuilt Clinical Decision 
Support Systems (CDSS), ranging from basic guidance regarding drug doses, routes and 
frequencies to more sophisticated systems which can perform drug interaction checks, drug 
allergy checks and can match individual patient characteristics to clinical guidelines, 
providing patient-specific recommendations (Bates et al., 2001). 
 A number of studies have shown the benefit of CPOE in reduction of chemotherapy-
associated prescribing errors. For example, researchers in Spain implemented a CPOE which 




involved entering the centre’s specific protocols into the system. The prescriber would 
access the system, choose the treatment protocol and enter the patient’s data (Huertas 
Fernandez et al., 2006). The system would suggest doses of drugs to be prescribed according 
to the patient’s height and weight and the chosen protocol. Once the prescriber completes 
the prescription, it is automatically transmitted to pharmacy where pharmacy preparation 
worksheet, labels and nursing administration sheets are produced. Implementation of such 
a system resulted in substantial reductions in omission and ambiguity errors. However, 
certain dose errors which were caused by inappropriate decisions regarding dose 
reductions were reported with computerised prescriptions (Huertas Fernandez et al., 2006). 
To improve decisions with doses tailored to specific patients, CPOE with CDSS features that 
offer suggestions for these dose changes are necessary (Bates et al., 2001). An example of 
the effectiveness of such a system in oncology has shown that dose errors are rare (Voeffray 
et al., 2006). In a Swedish cancer hospital, Voeffray and colleagues (2006) implemented a 
CPOE with added CDSS that included generating suggested dose reductions in case of organ 
impairments and alarms for dose changes as well as unusual doses. They studied prescribing 
error rates for 15 months before CPOE implementation and 21 months after the 
intervention. Prescribing error rates fell from 15 % to less than 1% with no dose errors. 
Furthermore, uptake of recommended chemotherapy protocols increased by 50%.  
Although CPOE with CDSS have shown improvement in medication safety, their 
implementation in cancer care is limited. A review of 100 interventional articles on the 
outcome of CDSS shows that systems which feature advanced features which aid decision-
making, using guidelines and information technology, are now in use in many healthcare 
settings and have been applied to cancer prevention strategies, mainly in the primary care 
setting (Garg et al., 2005). Their implementation in cancer management in secondary  and 
tertiary care is limited (Fox et al., 2009).   
The use of CPOE and CDSS cannot remove error entirely. Prescribers have been shown to 
circumvent alarms in these systems, sometimes leading to errors (Nerich et al., 2010). The 
systems are costly and require intensive input from the hospital to ensure their success.  
Factors that improve implementation include HCW training as well continuous monitoring 
to ensure that protocols and guidelines are adhered to (Bates et al., 2003). 
However, improvements to the prescribing process would be likely to have little impact on 
preparation errors and administration errors. Interventions targeting the whole system are 
expected to reduce the incidence of errors further (Leape et al., 1995). Further automation 




of the chemotherapy process that focuses on product verification includes electronic check 
of product identity at the preparation stage and administration stage (Bonnabry et al., 
2006).  
Automation and use of information technology is expected to be implemented in a number 
of healthcare settings. However, improvements to chemotherapy processes can be 
achieved using more holistic measures. These require the inclusion of healthcare in 
improvement measures that may be based on education, improved communication, error 
reporting and the implementation of SOPs. Informed multidisciplinary teams that adhere to 
standard guidelines provide safer care. They report errors and learn from high risk situations 
and perform double checks in the medication process and intercept errors before they 
reach a patient (Goldspiel et al., 2000). 
1.6 Approaches to error 
Blaming a doctor, pharmacist or nurse for a medical error is very satisfying (Reason, 2000) 
as the investigation is completed quickly and the individual blamed suffers the 
consequences of their actions whether it be that they are stopped from working, 
reprimanded or punished (Palmieri, 2008). The persons approach is fundamentally wrong 
for patient safety because individuals working in institutions where blame is prominent 
would be afraid to report errors and hence will  be unable to learn from them (Wu Aw, 
1991). 
Charles Perrow proposed the pessimistic view that in complex organizations accidents are 
prone to happen (Perrow, 1981); that it was in the nature of humans working in complex 
organizations to make errors. However, when looking at other industries, especially 
aviation, the level of safety is apparent. Aviation has reached this level by investigation of 
accidents using a systems approach (Reason, 2005).It can be argued the delivery of 
healthcare is as complex a system as aviation (Helmreich, 2000), if not more complex, and 
hence, the interactions between healthcare staff in the operating theatre may be similar to 
aeroplane cockpits (Sexton et al., 2000). Applying lessons learned from aviation and indeed 
other safe industries such as nuclear power plants, in healthcare systems can improve 
safety.  




1.7  Human error theory  
James Reason proposed that, in complex systems, such as those that exist in healthcare, 
harm to patients is prevented by defensive layers, some of which are engineered ( such as 
computerized medication systems) while others rely on people (doctors, nurses and 
pharmacists) as well as procedures and administrative controls barriers (Reason, 2000). 
Their function is to protect patients from the risks associated, however each defensive layer 
has several weaknesses, akin to the ‘holes’, of a Swiss Cheese. These ‘holes’ in the system 
are constantly changing and when they momentarily align they allow the trajectory of error 
to occur, bringing harm closer to patients (Figure 1-1). These holes arise due to two reasons, 
active failures and latent failures. Understanding the interplay between these two factors 
allows for a proactive approach to risk management, where interventions are targeted at 
building better defenses in the system (Reason, 2000).  
 
Figure 1-1 Swiss cheese model of how defences, barriers and safeguards may be penetrated by an accident 
trajectory (Reason 1990 p 393) 
 
Active failures are unsafe acts which can be divided into two broad categories; errors and 
violations. Errors are seen as breakdowns in normal cognitive processes whereas violations 
occur due to deliberate deviations from safety procedures and rules  (Reason, 1990).  
Errors are related to a hierarchy of human cognitive performance developed by Rasmussen 
(1983) and can be defined as:  




‘the failure of planned actions to achieve their desired ends- without the 
intervention of some unforeseeable event’ (Reason, 1998 p 71) 
Failures at the level of execution are “skill-based errors” that occur during automatic the 
performance of routine tasks in familiar circumstances, and require little conscious 
attention. According to Reason (1990), these errors of “omission” are associated with 
failures in attention which may be caused by distractions, interruptions and memory 
failures and can be divided into two main types; slips and lapses (Figure 1-2). 
 
 
Figure 1-2 A summary of the psychology of unsafe acts (Reason 1990 p207) 
 
A slip is an action that is carried out with the correct intention but the execution is faulty, 
whereas a lapse is a failure to execute an action due to distractions or memory failures. 
Mistakes on the other hand are decision-making failures which occur at higher levels of the 
human cognitive performance. They occur during performance of tasks that require 
problem solving, and although the execution is correct, the intent is incorrect. Reason 
(1990) divides these into two types; “Rule-based mistakes” (RBM) and “Knowledge-based 
mistakes” (KBM). RBMs occur during the execution of tasks which are governed by 
previously acquired training, experience or set rules and procedures. These errors may be 




in various forms but are associated with misapplication of a “good rule” or application of a 
“bad rule”. KBMs on the other hand, occur in novel circumstances where HCWs are required 
to depend on conscious reasoning to derive a course of action without the necessary 
background training, experience or task based rules (Reason, 1990).  
In this context, violations are deliberate actions that intentionally deviate from practices 
and occur within a regulated social context. They fall into three main groups; routine 
violations, optimising violations and situational violations.  In routine violation, the HCW 
would habitually cut corners, whereas in optimising violations the actions are to further 
personal rather than task related goals. HCWs who are involved in situational violations take 
the path available to getting the job done because the rules and procedures are seen as to 
be inappropriate (Reason, 1995).  
Active failures are distinct from latent failures because the effects of the former are more 
immediate whereas the later tend to lie dormant in a system and can only become evident 
in the presence of an unsafe act. Active failures are unsafe acts committed by HCWs who 
have direct interaction with the patient, whereas latent failure stem from actions and 
decisions taken by management or decision makers who are not directly involved in the 
workplace (Vincent et al., 1998).This distinction is necessary when causality analysis are 
conducted after an adverse event has taken place (Figure 1.3).   
 
Figure 1-3 Framework for analysing risk and safety in clinical medicine (Vincent 1998 p1155) 
 




The sequence of the accident (adverse event) begins with the fallible decisions made at the 
managerial and organizational level. These are decisions which are concerned with issues 
such as planning, scheduling, policy making, communication and maintenance. These latent 
failures are transmitted along organizational and departmental pathways to areas of patient 
care where they create conditions that provoke errors and violations. This description forms 
the basis for a framework to analyse risks and safety in clinical medicine (Vincent et al., 
1998). The framework enables researcher to analyse clinical incidents in a manner that 
considers all possible influences rather than focusing on HCWs at the sharp end. The 
Reason’s framework has been used in a number of previous medication error research 
(Dean et al., 2002a;Taxis et al., 2003a;Tully et al., 2009) and provides the philosophical 
underpinnings in the current study. 
1.8 Overview of the study setting 
This study explores patient safety in cancer care in a Sudanese cancer centre, an African 
country, south of Egypt, east of Chad, lying on the western coast of the Red Sea (Figure 1-
4). The country has recently split, leading to formation of the world’s newest country, South 
Sudan. This thesis is concerned with research conducted in the northern section of Sudan, 
now known as The Republic of the Sudan. 
 There are no confirmed data for the size of population in this country, since the split from 
the south, but there are estimates ranging from 30 million to 49 million (WHO, 2013a). The 
country comprises 15 states, with nearly one sixth of the population living in the national 
capital, Khartoum (Central Bureau of Statistics- Republic of Sudan, 2008).  Although the 
Sudanese people are from different ethnic groups, each with their own local dialects, most 
are Arabic-speaking Muslims.  
Organized heath care started in the late 1800s when it was delivered by the British colonial 
army but the first Ministry of Health was not established until 1949 (WHO, 2009). Currently, 
the health system comprises three levels (FMoH, 2007); the federal level, state level and 
locality level.  
The Federal Ministry of Health (FMOH) is the ultimate authority in Sudanese health care, 
concerned with policy making, strategic planning and international co-ordination, while the 
state level is responsible for policy making and implementation and the locality level is 
concerned with service delivery (FMoH, 2007). The state level is responsible for running 




secondary care hospitals, teaching hospitals and tertiary care specialist hospitals which lie 
within each state.  
Healthcare delivery in Sudan is influenced by issues commonly affecting developing 
countries in the region (Parkin et al., 2008). National poverty, a long history of internal 
conflict and inadequate resource allocation results in health services that are underfunded, 
inadequately equipped (WHO, 2003) with inequitable distribution (Joseph, 2007). 
Healthcare in Sudan is heavily burdened with infectious diseases, malnutrition, maternal 
and child mortality, and a  fragmented primary health service (FMoH, 2007a). 
The recent conflicts in Darfur, coupled with the previous long conflicts in the south, have 
displaced people into the outskirts of the major cities. This has created ad hoc dwellings 
around the major cities, principally Khartoum the capital, (Ibrahim et al., 2014) where there 
is disproportionate input from planning authorities and consequently, a greater number of 
people are overcrowding the existing health facilities (Klaassen, 2007). 
Although a great deal of attention is directed towards eradication of infectious disease, 
cancer is fast becoming a significant cause of death in African countries like Sudan (Parkin 
et al., 2008). Cancer was reported to be the third cause of recorded hospital mortality , 
amounting  to 5% of all deaths (Hamad, 2006). This figure may seem small but the actual 
cancer incidence cannot be  extrapolated from death certificates because they are usually 
deficient in major details (El Nour, 2007). Indeed, more than 95% of deaths occurring 
outside hospitals are not recorded (Abdalla et al., 2007). 




    
Figure 1-4 Map of Sudan (UN, 2012) Map No. 4458. 




1.8.1 Cancer Service Provision in Sudan 
Sudan established a National Cancer Control Programme in 1982 (Hamad, 2006); however, 
because cancer services are centralized, results from the programme are modest. In the 
year 2004, the government pledged provision of cancer care to all Sudanese patients 
without “out of pocket expenses”.  Cytotoxic chemotherapy used in cancer care is obtained 
according to the WHO Essential Medicines List (EML) which is developed in consultation 
with senior doctors in the field as well as the lead pharmaceutical advisory bodies of the 
country (WHO, 2007a). 
At the time this study was conducted, two large cancer centres, both situated in the centre 
of the country, 180km apart, served the population (Abuidris, 2009).  The largest of them is 
situated in the centre of the capital, Khartoum, close to other tertiary health services and 
teaching hospitals affiliated to the first medical school in Sudan (Khalil, 2013 ). The cancer 
centre was built in the late 1960s and, although it has been expanded,  the number of 
patients presenting with cancer  has increased 10 fold (Awadalla et al., 2007). This increase 
has not  been matched by resources in terms of equipment, human resources or facilities 
(Elgaili et al., 2010). For example, the introduction of cytotoxic chemotherapy in the late 
1980s has made a significant difference in delivery of care to patients, but these drugs are 
prepared on open benches in wards, exposing the process to considerable risk of errors. 
Currently, the cancer centre in Khartoum delivers care to 7000-8000 patients each year  
(Abuidris, 2009;Ahmed et al., 2013)   of which approximately 100 outpatients receive 
cytotoxic chemotherapy agents every day. The list of approved chemotherapy protocols at 
the cancer hospital is attached in Appendix 1. Other services include such as nuclear imaging 
and diagnostics, histopathology, radiotherapy, and palliative care services (Abuidris, 
2009;Tanneberger, 2012). 
In the shadow of the fragmented health system, the poverty of the inhabitants of Sudan, a 
literacy rate of 40-60% (Hamad, 2011;Mahaini, 2005) and the lack of cancer pathways, it is 
not surprising that most patients present to cancer services with advanced disease (Hamad, 
2006;Hamad, 2011;Awadelkarim, 2012). Although research is lacking in health-seeking 
behaviour of Sudanese patients, some studies have revealed that there are multiple factors 
involved; personal, cultural, financial and access to care. Limited knowledge about cancer is 
probably a major reason because patients interpret the disease as non-sinister and initially 
seek treatment from traditional healers. Some research has identified that the social factors 




such as ostracizing cancer and fear of becoming a burden on the family can be a deterrent 
to some patients, whereas in others it is mainly financial (Elgaili et al., 2010;Ibrahim et al., 
2011).  
Data from Sudan is somewhat different to cancer distribution in EMRO and European 
regions of the WHO, where lung cancer is the most common presentation (WHO, 2011b). 
Prostate cancer is more common among Sudanese men but the distribution among females 
was also similar to worldwide distribution where breast cancer is more common (Saeed et 
al., 2014). The most common cancers registered in Khartoum during 2009-2010 are shown 

































































2.1 Importance of this work 
Evidence from the literature has shown that little research had been undertaken on 
medication errors in the EMRO region and there is no published evidence of research 
investigating the safety of cytotoxic chemotherapy. 
This lack of evidence poses a problem when attempting to design interventions to improve 
the care of cancer patients in EMRO region. This research may be of importance when 
identifying key areas of interventions that need to be prioritised, particularly in a developing 
country where resources are limited.  
The research presented in this thesis consisted of a mix of qualitative methods and 
quantitative methods, which are outlined in the current chapter. The qualitative methods 
entailed engaging HCWs at the cancer centre in interviews and focus groups, while the 
quantities methods consisted of observations on the administration of intravenous 
cytotoxic chemotherapy and collecting errors associated with the prescribing of those 
drugs. 
Although the research programme was largely observational in nature and involved 
collecting data on standard practice at the cancer centre, a number of ethical issues 
important to the conduction of research were needed to be considered. The following 
section includes how these ethical issues considered and addressed. 
2.2 Research questions and Hypothesis: 
A number of research questions are the focus of this study 
Q1: What do staff working at a cancer centre in a developing country know about safety 
culture? 
 Q2: What is the frequency and the potential causes of prescribing errors at a cancer centre 
in Sudan? 
Q3: What is the frequency and the potential causes of intravenous administration errors at 
a cancer centre in Sudan? 
Q4: What are the recommendations for practice resulting for the cancer centre in Sudan, in 
view of these findings? 
 





Based on these questions, we can hypothesize that: 
1. The patient safety culture, with respect to chemotherapy, in a cancer centre in 
Sudan is similar to that reported in the literature.  
2. With regards to prescribing errors in a cancer centre in Sudan the category, 
frequency and potential causes are the same as those reported in the literature 
3. With regards to administration errors in a cancer centre in Sudan, the category, 
frequency and potential causes are the same as those reported in the literature.  
2.3 Description of thesis chapters 
The first chapter of this thesis outlined the main findings from the patient safety movement 
with an emphasis on medication errors in particular those involving cytotoxic 
chemotherapy. Cytotoxics are considered by International Health and Safety bodies to be 
carcinogenic and mutagenic (Eisenberg, 2012;IARC, 2012), which creates considerable  
concerns  for individuals exposed to these agents. This invariably includes healthcare staff 
who transport, prepare and handle these products. Thus, a review of the evolution of safety 
measures concerning the health and safety issues with regards to handling of cytotoxics was 
included in the first chapter. The chapter then presented the philosophical underpinnings 
for the research and finally, background information about the setting for this study (a large 
cancer centre in Sudan).  
A preliminary analysis of 100 archived medical records at the cancer centre revealed that 
21% of the records, had no age details, 56% had no tumour staging and 79% had no record 
of when symptoms started. The medical records were clearly deficient and therefore using 
retrospective chart review as a research method for identification of medication errors 
would have not provided sufficient findings. Previous work has shown that prospective 
study designs are more appropriate for identification of medication errors (Bates et al., 
1995b). The following section provides a brief outline of the prospective methods used in 
this study (Figure 2-1). 
The third chapter provides a description of a study that was undertaken to explore the 
safety culture at the cancer centre using the Manchester Patient Safety Framework 
(MaPSaF) (Parker et al., 2006). This was a preliminary study designed to provide an in depth 
understanding of the safety systems in place at the centre. Findings from this study helped 
in the development of subsequent work because it identified that safety systems were not 
in place at the centre and HCWs had limited understanding of safety culture and  






Figure 2-1 Overview of research presented in this thesis 
•Aims and objectives:
•Describe the safety culture at RICK as perceived by staff 
working with patients.
•Identify differences in safety culture perceptions 
according to profession and gender.
•Explore implications of perception on current practice 
regarding issues of patientsafety.
•Methods: 
• Six Focus groups using the MaPSaF for doctors, nurses 
and pharmacist- seperate genders
Study One: 
Patient safety 
culture at a cancer 
centre in Sudan
•Aims and objectives
•To determine the systems used to prescribe 
chemotherapy  to patients attending a Sudanese cancer 
hospital 
•To identify medication errors made during the prescribing 
of chemotherapy.
•To classify detected prescribing errors 
•To analyse the potential causes of prescribing errors
•Methods:
• Key informant interviews to describe standard practice 
followed during issuance of a cytotoxic chemotherapy 
prescription.
• Prescription analysis and identification of errors.
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•To describe the systems used to prepare and administer 
chemotherapy to patients attending a cancer hospital 
within Sudan 
•To design and implement a system to capture medication 
errors made during the preparation and administration of 
chemotherapy
•To classify the preparation and administration errors 
detected 
• To describe and analyse the potential causes of both 
preparation and administration errors
•Methods:
•Key informant interviews to describe standard practice 
followed during administration of cytotoxic 
chemotherapy.
•Observation of chemotherapy administration and 
identifation of errors.
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safety systems. Furthermore, at the time, major changes had taken place at the centre and 
these included the development of a cancer protocols booklet approved by the cancer 
centre in order to standardise prescribing.  
Evidence from the literature shows that medication errors in chemotherapy are associated 
mainly with the prescription and administration of these drugs and hence it was decided to 
focus on these two stages for the study.   
The fourth chapter in this thesis provides an overview of prescribing error literature and 
contains a description of the work conducted at the centre to explore such errors. The work 
commenced by conducting key informant interviews with doctors to identify standard 
practice followed during issuance of a cytotoxic chemotherapy prescription. This was 
followed by an analysis of cytotoxic chemotherapy prescriptions and critical interviews with 
doctors involved in errors identified from the analysis. Finally, and due to small numbers 
recruited in the critical incident interviews, a focus group was conducted with doctors at 
the cancer centre, to identify the scope and nature of prescribing errors, from their 
perspective and how they are managed. 
The fifth chapter in this thesis starts with an outline of intravenous administration error 
literature followed by key informant interviews to explore the standard practice involved in 
the administration of cytotoxic chemotherapy. Information from these exercises was used 
to inform an observation study of intravenous administration practices taking place on the 
chemotherapy day ward. Critical interviews were conducted with HCWs involved in the 
errors identified. This study was halted early because findings showed a considerably large 
number of errors relative to the incidence identified in the literature.  
The last chapter provides a final discussion of the findings from the current research and 
links them to the current published literature. An outline of recommendation for practices 
and for further work in the area are also discussed. 
2.4 Ethical and Cultural Considerations  
This project complied with the research principles as described by the Sudan Medical and 
Scientific Research Institute (SUMASRI) (SUMASRI, 2008). An application was made to 
SUMASRI which comprised the following documents: 
• Research proposal outlining all planned research activities. 





• Participant information leaflets for each research activity in English and Arabic that 
contained the following information:  
o Background to the project 
o Objectives of the project 
o The criteria why they were chosen 
o Protection of their employment rights 
o Freedom to withdraw from the project at any time 
o Confidentiality of their responses 
• Consent form in English and Arabic 
Ethical approval was obtained in April 2011 prior to commencing data collection (Appendix 
2). 
Prospective research participants, for each of the three studies, were given a project 
information leaflet and two copies of a consent form by hand with a week to read and 
decide if they were willing to participate in the project. The participants were also allowed 
to ask questions, for further clarification. Prospective participants were asked to contact 
the researcher by phone or in person to agree to take part in the study.  
Participants were entered into the study when they have provided voluntary consent. In 
developing countries, written and signed documents may be perceived as posing legal risks 
to participants (Bhutta, 2004). Previous research has shown that in situations where it was 
apparent that obtaining written consent was impossible verbal consent and tape recordings 
were substituted (Emanuel et al., 2004). In an attempt to encourage participation in this 
research and due to the sensitive nature of medication error discussions, participants were 
given the choice of any the following to be used as evidence that informed consent has been 
provided: 
• Taped recording of consent  
• Written consent 
• Verbal consent documented by a third party 
 To maintain the confidentiality of the data obtained; observation notes, tape recordings of 
interviews and focus groups, transcripts, verbatim answers and evidence of informed 
consent forms will be stored in a locked cupboard for a period of 12 months after 
completion of the thesis and destroyed after the completion and dissemination of the 





project. Anonymity was assured by assigning respondents unique nameless identifiers to 
prevent associations of responses to specific participants.  
The information leaflet for each study stated the length of the research activity with explicit 
statements explaining the freedom to withdraw at any time. While risks are present in all 
research, the risks to participants in this research were minimal because anonymity of the 
data were maintained and therefore it, would be difficult for a third party to link information 
to the specific participants. 
2.5 Research Team 
The principal research team consisted of three members; the principal researcher, a 
translator and a moderator who helped with conducting the focus groups. 
Apart from the principal researcher, the two other members of the research team had no 
working relationships with HCWs at the cancer centre. This was important to ensure the 
confidentiality of study participants. All members of the team were fluent in both Arabic 
(the language spoken in Sudan) and English.  
The language used in conducting the interviews and focus groups was mainly the Arabic 
language because it was felt that although pharmacists and doctors may have good fluency 
in English, the use of their mother tongue in discussions would enable them to express 
themselves more clearly. It was necessary to translate some of the documents into Arabic 
language and more specifically colloquial Arabic because the majority of nursing staff had 
minimal formal education and hence were unable to understand long English sentences or 
even Classic Arabic. The person who acted as a translator was a senior university colleague 
who had some experience in translations but was fluent in both languages, written and 
spoken. He had other roles besides translation and his main responsibilities were as follows: 
1- Listening to tape recordings of interviews and focus groups in order to verify 
transcripts. 
2- Acting as a second translator to separately translate research documents from 
English to Arabic. These were: 
a. Focus Group Schedules. 
b. Interview Schedules. 
c. Participant Information Leaflets. 
d. Consent Forms. 





3- Translate interview and focus group transcripts from Arabic to English. 
4- Participating in meetings with the principal researcher to compare translations and 
provide a mutual agreement on the best context for the final translation. 
Confidentiality of interviewees was maintained by choosing a translator from a different 
work setting and making sure that the transcripts were coded so as not to reveal their 
identity. Nonetheless, the translator agreed to keeping the information confidential 
because the identity of the interviewees and focus group participants could be revealed in 
the tape recordings when their names were mentioned which occurred on several 
occasions.  
All three members of the research team understood the need for maintaining 
confidentiality during the course of this study. 
2.6 Translation 
Cultural adaptation of research tools (Brislin, 1970) was undertaken at the research design 
stage translating all written documents to be given to participants in  Arabic language. 
Brislin’s model of back translation is considered the  gold standard in cross-cultural research 
(Rennie et al., 2008;Klepstad et al., 2002;Brislin, 1970) and has also been used in medication 
error research (Chiang et al., 2006) .  
This method is an iterative process whereby the forward translation stage is repeated until 
the back translated document resembles the original. It requires a different bilingual 
translator to translate the original document to the target language at each stage, followed 
by a back translation carried out without the individual seeing the original document. Each 
stage is evaluated by a group of translators and the process continues until the back 
translation resembles the original document. the approach would be essential for 
translation of validated research instruments. 






Figure 2-2 Rennie's Adaption of Brislin’s Back Translation Model (Rennie 2008 p418) 
 
Several authors have proposed modifications (see Figure2-2) to improve the efficiency of 
this model (Rennie et al., 2008;Jones et al., 2001). For the purposes of the current study, 
Rennie’s adaptation of Brislin’s model method was used for translation of validated study 
tools, PILs and consent forms. However, all the interviews and focus groups were conducted 
in Arabic and the verbatim answers required translation into English. This makes the 
exercise particularly time consuming specifically in the context of translating lengthy 
interview scripts within the time limitations of a PhD. Cross-cultural researchers have 
adopted more pragmatic approaches omitting the repetitive steps described by Brislin 
(Jones et al., 2011). One such approach was used in a Sudanese context and involved a single 
forward translation step (Baird, 2011). In order that a robust method was used in this 
research, Brislin’s model was modified by omitting the back-translation step but group 
validation was used to ensure that the translated document was equivalent to the original 
document. 
The translation team consisted of the researcher and one academic who were both fluent 
in Arabic and English languages. Arabic is the mother tongue of both the translators which 
is important because it ensures that cultural meanings of the words spoken during the 
interview are understood.  The following process was adopted for each interview script: 
1- The researcher and translator translated the verbatim script into English separately 
and simultaneously. 
2- Differences between the two documents were compared and discussed at length 
to reach a mutual agreement on the final translation. 
3- Notes and changes were made to each transcript before producing the final version. 





2.7 Research Challenges 
During the course of this study, a number of challenges were experienced, mainly because 
the concept of studying medication errors in a country where very little previous work had 
been undertaken, was perceived as a potential threat to participants.  This was evident by 
the response of HCWs to this project.  Although, when approached initially, prospective 
participants showed interest, there was poor attendance at pre-arranged appointments for 
focus groups and interviews. Some HCWs failed to attend appointments and sometimes 
their mobile phones were switched off and they were difficult to contact. In other situations, 
and perhaps also due to the busy schedule of work at a tertiary cancer centre, it was 
necessary to re-schedule interview and focus group appointments many times. The lack of 
interest expressed and the reluctance of HCWs to participate in discussions about 
medication errors was not unique to this study.  These issues were demonstrated clearly in 
the early medication error research which showed considerably low error rates from nurse 
and pharmacist incident reporting when compared to chart review (Bates et al., 1993).  
Most nurses who participated in this research showed reluctance to sign written consent 
forms and expressed that their participation in the study would be on the condition that 
this requirement was waived.  Thus, the ethical requirements necessary in the UK, were 
modified as explained above in the ethical considerations section.  
Towards the final stages of the research, data collection was halted because a chief 
administrator expressed concern about the dissemination of the study findings. Although 
this was a considerable set back, because prior ethical clearance was obtained from a 
Ministry of Health (MoH) recognized body. A request was made that the administration 
from the cancer centre should write a letter to the principal researcher explaining why they 
considered data collection should be halted. This letter was never received and data 
collection continued allowing successful completion of the study. Following discussions with 
key personnel from the Ministry, research supervisors and colleagues at the cancer centre, 
a decision was made to continue data collection.  


























There is consensus among national and international authorities about the importance of a 
positive safety culture in healthcare (Department of Health and Children, 2008;Kohn, 
2000;WHO, 2004b). Both health safety researchers (Leape et al., 2000;Vincent et al., 2000),  
and industry safety researchers (Helmreich, 2000) have also confirmed its importance. 
Guidance published to enable healthcare institutions to achieve patient safety have 
emphasized that  building a Patient Safety Culture (PSC) is essential (NPSA, 2004b;IOM, 
2004). One example is the former UK NPSA, who produced The seven steps to patient safety  
which  identified building a safety culture as the first step towards implementing patient 
safety strategies (NPSA, 2004b).  
Measurement of safety culture is instrumental in providing an understanding of how an 
organization views and responds to all aspects of safety as well as serving to highlight areas 
that require improvement  (Nieva et al., 2003).  This has important relevance to the current 
study because to our knowledge there has been no published study on the safety culture in 
healthcare institutions in Sudan. Moreover, poor safety practices when dealing with  
complex patients, such as those with cancer, is likely to have more detrimental 
consequences than among patients with fewer medical needs (Hofmann et al., 2006).  It can 
be argued that, in the chemotherapy unit, under study, the patients are considered complex 
for several reasons; 1) they present with advanced disease (Hamad, 2006) and have a high 
risk of organ impairment, 2) they are receiving potentially toxic substances (Gilbar, 2001) 
and 3) finally, intravenous medicines are prepared in uncontrolled environments on open 
benches in ward areas, placing both nurse and patient at considerable risk for safety (Joshi, 
2007). A study of the PSC in this setting would provide useful insight into the nature of safety 
systems adopted by HCWs and present an opportunity for them to engage in discussions 
regarding safety. 
This chapter begins with a review of a number of PSC tools that are commonly used in 
healthcare. The advantages and limitations of their use are discussed. The aims, 
methodology and results of a qualitative safety culture assessment at a cancer hospital are 
then reported. The discussion section presents a comparison of the results with existing 
literature and their impact in the context of a cancer centre in a developing country. 
 




3.2 Definition of Safety Culture 
Safety culture is the shared values, assumptions and  beliefs that an organization holds, 
whereas safety climate encompasses the measurable components of these values 
manifested in the behaviour, perceptions and attitudes  of employees (Colla et al., 2005). 
The latter being a component of the former (Thomas et al., 2005). In simpler terms, culture 
could be thought of as the personality of the group, while climate is the mood (Cox et al., 
1998).  
In the literature, the two words have been used interchangeably in many contexts but 
although researchers have agreed that both can be regarded as being similar, the tools used 
to measure culture are fundamentally different from those measuring climate. For example, 
safety climate can be readily deconstructed into quantifiable dimensions or concepts 
because it measures the attitude and behaviours shown by employees. This, however, does 
not apply to culture, which is not so easily shaped (Flin, 2007) and involves the dynamic 
processes that are deeply embedded and are continuously being shaped within the 
organization (Guldenmund, 2000).  Culture is more suited to ethnographic research which 
aims to describe and understand rather than quantify (Guldenmund, 2000).  However, 
because questionnaires are efficient methods for data collection, they have become the 
focus of the development of safety culture research (Flin et al., 2006;Colla et al., 2005;Singla 
et al., 2006). 
3.3 Overview of Safety Culture Tools 
Since the publication of recommendations by healthcare authorities, urging healthcare 
institutions to adopt a safety culture (Department of Health and Children, 2008;Kohn, 
2000;WHO, 2004b), a diverse range of assessment tools have been developed to evaluate  
both safety culture and safety climate (Ashcroft et al., 2005;Blegen, 2005;Connelly, 
2005;Fleming et al., 2008;Ginsburg et al., 2009;Kirk et al., 2007;Pronovost et al., 
2003;Sexton et al., 2006 ;Singer et al., 2003;Sorra et al., 2008;Kho et al., 2005). 
The UK based Health Foundation (2011) published a review that provides an overview of 
some of these tools for use within the NHS and lists over twenty tools commonly used in 
healthcare settings.    
Most of the tools identified are quantitative, and use a 4 or 5 point Likert scale for response 
(Singla et al., 2006). Many have originated in high risk industries such as oil drilling and 




aviation (Guldenmund, 2000) but have been later  modified for use in healthcare (Flin et al., 
2006).  
These tools may be used to assess and assign safety culture scores to hospitals as a whole, 
separate units or healthcare teams (Nieva et al., 2003). Safety culture tools have been used 
for a number of purposes. These include; assessment of patient safety culture (PSC),  
improving employee involvement, monitoring the impact of healthcare interventions, 
external and internal benchmarking and the extent that regulatory requirements are 
fulfilled (Nieva et al., 2003;Fleming, 2005). Despite these similarities, these tools vary 
tremendously. Flin and colleagues (2006) reviewed twelve studies that measured PSC and 
argue that PSC has been misapplied, mainly due to a misunderstanding of the important 
criteria required to ensure the robustness of measurement tools. For instance, some tools 
have been developed for local use within individual hospitals without taking into 
consideration requirements for survey design, such as counterbalancing negative and 
positive statements (The Health Foundation, 2011). Whereas others have been developed 
in industry, where they have been extensively tested and used, and were later either used 
in their original format or modified for use in healthcare and then further modified for use 
in specific healthcare settings. Such tools are not always transferable between different 
industries because many challenges can be encountered due to the differences among the 
settings (Flin, 2007). Most importantly, the differences between healthcare and industry lie 
in the context where safety culture is applicable. Safety in the healthcare environment 
involves both patient and worker; patients are unpredictable and team relations between 
and among different disciplines are more flexible than in industry (Flin et al., 2006). Similar 
arguments have been proposed in industry where an instrument developed in one industry 
may not be directly transferable to another (Cox et al., 1998). These findings were 
confirmed in other reviews of PSC tools (Colla et al., 2005;Singla et al., 2006). 
Further controversy exists regarding the use of terminology because when these tools were 
constructed researchers have used the terms  “safety climate” or “safety culture” 
interchangeably (Flin et al., 2006). Flin and colleagues (2006) reported a number of PSC tools 
that lacked theoretical underpinning, whereas others who have published theoretical 
underpinnings used a number of different safety culture theories (Fleming, 2005).   
Culture tools have mostly been designed to measure specific dimensions of culture and each 
tool had its unique dimensions, but some common themes were identified such as  
leadership, communication and teamwork (Singla et al., 2006). Other dimensions added 




include safety systems, risk perception, job demands, reporting, safety attitudes, personal 
resources and organizational factors (Flin et al., 2006).  
A number of these tools have been developed without psychometric testing that describes 
the validity and reliability (Flin et al., 2006). Some researchers have either not published 
their results of psychometric testing (Singla et al., 2006), or have published psychometric 
criteria below acceptable levels (Kho et al., 2005). 
When administered to healthcare staff, these tools have had variable response rates, 
ranging from 26% to 83% (Pronovost et al., 2005), and have sometimes proven to be invalid. 
There are several reasons to explain this observation. For example, a tool used in the USA 
may not necessarily be applicable to a UK setting and a tool used in an ICU setting may also 
lack validity when applied to a general medicine ward. Furthermore, Kho and colleagues 
(2005) argued that a tool may not necessarily measure the same constructs when used in 
different countries with their own unique health systems, team hierarchies and national 
cultures. They based these observations on a study where they used three different 
instruments, originating from work by Sexton and colleagues, on ICU staff in Canadian 
hospitals. The psychometric testing revealed major flaws with one of the instruments, 
showing the level of internal consistency to be lower than acceptable (Kho et al., 2005). 
These disagreements between PSC tools stem from the original concept of organizational 
culture, which is viewed as an abstract phenomenon, and hence gives the researcher the 
freedom to define and operationalise it according to their analysis and setting. Furthermore,  
organizational culture theorists vary considerably in their view, some conceptualising  it as 
observable practices and attitudes whilst others regard it as unconscious basic assumptions 
(Guldenmund, 2000). This has resulted in non-uniformity in the type of research used to 
study PSC where both quantitative and qualitative tools have been developed (Flin et al., 
2000), because some see it as a holistic concept whereas others are more reductionist and 
see it as a group of measurable attitudes (Guldenmund, 2000). 
3.4 Patient Safety Culture Tools 
The Health Foundation (2011) published a report on tools used in measuring PSC to help 
NHS hospitals in selecting the most applicable and robust tool. Although not a systematic 
review, it nevertheless collated a number of tools, summarized their use in healthcare and 
listed their advantages and disadvantages. It identified the five most commonly used as: 




The Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ), the Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture 
(HSOPSC), the Manchester Patient Safety Framework (MaPSaF), the Patient Safety Climate 
in Healthcare Organizations (PSCHO) and the Safety Climate Survey (SCS). A systematic 
review conducted by the European Network for Patient Safety (EuNetPaS) recommended 
that three of the above mentioned tools (SAQ, HSOPSC and MaPSaF) should be used in 
member states for measurement of safety culture (ESQH, 2008). The reasoning behind this 
recommendation lies in the rigour with which these tools were developed, and their 
robustness was shown when they were used in European Union member states with 
acceptable results.  Moreover, the WHO (2004) and Flin and colleagues (2009), recommend 
the use of the SAQ and the HSOPSC. 
The following section will list the history, development, uses, advantages and limitations of 
some of these tools (Table 3-1). This is a review of nine tools which includes the five most 
commonly used tools and briefly discusses less commonly used tools in order to highlight 
some of the issues complicating the comparison and generalisability of safety culture tools. 
Table 3-1 shows the different number of dimensions included in each tool. They will include 
tools that have been developed  in a specific field of healthcare such as pharmacy (Ashcroft 
et al., 2009), a tool that was developed specifically to measure culture in a setting different 
to western culture (Matsubara et al., 2008), a tool that had to undergo modification to allow 
its wider use in healthcare (Pronovost et al., 2003), and lastly a tool developed to measure 
one safety aspect (Gershon et al., 2000). 
3.4.1 The Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ) 
The Safety Attitudes Questionnaire (SAQ) originated from safety culture research in aviation 
and is a modified version of the Intensive Care Unit Management Questionnaire (ICUMQ) 
(Sexton et al., 2000) which  was based on the Flight Management Attitudes Questionnaire 
(FMAQ). The FMAQ was developed to measure crew members’ attitudes towards certain 
safety aspects such as teamwork, speaking up, leadership, communication and 
collaborative decision making. When developing the SAQ, items from the FMAQ valid for 
use in healthcare were retained and others removed or modified accordingly. The final 40 
item questionnaire focused on team work and working conditions. It consists of six 
dimensions (Table 3-1) and uses a 5-point Likert scale to determine the level of agreement 
of responders (Sexton et al., 2006). 




The SAQ was the first PSC tool to be extensively evaluated for reliability and validity. Sexton 
and colleagues (2006) surveyed 10843 healthcare staff from different disciplines and levels 
in 203 healthcare settings; in the UK, the USA and New Zealand.  The tool had good 
psychometric results (Raykov’s coefficient, 0.90) with acceptable multilevel confirmatory 
analysis  (Sexton et al., 2006). The authors compared findings from 203 clinical areas and 
found substantial variability in team work climate, safety climate, job satisfaction, stress 
recognition and working conditions and concluded that the SAQ is a useful instrument for 
benchmarking. 
The SAQ has been used for several purposes. It was one of the first tools to be used for 
inter-hospital as well as intra-hospital benchmarking in comparison with industry, it was 
also used for testing associations with improvements in safety culture and reporting 
outcomes, process measures and patient safety outcomes (Sexton et al., 2006;Colla et al., 
2005). It has also been used in a pre- and post-intervention study to improve patient safety 
in ICUs across Michigan state (Pronovost et al., 2008).  
In an interventional study, researchers in the US collected baseline teamwork climate scores 
and adherence to evidence-based interventions in ventilated patients among ICU staff and 
implemented the Comprehensive Unit Based Safety Program (CUSP) intervention 
(Pronovost et al., 2008). Post intervention testing measured these outcomes a year later. 
The CUSP is a six-step iterative safety intervention programme that improves patient safety 
culture by educating healthcare teams, increasing awareness and providing them with 
interventional toolkits targeting areas of poor patient safety. The study reported an 
improvement in teamwork climate from 17% to 46% and an improvement in the inclusion 
of chlorhexidine scrubs in the ventilator kits, but no measurable improvement in patient 
outcomes. The authors attributed this to a number of reasons; variations in clinical practice 
and in definitions of ventilator associated pneumonia and catheter related blood stream 
infections (Pronovost et al., 2008). The findings from this study support the view that 
although the introduction of safety practices into an organization may have improved 
certain aspects of culture, true culture change requires that interventions be sustained for 
periods of time longer than one year. 
The SAQ has many positive attributes. It uses Vincent’s framework for analysing risk and 
safety and Donabedian’s conceptual model for assessing quality (Sexton et al., 2006) and is 
available in the public domain for non-commercial use (Flin et al., 2009). It has also shown 
acceptable psychometric properties and has been used in PSC research  in ambulatory care 




(Holden et al., 2009), intensive care settings (Huang et al., 2010), translated to Turkish (Kaya 
et al., 2010), Chinese (Lee et al., 2010), and Norwegian (Deilkas et al., 2008) and adapted 
for regulatory authorities in the pharmaceutical sector (McCarthy, 2009). This demonstrates 
both reliability and validity (Allen et al., 2010;Pronovost et al., 2005). 
One of the major limitations in the use of the SAQ is the variable response rate, which can 
sometimes be as low as 29% or as high as 83% (Pronovost et al., 2005). In a study conducted 
by Allen and colleagues, among members of staff in two maternity units in Australia, only 
29% of participants responded.  This led the authors to disregard the findings as unreliable 
and to recommend that safety culture would be better measured using qualitative studies. 
3.4.2 Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture (HSOPSC) -US Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality 
The Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture (HSOPSC) was developed under contract for 
use by the US based Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ). The development 
of this tool included a thorough literature review on patient safety, safety culture and 
climate, organizational factors, medical error, error reporting and pre-existing tools on 
safety culture (Sorra et al., 2004). Key dimensions were identified and used to derive the 
original survey tool, which was subsequently reviewed and validated by hospital staff and 
researchers (Sorra et al., 2004). The final version was subjected to piloting and psychometric 
analysis by administering it to 1437 staff from 21 hospitals across the US and the best items 
and scales were retained. 
Unlike the SAQ, which is focused  primarily on teamwork, the HSOPSC extends its emphasis 
to management commitment to safety, handovers and transitions (Singla et al., 2006).  It is 
designed to measure seven, unit level aspects of patient safety culture, three hospital level 
aspects and three outcomes, using 42 questions (Table 3-1).  
In further research, Sorra and Dyer (2010) intended to confirm the original psychometric 
evaluations and tested the tool with over 50,513 HCWs from 331 hospitals in the US. The 
results provided acceptable psychometric properties on all dimensions with the exception 
of the staffing composite, which fell below the acceptable level at 0.37 (Sorra et al., 2010). 
The analysis found a strong relationship between overall perception of safety and 
management support for patient safety but a surprisingly weak relationship between non-




punitive culture and adverse event reporting (Sorra et al., 2010). The survey had an average 
response rate of 55%, which was considered acceptable. 
The tool has proven validity because it was used to evaluate PSC in adult critical care units 
(Armellino et al., 2010), and nursing homes (Castle et al., 2006). It has been translated into 
Italian (Bagnasco et al., 2011), Turkish (Bodur et al., 2009), Chinese (Chen et al., 2010), 
Japanese (Ito et al., 2011) Dutch (Hellings et al., 2010) and Arabic (El-Jardali et al., 2010). In 
the Middle East, the tool was tested in Saudi Arabia (Alahmadi, 2010) in its original English 
format as well as in Arabic (El-Jardali et al., 2010).  
Although the HSOPSC has been developed and mainly used in inpatient and hospital 
settings, it has also been used in primary care settings (Bodur et al., 2009). The main 
weakness of this tool, similar to the other key PSC tools, is that it identifies weaknesses 
within PSC but not their cause. One of the other weaknesses of this tool is a consistently 
low response rate of less than 50% (Armellino et al., 2010). In the study by Armellino et al 
(2010), the HSOPSC was distributed among 257 registered nurses within critical care in a US 
hospital. The questionnaire response rate was low at 40% but the authors inferred that this 
low response rate could be explained by the low safety culture score (21.09%) and the low 
error reporting rate (62.5%).  
Criticisms of the HSOPSC point to its weak reliability in assessing staffing dimensions. For 
example, when used in Lebanon among 12,250 healthcare staff from 68 hospitals, with a 
55% response rate, the staffing dimension had the weakest correlation with the outcome 
of adverse event reporting (El-Jardali et al., 2011). The highest positive scores for safety 
dimensions measured were for teamwork (82.3%), hospital management support (78.4%) 
and organizational learning (78.3%). The strength of reliability testing was doubtful because 
it varied between 0.431 and 0.61 for communication and 0.423 and 0.57 for staffing among 
different healthcare teams. The authors published their translation of the survey technique, 
which was not based on any known method of cross cultural research, thus having the 
potential to introduce construct weakness to the study as predicted by the study authors 
(Sorra et al., 2004). Although the study sample originally included doctors and pharmacists, 
the respondent group consisted mainly of nurses and clerical staff. These results were 
similar to a Saudi study which used the HSOPSC questionnaire in its original format without 
translation. The survey was distributed to 2580 HCWs from 13 Saudi hospitals which have 
demonstrated patient safety initiatives in place, from both the private and public sectors 
(Alahmadi, 2010).  The hospitals had good scores for learning (87%), teamwork within units 




(84%) and feedback about errors (77%) but it was interesting that teamwork across the 
hospital was weak (27%). Other areas which required improvement and showed poor scores 
on the patient safety scale were non-punitive response to errors (22%) and staffing (22%). 
Response rate in this study was similar to others with a poor response rate below 50%. The 
authors aggregated all the findings together and there were no comparisons among 
hospitals, hence it was not clear if there were associations between particular weaknesses 
and specific hospital characteristics (Alahmadi, 2010). For example, the Lebanese study 
showed overall patient safety scores were higher in smaller hospitals (El-Jardali et al., 2010). 
The HSOPSC has now developed to be a widely-utilized tool in research because 
psychometric testing has shown its reliability and validity and hence its robustness (Singla 
et al., 2006;Sorra et al., 2010). It encompasses all the issues pertinent to measuring PSC, as 
detailed by Reason (1997). A toolkit for general use and access with details of the tool 
development are available in the public domain via the AHRQ website (Sorra et al., 
2004).The HSOPSC has been recommended for use by the WHO in their High 5s project to 
achieve reductions in high risk patient safety problems. They recommend participating 
hospitals use the tool to measure baseline patient safety culture and monitoring of changes 
over time (Sorra et al., 2010). Consistently low rates of response have been frequently 
compensated for by inclusion of a large sample for the survey. 
3.4.3 The Safety Climate Scale  
One of the less well developed tools was the Safety Climate Scale, which is a 10 item tool, 
using a 5 point Likert scale, derived from safety culture studies in aviation, and focuses on 
leadership and employee commitment to PSC, adverse event reporting and understanding 
of systems in accident causation (Pronovost et al., 2003). The tool was first used in 
healthcare to compare the attitudes towards error, stress and teamwork among healthcare 
staff working in operating theatres and ICU units across five countries in comparison to staff 
in aviation in the same countries (Sexton et al., 2000). The study used a disproportionate 
number of aviation staff (30,000), mainly cockpit crew, in relation to healthcare staff (1033); 
mainly doctors and nurses. As anticipated cockpit crew, coming from a longer history of 
safety, had better safety scores than HCWs. For instance, pilots were least likely to deny the 
effects of fatigue on performance (26%) compared with consultant surgeons (70%). More 
than 90% of aviation staff and anaesthetists rejected steep hierarchies in comparison to 




55% of consultant surgeons. Safety culture scores varied among different healthcare teams 
with doctors (77%) having higher perceptions of good teamwork than nurses (40%). 
The tool has been combined with other PSC scales because it lacks dimensions related to 
human factors such as teamwork and communication, focusing on employee and leadership 
perceptions of a strong organizational commitment to patient safety (Pronovost et al., 
2003). In order to include the human factors, it was combined with the SAQ, and 
administered to midwifery staff in Australia, but the study was limited with a less than 
desired response rate of 28% (Allen et al., 2010). The tool was piloted and refined by 
Pronovost and colleagues (2003) but psychometric testing was not reported. The authors 
surveyed managerial clinical staff, clinical staff and clerical staff from wards, clinics and 
departments with a response rate of 82% (Pronovost et al., 2003), better than the HSOPSC 
(Armellino et al., 2010) and SAQ (Pronovost et al., 2005). Unlike findings from other studies 
(Sexton et al., 2000), this study revealed lower perceptions of safety culture among doctors 
than nurses. For instance, 84% of nurses perceived encouragement from management to 
report errors, whereas 54% of doctors perceived this to be true. Likewise, 46% of doctors 
and 86% of nurses indicated that they were aware of the proper channels for safety incident 
reporting. The absence of validity and reliability testing in published reports, together with 
the tool’s limited scales, have prevented further use of this tool.  
3.4.4 The Safety Climate Survey (SCS) 
Given that the Safety Climate Scale had limited utility in PSC research, researchers 
submitted it to further development by adding more safety performance composites from 
aviation. The new tool, the Safety Climate Survey (SCS), consisted of 21 items using a 5 point 
Likert scale. 
The SCS has been used in safety culture research as the sole research tool to assess the 
impact of executive walk rounds on patient safety culture among healthcare staff in a 
tertiary care hospital (Thomas et al., 2005), as well as in ICU settings (Kho et al., 2005)  and 
in renal dialysis (di Benedetto et al., 2011). 
Thomas and colleagues (2005) used the SCS in a “before and after” controlled study to 
assess the impact of executive walk rounds (EWRs), in all clinical units of a US tertiary care 
hospital, on staff safety culture. The published report of this early development work lacked 
psychometric testing (Thomas et al., 2005) which was separately conducted by Kho and 
colleagues (2005) among staff from four ICUs in Canada .  




Thomas and colleagues (2005) used the tool to evaluate safety culture changes among 
nurses after an intervention which involved limited exposure to EWRs. The authors 
conducted a baseline study of PSC among 1119 healthcare providers from different hospital 
units such as pharmacy, radiology, nursing, physical therapy and dieticians. They 
randomised 23 hospital units, 12 to control group and 11 to EWRs, which consisted of 3 
four-weekly 30-60 minute meetings conducted by a team of four executives from the 
hospital, in which all personnel from the hospital unit were invited and engaged in a 
discussion of issues pertinent to patient safety and the role of leadership in improving 
patient safety. After three months, the survey was repeated on the 23 units but results 
revealed no change for patient safety for all health providers except for nurses, who 
composed 50% of the sample. Nurses in the EWR intervention group (72.9%) had higher 
safety scores than those in the control group (52.5%). The results of this study, although 
showing the tool can detect culture changes, suggest that as the tool was originally 
developed for use among doctor and nurse teams it may not be valid for use within other 
healthcare teams such as pharmacy and physiotherapy. Moreover, the study period was 
too short to detect significant changes in culture. 
Kho and colleagues (2005), using their experience from previous work to develop the PSC 
questionnaires, subjected the tool to psychometric analysis and administered it to 427 staff 
from four ICUs in Canada. The tool showed acceptable internal consistency (0.86), test re-
test reliability (0.92). The authors reported similar safety culture perceptions among all 
teams of frontline staff in the four ICUs but higher perceptions among managers (Kho et al., 
2005). 
Although the Safety Culture Climate Survey was endorsed by the Institute for Healthcare 
Improvement (Kho et al., 2005) and was once available in the public domain,  it has 
subsequently been removed, probably because it tests one construct only and is currently 
outdated (The Health Foundation, 2011). 
3.4.5 The Patient Safety Climate in Healthcare Organizations survey (PSCHO) 
Singer and colleagues (2003 and 2007) developed the Patient Safety Climate in Healthcare 
Organizations survey (PSCHO) as part of a Stanford based, patient safety research project, 
sponsored by the US based Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality and run by the 
Patient Safety Consortium which consisted of 105 hospitals from the USA.  The tool, which 
is also known as the “Stanford Instrument” (Fleming, 2005) was constructed based on a 




literature review of five safety climate surveys developed for High Reliability Organizations 
(HROs) such as nuclear power stations, aircraft carriers and aviation control systems (Weick 
et al., 2008). HROs are complex organizations which, despite of working under extreme 
hazard and high risk of error, maintain a high record of safety (Roberts, 1990), by being 
grounded in a state of collective mindfulness that makes all staff highly alert to details that 
may indicate danger. 
The original five tools used in constructing the PSCHO were; the Naval Aviation Command 
Safety System Survey, the Operating Room Management Attitudes Questionnaire, the 
Anaesthesia Work Environment Study, Risk Management Questionnaire and Safety 
Orientation in Medical Facilities (Gaba et al., 2003), none of which were considered suitable 
in their original format because they were either not developed for healthcare or not 
subjected to rigorous survey administration and psychometric analysis (Singer et al., 2003). 
The authors identified a number of dimensions from these surveys that were suitable for 
tailoring a tool valid for use in healthcare organizations. The PSCHO was subjected to 
rigorous piloting that initially focused on feasibility of the tool, resulting in a reduction from 
122 to 38 items covering nine dimensions (see Table 3-1), in addition to items that are 
designed to capture demographic and background data (Singer et al., 2003;Singer et al., 
2007). Including demographic details is uncommon in other PSC tools but was thought to 
be important by the authors because they considered that PSC may be affected by such 
characteristics. 
The tool was used to evaluate safety culture among 6312 hospital employees from senior 
management, doctors and other employees from a number of hospitals across California 
(Singer et al., 2003). The study used an unusual weighting to their sampling by including all 
doctors, all senior administration staff and 10% of other employees, justifying this with 
findings from previous studies that showed poor response rates among doctors. The study 
findings were consistent with other PSC research (Sexton et al., 2006 ;Kho et al., 2005) 
because it was shown that senior managers had more favourable perceptions regarding 
safety climate than did clinicians, and nurses had the least favourable perceptions. These 
findings were confirmed in a later study which included 35,370 hospital employees from 92 
US hospitals (Singer et al., 2009b). The published report assessed feasibility of the tool 
rather than its psychometric analysis and lacked an account of the theoretical 
underpinnings. Although the authors reported that the tool was feasible in measuring PSC 
the response rate of 47% may indicate low face validity or generally poor safety culture 




rather than the justification suggested for poor response by doctors because of busy work 
schedules.  
Results from this study were compared with safety climate among US naval aviation corps 
(Gaba et al., 2003), using a separate tool utilized in the initial construction of the PSCHO and 
shares with it 23 common items . The response rate among the naval corps was nearly 
double that of hospital personnel (80% vs 47.7%). The authors analysed the common 23 
items between the two tools and revealed that naval corps showed less negative perception 
of safety culture than hospital personnel (5.6% vs 18%) but had similarities in terms of their 
mutual belief of the high level of and commitment to safety by their individual 
organizations. Both groups also showed similarities in their concern for safety when 
resources or experienced personnel are compromised, but HCWs showed more concern. 
The administration of the survey in the naval corps was carried out over three years whereas 
in the hospital over six months, which may explain the increased response rate. The choice 
of naval corps may not be entirely successful in comparative research with medical and 
hospital personnel, who have totally differing cultures. Naval corps traditionally have a high 
culture of submission and obedience whereas hospital personnel have more freedom and 
flexibility in their own decision making (Gaba et al., 2003).  
In a later study, Singer and colleagues (2007) subjected the tool to psychometric analysis by 
administering it to 42,249 individuals employed at 105 hospitals in the US with a 51% 
response rate. The study recruited participants from all disciplines and hierarchies within 
hospitals in the USA as part of a project run by the Patient Safety Consortium, which was 
formed specifically for this project. They asked HCWs to rate safety issues according to three 
levels; the individual, the unit and the organization (Table 3-2). Researchers reported 
psychometric analysis varied according to the dimensions measured, with low reliability for 
the learning dimension, Cronbach alpha score from 0.5 to 0.7 (Singer et al., 2007).  
The PSCHO was used further to evaluate the impact of a safety intervention among nurses 
in Canada (Ginsburg et al., 2005),  compare differences between healthcare teams  in the 
US (Cooper et al., 2008;Singer et al., 2009b) and to  test the association of organizational 
culture and patient safety climate (Hartmann et al., 2009). 
Although previous studies showed limited changes when comparing PSC in “pre and post” 
interventional studies, nevertheless Ginsburg and colleagues (2005) attempted to evaluate 
the impact of an educational intervention on patient safety scores among nurses in leading 
clinical roles from two Canadian teaching hospitals, using non-equivalent control groups 




(Ginsburg et al., 2005). The educational intervention was designed to address adverse 
events literature, human error, patient safety tools and the importance of human factors. 
A sample of 356 nurses were invited to take part in the study by completing the baseline 
safety climate questionnaire (PSCHO). They were then invited to attend the educational 
workshop which lasted six months. Nurses from the original cohort who did not attend the 
workshop were given the post study questionnaire to complete immediately after the 
workshop, with a 69% response rate. Nurses in the intervention group were asked to 
complete the questionnaire four months after completion of the educational intervention. 
Although a statistically significant (p<0.001, chi-square test) change was seen in valuing 
safety in the intervention group, no significant changes in other dimensions were detected. 
A decrease in the ratings of safety in the control group over a ten-month period was 
reported. The non-equivalent control group study may have introduced selection bias 
where nurses who originally had safety concerns were recruited. Similar to other PSC 
research (Thomas et al., 2005),  the ten month period was barely long enough to permit  
significant changes in culture which is considered strongly embedded and difficult to change 
(Ginsburg et al., 2005). 
Using a similar sampling frame to their previous studies, Singer and colleagues (2009) 
surveyed 35,370 hospital employees from 92 US hospitals. The findings were similar to 
previous work by these researchers with employees, where 17.1% of the responses from 
hospital employees indicated a negative perception of safety climate. This varied according 
to hospital, area of work and team. Employees in the emergency department had 18% more 
negative responses in their perception of patient safety. Among teams, nurses showed 
more negative perceptions compared to doctors. However, this finding was not applicable 
to all dimensions as nurses showed 24% higher negative perceptions of safety than doctors 
in terms of formal recognition of safety and 21% higher with regards to unit support. 
Doctors had higher negative perceptions with regards to fear and blame. Among the same 
discipline, ED nurses had 80% more negative perceptions of safety culture (Singer et al., 
2009b). This study demonstrated the feasibility of measuring difference within and among 
healthcare teams and areas of work and showed differences according to discipline. 
Another study demonstrated that the tool can also identify difference due to team 
hierarchies (Hartmann et al., 2009). 
The PSCHO was used to test the association between a strong organizational culture and 
patient safety climate at Veterans Health Associations (VA) hospitals in the US, a group of 
hospitals that comprise a significant part of the US health system (Hartmann et al., 2009). 




The tool was administered to 9,250 staff, using Singer’s sampling frame, at eight VA 
hospitals, with a 50% response rate similar to previous studies. The study revealed that 
hierarchy was related to poor safety climate and higher levels of group and entrepreneurial 
culture were associated with higher safety climate scores. Although the study found strong 
associations between safety climate and organizational climate, the effect on actual patient 
safety outcomes could not be accurately inferred. 
This tool had been tested extensively, mainly in the US but generally restricted to North 
America, and included large numbers of participants. Response rates with this tool have 
been consistently lower than 50%, with the exception one study in Canada (69%) and even 
with reminders and repeated mailings did not improve above 50% (Singer et al., 2009b). 
3.4.6 The Manchester Safety Patient Framework (MaPSaF) 
This Manchester Safety Patient Framework (MaPSaF) provides a qualitative approach the 
application of PSC measurement which is unique among other tools that are primarily 
quantitative. The Manchester Patient Safety Framework was developed for research into 
PSC by Manchester University (Parker, 2009;Kirk et al., 2007). It was based on Westrum’s 
typology of safety culture which proposes that safety culture follows a natural progression 
towards ultimate safety and that information flow across the organization is predictive of 
safety performance. Safety in an organization follows an evolutionary path from the 
pathological  through bureaucratic to the generative level (Westrum, 2004). Westrum 
tripartite typology was modified by James Reason who introduced the reactive and 
proactive levels (Reason, 1997) and later used to develop a framework for safety culture 
research (Parker et al., 2006).  
Unlike the development of other safety culture tools (Singer et al., 2007;Sorra et al., 2004), 
where authors used an industry-based literature review to generate a list of dimensions 
pertinent to PSC, this tool utilized literature available in primary healthcare. Hence, 
development of the MaPSaF benefited from the maturity of PSC tools used in healthcare. 
Qualitative tools require validity testing different from questionnaires, hence the 
preliminary list was subjected to review and adaptation by five opinions, producing the final 
list which was used as the conceptual framework for semi-structured interviews with 
managerial and healthcare staff in primary care. The final tool comprises nine dimensions 
of PSC (Table 3-1); five levels of safety maturity were developed for each dimension (Table 
3-2). The interviewees judged the dimensions to be valid and applicable to primary 




healthcare and had little difficulty describing the culture maturity levels except for the 
generative level which was thought to be unachievable. The tool was subjected to further 
validation using individual interviews and focus groups conducted among single multi 
professional groups.  Findings from these validation exercises revealed the MaPSaF is a valid 
tool  for evaluating the maturity of safety culture and the discussions appeared to 
contribute to participants’ understanding of safety culture (Kirk et al., 2007). Findings from 
the initial validation exercises were similar to both the SAQ and PSCHO tools in that 
perception of safety culture varied according to working team and hierarchy. The unique 
feature of qualitative tools, unlike quantitative tools which require psychometric analysis to 
prove their reliability and internal consistency, mean that they can only be analysed using 
the subjective inferences from study participants. This can introduce a limitation because it 
is important that the choice of study participants is carefully considered. 
Although the tool was initially developed for use in primary healthcare and community 
pharmacies (Ashcroft et al., 2005), it has been validated for use by the former NPSA (NPSA, 
2006)  in ambulance, primary care, acute care and mental health settings. The MaPSaf is 
available in the public domain with a facilitator guide. Although it is purported to be widely 
used (ESQH, 2008), published research using this tool is limited. Qualitative research can be 
demanding and presents a number of challenges to the researcher and the participants 
(Smith, 1998). Using this tool requires the guidance of a well-trained facilitator, the 
investment of time and resources and the commitment of healthcare staff and may explain 
its limited use in published research (The Health Foundation, 2011).  
3.4.7 The Pharmacy Climate Questionnaire (PSCQ) 
A number of tools have been developed to measure safety culture about medication 
(Fleming et al., 2008;Ashcroft et al., 2009;Colla et al., 2005;Blegen, 2005). One of these tools 
has been extensively tested, translated into a number of European languages and is 
available on the public domain for research purposes, is the Pharmacy Safety Climate 
Questionnaire (PSCQ) (Ashcroft et al., 2009). It is a quantitative tool based on the MaPSaF 
(Kirk et al., 2007;Parker, 2009) model and Westrum’s theory (Westrum, 2004) developed to 
test safety climate in community pharmacies.  
The preliminary tool contained 42 questions on nine themes of safety culture based on the 
MaPSaF (Table 3-1); commitment to patient safety, communication in the pharmacy, 




staffing and management, education and training about safety, team working, incident 
reporting, investigating incidents and learning following an incident (Table 3-2). 
Community pharmacists were recruited by attending a continuous professional 
development session on risk management. It was administered to 998 community 
pharmacists in Northern England. Principal component analysis was carried out, resulting in 
a rejection of seven items and one component. The final tool had 34 items measuring 7 
components. The final version displayed an internal consistency, Cronbach alpha of 0.67-
0.88. 
This tool’s distinctive quality in assessing PSC in community pharmacy presents a limitation 
because it may not be directly transferable to other health settings. However, it has been 
robustly developed, based on the well-developed theory of culture maturity. It also 
underwent appropriate psychometric analysis, although using a smaller number of 
participants than other tools, such as the SAQ, PSCHO and the AHRQ tool. 
3.4.8 Gershon Safety Climate Tool 
One of the earliest safety climate tools was developed by Gershon et al  (2000), based on 
their colleagues’ previous work (DeJoy DM et al., 1995) and supplemented by a literature 
search and qualitative research. The tool aims to determine whether a hospital’s 
commitment to blood-borne pathogens risk management is related to workers’ safe 
practices. It measures four constructs: demographics, safety climate, self-rated compliance 
rate and exposure history. The authors surveyed 1240 HCWs with high risk of exposure to 
blood-borne pathogens from a teaching medical facility in the US and obtained a 60% 
response rate. 
The safety climate construct was factor analysed and six factors were extracted (Table 3-1), 
and unreliable scale items were rejected. Cronbach alpha coefficients were used as a 
measure of a factor’s internal consistency and retaining items which had a reading of 0.71-
0.80. 
 HCWs perceptions were positive for availability of personal protective clothing but very 
poor for physical work environment and interpersonal communication. Workers had 
generally good compliance with following safety practices but 9% reported a recent 
exposure to blood or bodily fluids. Compliance was three times higher among workers who 
had a perception of a clean work environment and was positively associated with senior 




managerial support and absence of work hindrances. The authors reported that HCWs risk 
was reduced considerably following the administration of this questionnaire.   
Unlike other PSC tools, and similar to those in industry, this tool focuses mainly on worker 
safety, hence it has limited applications to the wider safety culture issues that may arise in 
a healthcare setting.  
Gershon’s Safety Tool was modified by Turnberg and Daniell (2008) to determine the 
relationship of exposure to respiratory pathogen and safety climate and found to have 
acceptable psychometric properties (Turnberg et al., 2008). 
3.4.9 Japan Patient Climate Scale  
Matsubara and colleagues in Japan (2008), realizing that PSC tools developed for use in one 
country need not be applicable in a different country, particularly when the language and 
overall culture are fundamentally different, developed a tool tailored for Japanese 
healthcare staff. The Japan Safety Climate Scale was based on Reason’s Error Theory and 
includes 33 items (Table 3-1) with eight dimensions covering worker safety and 
organizational climate (see Table 3-1). Items for inclusion in the tool were extracted from 
the literature and a survey of HCWs who were asked to indicate their areas of safety 
concerns, followed by expert opinion. The authors distributed the original questionnaire to 
1878 HCWs from different disciplines from nine hospitals in Japan and 76.6% returned 
completed questionnaires, a response rate which was not achieved with other tools. 
Psychometric analysis was used to retain items that had a Cronbach alpha coefficient and 
intra-class correlations for test re-test reliability of more than 0.70 and inter-rater reliability 
of more than 0.60. 
The context in which this tool was developed precludes its use in other countries where the 
language is different. 
  
3.4.10 Summary of Patient Safety Culture Tools 
Most PSC tools were developed in the USA except for three; the Patient Safety Assessment 
tool, Japan Patient Climate Scale and the MaPSaF. In general, questionnaires are easily 
utilized to monitor PSC changes after interventions, measure PSC in healthcare 
organizations and compare perceptions of different disciplines and hierarchies of HCWs. 




However, they only provide a snapshot of PSC and are best utilised to measure safety 
climate, which is an aspect of PSC, because they do not give details as to why differences 
exist. A more accurate assessment of PSC can only be accomplished using qualitative 
methods such as the MaPSaF. Moreover, in a healthcare institution from a developing 
country such as RICK, where safety systems are not accessible to all staff, the use of 
questionnaires will result in incomplete findings. Questionnaires will provide a 
quantification of patient safety climate attitudes, behaviours and practices but will not offer 
any explanations as to the beliefs and values held by those workers. Qualitative research 
methods that employ focus groups and interviews, although costly and time-consuming, 
would provide a more accurate measure of PSC. The only validated tool for this purpose is 
the MaPSaF.  
 
















SAQ 6 HRO Theory, 
Donabedian’s 
Model 
63 Cronbach alpha: 0.68-
0.81 
Widely tested, Sound 
Psychometrics published, 
Available in the public domain 
Poor response rate 
AHRQ HSOPSC 19 
 
NR 44 Cronbach alpha: 0.63-
0.83 
For inter- and intra-hospital 
comparisons 
Sound Psychometrics published 
Available in the public domain 
Mainly used in hospitals 
Poor response rate 
PSCHO 9 HRO 45 NR Mainly used in hospitals 
 




10  21 internal consistency 
(0.86), test re-test 
reliability (0.92) 
Easy to use Limited use and scale 
Safety Climate 
Scale 
NR NR 10 NR Easy to use Limited use and scale 
MaPSaF 10 Safety 
Maturity  
Model 
N/A N/A Provides accurate assessment of 
culture, can be educational 








42 Cronbach alpha:  
0.67-0.88 
Unique to community pharmacy 
settings 





20 Cronbach alpha and 
test- retest reliability 
>0.70 
Tailored for Japan healthcare 
staff 




6 NR 20 Cronbach alpha: 0.71-
0.80 
Measures safety behaviour with 
safety climate 
Limited utility in other settings 
Abbreviations: AHRQ HSOPSC = Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture, MaPSaF = Manchester Patient Safety Framework, PSCHO = Patient Safety 
Culture in Healthcare Organizations Survey; SAQ = Safety Attitudes Questionnaire, HRO= High reliability Organizations, NR= Not reported 
 





Table 3-2Dimensions of Patient Safety Culture Tools 
Tool Dimension 
SAQ Teamwork, Job satisfaction, Perception of management, Safety climate, Working conditions, Stress Recognition 
AHRQ HSOPSC Unit Level: Teamwork within units, Organizational learning, Supervisor/manager expectations and actions promoting safety, Hospital 
management support for safety, Communication openness, Error feedback and communication, Staffing, Non-punitive response to error 
Hospital level: Teamwork across units, Hospital handoffs and transitions 
Safety Outcomes: Overall perceptions of safety, Frequency of event reporting 
MaPSaF Commitment to overall continuous improvement, Priority given to safety, System errors and individual responsibility, recording incidents 
and best practice, evaluating incidents and best practice, Learning and effecting change, Communication about safety issues 
Personnel management and safety issues, Staff education and training, Team working 
Japan Safety Continuous improvement, reporting rules/compliance, Patient/Family involvement, Supervisor Safety Leadership, Allied Professional Safety 
leadership, Patient Safety Committee leadership, Rules equipment availability 
PSCHO The Organization: Seniors management engagement, Organizational resources, Overall emphasis on safety 
The work Unit: Unit safety norms and unit Recognition, support for safety. 






Commitment to patient safety, Communication in the pharmacy, Staffing Management, Education and training, Team working Incident 
Reporting Investigating Incidents Learning following an incident 
Gershon Tool Demonstrable management support for safety problems, Absences of hindrances to work practice, Availability of personal protective and 
engineering control equipment, Minimal conflict and good communication among staff members, Frequent safety related feedback by 
supervisors, Cleanliness and orderliness of the work site 
Abbreviations: AHRQ HSOPSC = Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture, MaPSaF = Manchester Patient Safety Framework, 
PSCHO = Patient Safety Culture in Healthcare Organizations Survey; SAQ = Safety Attitudes Questionnaire, SCSc=Safety Climate Scale, SCSu=Safety Climate Survey, NR= Not 
reported  




3.5 Aims and Objectives 
The following study aims to describe the safety culture at the Radiation and Isotope Centre 
Khartoum as perceived by staff working directly with patients i.e. doctors, nurses and 
pharmacists. The objectives of this study are to: 
1. Describe the safety culture at the Radiation and Isotope Centre Khartoum as 
perceived by staff working with patients. 
2. Identify differences in safety culture perceptions according to profession and 
gender. 
3. Explore implications of perception on current practice regarding issues of patient 
safety. 
3.6 Methods 
The (MaPSaF), a tool designed for use in a focus group setting, was modified and adapted 
for this study (Parker, 2009). A focus group is defined as:  
“a carefully planned discussion designed to obtain perceptions on a defined area of 
interest in a permissive non-threatening way” (Krueger 1994, p16) 
A key function of a focus group is to gain insight and information from the communication 
and interactions that occur between participants, who ideally should have similar shared 
backgrounds and experiences (Kitzinger, 1994). Although focus group findings are not 
intended to be generalisable, several groups should be run consecutively to avoid the risk 
of collecting little information if the group participants happen to be detached and not 
interested in the topic of discussion.  
The group interaction and discussion is effective for collecting qualitative, exploratory 
information and usually generates useful insight into unexplored topics (Kitzinger, 1994). 
However, the interaction of the group offers several limitations that may include 
compromising individual confidentiality, potential loss of control over the direction of the 
group discussion and the risk of dominance of one or more participants (Krueger, 1994). 
However, these issues can be minimized by improving the skill of the focus group 
moderator. 




Qualitative methods are best suited to this type of study because they yield rich 
conversational material that can be analysed to understand HCWs’ knowledge about safety 
systems. Qualitative methods have been described as essential in obtaining a thorough 
description of safety systems in healthcare organizations (Allen et al., 2010;Nieva et al., 
2003). 
3.6.1 Development and modification of the study tool 
The MaPSaF was originally developed for use in several different healthcare settings: acute 
care, mental health, primary care and ambulance (NPSA, 2006). Although RICK is a tertiary 
referral centre, it shares certain features with acute care settings in the UK NHS such as: day 
care, inpatient wards, and outpatient clinics where drugs are prescribed, dispensed and 
administered in environments with similar pressures. Hence the acute version of the 
MaPSaf was appropriate for this study (NPSA, 2006). 
Although most university graduates in Sudan are bilingual and can communicate well in 
both languages, the planned research involved HCWs from different disciplines and 
therefore it was considered appropriate to translate the framework into Arabic. Since the 
MaPSaF is a validated tool, changes to the language used may compromise its robustness. 
A translation method, which has been previously employed when other validated 
healthcare tools have been used where English is not spoken, is back translation (Beran et 
al., 2006;Jacobsen et al., 2009;Klepstad et al., 2002). Following translation, the tool was 
subjected to piloting and further modifications to suit Sudanese culture (see Figure 3-1). 
3.6.2 Translation of the MaPSaF 
Brislin’s translation method was modified using an approach published in cross language 
research (Klepstad et al., 2002), by following three major steps; forward translation, group 
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Translation one  
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Arabic translation 
Back translation into English 
2nd Draft Arabic translation 
Reviewed by Arabic Linguist 
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Translation Two  
Final Arabic version: used in female/male 
nurse and male pharmacist focus groups  
Figure 3-1 Development of the Arabic version of the MaPSaF and the simplified English MaPSaF for use in RICK 





1. Forward Translation: In November 2009, three translators separately translated the 
MaPSaF; these were two members of the research team in addition to a bilingual 
colleague who worked at a local university. They were asked to use an 
English/Arabic Dictionary to translate the MaPSaF and formulate Arabic sentences 
that best described the meaning of the sentences used in the framework. 
2. Forward Translation: The translators produced handwritten documents of the 
MaPSaF translations. The researcher arranged for a series of one hour long 
meetings with both translators, to discuss and compare each of the ten dimensions 
of the MaPSaF. During each meeting, the group read through each of the 
translations, five minutes was given for reflection and each member reported on 
which of the translations they thought to be most accurate. A discussion followed 
so that agreement was reached on the final draft translated version. 
3. Back Translation: The draft translation was then given to a professional translator 
who worked at the Linguistics Department at the University of Khartoum. The 
Linguistics Department is the official translating department endorsed by the 
government of Sudan. Although other researchers have used a professional 
translator whose mother tongue is English (Klepstad et al., 2002), it was not possible 
to have access to such a translator in Sudan. The back translation was discussed in 
a meeting between the researcher and the translator and changes were made to 
the Arabic version (Appendix 3-1).    
3.6.3 Face Validity of the Arabic MaPSaF 
In December 2009, a group consisting of two pharmacists and two nurses, who work as 
lecturers at the University of Medical Science and Technology (Khartoum), were invited to 
read and comment on the English and Arabic versions of the MaPSaF. Everyone was given 
the original English language tool and the translated version, a week before this meeting. 
The group recommended that the Arabic version to be used with nurses, because most are 
trained at nursing schools where the teaching is carried out in Arabic. Whereas because 
both doctors and pharmacists are taught in English when studying for their undergraduate 
qualifications and hence, the English version would be appropriate for these groups.  
 
 




The following recommendations were made: 
Arabic Version 
The participants involved in the validity exercise suggested that some of the Arabic 
sentences were too academic for nursing staff at RICK. Arabic is a complex language, with 
many regional colloquial variations, which have been incorporated into the mainstream 
Arabic that is spoken in Sudan. The group suggested some colloquial terms that were 
subsequently discussed with the professional translator and a final format was agreed 
(Appendix 3-2).  
English Version 
The English version was found to be acceptable but certain terminologies, which were 
unique to the English culture, were thought to be ambiguous and required further 
explanation by the researcher, were removed. These were: (Appendix 3-3):   
• ‘skeletons in the cupboard’ 
• ‘brush under the carpet’ 
This exercise was also used to test the feasibility of the MaPSaF and 60- 90 minute meetings 
were considered suitable to conduct the focus groups. 
3.6.4 Sample, recruitment and procedures 
The focus group interviews were conducted in the main hospital building of the cancer 
centre. Morgan (1997) recommends conducting three to five focus groups, depending on 
the nature of the study and the people involved.  Since this study was of an exploratory 
nature, aiming to understand Patient Safety Culture among staff in direct contact with 
patients, it was decided that discussions should be carried out with HCWs involved in the 
prescribing, dispensing and administration of chemotherapy. 
These were the nurses, doctors and pharmacists, with separate groups for each gender. 
Such homogeneity would allow participants to provide rich material during the discussions 
because, being of common backgrounds, they would have shared experiences and be less 
inhibited (Krueger, 1994). It was envisaged at this preliminary stage of the research, where 
the healthcare team dynamics were not fully understood, specifically and in societies who 
have a high masculinity index where males can dominate or even limit the scope of the 
conversation (Hofstede et al., 1991), that single gender groups would be justified. Separate 




gender groups may be conducted when discussions are expected to probe sensitive matters 
(Morgan, 1997). Given the toxicity profile of chemotherapy (Hemminki et al., 1985;Selevan 
et al., 1985;Barton et al., 2013;Dranitsaris et al., 2005), it was anticipated that discussions 
regarding reproductive safety during the manipulation of these agents would arise. Hence, 
as a precautionary measure and to ensure that focus group participants experienced little 
inhibitions during discussions, groups were conducted with single genders. 
Purposive sampling, a standard technique followed in focus groups, was used (Morgan, 
1997), because generalisability was not a desired outcome of this study (Barbour et al., 
1998;Huston et al., 2008;Krueger, 1994;Morgan, 1997). To ensure that participants had 
maximal experience in using chemotherapy and would be able to recall their experiences, 
HCWs with at least two years’ experience in the cancer centre, were approached. There is 
little consensus about the optimal size for a focus group, with some experts advocating 
group sizes ranging from 6-8 (Krueger, 1994) to 8-12 individuals (Barbour et al., 1998), but 
the number of participants may be as few as 3 (Barbour et al., 1998) to 4 (Krueger, 1994). A 
minimum number of four participants in each group was chosen because these participants 
could be accommodated in the restricted space available and the time constraints placed 
on staff at the cancer centre. 
It was aimed to recruit participants from each department who had different 
responsibilities to ensure diversity of experience, but to ensure that they are of similar grade 
to allow uninhibited discussions. 
After discussion with the research supervisors, it was agreed that verbal consent would be 
appropriate at this early stage of the research, following the process outlined in Chapter 2. 
Each group of HCWs were given a PIL (Appendices 3-4 and 3-6) and consent form 
(Appendices 3-5 and 3-7). to read and sign upon agreement as outlined in chapter 2.  
Pharmacists’ Focus Group 
At the time of this study, RICK pharmacy employed a total of 17 pharmacists, 12 working in 
the three dispensaries, 3 clinical pharmacists and 2 pharmacists who worked in a managerial 
position. The three dispensaries were: 
• Outpatient dispensary 
• Inpatient dispensary 
• Community pharmacy 




The clinical pharmacists worked in rotations and participated in consultant-led ward rounds, 
clinical meetings as well as medical and nursing staff education. Clinical pharmacists 
supervised nursing staff at the chemotherapy administration unit as well as running the 
medicine information centre. A total of 15 pharmacists were eligible to take part in this 
study. The female pharmacists focus group was the first to be held on the 1st March 2010 
and was conducted in the Medicines Information Centre. Male pharmacists chose the 
community pharmacy office for their focus group, which was conducted on 19th August 
2010. 
Nurses Focus Group 
During 2010, when this project was carried out, the wards were run by two matrons and 26 
nurses, who worked in shifts between the various wards. A total of 26 nurses were eligible 
to participate in the study because the study targeted nurses at the forefront of patient care 
rather than managerial level. Two separate gender groups were recruited; four female 
nurses and four male nurses. It became clear, after the first focus group, that conducting 
sessions with a larger number of participants was not possible, because of the nurses’ work 
schedules; groups of 4 were considered to be a reasonable focus group size in this setting. 
The female nurses focus group was conducted on 8th March 2010, at the nurses’ office, 
situated on the inpatient wards. The male nurses focus group was conducted on 16th August 
2010, in the palliative care nursing office.  It is worthwhile to note that no major changes 
had taken place during the intervening time which would invalidate the findings from this 
focus group. 
 Doctors Focus Groups 
At the time of conducting this research five consultant units were running clinics at RICK. 
Each senior consultant had a team that consisted of 1-4 consultants, 1-4 registrars and 2 
junior doctors, according to the patient load. All the doctors, with the exception of the junior 
doctors, were involved in assessing out-patients and prescribing chemotherapy. It was 
intended to run two gender based groups represented by a range of staff:  registrars (n=6), 
junior consultants (n=4) and recently qualified consultants (n=3). The acute consultants had 
been qualified for one year whereas the junior consultants had been qualified for over three 
years but remained part of another consultant’s team. To obtain participants with a variety 
of backgrounds, two senior consultants and two junior consultants were approached to 
participate in the female group, which was conducted on 15th March in the female doctors’ 
mess. It was only possible to recruit male doctors for their focus group interview on 19th 




August.  The focus group was conducted in the male doctors’ mess. This group consisted of 
registrars only because they weren’t included in the female doctors group and it was 
thought that they would give valuable insight into training and practice. 
3.6.5  Focus Group protocol  
The NPSA published an online guide for facilitators using the MaPSaF, to direct the focus 
group research in healthcare (NPSA, 2006). 
Participants were asked to choose a location that was suitably furnished to allow 
participants to see each other’s faces and where interruptions would not occur. All 
participants agreed that a lunchtime meeting would be most appropriate where 
refreshments were provided. Participants were given the choice of using either the English 
or Arabic version of the MaPSaF. 
3.6.6 Moderators 
Kidd and Parshall (2000) recommend at least two members of the research team are 
present during focus group discussions, including preferably the principal researcher, to 
ensure that verbal and non-verbal exchanges are recorded in a robust manner. A moderator 
and assistant moderator were present in all the focus groups, each with different 
responsibilities (Table 3-3). The principal researcher moderated the discussion, while an 
academic colleague, who had been involved in initial meetings to validate the tool, acted as 
the assistant moderator.  The main role of the moderator was to steer the discussion 
towards the aims of the interview and maintain the interest of the group. Whereas the 
assistant moderator organized the seating plan, recorded the discussion using a tape 












Table 3-3 Tasks assigned to focus group moderators 
Moderator Assistant moderator 
• Welcoming the group • Distribute the food and 
refreshments 
• Presenting information about the 
purposes of the interview. 
• Draw a seating plan for all 
participants of the focus group 
• Explaining the role of each member of 
the group. 
• Distribute and collect the required 
paperwork 
• Assisting participants in understanding 
the elements of the MaPSaF 
• Monitor time and tape recorder  
• Facilitating the discussion  
• Taking notes during the focus group  
 
The focus group sessions were conducted in the following manner: 
1. The moderator thanked the participants for agreeing to be involved in the focus 
group.  
2. The moderator presented a ten-minute introduction to the MaPSaF and an 
overview of the session, including what was expected of the participants (Appendix 
3-8).  
3. Permission to tape record the conversations was obtained from all the participants. 
4. The MaPSaF was distributed amongst the participants. 
5. The group was given 20 minutes to read the MaPSaF sheets and asked to circle on 
the evaluation sheet the level which best described their team and the one which 
corresponded with the organization (Appendix 3-9 for the English evaluation form 
and Appendix 3-10 for the Arabic evaluation form).  
6. Each member of the group was subsequently asked to confer with the person 
sitting closest to them to allow the participants to compare their evaluations and 
record the reasons why they chose them.  
7. The last step involved engaging the group in discussions around the choices they 
had made. The notes written down by each pair were collected and both 




evaluations and notes were written on a flip chart and participants were asked to 
discuss the reasons for their choices.  
3.6.7 Data management and analysis 
After obtaining consent from focus group participants, a tape recorder was used to record 
each of the sessions. Both audio-taping and verbatim transcribing are considered standard 
practice when documenting discussions during focus group interviews (Krueger, 1994). 
However, audio recording is more accurate and convenient because it allows further 
verification of conversations by repeated listening and doesn’t distract the moderator from 
steering the interview. 
The moderator and assistant moderator met after each focus group, to discuss participant 
notes, moderator notes and tape recordings, and label them appropriately. Initially the 
recorded data were listened to repeatedly by the principal researcher and transcribed 
verbatim in the Arabic language. The recordings were given to a second member of the 
research team to validate the accuracy of the transcriptions. The Arabic transcript was 
translated into English language for purposes of analysis using the methodology outlined in 
chapter 2.  
The English transcripts were studied in detail by the principal researcher and key themes 
and categories were identified using the directed approach for content analysis.  
Transcribed interviews were entered into NVIVO; a qualitative analysis software system for 
storage and coding. Frame work Analysis, as described by Richie and Spencer (1980), was 
used for analysis of the results. Richie and Spencer (Richie et al., 2003) describe this method 
as: 
“Thematic framework is used to classify and organize data according to key themes, 
concepts and emergent categories. As such each study has a distinct thematic 
framework comprising a series of main themes subdivided by a succession of related 
subtopics. These evolve and are refined through familiarization with the raw data 
and cross-sectional labeling. Once it is judged to be comprehensive, each main 
theme is displayed or charted in its own matrix where every respondent is allowed 
a row and each column denotes a separate sub-topic” (Richie, 2003 p 220) 
Framework analysis has been extensively used in patient safety research (Duncan et al., 
2012;Schwappach et al., 2010;Schwappach et al., 2012;Williams et al., 2013;Watson et al., 




2006;Lesar et al., 2007;Taxis et al., 2003a;Ashcroft et al., 2005). It is an analytical method 
which is suited to the analysis of qualitative data that covers similar topics and themes and 
provides a method for achieving a holistic description of the data. However, its major 
drawback is its limitation in the analysis of heterogeneous data. 
Findings from the safety culture maturity scoring exercise were reported using MaPSaF 
dimensions. However, and in view of the findings of this research (Section 3.7), and after 
discussion with the PhD supervisors, it was decided that it would not be conducive to map 
themes emerging from the focus group discussion to the MaPSaF. Instead, these were 
mapped to Reason’s (1997) components of an “informed culture” as detailed in Table 3-4. 
Such a culture exists when leadership and staff report errors (a reporting culture), where 
leadership understands when a safety incident is intentional or non-intentional (just 
culture) and where those errors are used constructively in future learning activities. An 
important dimension to a safety culture is seen as the ability for hierarchies to flatten in 
times of need, where the expertise of individuals is sought by leadership.  
 
Table 3-4 Themes of safety culture (Reason 1997 p 195-196) 
General Theme Definition 
Reporting 
 
An organizational culture in which people are prepared to report 
errors and near misses. 
 
Just An environment of trust where people are actively encouraged to 
report their safety concerns without fear of scapegoating or 
retribution, whilst at the same time recognising the difference 
between intentional and unintentional safe acts. 
 
Flexible A climate that adapts to changing demands and involves a shift in 
hierarchies that allows control to pass to experts at the frontline. 
 
Learning An environment that supports feedback to all staff as a result of error 




The overarching safe culture where those who manage and operate 
the system have current knowledge about the human, technical, 
organizational and environmental factors that determine the safety 
of the system as a whole. 
 
 





A total of six focus groups were conducted with 4 participants in each. Hence there were 24 
HCWs included in the study (Table 3-5). 
 The pharmacist focus group was conducted as planned but the plan for the nurses and 
doctors’ groups had to undergo modifications to accommodate nurse work schedule, 
doctors’ examinations and other issues. When conducting the female doctors group, the 
registrars were sitting their examinations, and they indicated that they would not have time 
to participate in a focus group. Therefore, it was only possible to conduct a discussion group 
with consultants. Since the female doctors group was only composed of consultants, it was 
decided to recruit only registrars to the male doctors group.  Table 3-5 provides details of 
the composition of these groups. 
Table 3-5 Composition of focus groups 
Focus 
Groups 
Composition of groups 
 Female Male 
Pharmacists 1 dispensary pharmacist, 2 
clinical pharmacists and 1 
department supervisor 
 
1 outpatient dispensary pharmacist, 2 
inpatient pharmacists and 1 department 
supervisor 
Doctors 2 senior consultants,2 acute 
consultants 
 
2 senior registrars and 2 junior registrars 
Nurses  1 chemotherapy day nurse 
and 3 ward nurses 
1 chemotherapy day nurse, 2 ward 
nurses, 1 specialist nurse 
  
Results of MaPSaF Scoring 
The three focus groups rated the ten dimensions of the MaPSaF mostly, at the lowest level 
of maturity -reactive and pathological (Table 3-6). The pharmacists’ group rated their own 
at different levels of maturity to the organization, rating the latter at a lower level to their 
own team. For example, pharmacists rated the team’s priority to safety as reactive whilst 
that of the organization as pathological. Both doctors and nurses rated both their own 




teams and the organization at the same level of maturity at each of the ten MaPSaF 
dimensions, hence table 3-6 shows one column for both team and organization. Although 
none of the groups rated the dimensions at the higher maturity levels (bureaucratic, pro-
active and generative), it is noteworthy that nurses rated all ten dimensions as pathological.  
Results of the Focus groups 
Focus group discussions were mapped according to Reason’s dimensions of safety culture 
and further analysed to reveal components of these general themes, as listed in table 3-7.  
When analysing the quotes, several situations were described in which HCWs perceived 
they felt encouraged to report an error, which were subdivided as components of a 
“reporting” culture. Error reporting was not according to organizational systems but 
occurred in several situations due to individual initiatives, when there was involvement of 
external bodies, when they were assured of confidentiality and when they felt they were 
required to resolve a problem with a specific patient. Other situations which discouraged 
HCWs from reporting were lack of knowledge about reporting systems, near misses, failure 
to recognise errors, confrontations and blame, which was illustrated with examples of 
disrepute and punishment. During the conversations, accounts of some errors were 
mentioned. 
 Conversations mapped to a “Flexible” culture identified themes that were key issues 
contributing to shifts in hierarchies such as team-working and communication. 
During focus group discussions, instances where participants learned from errors were 
mapped as subthemes of a “learning” culture. None of the participants were able to recall 
incidents where they had learned from errors in a systematic manner; however, on an 
individual basis, participants observed the situations where their colleagues were involved 
in an error and used wisdom to avoid falling into similar traps. 
Much discussion involved the human factors that can lead to errors and these were mapped 
as components of an “informed” culture. Issues that were discussed focused on the role of 
leadership in the organization; human, technical, organizational and environmental sub-
themes were identified.   




Table 3-6 Safety culture scoring among focus groups using the MaPSaF 
MaPSaF Dimension Focus Groups 
Pharmacists Doctors* Nurses* 
Team Organization 
Commitment to overall continuous improvement R R R P 
Priority given to safety  R P R P 
System errors and individual responsibility R R P P 
Recording incidents and best practice P P P P 
Evaluating incidents and best practice P P P P 
Learning and effecting change R P P P 
Communication about safety incidents R P P P 
Personnel management and safety issues R P R P 
Staff education and training R R R P 
Team working R P R P 
*Doctor and nurse focus groups rated both the team and the organization at the same level 
Abbreviations: P: Pathological; R: Reactive.  
    
 




Table 3-7 Themes emerging from focus group discussions 
General Theme Components Examples 
Reporting Ease of reporting Enablers: External body involvement, resolution of problem, individual initiatives 
Disablers: Knowledge of reporting systems, near misses, recognition of errors  
Confidentiality Confidential, confrontational 
 






Actions Intentions, work systems, violation 
 
Consequences Patient harm, risk of errors 
 
 
Flexible Team working Hierarchy, trust, job descriptions 
 
Communication Top-down, lack of communication 
 
 
Learning Experience Informal observations 
 
  
Informed  Leadership Human- employee wellbeing, self-esteem,  
Organizational- job descriptions, procedures 
Environment- Busy work environment, disorganization 
Resources- equipment, training 





The themes related to reported, emerging from focus group discussions were categorised 
into three further components, ease of reporting, confidentiality and response to reported 
incidents. 
3.7.1.1 Ease of reporting 
Focus group participants discussed factors that they perceived enablers to reporting 
incidents or factors that prevented HCWs from reporting errors. The latter were categorised 
as disablers of reporting. 
Enablers 
Involvement of external bodies 
Focus group participants explained that some hospital departments had good reporting 
systems because they were audited by an international agency such as the International 
Atomic Agency (IAA).  Group discussions explained that the hospital management would 
only recognise errors when there was a risk that the Ministry of health would be involved.  
Such error reporting enabling aspects were only mentioned by doctors and pharmacists and 
not by any of the nurses. For example 
“They (Physics department) have that international association, yeah the IAA, to 
assist them and make sure that their procedures are up to date. If it wasn’t for that 
.... what do you call it? that IAA, they wouldn’t be so complete” (Consultant A Focus 
Group 3) 
“…… if news has reached the Ministry of Health, the whole hospital starts to do 
something. There are other things that would start the development of work 
processes, such as: when an important patient is involved or a minister comes with 
a co-patient or a patient………This is how we do our work here, so it’s like we need a 
clip around the ears to do anything.”  (Pharmacist C Focus Group 5) 
Resolution of problems 
Both female and male nurses in particular expressed the view that in the event of an error 
occurring, in order to reduce harm and save the patient from complications, they may 
report their error to others who they saw as allies and being more knowledgeable than 
themselves. The purpose of reporting in this example was to resolve problems and thus the 
approach used would be informal and on a personal basis.  Examples from the nurses are: 




“If I make a mistake, I just go to pharmacy and nobody needs to know about it” 
(Nurse D Focus Group 2) 
“No one is immune to making mistakes but why would you contact management 
about that. You need to know what the error is and how to handle the error and 
how to save the patient from the complications. That’s all.” (Nurse A Focus Group 
6) 
“so, I went and found out what to do and how to fix it because I don’t want to harm 
the patient, and in such an instance, I mostly know how to have a quick fix. I have 
my own fixes, yes, I do. I know when I need to contact the consultant or contact the 
pharmacy.” (Nurse B Focus Group 6) 
Individual initiatives 
Although all HCWs explained that they have no knowledge about incident reporting 
systems, two focus group participants described that they have sometimes felt it was 
necessary to report a safety incident in a formal manner. In the two situations described 
below, the HCWs felt that their colleagues dealt with the matter with mistrust, manifested 
by surprised looks and aggressive behaviour. None of the nurses were able to give examples 
of when they were involved in any sort of formal error reporting.  
“When I was a new doctor at RICK, there was a medical error on the ward. I enquired 
if there was an incident reporting form and all I got were looks of surprise. So, I 
wrote a letter to the nurse in charge and the Chief Executive (CE) of the hospital and 
copied in his deputy detailing the incident….” (Registrar B Focus Group 4) 
 In another situation, a patient returned a vial of cytotoxic medicine and told the pharmacist 
that there was something wrong with the vial. 
“......I said to the patient that the nurse needs to report this to the senior nurse. That 
they should write to me an official letter saying that this injection was faulty before 
they opened it.  Would you believe it, the nurse came (a few minutes later) into the 
pharmacy and tried to strangle me, shouting we aren’t thieves man, we aren’t this 









Knowledge of reporting systems 
A lack of knowledge regarding hospital incident reporting systems emerged from focus 
group discussions among all the healthcare teams. However, female nurses assumed that 
these systems must be in place but attributed their ignorance to poor communication by 
senior management. For example: 
“Policies? There aren’t any. Or am I mistaken (directing this to other participants in 
the group)?” (Nurse C Focus Group 2) 
“They (management) must have discussed them (the safety policies) in their 
meetings. We know that they have regular meetings upstairs in the office but no 
one tells us anything, we don’t even know what these meetings are about….” (Nurse 
B Focus Group 2) 
“…. I don’t personally know who to inform when an error occurs” (Registrar A Focus 
Group 4) 
Near misses 
Another obstacle to error reporting was near misses. A male doctor explained that if the 
error was recognized early enough and corrected, it would be more constructive to deal 
with it at a personal level rather than involving management, as explained below: 
“We had an incident last week when a nurse weighed the patient incorrectly. He 
recorded a weight of 95kg but the patient looked too thin to weigh that much, so I 
asked the nurse to re-weigh the patient and there was a 30kg difference. The patient 
was receiving intensive chemotherapy with high doses and such an error could have 
been very dangerous. Instead of reporting this anywhere, I took the nurse aside and 
talked to him saying things like “you should be more careful” and “I know that you 
used to be reliable.” (Registrar B Focus Group 4) 
Recognition of errors 
Although formal error reporting systems were not recognized, some HCWs did report errors 
using verbal and written methods. However, several reasons for poor reporting were 
proposed. Nurses suggested that some individuals may not be aware that they had 
committed an error and therefore would not see the need to report their actions, whilst 
doctors attributed poor error reporting to incomplete patient notes, which would make it 




impossible in some situations to identify whether an error had occurred. Below are 
examples from the nurses’ and doctors’ discussions.  
“But does everybody know that they have made an error, some may not even know 
that they have made an error? That’s happened to me before, yes me the same 
person sitting in front of you. I didn’t know I had made an error but one of the other 
nurses pointed it out to me” (Nurse B Focus Group 6)  
“The basics of safety are missing, the patients’ notes are incomplete most of the 
time and hence if a problem arises, no one knows what the cause is. We need 
systems to ensure safety and to be able to identify safety issues.” (Registrar B Focus 
Group 4) 
3.7.1.2 Confidentiality  
Both nurses and doctors felt that confrontation in front of other HCWs and patients was 
damaging. Doctors implied that confidentiality was important and conducive to reporting 
of errors. For Example: 
“… Pharmacist (X) was very aggressive.  If any of us were involved in an error (X) 
would come into the clinic with the prescription in her hand and start shouting. No 
one likes being shouted out in front of others and not in a general clinic.” 
(Consultant A Focus Group 3) 
 A nurse explained that other nurses may feel resentful if they are corrected in front of other 
staff and patients. Below is an example. 
 “Not everyone listens, some people may resent being told how to do their job. Not 
all people are the same and it also depends on the way they are being told. So, if 
you call me into the office and speak to me nicely, that would be different from when 
you shout at me in the ward.” (Nurse B Focus Group 6) 
3.7.1.3 Response to reported incidents 
Errors were handled in a number of different ways both by the hospital management, by 
staff and sometimes the patient. It was implied that although most error reports were 









All focus group participants revealed that they felt uneasy when they had been involved in 
reporting an error, they indicated they were met with unfair treatment. Punishments were 
either in the form of disciplinary action or verbal reprimands.  
 “If I made a mistake, then the matron will investigate this and will start disciplinary 
action against me” (Nurse B Focus Group 2) 
“… when we were in chemotherapy, one of the students made the mistake of mixing 
cisplatin with adriamycin in one bag. I recognised there was a problem, when I saw 
the amount of drug in the infusion bottle and there was also some medicine spilt on 
the floor. I contacted the pharmacy straight away and showed them what 
happened. The pharmacy said we should get the nurse to pay for the medicine.” 
(Nurse B Focus Group 6) 
Some participants proposed that punitive action is an effective approach to error 
prevention. Below is an illustration of this: 
“They (nurses) don’t understand instructions. They would ignore the written 
instructions to give the patient hydration………. If the administration has a working 
punishment system so when people work they would know they are held 
accountable for what they do, only then we would have safe systems” (Pharmacist 
B Focus Group 1) 
However, nurses particularly expressed that a better approach to error prevention would 
be to provide support to staff who admit to their own error, as explained below: 
“there is a difference if the error was reported by the co-patient or by the patient 
than when the nurse goes to the management and reported their own errors. If the 
nurse reports their own error, I would think the management would stand by him 
and support him and solve the problem and in the end, there is a solution to every 
problem.” (Nurse B Focus Group 2) 
Reputation  
Male doctors and nurses on more than one occasion expressed concern that reporting of 
errors was avoided because HCWs felt that it may affect their reputation. These opinions 
were not shared by other groups but appeared to identify several aspects; the reputation 
of colleagues, the reputation of the whole organization and personal and individual 
reputation.  




A male nurse explained that it was important to avoid bringing shame and disrepute to 
fellow HCWs when an error occurs, because errors can be managed without exposing those 
who are involved. An example quote is detailed below.   
“I can’t say to a patient that the pharmacist has given them the wrong medicines, 
Isn’t that, right? I will take the medicine myself back to the pharmacy. That’s what 
we do. I take the medicine back to the pharmacy and tell them what the problem is. 
………never show the patient what had happened, otherwise they would lose faith in 
the medicines. We just take the medicine very quietly to the pharmacy and never 
say anything that would reflect a bad picture of our colleagues, because this is the 
reputation of the hospital and in the end, this pharmacist is our colleague.” (Nurse 
B Focus Group 6) 
A male doctor described how, when an error was reported, this may affect his future as a 
medical practitioner. This was because this information could be communicated to others 
and the one bad incident might therefore tarnish the doctor’s reputation in the future. 
“We also work and live in a small circle and when word gets around that a certain 
doctor was involved in an error, people will never forget.” (Registrar A Focus Group 
4) 
Another reason for purposefully concealing an error was reported to be personal ego as 
illustrated in the quote below from male nurse.  
“But there are people who keep quiet about it. They are big-headed and can’t take 
instructions from any one……………, so they just keep quiet” (Nurse B Focus Group 
6) 
Errors are ignored 
All groups of HCWs described experiences where management ignored the informal 
methods of error reporting, practiced at the centre. Below are two typical opinions from a 
female pharmacist and a male doctor. 
 “….. the deputy manager may look concerned but he won’t do anything about it” 
(Pharmacist C Focus Group 1) 
“I don’t think that anyone in this hospital would take an error seriously…….” 
(Registrar A Focus Group 4) 




A male doctor wrote a number of incident reports but felt that management disregarded 
his efforts and consequently he stopped reporting errors. He explained: 
“I didn’t receive a response to my letter. I continued to write reports of incidents for 
a whole year afterwards but eventually stopped when all were ignored………………. 
So now I will just sort out the problem myself and not get anyone from management 
involved. I don’t care anymore.” (Registrar B Focus Group 4) 
Nurses perceived that there were simple technical reasons why errors were ignored by 
management, whereas most doctors perceived the reasons for concealing errors were not 
necessarily innocent.  Nurses indicated that the busy and disorganized work environments 
were the main reasons that prevented management from investigating an error properly. 
For example: 
“There is never any follow up to errors in chemotherapy. How would you follow up 
anything? The wards are not organized. The number of patients is too high and the 
number of staff hardly covers them.” (Nurse B Focus Group 6) 
But doctors felt that management ignored errors as part of a well-conceived plan to cover 
up because they were also responsible and ultimately accountable for those errors. This is 
explained in a number of quotes below: 
“When I used to raise, the issues surrounding an error, I found that it used to stop 
at the chief nurse, the medical manager or the human resources manager. I 
discovered lately that senior members of staff are involved in similar errors.” 
(Registrar B Focus Group 4) 
“People cover up for each other because they know that they have either been 
previously involved in the error themselves or will be involved in an error in the 
future.” (Registrar C Focus Group 4) 
In one incident, an inquiry was set up by the Ministry of Health to investigate the causes of 
machine breakdowns at the hospital. According to the accounts from male doctors, the 
investigation took nearly three months and involved personnel from National Security. 
However, none of the HCWs were aware of the final findings from the investigation. Below 
are illustrative quotes. 
“…. the radiotherapy problem was raised to the Minister of Health and then onto 
the presidency office and as a result, an investigation team was sent to the hospital. 




The investigation team was from National Security and they decided to come and 
spend three months in the hospital dressed as normal patients or co-patients.” 
(Registrar B Focus Group 4)  
“We haven’t heard anything from that “report”, we think it was stopped 
at the presidency office because the names mentioned are in close alliance 
with the governing party” (Registrar C Focus Group 4) 
3.7.2 Just culture 
Themes from focus group discussion were mapped to requirements of a just culture. The 
intentions of the HCW in provision of care were discussed. Focus group participants 
discussed the requirements they needed for appropriate actions (good patient care) and 
provided examples of when known work practices are violated. Some examples of 
consequences of errors were described by participants  
3.7.2.1 Intentions 
Discussions from focus groups revealed that, although the intentions of most HCWs were 
to provide the best care to patients.  Examples from these focus groups were: 
“We are concerned with patient safety first of all, for all nurses the patient safety 
issue is very important to us all because we are always with the patient. We are very 
concerned here, the patient who comes to us is not well to start off with and it’s our 
responsibility to make sure that they are safe and receiving the best type of care. 
We have to ensure everything is in order …” (Nurse A Focus Group 6) 
“Patient safety is very important to us because we double check the prescription, we 
make sure to place an administration sheet (in the patient’s clinical notes)” 
(Pharmacist B Focus Group 1) 
“…… but our aim is to provide patient care and to receive training” (Registrar B 
Focus Group 4)  
3.7.2.2 Actions 
Work systems 
Focus group participants explained that some elements were essential for good patient 
care: training, the work environment, tools, equipment, quality health systems, procedures 




and policies. However, the discussions revealed that for much of the time these elements 
were either disorganized, inadequate or both. 
“They (senior doctors) tell us what to do and how to do. I don’t know of a job 
description; I mean we don’t have one.” (Registrar B Focus Group 3)  
“We in the private wing don’t have a wash basin, how can we talk about safety and 
about quality, How? If nurses don’t have access to a wash basin to wash their hands. 
I have to wash my hands in the toilet, and that’s where I wash for my prayers and 
wash my hands in the toilet before I can eat my breakfast and before I can deal with 
a patient. You know? Why? Where does quality start? I would like to know?”  (Nurse 
B Focus Group 6) 
“They brought that (pointing to the cytotoxic waste box) in some time ago and once 
that is full they should come and replace it,………. It’s overflowing now, I suppose, 
one of them should come on a weekly basis to check the boxes and replace them if 
need be.” (Nurse C Focus Group 6) 
“We have not had a simulator in the radiotherapy department for more than a year, 
which is very dangerous for patients. Patients who need radiotherapy treatment 
must have their sessions planned under a simulator to make sure that the vital 
organs are protected. Because we don’t have a simulator, we end up carrying out 
the planning manually and patients suffer from damage that is easily avoidable” 
(Registrar C Focus Group 4) 
Violations 
All focus groups had concerns about violations of work systems which they thought 
contributed to poor overall quality and errors. Examples of these violations were taking 
“short cuts” and poor documentation  
Discussions revealed that some nurses use “short cuts” without understanding the 
consequences of their actions. They would intentionally ignore written instructions leading 
to patients missing essential treatment.  
If they see a patient with more iv fluids than drugs, they will give the easiest and 
only give the drugs and the patient may miss out on the iv fluids. That could be 
dangerous, but they don’t know because no one told them of the importance of 




giving iv fluids to a patient on ‘chemo’. They don’t even understand the effect of 
these fluids on the patient’s health….” (Nurse B Focus Group 6) 
3.7.2.3 Consequences 
Neither participants in the pharmacist nor nurse focus groups could give examples of 
situations when patients were harmed or were exposed to risk of errors. However, some of 
these cases were described by female doctors and male doctors. The section below presents 
some examples of harmful consequences that transpired from unsafe acts  
Patient Harm 
In one instance a patient was harmed because the consultant wrote the same prescription 
for a patient, two weeks in a row. This chemotherapy should be given at three weekly 
intervals and the doctor did not realize that the dose was not due. The patient received the 
medicine and suffered serious side effects.  
“…one of the senior consultants wrote the drug for the patient two weeks in a row. 
This patient came in with severe side effects and was very unwell. The consultant 
asked her how she got the drugs and when she told him it was “you” (meaning the 
consultant, the doctor pointed with her finger at the air enacting the patient’s 
action) ……” (Consultant A Focus Group 3) 
Risk of errors 
Both female and male doctors thought that errors and missing data in the hospital’s patient 
medical records contributed to compromising patient care. The absence of appropriate 
documentation in patient medical records meant that errors may be missed and that 
information is mostly incomplete. Doctors in this situation expressed their frustration 
because they had to obtain essential medical information from patients who may be in a 
critical condition and hence unable to provide a comprehensive history. An example is given 
below 
“…. I was called to see a patient last week, but I looked through the file to discover 
that he is not in my team and that there are no records of why he was admitted. I 
was able to find out this information from the patient and not from the file. I think 
that this is unacceptable and everyone is exhausted from the lack of proper systems 
of work” (Registrar A Focus Group 4) 




3.7.3 Flexible culture 
All groups perceived that teamwork was ineffective within the hospital because of the lack 
of team dynamics, job descriptions and ineffective communication.   
Team work 
Participants provided insight into the nature of teamwork at the cancer centre. Nurses 
perceived that teamwork did not exist within the hospital or within the nursing teams 
themselves. However, there were isolated situations where teamwork was evident but this 
was dependent on the individuals involved rather than work systems. Below are typical 
quotes:  
“……………. nurses don’t work together here. Everyone does their own thing and no 
one asks you unless there is a problem.” (Nurse C Focus Group 2) 
“This depends on how people act and their personalities, because this is the type of 
job that needs more than one person’s input” (Nurse A Focus Group 6) 
Conversations revealed that the precise role of each individual in the team was felt to be ill-
defined. A typical quote from male pharmacists’ discussions is detailed below. 
“…team work to me is just like a football game, with everyone knowing their precise 
role. They should all work together to achieve the objective, but here our roles are 
not precise and not known. We would like to help each other; we would like to 
cooperate but not many know what their precise role is in achieving the desired 
objective………I still feel a bit lost in the pharmacy not knowing which jobs of the 
pharmacy have been allocated to who? Who would be responsible for certain tasks? 
We have started distributing tasks and responsibilities but I still can’t see a clear 
picture. I think it would take time” (Pharmacist B Focus Group 5) 
Team hierarchies were described as rigid without flexibility, where the interventions of 
juniors were ignored and the orders from senior doctors are implemented. One particularly 
unsafe situation was described by a male doctor, where a senior consultant intentionally 
wrote a prescription for a highly toxic drug to treat a non-chemo sensitive disease, but 
refused to listen to an intervention from the junior doctor:  
““You think that we should be respected as doctors but the senior consultants don’t 
count us as members of a team. ……… he (senior consultant) insisted on giving the 
patient a drug that is very toxic and not effective. When I suggested to him to change 




the therapy, he had a go at me and said the patient was his and that he could easily 
put a knife to his throat and no one can argue with him about that.” (Registrar C 
Focus Group 4) 
All healthcare teams revealed that they lacked trust in each other. However, there were 
specific trust issues with respect to nursing staff, where examples of suspicions of bribery 
and inappropriate behaviour were described in the discussions. Typical quotes from male 
pharmacists’ and male nurses’ discussions are described below.      
“Some departments are ready to co-operate. If you want to help bring the medicines 
from the pharmacy to a patient on the ward, they think you are receiving money 
‘under the table’. You know, there are a few.......... a few especially in the pharmacy. 
I mean there are people who reflect a bad picture of their colleagues” (Nurse B 
Focus Group 6) 
“Yeah, Dr X once said it to me in front of Dr Y. It was actually a patient of Dr Y’s that 
he had phoned to tell me about and see what I could do to help her. I helped her 
with her paperwork and when Dr X saw me he said: (Oh you are always chaperoning 
a pretty girl). I got very angry with him, I said to him I am free to do whatever I want, 
be a co-patient, or anything, I am free to do as I want…” (Nurse B Focus Group 6) 
3.7.3.1 Communication 
Breakdowns in communication between HCWs had the potential to lead to tense work 
relationships, arguments and errors. Two male doctors described how the hierarchical 
communication led to a confrontation with management. 
“We came one morning and discovered a letter posted on the door of the doctors’ 
mess with a timetable for our working hours. We convened in the office and decided 
unanimously to boycott the ‘on call’ shift and not work even if they paid us one 
thousand pounds a night. We all felt they had no respect for us.  We are registrars 
and pending consultants. This issue was mismanaged in a shameful way because 
when we went to the deputy chief he chucked us out of the office.” (Registrar C 
Focus Group 4) 
Focus group participants explained how hierarchical communication made them suspicious 
of management and led to loss of trust. This manner of communication was considered by 
male nurses to be a deterrent to discussing issues with management. In contrast, the female 
nurses thought this acceptable in a management relationship.  Below are typical quotes. 




“…. It should start at the bottom, that’s why what they do is mainly superficial and 
no one really takes notice. These people, they are sitting at the top and start at the 
top. They come passing through, but we keep our mouths shut and we don’t speak 
to them” (Nurse B Focus Group 6) 
“The head nurse and the matron are responsible for us and they should tell us what 
goes on in these meetings and what they are about” (Nurse D Focus Group 2) 
Failure in communication related to tasks and processes was common in the cancer centre 
and HCWs explained how this can sometimes lead to errors.  A pharmacist described a 
situation where there was a failure of communication with respect to changes in opioid 
recording procedures. He felt that this could have led to an error as described below: 
“I once came in and started dispensing morphine on a weekend and didn’t realise 
that they (dispensary staff) have changed the morphine dispensing procedure. 
Obviously, I recorded things wrongly and didn’t discover my mistake till two months 
later. I wasn’t with the staff the day before and hence missed out on this information 
and the change in procedure. I don’t know what you would call this, random 
processes, no system, I don’t know. …” (Pharmacist C Focus Group 5) 
3.7.4 Learning culture 
All healthcare teams described concealing errors and therefore as a consequence the team 
lost the opportunity to learn from such errors in a systematic manner.  
Informal observations 
Nurses and doctors in particular revealed that they observe the consequences of errors 
committed by colleagues and use them as a learning experience. However sometimes this 
method was ineffective as in the examples below.  
 “If a problem happens, then I would know what to do next time. ……., but before 
that we learnt from experience” (Nurse B Focus Group 2) 
“The team usually comes together to try and solve the problem and this is usually 
done on a personal level according to each doctor’s ideas or relationships with other 
departments. But I can’t guarantee that everyone would remember not to do that 
same error again” (Registrar B Focus Group 4) 




3.7.5 Informed Culture 
System inadequacies mentioned in focus group discussions were frequently attributed to 
poor management and issues with leadership. Focus group participants considered that 
essential human, organizational, technical and environmental factors were necessary for 
establishing a safety culture. They indicated that they considered that the hospital 
leadership prioritised quantity over quality. Typical quotes from both male and female 
nurse discussions are described below. 
 “Safety to patients!? The priority is that the patient has the ‘chemo’ and go.” (Nurse 
A Focus Group 6) 
“They don’t want to know about mistakes so why should we tell them. They want 
the work done whichever way – wrong or right as long as it’s done.” (Nurse A Focus 
Group 2) 
3.7.5.1 Human factors 
The low priority given to safety was reflected in other aspects of the staff’s wellbeing. 
Nurses in particular felt unsupported by their management as described below: 
“…but they don’t look at his environment, his circumstances, ok. Now if you have a 
labourer and you want to employ him, let’s suppose, any labourer, if you don’t treat 
him well, do you think you can trust him. No, you won’t trust him. Now if you employ 
someone, you need to take care of him, find out what his problems are and I mean 
all these people, they have families, they have problems, they have so much to worry 
about…. You solve the problems of your staff, and prepare a good emotional 
environment, train and then see” (Nurse B Focus Group 6) 
Low pay contributed to a general feeling of low self-esteem, resulting in nurses engaging in 
private work to supplement their salaries, leading them to neglect their tasks at the hospital. 
A typical quote from male nurse focus groups is detailed below. 
“You hear them say, they give me so much and I will work for their money’s worth 
and no more. In this type of work, if you don’t have your conscience in place and 
don’t have a sense of duty, and you work for the patient’s benefit, I mean put the 
patient’s benefit as number one priority, then you will never be able to work…. but 
they don’t consider them for job promotions, incentives and allowances. They don’t 
see how the nurse lives, their problems at home, all of that doesn’t matter. Ok, in 




these current living conditions, is anyone blind to how expensive the food has 
become. Ok? but people end up doing extra work and they say we have so and so…. 
(meaning they have private jobs in other hospitals and centres)” (Nurse B Focus 
Group 6)  
3.7.5.2 Organizational factors 
All focus group participants explained they were not aware of job descriptions. None of the 
participants in any of the healthcare teams had been given a job description but relied on 
being told what to do by others. Below are typical quotes: 
“There is no job description and hence anyone can do anything they feel, 
hypothetically speaking, someone might come in and do any job” (Pharmacist B 
Focus Group 5) 
Focus group participants explained that personal intuition, work ethics, and word of mouth 
were used to inform staff of what was expected of them. They had no knowledge of work- 
based procedures and protocols. Below is a typical quote from male nurses’ discussions. 
“There is a job description of some sort. They tell you what you have to know. But I 
haven’t seen anything in writing…. These are the code of ethics which has everything 
in it and the work regulations, regulations, code of ethics and performance; you tend 
to know what to do.” (Nurse B Focus Group 6) 
The lack of job descriptions resulted in job role and tasks being left to the HCW’s own 
interpretation, which meant that essential patient care was seen to be an extra burden and 
a source of stress. A typical quote from male nurse focus groups is shown below. 
“…we can assist them (patients), explain to them how to keep clean, how to eat well, 
........ .... if there are extra things and the patient has to have wound dressings, they 
need investigations every hour, also someone wanting some drugs that have to be 
given at certain times of the day, or they may be someone requiring chemotherapy 
or things like that, then that can cause stress. But, I don’t know we won’t ’short-
change’ the patient and will do the best we can and everything that we are able to 
do for that patient.” (Nurse B Focus Group 6) 
A doctor described how he thought the absence of job descriptions and appraisals 
prevented identification of incompetent members of staff. 




“We don’t have job descriptions or job appraisals. If there are job appraisals, certain 
management staff would have been found to be incompetent and stopped from 
working.” (Registrar D Focus Group 4) 
3.7.5.3 The work environment 
Error-provoking work environments were discussed at length during all the focus group 
discussions. Busy and disorganized work environments were considered by most 
participants in all focus groups to contribute to errors, or events that might lead to errors. 
Below is a typical quote from a female nurse. 
 “We used to have a table (paper record) where we recorded administration details. 
We use to draw that up ourselves but we don’t do that anymore…. we used to record 
the drugs we give to patients… We stopped recording because the wards were 
getting too busy.” (Nurse C Focus Group 2) 
Furthermore, busy and disorganized work environments were also considered to be a cause 
of tension to health care workers and conflict between doctors and patients. Below is a 
typical quote. 
 “Patients must know where to go and they should be given information and 
directions. During clinics, we get numerous interruptions from patients who want to 
know where the medical records are or where the lab is. We end up being short-
tempered and snap at people and make errors. The patients as well get agitated. 
Simple measures like a functional information desk and directions could make life 
easier for everyone. ….. These things are simple and you don’t need to carry out a 
study to identify them. We need a user-friendly hospital that is also subject to 
safeguards to improve quality.” (Registrar B Focus Group 4) 
Disorganized patient medical notes were identified as another cause of error, as illustrated 
below. 
“I honestly can see how errors could occur when prescribing chemotherapy. The 
patient files are badly designed, the records are all over the place and they usually 
look like a stack of cards. I am sure that most doctors are not able to read the whole 
patient history before prescribing and hence tend to guess.” (Registrar C Focus 
Group 4) 




3.7.5.4  Resources 
There was general concern about tools, equipment, availability of essential medicines, 
training and other quality systems that were identified as essential components of safe 
patient care. Deficiencies in equipment were identified by doctors as being caused by 
mismanagement of finances rather than scarcity of resources. A typical quote from a male 
doctor explained. 
“…. The management were unable to manage the finances in an efficient way and 
money was squandered on issues which were not of priority. The management team 
should prioritize patient care and fix the radiotherapy machines…” (Registrar B 
Focus Group 4) 
Emergency medicines were not always available on wards and one doctor provided an 
account of how this resulted in a patient’s death:   
“Even when there are improvements, things don’t last very long. About two years 
ago, I spoke with the chief executive of the hospital and the chief pharmacist about 
providing free emergency drugs for patients. We worked on a list of emergency 
resuscitation drugs and decided that we should place them in the doctors’ mess so 
that they can be freely accessed. That system was working well for a while but 
suddenly last week, I discovered that I have no access to emergency drugs. I haven’t 
been doing on call service for a while and I don’t know when this system fell apart. 
A patient had a cardiac arrest and he died because I didn’t have access to emergency 
drugs”  (Registrar B Focus Group 4) 
Among the focus groups who handled chemotherapy, the nurses and pharmacists had 
concerns with regards to waste management, because they perceived that the current 
systems were sporadic and un-sustained. This is described in the examples below. 
 “How can we talk safety?  Safety in chemotherapy, how is that? If there was safety, 
do you think the chemotherapy waste bin should be left lying about like this? 
Shouldn’t be like this, should it? …… If you come in here, you see the bins overflowing 
with chemotherapy, the vials all over the surface and syringes lying about on the 
table and sometimes next to the patient in the bed.” (Nurse A Focus Group 6) 
“ …. e.g. we had a problem with waste management in the … department......they 
just ignored it.”  (Pharmacist C Focus Group 5)  




Doctors and pharmacists had access to different training opportunities but this was ad hoc 
and was not based on a needs assessment. Focus group participants felt that few people 
had access to these training sessions and the benefits were not shared. Furthermore, the 
training had no direction because some doctors felt that they had a lack of basic medical 
training. In contrast nurses were unable to describe training opportunities available to them 
at the hospital.  Instead individuals sought training from other organizations as described in 
the quotes below. 
“there are lots of training but people go on courses and conferences and don’t come 
back with feedback. People from the physics department go on many training days 
but that is because it is external” (Pharmacist C Focus Group 1) 
“Yeah that’s fine, there’s lots of training but what is it based on. I don’t think that 
they have done a needs assessment to find out if there are areas of training that are 
more required that others and the training depends on personal initiatives. So, Dr X 
is keen on training and hence when he was responsible for training, there were 
regular training sessions. But usually people will go to the training session when it 
is available not when they need it” (Registrar A Focus Group 4) 
“The nurses need help with giving the ‘chemo’. .........Even the preparation of the 
drugs is a problem to some nurses. They don’t know what to dilute the drug with, 
dissolve in, or administer it in.............”  (Nurse A Focus Group 6) 
 
3.8  Discussion 
This qualitative study was conducted among 24 HCWs to explore their perceptions about 
PSC and to identify its implications for current practice. To our knowledge this is the first 
study of its kind to be conducted in a cancer hospital in a developing country.  Data collected 
in this study was mapped to Reason’s (1997) seven components, essential to establishment 
of a safety culture. Overall, the safety culture at the cancer hospital was perceived to be 
poorly developed. HCWs reported feeling unsupported, were unaware of patient safety 
systems and tended to hide errors because they were convinced that errors would be either 
ignored or dealt with in a punitive manner. Moreover, a lack of essential safety systems 
contributed to medication errors, frustration and low morale among the staff.  




Applying the MaPSaf as the framework for the current study enabled the identification of 
the cancer hospital’s safety culture as perceived by HCWs. The key weaknesses identified 
were: 
• An apparent absence of safety systems at RICK meant that the safety parameters 
developed by Parker (2009) as essential for PSC were rated by the participants 
consistently at the lower points on the scale. 
• Error reporting systems are not accessible to HCWs and, in instances of sporadic 
error reporting, there was no feedback and hence learning from errors was 
seemingly absent. 
• A culture of blame was shared among all HCWs leading to hiding of errors. 
• Poor communication meant that teamwork was weak and team hierarchies were 
described as rigid. 
Measuring PSC is important because it can both reveal how staff act towards safety 
incidents and identify areas of practice that require safety improvement (Nieva et al., 2003). 
A modified version of  MaPSaF had been used  to study baseline  PSC maturity in a general 
medicine setting and track its development after implementing a safety intervention across 
three hospitals in Sweden (Ohrn et al., 2011). Similar to the study hospital, some 
departments from the three hospitals initially rated their safety culture at low PSC maturity.  
Implementing a Patient Safety Dialogue intervention, based on EWRs, improved PSC over a 
five year period, with a change of 78% in general patient safety from baseline (Ohrn et al., 
2011).   
3.8.1 Error Reporting and Learning 
Findings from focus groups indicated that participants were unaware of systems of error 
reporting at the study hospital and when errors are reported, they are ignored, hidden or 
dealt with in a punitive manner. There are several consequences to this finding. Firstly, 
errors were not recognised by HCWs which meant that if an error occurred, corrective 
actions could not take place and patients would be at risk of increased harm. Secondly, 
because errors were not discussed, they were likely to be repeated in similar circumstances 
and thirdly, without formal error reporting, opportunities for learning from these errors in 
order to improve patient services were limited. It is not known whether error reporting 
systems exist in Sudan but there are published reports that Sudan Ministry of Health, in 
association with the WHO, Regional Office for EMRO, has established a patient safety 




system (Abdallah, 2011;WHO, 2012;Siddiqi et al., 2012). A study carried out in collaboration 
with the WHO across seven member countries of EMRO, including Sudan, aimed to set up 
the Patient Safety Friendly Hospital Initiative as a pilot to enable member states to establish 
a Patient Safety programme (Siddiqi et al., 2012). The pilot involved nominating a hospital 
which was subsequently assessed for level of patient safety according to five domains: 
leadership and management measures, patient and public involvement measures, safe 
evidence-based clinical practice measures, safe environment measures and life-long 
learning measures.  After completion of the assessment, the nominated hospital was given 
suggestions and recommendations on how to improve the total score, with a re-assessment 
after a specified period of time. The authors recommended that healthcare systems in 
member states should repeat this process in ten hospitals as a first step towards applying 
this initiative nationally. However, there has been no further published information to 
identify if this initiative was implemented nationally. HCWs at the study cancer hospital 
were not aware that such a system existed in their hospital.  
A review of 25 studies conducted in a Middle Eastern country, Iran, did not identify 
awareness about error reporting systems as a barrier to error reporting (Mansouri et al., 
2014). However, none of the studies aimed to assess staff awareness about the existence 
of reporting systems. Research conducted in Australia and the US has shown that some 
HCWs may not be aware of the presence of an error reporting system even when this was 
in place (Evans et al., 2006;Pronovost et al., 2003). A survey conducted in six South 
Australian hospitals among 186 doctors and 587 nurses revealed that 1.7% of staff were 
unaware of error reporting systems at their hospitals and that the main barrier to reporting 
was lack of feedback (Evans et al., 2006). Fewer doctors (46%) than nurses were aware of 
error reporting systems in a survey conducted among over 600 staff comprising doctors, 
nurses, pharmacists, managers and administrators in a 900 bed US hospital (Pronovost et 
al., 2003). 
HCWs have been reported to informally report and discuss errors with colleagues (Wu Aw, 
1991).  A survey of 254 house officers training at a US based academic tertiary care centre 
found that 54% of doctors discussed their errors with the senior clinician, even in the 
absence of a formal error reporting system (Wu Aw, 1991). 
Focus group discussions in the current study revealed that when near misses occurred at 
the cancer centre, the individuals concerned did not identify a need for reporting. This is 
contrary to the requirements of achieving patient safety because HCWs share a common 




goal to provide patients with safe medical care and error reporting is essential in identifying 
safety risks (Cohen, 2000). Furthermore, reporting of near misses is an essential component 
of PSC (Reason, 1998).  Near miss reporting has been identified in industry as essential in 
identifying error prone situations and correcting them before an error occurred (Barach et 
al., 2000). Near misses are not reported in the study hospital and it can hence be inferred 
that errors are likely to be repeated placing patients at considerable risk of harm from ADEs.   
A general perception which emerged from the healthcare team discussions was that error 
reporting could lead to breach of staff confidentiality because, from their previous 
experiences when errors were discovered by other staff, such errors were either disclosed 
or discussed in public.  If this manner of error disclosure was the norm at the cancer centre, 
it is likely to be a strong deterrent to reporting errors. Confidentiality is an important aspect 
in error reporting (Barach et al., 2000).This finding was similar to other studies in developing 
countries where researchers in Saudi Arabia identified that breach of confidentiality led to 
fear of reporting among HCWs (Alahmadi, 2010).  
 An important aspect for reporting errors is elimination of a blame culture (Leape, 1994). A 
culture that fosters blame and punishment discourages reporting of  errors, and hence 
hinders learning processes and the development of a safety culture (Nieva et al., 2003). The 
first step required to improve  patient safety was to build a safety culture (NPSA, 2004b) 
where HCWs understand the importance of reporting errors in a just environment which is 
free from blame (Reason, 1998).  
Removal of the blame when dealing with errors can lead to improved incident reporting and 
learning  (Womer et al., 2002). In a cancer centre in the USA, a multidisciplinary patient 
safety intervention was carried out among 27 nurses in order to improve error reporting. 
Prior to the intervention, a disciplinary procedure recommended that nurses, involved in 
errors, receive written warnings or even be suspended. The intervention involved 
introducing an anonymous error reporting system in conjunction with feedback meetings 
where solutions to the reported errors and near misses were discussed. This resulted in an 
increase in reported near misses and prevented errors and a decrease in actual errors 
(Womer et al., 2002). 
In order to ensure safe medical care, the establishment of an error reporting system in a 
Sudanese cancer hospital is a key component, the responsibility of which lies with both the 
state and the individual health care organization (Kohn, 2000;NPSA, 2004b;WHO, 2005b). 
Individual HCWs involved in errors as well as organizations should learn from error and 




construct systems that capture, reduce and mitigate those errors should they reach a 
patient (Wu Aw, 1991). Such a system is essential for the study hospital because it was 
evident from the focus group discussions that errors do occur, were repeated and many 
were preventable. The anonymous error reporting system established by Womer and 
colleagues (2002) consisting of a box where incident forms, scribbled notes, copies of orders 
and medication labels were deposited. A similar safety system, in line with guidelines from 
the previous NPSA “Seven Steps to Patient Safety” could be implemented within the limited 
resource setting of the study hospital. 
3.8.2 A Culture of Blame 
During the focus groups participants provided a number of accounts of situations where 
errors were discussed. However, a culture of blame was seemingly prevalent among the 
HCWs who themselves considered that part of error management was to punish the 
individuals involved or in order to reduce the incidence of errors. A culture of blame is not 
conducive to learning from errors (Singer et al., 2003), because HCWs will hide errors in 
order to avoid punishment, reprimand, disciplinary action and being labelled as 
incompetent (Nwozichi, 2015). However, this is not unique to the study setting but “blame” 
was the common manner of error management in the years before the IOM published “To 
err is Human” (Kohn, 2000).  An example of this occurred in a large cancer hospital in the 
USA, where a  cancer patient  died as a result of been given the wrong dose of chemotherapy 
(Conway et al., 2005). The incident was highly publicised and the eighteen nurses who were 
involved were sanctioned by the state board for their role, without an investigation being 
carried out (Grant, 1999). In response to the disciplinary action taken against the nurses 
(Grant, 1999), Lucien Leape wrote an article in the Boston Globe stating that this decision  
“is misguided, inappropriate, and harmful”, explaining that punishment in the absence of 
wilful neglect or negligence would not improve the performance of the individuals involved, 
deter others from similar errors or protect the patients from the effects of these errors 
(Leape, 12 Jan 1999).The cancer centre involved undertook a detailed investigation of the 
incident to identify  service gaps. A number of safety systems were introduced, including a 
non-punitive error reporting system and chemotherapy pre-printed templates, that 
reduced the errors of ambiguity or incompleteness seen with handwritten prescriptions 
(Dinning, 2005). System improvements and improvement of patient safety culture 
contributed to reducing the incidence of chemotherapy-related safety events from 3.4 




incidents per 1000 doses to 1.7 incidents per 1000 doses, over an eight year period, with no 
fatalities (Conway et al., 2006). 
 Blame cultures can foster a blame cycle where the management feels frustrated at staff 
not adhering to rules and staff feel devalued (Reason, 1990). This was evident in the current 
study, where staff often felt that management ignored their needs and did not provide them 
with the support they deserved. One example was that nurses left their tasks unattended 
to gain extra income from other hospitals, another was the general disregard of 
documentation, suggesting that staff felt these rules were not important. Documentation 
is generally well known to be poor in low- and middle-income countries (WHO, 2010), and 
a culture of non-adherence to medical record keeping was reported in other African 
countries (Pirkle et al., 2012). Recording in patients’ notes was perceived as time-consuming 
and that accomplishing the medical task was more important (Pirkle et al., 2012). However, 
medical records are an essential element of patient care, the absence of which can 
undermine patient safety (Bradley et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, nurses would intentionally violate some procedures because they seemed to 
lack the understanding underscoring the importance of these procedures. An example was 
when they missed giving the patient their intravenous fluids despite these being clearly 
written in the chemotherapy administration instructions. This may have significant clinical 
implications for the patient. Drugs such as cisplatin and methotrexate are renally cleared 
and patients must receive appropriate hydration to enable efficient excretion, without 
which patients are at high risk of toxicity (Reed, 2008). A similar situation was identified at 
an African hospital (Kotagal et al., 2009). In response, an intervention that targeted process 
improvement was implemented, where time to give drugs was improved by 95% (Kotagal 
et al., 2009). Furthermore, the authors reported better patient outcomes and increased 
staff morale at the end of the study (Kotagal et al., 2009). 
According to participants’ discussions, daily patient care was handled by relatives and 
caregivers, and nurses viewed their involvement in such tasks to be an extra burden, rather 
than their responsibility. Similar findings have been reported in research from developing 
countries. Nurses in Bangladesh were reported to spend less than 10% of their time in direct 
patient care. Interviews from key informants from nurses, doctors, patients, carers and 
hospital workers confirmed that nurses view direct nursing care as the responsibility of 
carers because of cultural issues where females are not allowed to touch males, and 




professionals perceived that dealing with patients’ personal hygiene would reduce their 
status in society (Hadley et al., 2007). 
Errors described by focus group participants in the current study, were perceived to be 
caused by procedural violations. Violations are not commonly described in the medical 
literature and this may be due to a number of reasons. Most importantly, a number of AE 
studies are based on record review, which makes ascertaining violations difficult. Secondly, 
findings from incident reporting systems are unlikely to isolate such incidents, and finally, 
reporting violations may expose the individuals involved to accusations of negligence and 
misconduct (Amalberti et al., 2006). Consequently, most landmark studies in patient safety 
did not mention violations (Classen et al., 1997;Baker et al., 2004;Leape et al., 1991) in their 
reports. The exception  being one study conducted as part of the Quality in Australian 
Healthcare Study which listed two descriptions of errors categorised as violations of rules 
(Wilson et al., 1999). 
In instances where written instructions are ignored, in a just culture, HCWs who 
intentionally ignore safety procedures should be held accountable for their actions 
(Wachter et al., 2009). However, in the study setting this approach may present some 
difficulties because to determine if an individual health care worker is culpable for the error, 
a number of factors need to be considered (Reason, 2004). Firstly, a decision needs to be 
made if the individual involved had intentions of malevolence, sabotage or harm. Secondly, 
the individual involved should be assessed for substance abuse. Thirdly, individuals involved 
should have received appropriate training, clear SOPs and task related guidelines. And 
lastly, the circumstances surrounding the errors should be assessed to determine if, under 
similar conditions, this error would be repeated. Findings from the current study reveal that 
HCWs had little awareness about SOPs and had little guidance. Furthermore, training in 
medication processes was seemingly absent. A just culture may only be implemented in 
workplaces where the level of safety is mature and safety systems are in place (Wachter et 
al., 2009). 
3.8.3 Teamwork 
A combination of ineffective communication, lack of job descriptions and team dynamics 
contributed to an overall perception that teamwork was poorly developed at the cancer 
centre. It is not surprising that teamwork among staff who have poor communication is 
poorly developed. This finding was in contrast to findings from research in similar healthcare 




settings.  A survey, using HSPOSC among 6,807 HCWs in Lebanon, had the highest positive 
composite scores for teamwork between staff in units  but it was the lowest between units 
(El-Jardali et al., 2011). Teamwork between units has also been shown to be poor in early 
healthcare studies in western cultures, whereas aviation teams who worked in 
organizations with a well-established safety culture scored favourably for teamwork 
composites (Sexton et al., 2006 ). Development of teamwork habits, behaviours and skills 
has the potential to reduce medication errors and improve communication (Risser et al., 
1999). 
Poor communication has several implications for patient care because it can lead to 
misunderstandings when treating patients and low morale among HCWs. In contrast, good 
communication has been shown to be associated with improvements in patient safety 
incidents (Alfredsdottir et al., 2008). Nursing staff in the focus groups implied that they 
accepted hierarchical communication, whereas doctors believed this approach in 
communication, unacceptable. This could be interpreted using the Power Distance Index 
(PDI) which places the Sudanese society on a high PDI (Hofstede et al., 1991). PDI is the 
degree to which the less powerful members of an organization accept or expect that power 
is distributed unequally. Therefore groups with high power distances accept and expect 
hierarchies where everyone has a rigid level (Hofstede et al., 1991) . These findings were 
confirmed from work conducted in Egypt where a similar culture exists. A total of 369 
healthcare providers from a group of university hospitals were surveyed, using an Arabic 
translation of the AHRQ’s HSOPSC, which identified communication openness and 
communication about errors to have composite scores of less than 50% (34.6% and 39.7% 
respectively). A positive correlation between team communications and PDI was identified 
in a survey of 600 Japanese doctors and nurses (Itoh et al., 2002). Communication among 
and between teams can be improved using PSC interventions such as checklists.  
Implementation of a surgical checklist at a university hospital in the UK helped nurses to 
speak up about safety incidents, improving patient safety (Etchegaray et al., 2014). Similar 
interventions have documented success in Sudan. Unpublished work has shown that 
implementation of the WHO safe surgery checklist improved communication and 
contributed to better team relations in operating theatres (Abdallah, 2011). 
Communication specifically among nurse focus group participants was affected by poor 
trust and allusions of bribery. Although efforts were made during the focus groups to invite 
nurse participants to give examples of occasions when they had witnessed or were involved 
bribery, these were unsuccessful. The literature suggests that HCWs in poor income 




countries may become involved in bribes, and the earnings may be used to supplement 
their low incomes (Lehmann et al., 2008). A survey of 272 patients and HCWs from public 
and private healthcare facilities in a developing country revealed several examples where 
relatives were asked to pay HCWs for services known to be free of charge (Tibandebage et 
al., 2005). Efforts to reduce this behaviour can be achieved by effective management, 
supervision and clinical auditing (Tibandebage et al., 2005) .  
3.8.4 Leadership 
A finding common to all focus group participants was poor access to appropriate training 
and equipment. Furthermore, HCWs worked in environments that were conducive to error. 
Qualitative research conducted in developing countries has identified that lack of 
equipment is common in healthcare facilities. Examples were described, similar to the 
current study, where patients had died because of poor access to necessary medical 
equipment and medicines; for example, an interview study of 57 HCWs  from two East 
African hospitals described similar work environment situations where theatre areas were 
outdated and poorly furnished, and where work environments were busy (Aveling et al., 
2015).   
Busy work environments were mentioned as a source of error in the current study but no 
examples of how interruptions affected errors were described. However, interruptions have 
been identified as a source of medication errors in delivery of cancer chemotherapy 
(Schulmeister, 1997). Womer and colleagues (2002), at a large cancer centre, introduced a 
note system to reduce interruptions in the busy work environment as part of a wider patient 
safety improvement strategy. Interruptions were reduced from 27.6 per shift to 13.8 and, 
together with other safety improvements, the centre achieved an 84% reduction in error 
rates (Womer et al., 2002). Busy work environments cannot be eliminated, especially 
because the study hospital is the major referral centre for Sudan, but as the findings suggest 
there is a need to design a system which manages the large number of patients attending 
the hospital and ensures that safe medical care is delivered.  
Work-based training has been identified as essential to ensure accuracy of work and has 
been shown in a randomised controlled trial, conducted among final medical school 
graduates in a German university, to reduce the incidence of drug-related problems (Celebi 
et al., 2009). Given the risks associated with the use of cytotoxic chemotherapy (McDiarmid, 
2006;Cousins et al., 1994), safety for both patients and hospital staff can be assured if 




appropriate competency-based training programmes are in place (NPSA, 2010b;ASHP, 
2002). In the US, legislation exists to ensure that guidelines for handling chemotherapy are 
implemented in healthcare settings (Eisenberg, 2012). It follows that working in these high 
risk conditions without the appropriate training may be considered unacceptable (ASHP, 
2002) 
A qualitative study that compared the implementation of a surgical checklist in two 
hospitals, one in the UK where health services are well-developed and another in a low 
income sub-Saharan country, found that compliance was higher in the former hospital. The 
authors identified that the obstacles to implementation of the checklist were: resource 
limitations, poor documentation, poor team dynamics and communication, lack of 
accountability, policies and institutional support. They identified that safety interventions 
are difficult to implement in the absence of institutional support and staff motivation 
(Aveling et al., 2013). Hence, in our hospital, the organization as a whole is responsible for 
addressing deficiencies in systems essential for establishment of a safety culture. Leaders 
are instrumental in shaping the organization’s culture because their actions, rewards and 
punishments communicate their priorities to staff. Therefore if the leader is focused on 
safety, they would direct resources to development of safety systems, encourage and 
reward staff who adhere to these systems (Westrum, 2004).  
The WHO acknowledge that doctors, nurses and pharmacists place patient care as a priority 
and often work under great pressure to improve patient outcomes; however, without 
investing resources into quality of care, failings of these individual attempts can occur. The 
support from the administration in a well-known cancer centre in the US has provided the 
means and leadership to steer the cancer centre to reach an exemplary level of patient 
safety (Conway et al., 2005;Womer et al., 2002). In the current study setting, the focus 
group discussions would suggest leadership has not placed safety as a priority and hence 
staff feel untrained, unequipped, unsupported and have low morale, which has the 
potential to compromise patient outcomes.  
3.9 Limitations 
The current study has several limitations. Firstly, the study attempted to measure patient 
safety culture in an organization where safety systems were deficient and therefore HCWs 
consistently scored all dimensions of the MaPSaF at the lower levels. However, even in the 
absence of a PSC, the use of the MaPSaF would probably contribute to raising awareness 




about PSC issues and stimulate discussions about gaps in the services and possible 
interventions. Secondly, this apparent absence of reporting systems meant that analysis of 
focus group data were not feasible using the MaPSaF framework. However, the use of 
Reason’s framework was successful in mapping the themes emerging from these exercises. 
The third important limitation was the difficulty in recruiting staff to participate in the study. 
This resulted in considerable lag in time between focus groups. Potential participants were 
approached to take part in the study and individuals had accepted and consented but did 
not attend the pre-arranged focus group date and were not contactable by telephone. It 
was clear that the social norm of HCWs at the cancer hospital prevented them from simply 
declining to participate in the study. Moreover, it can be inferred that the blame culture 
contributed to staff’s anxiety about discussing errors and prevented participation in the 
study. Although focus groups were run with some lag time, it is unlikely that this factor will 
have had an impact on the design of the study because there were no major changes in 
work systems during the whole study period. This was confirmed by the consistent findings 
among the groups. 
The qualitative nature of this study may be an important factor in generalization of findings, 
because a small and non-representative sample of HCWs was recruited in the study. 
However, the purpose of qualitative studies is not to be representative and, in the current 
study, they were used to identify service gaps and highlight areas that required further 
research. 
3.10 Future work 
Considering the findings of this study, further work was undertaken to identify the 
frequency and types of medication errors associated with chemotherapy and explore the 
possible causes of these errors. It is expected that findings from these studies would offer 
a better understanding of the impact of the absence of PSC elements on the chemotherapy 
process. Furthermore, these studies are expected to involve a wider number of staff and 
hence make the findings of the study more generalizable to the cancer centre under study.  
There is a wealth of published work on the success of interventions to improve PSC; 
however, most were conducted in western countries where work environments and culture 
are different to the current setting. There is a need to design an interventional study to 
address some of the gaps identified in this study. 




3.11 Conclusions  
Findings from the current study highlight important gaps in service provision to cancer 
patients. Errors and violations were common but were mostly ignored and, when 
highlighted, the individuals were dealt with in a punitive manner. Teamwork was hampered 
by rigid hierarchies, and communication within teams and between teams was non-
conducive to a PSC. There seemed to be an absence of leadership to drive PSC, 
demonstrated in the absence of training, poor resources and the apparent absence of safety 
systems.  
PSC is embedded in the values, assumptions and the norms of the organization which 
requires the implementation of supportive structures and processes. Hence, few of the 
obstacles identified by focus group participants can be addressed with single short term 
interventions or without the mobilisation of resources. Evidence from the literature 
underscores the importance of leadership in championing changes required for establishing 
a safety culture (Frankel et al., 2006). However, an important barrier to culture change is 
the unawareness of patient safety gaps. Leaders need to be accountable and aware of safety 
gaps in their organizations and this can be achieved by establishing systems of error 
reporting at the team level and overseen by a multidisciplinary committee composed of 
medical, nursing and pharmacy managers. Regular monitoring and feedback from errors 
may have an important impact on improving safety culture at the centre. Firstly, error 
reporting would determine gaps in service provision and improve communication within 
teams and across teams. Secondly, regular monitoring and feedback would possibly 
stimulate discussions essential in devising innovative interventions tailored to the needs of 
HCWs at the cancer centre and patient safety. Thirdly, findings from these exercises may be 
used as a tool for advocacy at the state level. The implementation of interventions requires 
the mobilisation of resources and supervision from the ministry to ensure its sustainability. 
In conclusion, considerable system changes are required to improve patient safety but can 
be achieved using simple measures that require the engagement of leaders at the team 
level, organizational level and state level. 

























4.1 The Prescribing Process 
The process of writing a prescription is complex and involves sound clinical reasoning and 
careful judgement (Haas et al., 2012). Decision making during the prescription process is 
influenced by a number of factors: maximising benefit, respecting patients’ choices, cost-
effectiveness and minimising treatment-related risks (Barber, 1995). Hence, in order to 
ensure these factors are met, several steps should be taken before issuing a prescription. 
The prescriber should 1) reach the appropriate diagnosis, 2) assess whether or not the 
patient requires an intervention or treatment, 3) choose a medicine, dose, dosage form and 
protocol appropriate for the patient and 4), lastly, engage with the patient in a discussion 
to ensure that the medicine chosen is acceptable, that they understand the dosage 
instruction, the potential adverse effects and what monitoring is required.  
There are no international standards governing the contents of a prescription, although 
every country has its own regulations. However, the WHO states that all prescriptions 
should contain clear information in order that the medicines are dispensed accurately (Vries 
et al., 1995). The seven components identified by WHO are summarised in Figure 4-1.
 
Figure 4-1 Components of a prescription adapted from Vries et al (1995 p 66-69) 
4.2 Prescribing errors 
Medication errors can contribute to up to 29% of hospital admissions (Morimoto et al., 
2011) and 15% of in-hospital adverse events, half of which are preventable (de Vries et al., 
2008). Preventable adverse events can occur at the prescribing, dispensing or 
administration stages of the medication process, with one third due to prescribing errors 
(Morimoto et al., 2011). Various definitions of prescribing errors have been adopted in 




medication safety research (Lewis et al., 2009), but the most robust definition developed 
by Dean and colleagues (2000) has been used by nearly one fifth of those studies. A 
consensus on a systematic definition of prescribing errors was reached using two-stage 
Delphi technique where thirty-four healthcare professionals described a clinically 
meaningful prescribing error as (Dean et al., 2000): 
“a result of a prescribing decision or prescription writing process, there is an 
unintentional significant (1) reduction in the probability of treatment being timely 
and effective or (2) increase in the risk of harm when compared with generally 
accepted practice.” (Dean et al 2000 p 235) 
Research into the scope of prescribing errors has found no consistency between studies in 
the frequency or nature of errors (Lewis et al., 2009). The first systematic review of 
prescribing error research, which included 65 studies, revealed that the rate of errors could 
be 2-14% or 8-227 errors per 100 admissions (Lewis et al., 2009). This review reported that 
variability has arisen because studies used different methods of error detection and 
different definitions, hence findings from prescribing error studies are difficult to interpret 
and compare. For example, process-based errors would identify higher rates than outcome-
based studies which would only identify prescribing errors that resulted in patient harm. 
The review revealed that most studies were conducted in western countries with a few 
(n=5) conducted in countries from Asia and the Middle East. More than 80% of the studies 
used a prospective design, and most investigated process rather than outcome. Most 
studies derived their data from errors identified by pharmacists during routine practice. 
Dosage errors were the most commonly identified, primarily with antimicrobials (32%), 
cardiovascular drugs (17%) and central nervous system and gastrointestinal drugs (8%). A 
number of studies reported that recently qualified doctors, in comparison with senior 
doctors, contributed the most to prescribing errors (Lewis et al., 2009). 
4.2.1 Types of prescribing error 
As prescribing is complex, errors can occur at more than one component of the prescribing 
process. The commonest errors occur when deciding or calculating a dose (Winterstein et 
al., 2004). Winterstein and colleagues (2004) analysed 321 incident reports associated with 
medication errors occurring in a US tertiary hospital.  Their analysis revealed that overdoses 
were more common than underdoes and among three common prescribing errors were 
omission of a medicine which is clinically indicated and wrong choice of medicine. Omission 




errors were more common among newly admitted patients, in particular (Franklin et al., 
2011). Other errors reported in the literature include; wrong frequency (Bates et al., 1995a), 
transcription errors (Fahimi et al., 2009), failing to order appropriate monitoring for the 
medicine (Benkirane et al., 2009), drug interactions and prescribing a drug to a patient who 
is allergic (Runciman et al., 2003).      
4.2.2 Causes and contributory factors associated with prescribing errors 
Prescribing errors are associated with a number of active failures, error-provoking 
conditions and latent factors. A review of 16 prescribing error studies identified that active 
failures were mostly associated with KBMs, slips and lapses (Tully et al., 2009).  Rule 
violations were less common but have been reported in the literature (Buckley et al., 2007). 
An observational study of 263 prescriptions in a paediatric ICU identified that although 
knowledge-based mistakes are more common (46.2%), rule violations (30.8%) can also 
occur. An example of a rule violation was the prescribing of analgesics without appropriate 
titration (Buckley et al., 2007).  
Each active failure occurs under a number of error-provoking conditions which may be 
associated with the individual prescriber, the prescribing task, the working environment, 
healthcare team and the patient (Tully et al., 2009). Inadequate skills and knowledge, heavy 
workload and staffing were the most common error-provoking conditions (Dean et al., 
2002a). Dean and colleagues (2002) interviewed 44 doctors to identify the factors 
associated with prescribing errors in a UK based teaching hospital. A combination of semi-
structured interviews and questionnaires were used to identify contributory factors leading 
to errors. They also identified factors associated with the work environment, where busy 
doctors were commonly interrupted by patients and other members of the healthcare 
team. The authors reported that doctors had poor appreciation of the prescribing task, 
possibly due to insufficient teaching during undergraduate medical education. 
The low importance attached to transcribing was also reported as a latent factor associated 
with prescribing errors (Coombes et al., 2008). A semi-structured questionnaire was used 
to identify factors associated with prescribing errors among fourteen newly qualified 
doctors in an Australian hospital. Doctors also attributed some of their errors to a number 
of error-provoking conditions such as inadequate supervision within the team, complex 
patients, the mental wellbeing of the individual doctor, availability of protocols to aid the 




prescribing task and environmental factors such as working long hours (Coombes et al., 
2008). 
Since lack of knowledge has been linked to prescribing errors, junior doctors have been 
commonly implicated in those errors (Coombes et al., 2008;Dean et al., 2002a). However, 
conflicting findings have been reported from other studies, because some studies failed to 
adjust error rates to the number of prescriptions written by junior doctors (Lewis et al., 
2009). A retrospective review of over 8000 prescriptions in a US hospital revealed that junior 
doctors wrote more than 60% of prescriptions in comparison with other grades (Hendey et 
al., 2005). First year postgraduate doctors had higher error rates when compared with other 
grades during overnight and on call periods but error rates were similar otherwise (Hendey 
et al., 2005). These findings have been confirmed by another large study undertaken in a 
group of UK hospitals (Dornan et al., 2009). The researchers used methods commonly 
employed in prescribing error research (Lewis et al., 2009), by asking pharmacists to record 
prescribing errors encountered in their daily review of medication cards and prescriptions.  
Data were obtained from pharmacists’ prescription screening of 124,260 medication 
orders, collected monthly on seven consecutive months, with an error rate of 8.9%. During 
data collection period, newly qualified doctors in their first year were responsible for 
prescribing most the medications (50,016) and consultants were responsible for prescribing 
the least number of medication orders. Although the rate of errors committed by newly 
qualified doctors was highest among the other prescribers, it was lower than those 
committed by second year doctors who had a prescribing error rate of 10.3%.  
4.2.3 Barriers to prescribing errors 
The process of prescribing should improve patient outcomes but is in itself complex, mainly 
due to the numerous factors that have to be considered before reaching a final decision 
about the drug, dose, duration and route (Aronson et al., 2006). The WHO highlighted that 
inadequate teaching of prescribing in medical schools compromises the ability of doctors to 
write appropriate prescriptions (Vries et al., 1995). Communication failures have been 
recognized as playing a major role in prescribing errors where the safety culture of the 
medical institution meant that nurses and junior doctors felt disempowered to question 
senior staff (Sexton et al., 2006).  Safeguards are important in medical institutions and in 
this study, doctors, identified pharmacists as important defences because they intercepted 
errors before reaching patients. Pharmacists undoubtedly have a positive impact on 




reducing medication errors and have been shown to contribute to a reduction of 66% of 
prescribing errors (Leape et al., 1999).  
The role of pharmacists in rectifying errors was explored in a comparative study that also 
identified the incidence of errors in three NHS organizations (Franklin et al., 2011). Similar 
methods to previous prescribing error research (Dean et al., 2002b) were used which 
involved collecting data from pharmacists’ routine ward-based prescription screening at 
three NHS hospitals. Out of 6,605 prescriptions, 1025 errors were identified, of which 
omission errors were the commonest, followed by dose errors and incomplete prescription. 
Errors were more common in the organization where pharmacists were least likely to 
intervene and rectify a prescribing error. Pharmacists were able to intercept most errors 
before they reached patients and a mean of only 0.9 doses were administered or omitted 
before the prescribing error was rectified (Franklin et al., 2011). 
4.2.4 Studies of prescribing errors in the African and East Mediterranean 
(AFRO/EMRO) WHO region 
Since the early 1990s substantial progress has been made by western countries to identify 
the effect and factors leading to prescribing errors on patients, but those from the 
developing world have yet to gain momentum. Assisted by the WHO, the African and East 
Mediterranean Adverse Events Study (Wilson et al., 2012;WHO, 2011a) , showed that ADEs 
contribute to 4% of patient harm. This rate is relatively low in comparison with studies in 
western countries 12%- 20% (de Vries et al., 2008) which may indicate that the use of 
medicines in the studied countries was not as widespread as in western countries. However, 
the impact of AEs in these countries is more significant because they are associated with 
higher rates of death (30% vs 8%) when compared with western studies (Vincent, 2010) and 
higher preventability (83%). Since preventable AEs have been associated with system-
related factors which lead to errors (Rothschild et al., 2005) it can be inferred that 
medication errors and hence prescribing errors can be common. Studies of medication 
errors in the region have confirmed that prescribing errors (47%) are the most common 
among those errors (Dibbi et al., 2006). 
However, evidence from the region on prescribing error in hospitals shows a considerable 
degree of variability (7%-100%) because studies each used a different definitions of error 
(Table 4-1), categories of error, study design (Table 4-2) and settings (Agalu et al., 




2011;Alagha et al., 2011;Al-Dhawailie, 2011;Al-Hajje et al., 2012;Al-Jeraisy et al., 2011;Dibbi 
et al., 2006;Irshaid et al., 2005;Yousif et al., 2011;Arulogun et al., 2011). 
The definitions used to study prescribing errors varied greatly (Table 4-1) and some studies 
did not state an error definition (Al-Dhawailie, 2011;Arulogun et al., 2011;Yousif et al., 
2011).  For example, a retrospective analysis of prescriptions in Saudi Arabian hospitals used 
the WHO definition for prescribing errors which considered all elements of a prescription, 
including the telephone number of the prescriber and the address of the patient (Irshaid et 
al., 2005). Consequently, 100% of the 3796 prescriptions analysed contained at least one 
error (Irshaid et al., 2005).  Another study that used a more commonly adopted definition 
in prescribing error research (Dean et al., 2000) reported a much lower error rate (Al-Hajje 
et al., 2012).  In the study, data were collected from seven hospitals across Lebanon, and 
targeted patients who were newly admitted to non-obstetric wards. Data collectors 
reviewed the first ten patients who were admitted to the wards and extracted clinical data 
from the files as well as prescription details. In total, the researchers reviewed 1826 
prescriptions for 313 patients and identified that 40% of prescriptions had at least one error. 
Unlike previous research, which identified that dose errors were more common, findings 
from this study showed that lack of monitoring parameters was more common (20%) in 
comparison with dose errors (6%).  
The category of prescribing error also varied among studies from the region. For example, 
studies that reported on legality of prescription reported missing date and patient details 
(52.5%-99.9%) as the most common type of error (Arulogun et al., 2011;Yousif et al., 2011). 
Arulogun and colleagues (2011), used retrospective study designs to identify errors among 
1866 prescriptions and mainly identified omission errors and, since both studies had no 
access to the patient clinical details, clinical errors were in the minority.





Table 4-1 Definitions used in prescribing error studies conducted in the AFRO/EMRO region 
Author/ year Definition of prescribing error 
Irshaid 2005 A prescription should contain: name and address of the prescriber with telephone number, date of prescription, name and strength of drug, 
dosage form and total amount, information for label, prescribers’ initials or signature, name and address of patient (age if child or elderly) 
(Vries et al., 1995) 
Debbi 2006 Not reported 
Agalu 2011 A deviation of medication prescribing from standard practices (as indicated in national standard treatment guidelines, textbooks, handbooks, 
and software) excluding dosage form errors, illegible hand writing, and failure to authenticate the prescription with signature and/or date. 
Arulogun 2011 Not reported 
Al-Dhawalie 2011 Not reported 
Al Jeraisy 2011 An incorrect or inappropriate drug selection (based on indications, contraindications and other factors), dose, route, rate of administration, 
or frequency. A prescribing error also included illegible handwriting, an incomplete order (missing the dose, route, or frequency), 
incompatibility, incorrect instructions for using the drug product, and the use of non-standard nomenclature or abbreviations that requires 
further interpretation. 
Yousif 2011 Legibility, completeness, abbreviations, changes, poly-pharmacy, refilling order, the identity of the prescriber, instructions to the patients and 
pharmacists, drug-drug interactions and adequacy of the prescriptions 
Al- Hajje 2012 A result of a prescribing decision or prescription writing process, there is an unintentional significant (1) reduction in the probability of 
treatment being timely and effective or (2) increase in the risk of harm when compared with generally accepted practice (Dean et al., 2000) 





Table 4-2 Study design of research on prescribing errors in the AFRO/EMRO region 





Most common prescribing error 
Irshaid 2005 Saudi Arabia GH Retrospective prescription review 3796  100 contact details of prescriber, 
address and weight of patient 
Debbi 2006 Saudi Arabia GH Retrospective record review 10,000  18 Wrong dosage strength 34.8% 
Agalu 2011 Ethiopia ICU Prospective pharmacist screening 398  52.5 Wrong combination 25.7% 
Al-Dhawalie 2011 Saudi Arabia TH Prospective pharmacist screening 1582  7.1 Wrong strength 34% 
Arulogun 2011 Nigeria TH Retrospective prescription review 1866  76.3 Prescription illegitimate- missing 
date and age of patient 
Yousif 2011 Sudan PH, PrH, DC Retrospective prescription review 2000  99.9 Patient's demographics 97.2% 
Al- Hajje 2012 Lebanon 7 PH and PrH Prospective record review 1826   40 Failure to state monitoring 20% 
Al Jeraisy 2011 Saudi Arabia PICU Prospective pharmacist screening 2380  56 Dose errors 39% 
Abbreviations: DC: doctor’s clinics, GH= general hospital, ICU: intensive care unit, PH: public hospital, PICU: paediatric intensive unit, PrH: private hospital, TH: 
teaching hospital 




Other errors were missing dose, dose frequency and dosage form (23.8%), errors of style 
including illegal abbreviations and illegible writing (18.8%), errors of dose (4.9%) and 
irrational use of medicines (0.8%), which were errors that included the wrong choice of 
medicine, and the use of Latin abbreviations (Arulogun et al., 2011). 
One category not seen in western studies was the use of trade names (85%), which was very 
common in a Sudanese study (Yousif et al., 2011). The use of trade names in prescribing is 
discouraged by WHO in attempts to rationalise prescribing and is an indicator of Rational 
Use of Medicine (RUM) (Awad et al., 2007). RUM was defined as: 
“patients receive medications appropriate to their clinical needs in doses that meet 
their individual requirement for an adequate period of time and at lowest cost to 
them and their community” (Awad et al 2007 p2). 
In general, prescribing error categories such as date and missing patient address are not 
defined as errors (Dean et al., 2000) and have not been included in most prescribing error 
research  (Lewis et al., 2009)  because they were found to have minimal impact in patient 
outcomes (Lesar et al., 1990). 
In comparison, a study that used error categories common to other prescribing error 
research (Franklin et al., 2011;Lewis et al., 2009) identified different error types (Al-
Dhawailie, 2011). Researchers analysed data collected by pharmacists during routine 
screening of 1582 prescriptions in a Saudi university hospital. Among the prescriptions 
included in the study, 7% contained an error. The most common type of error was wrong 
strength (35%), followed by wrong frequency (23%), wrong dose (12%) and wrong patient 
(4%). Unlike other prescribing error research in the area, the authors did not report on 
omission errors associated with patient demographics or prescriber identity (Al-Dhawailie, 
2011). 
Variations in study design meant that studies reported on other findings such outcomes,  
potential severity of errors (Al-Jeraisy et al., 2011) and contributory factors (Yousif et al., 
2011). AL-Jeraisy and colleagues (2011) analysed data collected prospectively by 
pharmacists’ screening of 2380 orders in a paediatric ICU in a Saudi Arabian hospital. The 
researchers reported that among prescriptions with errors (56%), those that had the 
potential to cause harm were in the majority (78.8%). However, the authors reported that 
medical records were not available for pharmacists and it was unclear what methods were 
used to assign harm (Al-Jeraisy et al., 2011). On the other hand, a mixed methods study was 




able to report on contributory causes associated with prescribing errors  (Yousif et al., 
2011). A study identified from Sudan involved the analysis of  2000 prescriptions presenting 
at pharmacies from hospitals, doctors’ clinics and primary care centres in the Wad Madani 
area (Yousif et al., 2011). Apart from the tool used, researchers published little information 
about methods used and validation techniques. A structured questionnaire was used to 
explore prescribing habits and contributory factors associated with errors among 155 
doctors. Doctors revealed some causes of error similar to western studies (Dornan et al., 
2009) such as time work pressure (57.5%). But others appeared to be unique to the area 
because over half of the participating doctors stated that the choice of drug prescribed was 
influenced by patient pressure (Yousif et al., 2011). 
One study reported medication error related deaths (Dibbi et al., 2006). A retrospective 
review of 10,000 medical records of hospitalized patients at a hospital in Saudi Arabia  
revealed that medication errors occurred in 26% of the patients (Dibbi et al., 2006). Unlike 
other studies in the region 26 medication related deaths were reported of which 30% (n=8) 
were due to prescribing errors. 
4.3 An overview of chemotherapy prescribing  
Cancer is becoming an important cause of morbidity and mortality in Sudan, with nearly 
10,000 new patients diagnosed every year (Saeed et al., 2014). There has been a steady 
increase in the number of cancer patients diagnosed in Sudan and other developing 
countries, with a notable increase in prescriptions for cancer chemotherapy. Increase in 
cancer cases in developing countries are mainly caused by adoption of a western lifestyle 
with poor environmental control (Jones, 1999). Most cases present at advanced stages 
(Hamad, 2006;WHO, 2002a) where the use of chemotherapy constitutes an important 
mode of therapeutic management (Carlson et al., 2003;Anderson et al., 2008) In addition, 
evidence from developing countries has shown that chemotherapy contributes to 
prolonging survival in patients with cancer (Bonadonna et al., 1981;EBCTCG, 2005). 
Furthermore, developments in drugs used for the supportive care of patients receiving 
chemotherapy, and the availability of affordable generic medicines (Sikora et al., 1999), 
means that these agents may be relatively safely and economically prescribed and 
administered in countries from the developing world (Anderson et al., 2008).  
Chemotherapeutic drugs are commonly prescribed in combination (Cohen et al., 1996) to 
patients who are often elderly or have compromised organ function (Mehta et al., 1998). 




These agents are inherently toxic causing a number of side effects (Trotti et al., 2003) which 
affect multiple body systems (Ajani et al., 1990) and even when used appropriately they 
have the potential to cause life-threatening symptoms leading to hospitalization 
(Nurgalieva et al., 2009). To counteract these side effects, it is necessary to prescribe 
supportive therapy which include anti-emetic agents (Hesketh, 2008), bone marrow 
stimulating agents (Kuderer et al., 2007) and intensive hydration (ASHP, 2002). 
Furthermore, multiple protocols exist for any one cancer and each mostly contains a 
combination of drugs with differing doses (Gandhi et al., 2005a), making prescribing in 
cancer a complex task. 
 Most chemotherapy prescribing is currently undertaken in the outpatient setting (Calman 
et al., 1978) and decisions may be based on investigations and laboratory results that have 
originated outside the hospital (Gandhi et al., 2005a). Dosing of chemotherapy drugs is 
commonly based on Body Surface Area (BSA) calculations (Mosteller, 1987), although this 
tradition has been challenged because research has revealed this method’s poor correlation 
with the pharmacokinetics of most chemotherapy drugs (Gurney, 1996). However, BSA 
calculation continues to be the standard for chemotherapy dosing. In order to produce a 
prescription with a minimum risk of harm, a number of steps should be followed. These are: 
correct treatment plan, correct medication dose, order and treatment plan matching, 
cumulative dose, recalculation of doses, verification of dose calculation and presence of 
nurse checklist (Kim et al., 2006). 
In order to achieve best outcomes, and due to the narrow therapeutic index of these agents, 
careful tailoring of dosage is necessary to ensure efficacy and reduce the severity of adverse 
drug reactions (Gurney, 2002). Chemotherapy dosing should therefore be adjusted 
according to response, toxicities and co-morbidities (Ford et al., 2006).   
Given that the writing of a chemotherapy prescription involves a complex set of tasks, the 
potential for an error is high and likely to cause serious consequences (Boyle et al., 2002). 
A number of interventions have been recommended to improve prescribing accuracy 
(Cohen et al., 1996). The first of these recommendations is to ensure that the appropriate 
number of staff and skill mix is in place and that staff have the relevant knowledge, skills 
and competencies required to provide cancer care (Pan London, 2011). The provision of 
cancer care should be guided by SOPs and policies to ensure safe clear instructions are 
available for staff, who should have access to information pertinent to provision of safe 
cancer care (Carrington et al., 2010a). Treatment plans should be guided by pre-defined, 




evidence-based standardised treatment protocols, which provide guidance on therapies, 
dosages and scheduling relevant to the treatment (ASHP, 2002). Copies of chemotherapy 
protocols should be available in doctors’ offices, pharmacies and nursing stations to enable 
prescription verification or double checking (NPSA, 2010b). Prescription verification is a 
necessary requirement to prevent errors and is usually undertaken by pharmacists 
(Williamson, 2010) but nurses, other HCWs and even patients have a role (Goldspiel et al., 
2000). Patients may also be involved and should be educated about their treatment plans 
and given clear and simple information leaflets (Carrington et al., 2010a). 
Since usually a number of supportive drugs are also prescribed, in addition to the 
chemotherapeutic agents, the potential of omission errors can be as high as 100% (Huertas 
Fernandez et al., 2006). Hence, pre-printed prescribing templates were introduced to 
standardise the prescribing process, improve legibility and provide a guide for doctors 
through the required details (Cohen et al., 1996). Particulars of chemotherapy prescription 
templates include: patient demographics, a list of the chemotherapy drugs, with 
recommended doses according to a pre-defined protocol, supportive agents, the vehicle, 
route and rate of administration, the sequence of administration and a list of necessary pre-
chemotherapy laboratory investigations (Dinning, 2005). Other improvements to the 
process of prescribing include designing systems to constrain errors (Carrington et al., 
2007), improving communication with the patient, drug manufacturers, and among the 
team as well as introducing an incident reporting system (Cohen et al., 1996).  
The effects of these interventions have been shown to reduce medication errors associated 
with chemotherapy prescribing (Goldspiel et al., 2000). A system improvement project was 
initiated by the pharmacy department at a large cancer research centre in the US, 
responsible for provision of 8500 doses every year. The project involved creating a 
multidisciplinary team to design an incident reporting system, protocol development, 
computer system improvements, introduction of dose verification, improvement of 
information access, education and error follow up. The implementation of these changes 
resulted in a reduction of 23% in prescribing errors and 53% of serious prescribing errors. 
The evaluation of these system changes involved the analysis of data obtained from the 
cancer centre’s incident reporting system. Incident reporting systems have been recognized 
to be less robust than other prospective methods in measuring the impact of interventions 
in reducing chemotherapy associated errors (Bonnabry et al., 2006). However, they are a 
requirement for patient safety (Kohn, 2000), give an indication of errors and adverse events 




associated with chemotherapy (Weingart et al., 2009) and are positively correlated with a 
more positive safety culture (Hutchinson et al., 2009).   
Furthermore, the introduction of CPOE aimed to reduce prescribing errors and ambiguities 
(NPSA, 2010b). Although there has been scepticism about the use of automation to address 
errors (Berwick, 2001), CPOE is becoming more widespread than manual prescribing and 
research has shown improvement with some errors, mainly omission errors and dosing 
errors (Bonnabry et al., 2006;Kim et al., 2006;Nerich et al., 2010).  
However, despite attempts to reduce errors in the chemotherapy process, prescribing 
errors are common (Fyhr et al., 2012). Evidence from the literature has shown that 
chemotherapy-related errors can increase healthcare costs (Ranchon et al., 2011), cause 
serious harm (Soloni et al., 2009), and death (Weingart et al., 2010). 
4.3.1 Prescribing errors associated with chemotherapy  
Research in medication errors shows little evidence of prescribing errors associated with 
chemotherapeutic agents (Lewis et al., 2009), for a number of reasons. Most chemotherapy 
prescribing is currently undertaken in outpatient units of general hospitals, whilst inpatient 
care is provided in specialist centres (Calman et al., 1978)    and data from AE studies have 
mostly focused on general medicine wards, surgical wards and paediatric wards (Kanjanarat 
et al., 2003).  Some AE studies, however, confirm that cytotoxics can cause AEs and is among 
the top ten drugs responsible for ADEs (Bates, 1999;Morimoto et al., 2011;Runciman et al., 
2003) . 
Studies which have focused on chemotherapy-related prescribing errors have shown that 
they are common and vary from 1.4%  (Garzás-Martín de Almagro et al., 2008) to 27.6% 
(Slama et al., 2005). Older studies were carried out in settings where doctors hand wrote 
the whole prescription(Alcácera et al., 2001;Díaz-Carrasco et al., 2007). Some of those 
studies were conducted in hospitals which used standardised pre-printed templates 
(Ranchon et al., 2011;Garzás-Martín de Almagro et al., 2008) and others used automated 
systems (Huertas Fernandez et al., 2006;Nerich et al., 2010;Serrano Fabia et al., 2005). 
Studies employed either prescription review, routinely undertaken by pharmacists and 
which has become established standard practice in medication error research (Lewis et al., 
2009)or retrospective record review. These variations in the methods adopted make direct 
comparison of their findings difficult. All studies examined the prescribing process with a 
few identifying ADEs. 




Pharmacist review is commonly used in methods studying prescribing errors because it is 
an established system (Lewis et al., 2009). The role of pharmacists in prescribing error 
prevention has been repeatedly substantiated (Serrano Fabia et al., 2005). A Spanish 
hospital introduced pharmacist prescription screening using an automated system where 
patient details were accessible from the pharmacy (Serrano Fabia et al., 2005). Analysis of 
prescribing error data over two years revealed that 15.8 errors were detected per 1000 
patient days and increased by 41% in the second year. 
Pharmacist review was used to study chemotherapy-associated prescribing errors in a 
French hospital (Slama et al., 2005). Pharmacists used the American Society of Health 
systems Pharmacists (ASHP) guidelines to review 2826 items prescribed for 285 patients 
and identified errors in 12.3% of prescribed items. The most common errors involved 
transfusion method errors (74%), followed by dose errors (8.6%), prescription ambiguities 
(8.3%) and omission of a necessary medicine (4%). The significance of omission errors 
associated with handwritten prescriptions was confirmed in another study where they were 
the second commonest; 21.5% among more than 43,000 prescribed drugs (Díaz-Carrasco et 
al., 2007).   
In comparison, errors of omission, errors in the transfusion method and prescription 
ambiguities and dose errors were not reported in another study that used CPOE (Huertas 
Fernandez et al., 2006), where the most common error was missing signature (6.6%) among 
30 prescriptions. The use of CPOE does not eliminate other errors entirely. In another study 
with a comparatively larger sample (14,854) of prescriptions using CPOE, more errors were 
identified (Nerich et al., 2010). Errors were identified in 1.5% of prescriptions, the most 
common of which were dose errors (61%). Examples of these errors were when either the 
wrong drug or wrong numbers were entered into the system (43.1%) and when system 
alarms such as maximum doses were ignored (16.1%). Other errors included wrong choice 
of chemotherapy protocol (10.6%) and incorrect scheduling of chemotherapy (12.4%). 
There are a number of risk factors associated with prescribing errors. Data collected from 
pharmacists’ prescription screening over a two-year period analysed more than 17,000 
chemotherapy prescriptions and found 3.15% contained an error (Ranchon et al., 2012). 
The risk factors for prescribing errors were a BSA of more than 2m2, protocols requiring 
more than three drugs, protocols containing carboplatin, a requirement for chemotherapy 
modification, inpatient stay and prescriptions written by resident doctors. 





Table 4-3 Studies on Prescribing Errors Associated with Cytotoxic Chemotherapy 
Author/year Setting Country Prescribing 
system 
Methods Sample Prescribing error rate 
(% unless otherwise 
stated) 





Serrano-Fabia, 2005  IP/OP Spain A Prescription review 2- year 16.8 IP 1000 pt/days 
Slama, 2005  IP/OP France HW Prescription review 6 months-1262 27.6 
Huertas Fernandez, 
2006  
N/S Spain HW and A Controlled trial 30 vs 30 Manual- 100 
Automatated-13 
Díaz-Carrasco, 2007  IP/OP Spain HW Retrospective record 
review 
43,188 doses  3.1/1,000 
preparations 
Garzás-Martín de 
Almagro, 2008  
IP/OP Spain Mixed Prescription review 6741 
prescriptions 
1.4 
Nerich, 2010  IP /OP France A Pharmacist review 1 year -14854  3.1 
Ranchon, 2011  IP /OP France T Prescription review 2 years-17,150 
prescriptions 
3.15 
IP: Inpatient; OP: Outpatient; A: Automated; HW, Handwritten; T: Pre-printed templates; P:  Prescribing. N/R: not reported 




The potential for severe harm was reported in the literature and was associated with 16% 
of prescribing errors (Alcácera et al., 2001). A study that used retrospective methods, 
analysed prescribing errors (6%) among 250 chemotherapy prescriptions. The authors 
reported that potentially serious errors were associated with frequently prescribed drugs 
(etoposide and 5 fluorouracil) and therapeutic agents which were novel at the time of the 
study (oxaliplatin and topotecan). However, statistical significance associated with these 
errors was not reported (Alcácera et al., 2001). The severity rate is similar to another study 
which identified that 21% of prescribing errors have the potential to cause harm (Huertas 
Fernandez et al., 2006). However, the authors of each study used  different severity scales 
which were not commonly employed in prescribing error research (Lewis et al., 2009).  
 Published research to date on chemotherapy prescribing errors has shown that they are 
common and can have the potential for serious consequences. However, the evidence is 
restricted to western countries and the scale and potential harm of those errors in 
developing countries, is unknown. Given that chemotherapy use in a developing country 
(Sudan) is increasing, identifying the scope of prescribing errors is a priority for patient 
safety. 
4.4 Aims and objectives of the study 
The aim of this study was to quantify and classify errors associated with chemotherapy 
prescriptions in a cancer hospital in Sudan and identify contributory factors. 
4.4.1 Objectives: 
• To determine the systems used to prescribe chemotherapy to patients attending a 
Sudanese cancer hospital  
• To identify medication errors made during the prescribing of chemotherapy 
• To classify detected prescribing errors  
• To analyse the potential causes of prescribing errors 
4.5 Study Design and Methods 
This study used a mixed research method to explore the types and potential causes of 
prescribing errors associated with chemotherapy. The purpose of the mixed method design 




was to both quantify and characterise the types of errors and also gain a perspective of 
doctors’ experiences when errors occur and their views about the cause of these errors.  
The study was undertaken during February and March of 2011 in a major cancer centre  
Khartoum, which delivers care to 7000-8000 cancer patients each year (Abuidris, 
2009;Ahmed et al., 2013), of which approximately 100 outpatients/day are treated at the 
chemotherapy day unit.  Patients diagnosed with cancer from across Sudan are referred by 
their doctors to the outpatient cancer department. At the time of the study, the outpatient 
department held 9 clinics run by 42 medical doctors organized into consultant teams, each 
comprising one senior consultant, junior consultants, senior registrars, junior registrars and 
medical officers. 
Study design followed four interlinked stages, described in Figure 4-2.  
Stage One- An exploratory study using key informant interviews was conducted to describe 
the workflow in the outpatient clinic and map the processes followed when writing a 
prescription for chemotherapy. Findings from this stage were used together with 
information obtained in the literature to inform the development of a data collection tool 
used in stage two. 
Stage Two- An observation study of pharmacists’ prescription screening was used to identify 
prescribing errors in prescriptions presented to the pharmacy department. Incidents 
identified in this stage were used in stage three.  
Stage Three – A qualitative study using the Critical Incident Technique (CIT), to discuss errors 
identified in Stage Two. This study aimed to explore the contributory causes of prescribing 
errors associated with chemotherapy prescriptions. 
Stage Four- Focus group interviews were conducted with doctors who were not available 
for CIT interviews but were involved in errors to explore their opinions and experiences 
regarding the nature and causes of prescribing errors associated with chemotherapy. 












Study one: Key 
informant interview 







Critical incidents Quantitative data for focus group exercises 




4.6 Stage one: Mapping the prescribing process using Key informant interviews 
The aim of this stage of the study was to obtain a description of the outpatient clinic and 
map the prescribing process. This was necessary because during researching patient safety 
culture (Chapter 3), it became evident that written standard operating procedures were not 
routinely used and nurses, doctors and pharmacists were guided in their tasks by observing 
their peers.  Key informant interviews were used to establish a description of how the 
outpatient clinics were run and what processes were used to prescribe chemotherapy. 
4.6.1 Key informant interviews 
Spradley (1979) describes key informant interviews as in-depth ethnographic interviews 
that use informants who are particularly knowledgeable about a certain field. Ethnographic 
techniques are well suited to probing human behaviours and culture and understanding the 
causes of  sensitive issues (Dixon-Woods, 2003), which makes this technique suitable to 
exploring the undocumented processes followed in chemotherapy prescribing.  
Interviews follow a flexible schedule that allow the interviewee to deviate and put forward 
new ideas and concepts.  They have the advantage of offering the individual a feeling of 
being valued because their opinions are being sought as well as obtaining quality 
information. However, there are limitation using this technique because such interviews are 
neither generalizable nor representative and are time consuming to carry out and often 
difficult to analyze (Bowling, 2002;Spradley, 1979). 
4.6.2 Sampling and sampling technique 
In order to obtain a rich and varied description of the prescribing process, key informant 
interviews were conducted with a number of doctors. Since medical officers were not 
authorised to prescribe cytotoxic chemotherapy, they were excluded from this study.  
Unlike quantitative research methods where a large sample is recruited, qualitative 
research does not seek to generalize findings and hence a smaller number of participants is 
adequate (Smith, 2002;Patton, 1990). In qualitative research the common sampling 
techniques used  are convenience sampling, purposive sampling, snowballing and 
theoretical sampling (Bowling, 2002).  Purposive sampling method was used because the 
views of experienced doctors were important to provide valuable input into describing work 




practices during the prescribing process. Purposive sampling has been used in qualitative 
medication error research (Evans et al., 2006;Hand et al., 2000;Sanghera et al., 
2007;Franklin et al., 2011;Ghaleb et al., 2005)  where they targeted “information rich” 
individuals.  
Purposive sampling was used to identify a doctor from different grades; senior consultant, 
junior consultant, senior registrar, junior registrar. Doctors from each grade, with the 
longest experience at the cancer hospital, were approached and those that consented were 
entered into the study. Four doctors were included in these interviews and each doctor was 
given a PIL (Appendix 4-1) and consent form (Appendix 4-2), 48 hours before the interview 
date. Once the doctors agreed and consented to the interview, a date and time was 
scheduled. 
4.6.3 Development of the Interview Schedule 
 The interview schedule was developed using the principles outlined by Spradley (1979), 
using grand tour and mini tour questions. Prior to administration of the interview schedule, 
the content and wording were repeatedly reviewed by the supervisory team and changes 
were made to remove ambiguity and irrelevant questions. The interview schedule is 
attached separately in Appendix 4-3. Interviews were designed to last between 30-45 
minutes to avoid interview fatigue and minimize the impact on service delivery. Prompts 
were used throughout the interview to encourage the interviewee to increase the richness 
and depth of the information provided and to support dialogue between participant and 
researcher.  
4.6.4 Data Collection 
 After obtaining consent, the researcher briefed the interviewee using the pre-agreed 
criteria, outlined in Appendix 4-3. Interview participants were made aware that they could 
withdraw at any time during the interview process. The interviews were held in a quiet 
location specified by the interviewees and, after obtaining permission, the interviews were 
recorded using a digital audio recorder (Sony ICD-BX800 voice recorder).  
The interviews were conducted using a mix of English and Arabic languages, with the 
introduction, questions and prompts being entirely in English. Participants were given the 
freedom to answer in either English or Arabic language. These types of discussions are 




common in Sudanese culture where dialogues use a mix of both languages during the 
conversation and more so when using scientific terminology e.g. disease names, patient 
condition and medicines names which are spoken in English.  
4.6.5 Data management and Analysis 
Recorded interviews were listened to several times before transcription was undertaken. 
Interviews were transcribed verbatim by hand and later the Arabic content was translated 
into English for the purposes of analysis using the process outlined in Chapter 2 of the 
current thesis. 
Transcribed interviews were entered into NVIVO; a qualitative analysis software system for 
storage and coding. Framework Analysis, as described by Richie and Spencer (1980), was 
used for analysis of the results.  
For this study, text was coded using Framework analysis (described in Chapter 3 section 
3.6.7) to major emerging themes that described the prescription process. The framework 
adopted was the British Oncology Pharmacy Association (BOPA) Standards for Clinical 
Pharmacy Verification for Cancer Medicines (Table 4-4). This framework was used for 
















Table 4-4 Prescription Accuracy Guidelines (adapted from BOPA 2010) 
Prescription Category 
1. Accurate patient details (age, height and weight) are correct on prescription 
2. Appropriate prescriber’s details and signature 
3. Regimen is appropriate for patient’s diagnosis, medical history, performance 
status and chemotherapy history according to protocols approved by RICK drugs 
and therapeutic committee 
4. Regimen is the intended treatment as documented in the clinical notes 
5. Timing of administration is appropriate 
6. There are no known drug interactions (including with food) or conflicts with 
patient allergies and other medication(s) 
7. Body surface area (BSA) is correctly calculated, taking into account recent weight 
8. All dose calculations and dose units are correct and have been calculated 
correctly according to the protocol 
9.  The patient has not exceeded the cumulative dose, if appropriate according to 
manufacturer’s recommendations 
10. Where the dose was altered from the last prescription, check reason for any dose 
reduction(s) 
11. Check method of administration is appropriate 
12. The patient’s laboratory values, FBC, U&E’s and LFT’s are within accepted limits 
if appropriate. 
13. The doses of prescribed chemotherapy drugs are appropriate with respect to 
renal and hepatic function and any experienced toxicities 
14. All other essential tests have been undertaken 














4.6.6 Results of the Key informant interviews 
Four key informant interviews were conducted with a doctor from each prescriber grade. 
Doctors described clinic organization and the prescribing process. They explained their role 
in prescribing and the pharmacy role in transcribing of prescriptions onto administration 
sheets which were subsequently used by nursing staff to guide them in the administration 
of chemotherapy.  
Doctors were consistent in description of clinic organization; however, a number of 
inconsistencies were noted with regards to the prescribing process. Each doctor appeared 
to follow a different process in writing a prescription. The sum of the processes followed by 
the key informants are provided and outlined in Table 4-5. 
Doctors provided details on clinic organization and explained that all teams ran two clinics 
every week, the ‘Referral clinic’ and the ‘New patient’s clinic’.  
All new patients present at the ‘New Patients’ clinic’, where they were given a patient 
record number and patient medical file. Once the patient receives the file, they present to 
a consultant clinic. Consultants always carried out the initial consultation for patients. This 
involved; taking a medical history, patient clinical examination, assessment of investigations 
and preparation of a provisional treatment plan. On completion of the initial consultation, 
patients who do not require emergency treatment are given an appointment to attend the 
referral clinic.  The interim period gave doctors the opportunity to discuss new cases at 
weekly clinical meetings, where a final decision is made with regards to the treatment plan. 
According to the treatment plan, patients may be scheduled to either receive 
chemotherapy, radiotherapy or a combination of both, given as a course of pulsed therapy 
separated by specified time intervals, as detailed in the treatment protocol.  
When doctors wanted to issue a prescription for chemotherapy, they used a number of 
indicators to assess whether or not the patient was fit for chemotherapy. The first of those 
was to conduct a performance scoring based on the Eastern Cooperative Oncology Group 
(ECOG), which guides doctors in assessing the patient’s level of functioning (Oken et al., 
1982). The second step involved carrying out a patient medical and drug history to take into 
consideration drugs which may interact with chemotherapy, other contraindications and 
past doses of chemotherapy if applicable. The second step would be to assess the patient’s 
laboratory investigations, which may include full blood count, liver function tests and renal 
function. The fourth step comprised of the actual writing of the prescription which was 




guided by the treatment plan detailed in the patient’s medical file. The chemotherapy 
dosing was decided using the patient’s BSA, renal function or liver function as applicable. 
The final step involved completing the prescription form with the following details: patient 
name, diagnosis, gender, chemotherapy drug and doses, signature of prescribing doctor and 
date. Once the doctor completes the prescription, it is handed to the patient, along with 
the medical notes and the patient is instructed to take the documentation to the pharmacy, 
in order to obtain an appointment for chemotherapy. 
Table 4-5 Themes Emerging from Key Informant Interviews 
Dimension 
of interview 
Theme emerging from interview 
Clinic 
Organization 
• Teams ran two clinics every week, the ‘Referral clinic’ and the ‘New 
patients’ clinic’. 
New patients 
• New patients present at the “new patient clinic” 
• Patients are allocated a patient number and a patient medical file. 
• On receipt of patient number and medical file, patients returned to 
the clinic where they were examined by the consultant and their 
investigations reviewed. 
• A decision is made according to the clinical status of the patient to 
either be admitted (oncologic emergency), receive chemotherapy, 
receive radiotherapy or referred to another hospital 
Follow up patients  
• Patients are followed up in the “referral clinic”  
• Patients present for subsequent cycles for chemotherapy 
• Investigations carried out include, performance, score, tumor 
assessment, blood parameter investigation and others according to 
the chemotherapy required 
Prescribing 
Process 
• Assess patient performance score 
• Study clinical investigations to decide course of therapy 
• Assess patient history to ensure no contraindications, drug 
interactions, chemotherapy interval and cumulative doses 
• Decide on chemotherapy protocol to be given 
• Calculate BSA or Creatinine clearance to decide doses 
• Fill prescription form by free hand: patient name, diagnosis, gender, 
chemotherapy, doses, signature 
• Patient presents at pharmacy with documentation where 
prescription details are transcribed onto an administration sheet that 
contained the supportive drugs, infusion fluids, route of 




• General training in oncology and chemotherapy protocols 
• No specific training for prescribing 
Errors • Dose errors 
• Calculation skills, busy clinics, poor access to information, 
disorganized clinic.  
 




On presentation at the pharmacy department, pharmacists studied the notes and screened 
the prescription for accuracy. Once the pharmacist was satisfied with the prescription, it 
would be transcribed onto a protocol specific chemotherapy administration form. The form 
contained standard protocol specific supportive medication and was used by nurses to aid 
in the administration of chemotherapy on the ward. Finally, the patient would be given an 
appointment to receive chemotherapy. 
4.7 Stage Two- Identification of prescribing errors 
Pharmacists identified chemotherapy prescribing errors during their routine pharmacy 
practice, which were recorded onto a data collection tool which was developed to record 
particulars of these errors. Previous work had revealed the potential limitations of using 
pharmacist prescription screening to detect errors (Franklin et al., 2009). Firstly, during 
routine practice, pharmacists may consider some errors minor and not worth reporting. 
Secondly, prescription screening rigour can be affected by individual pharmacist expertise 
and clinical knowledge. Finally, pharmacists in their daily practice have less time than a 
dedicated researcher to study the medical records and identify errors.  In order to reduce 
the impact of these limitations, two measures were undertaken. Firstly, pharmacists 
responsible for screening chemotherapy orders were trained to ensure consistency of 
prescription screening and secondly, an independent data collector observed and recorded 
those errors onto the data collection tool. The second measure was introduced to eliminate 
the burden of data recording among the pharmacy team and ensure accurate data 
collection. 
4.7.1 Research team 
After obtaining approval from the chief pharmacist at the cancer centre, the research team 
consisted of the following: the principal researcher, three clinical pharmacists who were 
responsible for screening the prescriptions and transcribing prescription details onto the 
appropriate pre-printed chemotherapy administration templates, and a data collector who 
was responsible for recording of prescription details and prescribing errors. 
4.7.1.1 Research Team training 
The data collector and pharmacists were trained in patient safety research and screening of 
chemotherapy prescriptions. In addition, the data collector was provided with an 




orientation to the outpatient chemotherapy clinic and instructed in completion of the 
prescribing error tool. A description of the training provided in presented in Table 4-6. 
Table 4-6 Research team training 
Training 
Parameter 
                      Description 
Patient safety 
research 
• Introduction to the principles of medication safety research 
using a training package prepared by the WHO (2010). 
• Training package provided a video that detailed the RCA of 
an inadvertent error and a booklet on patient safety (WHO, 
2008a). Video contained a description of patient safety 






• Pharmacists completed the pharmacy department training 
programme for chemotherapy prescription checking. 
• A prescription checking exercise was evaluated using BOPA 
Standards for Clinical Pharmacy Verification of Prescriptions 
of Cancer Medicines (BOPA, 2010). 
Training in data 
collection 
• The data collector was trained in retrieving information from 
the patient files and prescription and recording the data onto 




• Shadowing a clinic based clinical pharmacist for a week to 
observe the organization of the outpatient clinic. 
• Training in reading medical records. 
4.7.2 Development of the data collection tools 
 To record all prescriptions presented at the pharmacy, two separate data collection tools 
were designed; one for collecting routine data on each prescription presented and one for 
recording details of identified errors. 
The prescription particulars data collection tool was designed to collect data for 14 
prescriptions per sheet for ease of recording (Appendix 4-4). The tool consisted of 
prescriber particulars, patient details, chemotherapy particulars and clinic details (Table 4-
7). 




The prescribing error collection tool (Appendix 4-5) was developed from the steps identified 
from stage one of the study and BOPA (2010) guidelines for verification of prescriptions for 
cancer medicines (Table 4-8). The tool was comprised of three elements; governance, 
documentation and clinical accuracy verification of prescriptions.  
Table 4-7 Prescription data collection tool 
Parameter Details 
Patient details Hospital number, Gender 
Prescriber details Consultant team, grade of prescriber 
Chemotherapy 
order details 
Diagnosis, Drugs prescribed, Chemotherapy protocol 
 
Clinic details Clinic location (RICK/ private clinic), Day of clinic 
Error Details Presence or absence of error, Error Number 
 
4.7.3 Pilot study 
After training, the data collector was asked to pilot the data collection tool by recording 
prescriptions received in the pharmacy and to record error details. The objectives of the 
pilot were to test, refine and validate the data collection tools. Piloting of quantitative 
research tools requires a sample of 50-100, of which the lower limit (50) was used in a 
validation of a scale for scoring the severity of medication errors (Dean and Barber, 1999). 
The pharmacy department screen and process 80-100 prescriptions for patients receiving 
chemotherapy in the day unit, daily. After discussion with the research team, a decision was 
made to conduct the pilot that on a sample of one day’s work or until there were no more 
alterations to be made to the tool. After completion of the pilot study, a number of 








Table 4-8 Components of prescribing error checklist based on Standards for Clinical Pharmacy Verification of 
Cancer Medicines (Adapted from BOPA guidelines 2010) 
Parameter Standards for prescription verification 
Governance • Prescriber is authorized to prescribe chemotherapy 
• Protocol is according to local approved protocols 
Documentation • Treatment plan is documented in the patient record 
• Protocol is as intended in the treatment plan 
• Patient demographics have been recorded 
• Prescription details are complete 






• Protocol is appropriate to diagnosis 
• No known drug interactions or allergies 
• Timing of administration is appropriate  
• Body surface area has been correctly calculated as appropriate 
• Dose calculations are according to protocol or other relevant 
clinical findings 
• Cumulative dose as appropriate 
• Methods of administration are appropriate 
• The necessary laboratory values and clinical investigations are 
within agreed limits according to protocol 
• Doses are appropriate to renal and hepatic function 













Table 4-9 Changes to the prescribing error tool after piloting 
 Element of prescribing error 
tool 
Changes after piloting 
Choice of drug • Added a section for not according to approved 
protocols 
• Substituted protocol not according to 
histopathology with protocol not appropriate 
with diagnosis 
• Removed the detailed section with supportive 
medicines. Prescriptions are transcribed into a 
pre-printed template (administration sheet) 
containing necessary supportive care medicines 




Divided the section to assess if the patient is fit for 
chemotherapy into: physical fitness, laboratory data 
and organ function 
Dose error Added wrong dose unit 
Prescription particulars Added a section to assess the legibility and 
completeness of the prescription 
 
4.7.4 Consent of doctors and prescribers 
A ten-minute talk about the study was given to the doctors during the weekly clinical 
meeting before the start of data collection about the study. The talk included the following: 
general aims and objectives of the project, data collection period, prescription details and 
errors to be collected, maintaining confidentially and anonymity of prescribers; doctors 
involved in errors were invited to take part in a 45-60-minute interview.  
4.7.5 Data collection  
The data collector was situated in the pharmacy department to collect data on prescriptions 
screened by the clinical pharmacists. Data collection was divided into two sections: 




1. Prescription and patient details - the information was retrieved by reviewing 
patient records and prescriptions, presenting to pharmacy. Details were recorded 
onto the prescription data collection tool (Appendix 4-4). 
2. Prescribing error details- once an error was identified, it was recorded on the 
prescribing error collection tool and given a unique serial number to identify the 
prescription from the prescription records (Appendix 4-5). 
Each of the prescriptions and patient medical records presented to the pharmacy, during 
the data collection period were included in the study. These prescriptions were for adult 
patients receiving chemotherapy treatment on the day ward. Prescriptions returned to 
prescribers because missing information or details were not included because it was not 
possible to ensure they were retrieved.   
The data collection period and the number of medication orders reviewed was guided by 
previous medication safety research, practice at RICK and research burden. Previous 
medication safety research in cancer chemotherapy involved the screening of 1262 
chemotherapy prescriptions (Slama et al., 2005) and 22,216 chemotherapy orders (Markert, 
2009) over 6 and 24 months consecutively. In the study setting, preliminary data collected 
in 2009, identified that pharmacy at RICK processed approximately 4000 chemotherapy 
orders each month, of which almost half were outpatients. Therefore, a decision was made 
to collect data from 2000 prescriptions over one month. This decision was based on typical 
sample size, workflow, exclusion of paediatric prescriptions, inpatients and to reduce the 
burden on the observer. All errors for each prescription were recorded on individual 
prescription data collection forms.  
4.7.6 Data management and analysis 
Prescribing errors data were validated, categorised and potential severity assigned before 
data entry and analysis. 
4.7.6.1 Error validation and categorisation 
Validation was carried out in two steps: the first being error validation within the research 
team and the second was obtained by an independent review from a senior oncology 
consultant. 
 




Step One- Validation by research team 
During regular intervals of the data collection period, the research team met to discuss and 
categorise the errors. Categories of prescribing error were based on previous medication 
safety research (Franklin et al., 2011) and modified according to the BOPA screening of 
prescriptions (see Table 4-10).  
Step two- Validation by consultant review 
 After categorisation, the errors were independently reviewed by a consultant oncologist. 
Disagreements between the research team’s decision and the consultant view were 
resolved in a meeting where it was decided that 7 prescriptions with errors should be 
excluded from the analysis.  The prescriptions were excluded because it was inferred that 
the prescribing decision was based on specific clinical reasoning. An example was a 
prescription for CHOP chemotherapy in a patient who had less than desired haemoglobin 
level. In this scenario, the consultant explained that the treating doctor would proceed with 
treatment because treating the underlying malignancies is expected to allow the 
haemoglobin to rise to normal levels.  
4.7.6.2 Determining potential error severity 
In order to assess the clinical significance of the errors, the potential severity of errors can 
be assessed using a validated severity tool. A number of tools have been developed but only 
two of these tools have been found to be valid and reliable for use in assessment of error 
severity. Both the NCC MERP (National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting 
and Prevention) and a severity tool developed by Dean and colleagues (1999) have 
published reliability and validity results (Garfield et al., 2013). The tool developed by Dean 
and colleagues required a 4-5-member panel to assign error severity (Dean et al., 1999), 
whereas the NCC MERP tool requires one person to be involved in assigning error severity. 
The NCC MERP tool was developed in the USA for categorisation of medical errors and 
includes nine categories of error based on severity and patient outcomes (Figure 4-3). The 
NCC MERP developed an algorithm to enhance interpreter consistency in assigning error 
categories   and reduce variability (National Coordinating Council on Medication Error 
Reporting and Prevention, 2012). The tool has been validated for use in research settings 
(Bobb et al., 2004;Forrey et al., 2007;Garfield et al., 2013). 
The severity rating was based on the potential of the prescribing error to result in an ADE 
or loss of therapeutic response, if it had not been intercepted. 




Table 4-10 Categories of prescribing errors 
Category Description 
Schedule 1. Continuation of drug for a longer duration than necessary e.g. extra cycle 
prescribed 
2. Prescribing a protocol for inaccurate length of therapy 
3. No indication for drug prescribed 
4. Duplication of therapy/ prescribing therapy with increased frequency 
5. Total cycle correct but divided into days incorrectly /Unintentional 




1. Prescription of drug to which patient has significant allergy 
2. Prescription of drug to which patient has clinical contra-indication such 
as low haematology parameters, renal failure or liver impairment 
3. Continuing a drug in the event of a clinically significant ADR 
4. Prescription of drug that is contra-indicated due to drug interaction 
5. Prescription of anthracyclines in a patient who has an ejection fraction 
less than 30%. 
6. Prescription of chemotherapy when neutrophil count <1.5x106//ml or 
haemoglobin <6g/dl or platelets <150x106/ml 
7. Prescription of chemotherapy when ECOG performance score is>2 (Oken 
et al., 1982) 
8. Prescription of a taxane when liver function tests: bilirubin 5x upper limit 
of normal or liver transaminase level >10x upper limit of normal 
9. Prescription of cisplatin when renal function in below 30ml/min 
 
Choice of drug 1. Prescription of a protocol/ drug that was not intended 
2. Prescription of a protocol that is not recommended for management of 
the specific  
Wrong dose 1. Exceeding the maximum cumulative lifetime dosage for anthracylines 
and similar drugs 
2. Dose/rate mismatch for infusions 
3. Overdose/underdose by more than 5% due to inaccurate calculation of 
Body Surface Area. 
4. Overdose/underdose by more than 5% due to inaccurate application of 
Calvert equation for carboplatin 
5. Overdose by more than 5% due to low renal function or increased liver 
test 
6. Choosing a dose more/less than 5% of that specified by the 
chemotherapy protocol 




Wrong route, formulation, Administration times, Instructions for IV 
administration, Start date or days of chemotherapy  
Prescription 
details 
Missing Product or formulation, Strength or dose, Route, signature, patient 
name, date, inaccurate spelling or abbreviations 
 
 




Severity was assigned using a two-step process. 
1. The principal researcher and the clinical pharmacists involved in the study reviewed 
all the prescribing errors made a prediction of potential outcome of errors and 
assigned severity rating using the NCC MERP algorithm (Figure 4-3). The potential 
clinical outcomes were determined according to the side effect profile of the drugs 
using the Electronic Medicines Compendium as a reference resource. 
2. To ensure validity, and that potential outcomes and severity rating were carried out 
within the appropriate clinical context, the results were reviewed by the senior 
consultant who participated in error validation. Discussions took place to reach an 
agreement on contentious predictions. 
Once agreement was reached, error category, and severity were recorded onto the 
prescribing error collection tool. 
 
4.7.6.3 Data entry and analysis 
Data from completed prescription and error data collection tools was coded and entered 
into the SPPS® Version 22 for data management and analysis. Data coding and entry was 
checked independently by a member of the research team for one in every 10 prescriptions. 
Descriptive statistics was used to produce frequency tables of patient gender, disease 
characteristics, number of cytotoxic chemotherapy agents prescribed and chemotherapy 
protocols. Associations between chemotherapy protocol and error categories were 
explored using chi-squared analysis. In addition, associations between individual drugs and 
error were explored using chi-square tests. Drugs involved in error were computed 
separately to identify if there was a statistically significant association between drug and 
occurrence of an error. A chi-squared value of <0.05 was considered to be a statistically 
significant result. 
Multivariate regression analysis was conducted to explore the effect of prescriber grade, 
number of drugs within a protocol and day of administration on the likelihood of an error 
occurring. An adjusted Odds Ratio (OR) of more than 1 was regarded as having a statistically 
significant impact on errors, as long as the confidence intervals do not cross the line of no 
effect. 
 





Figure 4-3 NCC MERP Index for Categorizing Medication Errors (obtained from http://www.nccmerp.org/sites/default/files/indexColor2001-06-12.pdf) 




4.7.7 Results  
4.7.7.1 Patient characteristics  
A total of 2194 patients presented with prescriptions for chemotherapy (see Table 4-11).  
The majority of patients were female (71%) and presented with breast cancer (36.5%) and 
most (82.5%) required prescriptions for combination chemotherapy containing between 
two and four drugs. 
Table 4-11 Table of patient characteristics 
Characteristic Total 
(%) 
Female gender n  
 (% of total) 
Diagnosis 
Breast 837 (38.1) 801 (96) 
Gynaecologic 426 (19.4) 426 (100) 
Gastrointestinal 251 (11.4) 95 (38) 
Haematological malignancy 237 (10.8) 72 (30) 
Head and Neck 218 (9.9) 63 (29) 
Sarcoma 108 (4.9) 48 (44) 
Lung cancer 67 (3.1) 12 (18) 
Urological (Prostate) 30 (1.4) - 
Others 20 (0.9) 10 (50) 
Total 2194 1557 (71) 
Number of drugs per protocol 
   
One drug 383 (17.5) 257 (70) 
Two drugs 1038 (47.3) 713 (69) 
Three drugs 720 (32.8) 538 (74) 
Four drugs 53 (2.4) 19 (36) 
 
4.7.7.2  Chemotherapy distribution according to primary diagnosis 
Most patients presented with prescriptions for anthracycline based chemotherapy (16.7%) 
for breast cancer. This was followed by single agent chemotherapy (16.4%) and then 
cisplatin combination therapy (15.8%) which were used to manage a range of different 
cancers (see Table 4-12).  





Table 4-12 Chemotherapy protocol and diagnosis distribution of prescriptions 
Chemotherapy protocol* Breast Gynae Gastro Haem H&N Urological Lung Sarcoma Others Total (%) 
Anthracycline based 
therapy 
366 - - - - - - - - 366 (16.7) 
Single agent 146 70 74 2 30 17 7 12 1 359 (16.4) 
Cisplatin combination - 41 103 - 145 9 21 25 2 346 (15.8) 
Taxane platinum doublet - 251 11 1 - - 22 - 3 288 (13.1) 
Non-approved protocol 72 54 24 27 35 4 3 36 14 269 (12.3) 
Taxane based therapy 214 - - - - - - - - 214 (9.8) 
Lymphoma Protocol 
(CHOP &ABVD) 
- - - 208 - - - - - 208 (9.5) 
CMF 39 - - - - - - - - 39 (1.8) 
Ifosfamide combination - - - - - - - 35 - 35 (1.6) 
Fluoropyrimidine based 
therapy 
- - 31 - - - - - - 31 (1.4) 
Platinum doublet - 3 4 - 8 - 13 - - 28 (1.3) 
Gemcitabine combination - - 4 - - - - - - 4 (0.2) 
Others - 7 - - - - - - - 7 (0.3) 
Total 837 426 251 237 218 108 67 30 20 2194 
*For details of chemotherapy protocols- see Appendix I 
Abbreviations: Gynae= gynaecological cancer, gasrto= gastrointestinal, H&N= head and neck cancers 




4.7.7.3 Error frequency and category 
Of the 2194 prescriptions written, a total of 314 errors were identified in 219 (10%) 
prescriptions. Of these, a total of 145 (66.2%) prescriptions, contained one error, 53 (24.2%) 
contained two errors and 21 (9.6%) contained three errors, so that approximately one third 
of those prescriptions with errors contained more than one error. This was largely due to 
the prescribing of combination regimens. For example, the inaccurate calculation of the BSA 
of a patient prescribed a 3-drug combination chemotherapy protocol, means that three 
errors were recorded on the prescription.  
 Dose errors were the most commonly identified (34.1%) and formulation errors were the 
least common, where only error was identified (see Table 4-13). Nearly one quarter of the 
errors identified were seen in prescriptions for a cisplatin based protocol (22.6%) and errors 
were more likely for prescription containing either cisplatin ( p <0.001, chi-sqaure test) or 
carboplatin (p=0.019, chi square test) prescriptions. 
A more detailed analysis of dose errors (see Table 4-14) showed that there were almost 
equal number of both overdoses (53; 49.5%) and under-doses (54; 50.5%). However, 
calculation errors (86; 74%) were the most common. More than a quarter (30; 28.0%) of 
dose errors were due to miscalculation of BSA, mostly resulting in under-dosing (28; 26.2). 
Other dose errors were caused by inaccurate calculation using the Calvert equation (25; 
23.4%) and inaccurate dose adjustment according to renal function tests (RFTs) (23; 21.5%).  
 
In more than one quarter of prescriptions with errors, the chemotherapy prescribed was 
contraindicated (87; 27.7%). More than half (50; 57%) were written when a blood 
parameter was well below the minimum desired limits (see Table 4-9 for limits) specified 
for the patient to receive chemotherapy (see Table 4-15). Around one fifth of prescriptions 
with errors (18; 20.7%) were written for patients with impaired renal function. In contrast, 









Table 4-13 Error categories in each chemotherapy protocol group 
Protocol No.  of 
prescriptions 


















366 18 14 5 5 2 4 2 - 50 (15.9) 
Cisplatin 
combination 
346 24 17 8 - 16 5 1 - 71(22.6) 
Single agent 359 11 12 3 4 3 8 2 1 44(14.0) 
Taxane platinum 
doublet 
288 22 7 5 3 - 1 - - 38(12.1) 
Non-approved 
protocol 
269 9 19 1 - 8 6 2 - 45(14.3) 
Taxane based 
therapy 
214 8 7 2 - - 5 1 - 23(7.3) 
Lymphoma 
Protocol 
208 11 4 9 1 - - 1 - 26(8.3) 
CMF 39 3 - - - - - - - 3 (1.0) 
Ifosfamide 
combination 
35 - - - - - - 2 - 2(0.6) 
Fluoropyrimidine 
based therapy 
31 1 2 1 - 1 - - - 5(1.6) 
Platinum 
doublet 
28 - 5 1 - 1 - - - 7(2.2) 
Gemcitabine 
combination 
4 - - - - - - - - - 
Other 7 - - - - - - - - - 
 Total (%) 2194 107(34.1) 87 (27.7) 35 (11.1) 13(4.1) 31 (9.9) 29(9.2) 11(3.5) 1(0.3) 314 





Table 4-14 Characteristics of dose errors 






Inaccurate dose calculation using BSA 28 (26.2) 2 (1.9) 30 (28.0) 
Inaccurate dose using Calvert equation* 13 (12.1) 12 (11.2) 25 (23.4) 
Inaccurate dose adjustment according to RFT 1 (0.9) 23 (21.5) 24 (22.4) 
Dose transcription error 11 (10.3) 8 (7.5) 19 (17.8) 
Inaccurate dose adjustment according to LFTs - 2 (1.9) 2 (1.9) 
Other 1 (0.9) 6 (5.6) 7 (6.5) 
Total 54 (50.5) 53 (49.5) 107 
*Calvert equation is used to calculate doses of carboplatin in terms of targeted area under the curve 
(AUC) and glomerular filtration rate (GFR). Dose of carboplatin = AUC (FGR +25) (Kaestner et al., 2007a) 






Table 4-15 Characteristics of drugs contraindicated 
Reason for drug contraindication Frequency (%) 
Depleted blood count* 50 (57.4) 
Impaired renal function (Creatinine clearance <30mL/min) 18 (20.7) 
Patient ECOG performance score >2** 6 (6.9) 
Cardiac Ejection fraction <30% for anthracycline 5 (5.7) 
Raised White cell > 12x106/mL 4 (4.6) 
Impaired Liver function *** 2 (2.3) 
Cumulative lifetime dose of anthracycline reached (>450mg/m2) 2 (2.3) 
Total 87 
*neutrophil count <1.5x106//mL, haemoglobin <6g/dL, platelets <150x106/mL, **ECOG performance score:0-5 
(Oken et al., 1982), ***Impaired liver function: bilirubin 5x upper limit of normal , liver transaminase level >10x 








4.7.7.4 Potential predictors of prescribing errors 
Although most prescriptions (34%) were written by senior registrars, all grades of prescriber 
were involved in errors (see Table 4-16). The highest rate of errors (20%) was identified 
among the group least involved in prescribing; unauthorised prescribers, followed by junior 
registrars (12.8%). Interestingly, senior registrars responsible for most of the prescriptions 
made the least number of errors (8.4%). The majority of errors (88%) had the potential to 
cause either serious/significant harm (n=171, 78%) or life-threatening harm (n=21, 10%).   





  (%) 












746 (34.0) 7 51 5 63(8.4) 
Junior 
consultant 
589 (26.8) 9 51 6  66(11.2)  
Senior 
consultant 
587 (26.8) 9 39 6 55(9.4) 
Junior 
registrar 
257 (11.7) 2 27 4 33(12.8) 
U/A* 
 
15 (0.7) - 3 - 3(20.0) 
Total (%) 2194 27 (12.3) 171 (78.1) 21(9.6) 219 
*U/A unauthorised prescribers 
Multivariate regression was used to examine the potential impact of prescriber grade on 
the likelihood of a prescribing error and its severity. After controlling for prescriber grade 
and severity of errors, there were no statistically significant differences for likelihood of 
error and severity of error (Table 4-17). The multivariate model indicated that although 
differences existed between all grades of prescriber in comparison to senior consultants, 
however, these were not statistically significant. Junior registrars (adjusted OR 1.43, 95% CI 
0.9-2.26) were 43% more likely to be involved in an error when compared with consultants. 
Senior registrars (adjusted OR 0.88, 95% CI 0.60-1.29) were 12% more likely to be involved 
in an error and junior consultants (adjusted OR 1.23 ,95% CI 0.84-1.78) were 23% more likely 
to be involved in an error when compared to senior consultants. Furthermore, junior 
registrars were more than twice likely to be involved in an error with a potentially moderate 




severe outcome (adjusted OR 2.25, 95% CI 0.57-8.94) or an error with a potentially 
severe/life-threatening outcome (adjusted OR 2.00, 95% CI 0.29-13.74) when compared to 
senior consultants.  
Table 4-17 Impact of prescriber grade on error occurrence and severity 
Grade of 
prescriber 








1.43 (0.9-2.26) Reference 2.25 (0.57-8.94) 2.00 (0.29-13.74) 
Senior 
registrar 
0.88 (0.60-1.29) Reference 1.79 (0.62-5.11) 1.43 (0.30-6.88) 
Junior 
consultant 
1.23 (0.84-1.78) Reference 1.33 (0.30-5.92) 1.42 (0.53-3.82) 
Senior 
Consultant 
Reference Reference Reference Reference 
 
Errors occurred during all working days(Sunday-Thursday), however, the highest frequency 
of errors (162 prescriptions with 22 errors,13.6%) was recorded on Thursdays (see Figure 4-
4) whereas workload was busiest on Sundays (589 prescriptions with 55 errors, 9.3%). 
Most prescriptions contained more than one drug (80%), but interestingly, the highest 
frequency of errors occurred among prescriptions which contained one (9.9%) or two drugs 
(11.9%) (see Figure 4-5).  
Multivariate regression explored the potential impact of weekday and number of drugs in 
a chemotherapy protocol on the frequency of prescribing errors. After controlling for days 
of the week and the number of drugs in a chemotherapy protocol there were differences 
for the two explanatory variables, however, these were not statistically significant (see 
Table 4.18). Errors were equally likely to occur on a Wednesday (adjusted OR 0.82; 95% CI 
0.483-1.39), in comparison to Thursday but more than half as likely on occur on Monday 
(adjusted OR 0.36; 95% CI 0.36-1.08). Furthermore, errors were equally likely to occur with 
a two-combination drug (adjusted OR 1.07; 95% CI 0.74-1.55) in comparison with one drug 
protocols and nearly 25% less likely to occur with three drug (adjusted OR 0.72; 95% CI 0.47-
1.09) and four drug combination chemotherapy protocols (adjusted OR 0.72; 95% CI 0.25-
2.09). 
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Table 4-18 Results of multivariate analysis for predictors of prescribing errors 
Variable p-value Multivariable analysis OR (95% CI) 
Number of drugs 
One drug Reference Reference 
Two Drugs 0.71 1.07(0.74-1.55) 
Three drugs 0.12 0.72 (0.47-1.09) 
Four drugs 0.546 0.72 (0.25-2.09) 
Day of the week 
Sunday 0.117 0.66 (0.39-1.11) 
Monday 0.091 0.36 (0.36-1.08) 
Tuesday 0.11 0.64 (0.37-1.11) 
Wednesday 0.46 0.82 (0.483-1.39) 
Thursday Reference Reference 
 
 
4.7.7.5 Potential clinical outcomes of errors 
The prescribing errors could have impacted significantly on patient care, and potential 
outcome (see Table 4-19). The majority of clinical outcomes would have been 
serious/significant harm or life threatening harm (192; 87.7%). Among these, nearly one in 
ten errors (21; 9.6%) would have the potential to cause life-threatening sequalae if they 
were not intercepted, mainly due to renal failure, pancytopenia and neutropenic sepsis. 
Almost half the errors (146, 44.7%) had the potential to cause side effects, some leading to 
bone marrow and neutropenic sepsis (30, 13.6%). Nearly 33.3% (n=73) of prescriptions with 











Table 4-19 Potential clinical outcome of errors 
 Potential for harm Potential clinical outcome  Frequency (%) 
 Low capacity for 
harm  
No Clinical Impact 27 (12.3) 
Serious/significant  Reduced Therapeutic Effect 73 (33.3) 
Bone Marrow Depression and neutropenic sepsis 30 (13.6) 
Increased risk of Side effects 29 (13.2) 
Renal Failure and bone marrow depression 23 (10.5) 
Thrombocytopenia 5 (2.3) 
Worsened Anaemia 5 (2.3) 
Exacerbation of Heart Failure 4 (1.8) 
Increased risk of Heart Failure 2 (0.9) 
 Subtotal 171 
Life-threatening 
 
Renal Failure, pancytopenia and neutropenic 
sepsis 
11 (5.0) 
Bladder Haemorrhage 3 (1.4) 
Pancytopenia and Neutropenic sepsis and death 2 (0.9) 
Fever and rapid shock 1 (0.5) 
Pancytopenia and irreversible cardiac failure and 
death 
1 (0.5) 
Pancytopenia and peripheral neuropathy and 
death 
1 (0.5) 
Pancytopenia, sepsis and renal failure and death 1 (0.5) 
Sepsis and liver failure 1 (0.5) 
 Subtotal 21 











4.7.7.6 Summary of results 
A total of 219 prescriptions (10%) among a sample of 2194 contained 314 errors, of which 
87.7% had the potential to cause significant/severe or life- threatening outcome in their 
recipients. Errors were more commonly due to dose errors or the drug being 
contraindicated. Prescriptions with cisplatin and carboplatin were more likely to be involved 
in errors. Junior registrars were twice more likely than senior consultants to write a 
prescription with a potentially life-threatening error, and errors were more common on 
Thursdays and Wednesdays which are the two days before the end of the working week in 
Sudan. Interestingly, errors were also more likely with single and double drug protocols in 
comparison to multiple drugs.  
4.8 Stage Three-Critical incident interviews 
Some of the aims of this research were to identify the contributory factors associated with 
medication errors. Both NPSA and the WHO recommended the use of Root Cause Analysis 
(RCA), for this purpose (WHO, 2008a;NPSA, 2004a). Other methods that have been used 
include Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (Kozakiewicz, 2005;Robinson et al., 2006), which 
is more suited to predicting AEs occurring in hypothetical situations during the preliminary 
stages of service development. Both methods are established in healthcare but are less 
adept at understanding human factors leading to error (Senders, 2004). Cooper and 
colleagues adopted the CIT to understand the human factors involved in anesthesia 
associated adverse events (Cooper et al., 1984;Cooper et al., 1978). Thus, they identified 
that equipment failure constituted 14% of the causes contributing to AEs in their study 
(Cooper et al., 1978).  
Pharmacy medication errors studies that employed CIT involved the identification of 
medication errors through voluntary staff reporting (James et al., 2008), however, this 
would not have been feasible in this study due to absence of reporting systems at the cancer 
hospital (identified in Chapter 3).  Pharmacist screening of prescriptions and CIT was used 
in an exploration of prescribing errors among a large cohort of newly qualified doctors 
(Dornan et al., 2009).  
Flanagan developed the CIT in 1954 which he described as a flexible set of procedure for:  
“collecting direct observations of human behavior in such a way as to facilitate their 
potential usefulness in solving practical problems” (Flanagan, 1954; p335).  




Flanagan (1974) provided detailed instructions on data collection for CIT and proposed that 
this could be done using either observations or interviews. The interviews should be worded 
in a specific way to prevent inferences from research participants and to encourage actual 
accounts of the critical incident. Research participants would be asked to focus on that 
specific incident with questions probing the behaviours involved.  
Flanagan describes the critical incident as:  
“any observable human activity that is sufficiently complete in itself to permit 
inferences and predictions to be made about the person performing the act “(Flanagan, 
1954; p335) 
The CIT has many advantages which include focusing on critical events and allowing the 
researcher to probe into extraordinary events. It reduces rater bias because the respondent 
is allowed to use their own words to express the reasons why the incident happens. 
Furthermore, CIT can be used to provide insight into the causes of incidents. However, this 
method has poor reliability and has the potential to fail in identifying causes of common 
everyday happenings. The technique has been used in nursing, medicine, dentistry and 
pharmacy (Fitzgerald et al., 2008;Norman et al., 1992;Cooper et al., 1978;Cooper et al., 
1984;James et al., 2008) with a guide published in 2005 (Woloshynowych et al., 2005) to 
assist its incorporation into medication error research. 
Flanagan describes five steps for conducting CIT (Flanagan, 1954);  Clarifying the aim of the 
activity, plans and specifications for carrying out the activity, collecting the data, analyzing 
the data and interpreting and reporting which were applied to the current study as 
explained in Table 4-20. 
In the current study, pharmacist routine prescription screening during stage 2 was used as 
a tool to capture prescribing errors. The errors identified during the previous stage were 










Table 4-20 Flanagan's five steps as applied to the current study 
Activity  Description 
Clarify the aim of the activity The activity being studied in this research is the 
preparation and administration of a chemotherapeutic 
agent 
Plans and specifications This involves identifying a plan of data collection and 
capturing of critical incidents. In the current study, this 
involved identifying prescription errors through 
pharmacist screening. 
Collecting data Flanagan proposed that data collection would be carried 
out by observation or individual interviews. In the current 
study interviews were the chosen method of data 
collection. Interview questions were designed to probe 
the critical incidents identified. Design of the interview 
schedule is explained below 
Analyzing the data  Reason’s Framework of Human error* was used in data 
analysis. The critical incidents were classified into 
categories of human error: Slips, Lapses, violations and 
mistakes. Critical behaviors were categorised using 
Reason’s Framework  
Interpreting and reporting Data was further interpreted and presented as a 
narrative in the thesis 
*(Reason, 1997)  
 
4.8.1 Recruitment of research participants 
Members of the medical team and clinical directors were aware that the study was taking 
place and all authorized prescribers were eligible to participate in the study. A total of 44 
doctors were involved in writing 219 prescriptions with errors as identified in stage 2 of the 
current study. However, two doctors were un-authorized prescribers and were excluded 
from the study. Once a critical incident was identified, research participants were invited in 
person or by telephone to attend an interview within 96 hours of identification of the 
incident. Research participants who were not available for interview within 96 hours of the 
error taking place, were not contacted again regarding the same error. Before the 




interviews, research participants were given a PIL (4-6) and two copies of the consent form 
to be signed (Appendix 4-7).  
4.8.1.1 Selection of cases for Critical Incident Technique 
During data collection in stage two, it was identified that a number of doctors were involved 
in more than one error per day. After discussion with research supervisors, it was decided 
to invite doctors an interview to discuss one error according to the interviewee’s 
preference. However, it was important that the error would have taken place, within 96 of 
conducting the interview.  
4.8.2 Data collection 
Doctors who had agreed to participate in CIT interviews were invited to choose a quiet 
location of their preference. Signed consent was taken before the start of the interview and 
participating doctors were informed that they had the right to withdraw from the interview 
at any point. Most interviews took place in the pharmacy medicines information office but 
a few were conducted at doctors’ offices. Research participants were invited to provide 
answers to the interview and were given the prescription (s) with error as a prompt. In the 
event of more than one error being identified, doctors were asked to choose one error of 
their preference to be included in the discussion. Interview questions were conducted in 
English but the doctors were given the freedom to choose either Arabic or English to 
answer. Verbal consent was obtained to record interviews using an audio digital recorder. 
4.8.2.1 Interview schedule 
The interview schedule was adapted from CIT (Appendix 4-8), designed to last between 30-
45 minutes and consisted of the following; introductory section, how the error occurred, 
the prescribing procedure at the time of the incident, description of the environment, 
perceived reason for the error, how to avoid such an error in the future, needs to prevent 









Table 4-21 Summary of critical incident interviews format 
Stage of interview schedule Description  
Introduction • Greetings. 
• A brief introduction into the study 
•  It was also confirmed at this stage that the study 
focused on how the incident took place with no 
emphasis on the persons involved 
• Anonymity, confidentiality and freedom to 
withdraw at any point of the study 
• A brief description of the critical incident was 
delivered to the interviewee 
Explain how the error 
occurred 
A detailed description of the nature of the 
incident- Research participant was asked to 
provide a detailed description of what the incident 
was and how it occurred  
Prescription process • Description of the process followed during the 
time the incident took place 
Description of the work 
environment 
• Description of the working environment at the 
time of the incident  
(Prompts used here were: interruptions, busy, 
number of patients, inappropriate preparation.) 
Reason for the error • The perception of the interview participant as to 
the potential cause of the critical incident 
How to avoid such errors in 
the future 
• Effective actions to reduce the error prone 
situations 
• Ineffective actions  
Needs • Technical and training needs required by interview 
participants to avoid errors.  
Closure • Gratitude to the participant for taking the time to 
be interviewed 
• Requesting a repeat visit should a matter need 
clarification in subsequent stages of the research 
 
 




4.8.3 Data Management and analysis 
Interviews were taped using (SONY IC Recorder ICD-BX800). Recorded interviews were 
transcribed verbatim and translated into English using the methods outlines in Chapter 2 of 
the current thesis. Translated data were entered into ENVIVO for storage and data analysis. 
Framework analysis ( described in Chapter 3 section 3.6.7) was used to map emerging 
themes to Reason’s Framework of Human Error (described in  section 1.7 of chapter 1) 
(Reason, 1990). The critical incidents were classified into categories of human error: slips, 
lapses, violations and mistakes. Critical behaviours were categorised using Reason’s 
Framework as organizational processes and pre-conditions for errors (Reason, 1997). 
 
4.8.4  Results  
During the first week of data collection an attempt was made to contact each of the doctors 
involved in the prescribing error identified in Stage 2 of the current chapter. However, the 
vast majority of doctors were either unreachable or not available within 96 hours of the 
incident. Hence it was decided to interview doctors involved in errors once rather than 
repeatedly contacting each doctor for each prescribing error. A total of 10 doctors 
consented to taking part in the study. Interviews were conducted with four consultants, 
four senior registrars and two junior registrars to discuss ten critical incidents identified in 
Stage 2 of the current chapter. 
During the interview, the participants were not able to recall the incident and could only do 
so when prompted. Once prompted, interviewees were able to describe the incident in 
some detail.  
4.8.4.1 Categories of unsafe acts  
Following analysis of these interviews, Reason’s accident causation model (Reason, 
1990)was used to categorise the errors (Figure 4-6). The active failures in this study were 
identified as slips, mistakes and violations and none were found to be due to lapses. All the 
four active failures due to slips were caused by attention failures, leading to mis-ordering 
of a prescription in three incidents and an omission of drug doses for one. Most of the active 
failures were due to intended actions either caused by mistakes or violations (see Figure 4-
6). One of the mistakes was an RBM caused by misapplication of a good rule and the other 
was caused by a KBM. 





Figure 4-6 Analysis of Critical Incidents into slips mistakes and violations




Except for two incidents, most critical incidents had the potential to cause significant life-threatening 
harm had the prescriptions not been intercepted (Figure 4-8). Interviews were conducted with two of 
the three doctors who wrote a prescription containing a 10-fold dose which had the potential to result 
in life-threatening harm. Among the critical incidents discussed, four prescriptions had the potential 
to cause life- threatening bone marrow suppression. 
4.8.4.2 Contributory causes of errors 
A number of conditions and factors were associated with the unsafe acts discussed with doctors during 
the critical incident interviews. Conditions associated with unsafe acts were analysed using Vincent’s 
adaptation (Vincent et al., 1998) of Reason’s original error framework (Reason, 1990). These were 
classified into error-provoking conditions and latent factors (Table 4-22). Doctors were able to give 
examples of errors that they have witnessed and described the factors that they perceived were 
responsible for causing such errors. 
4.8.4.3 Latent errors 
Several organizational and managerial factors were identified as the latent errors that contributed to 
prescribing error causation. These latent errors were shared amongst the critical incidents discussed 
in the current study. Among the organizational factors, clinic organization contributed to six critical 
incidents and culture contributed to five critical incidents (see Table 4-21). Other organizational 
factors that contributed to prescribing errors were workload, lack of resources, poorly organized 
hospital records and lack of training. Among the managerial factors, lack of task related procedures 








Table 4-22- Error-provoking conditions and latent factors associated with active failures discussed in critical incident interviews (n=10) 
Causes   of    errors  
Unintended actions Intended actions 









Resources +    + +  +   
Workload + +  +       
Clinic Organization +  +   + + + +  
Hospital Records   +   +     
Culture +  + +    + +  
Training     +   + + + 
Managerial 
Factors 
Procedures       + + + + 
Responsibility        +    
Error provoking 
conditions 
Patient Demand      + + + +  
Complex +    + +     
Individual Knowledge gaps     +     + 
Professional Responsibility       + +  + 
Stress   +    +    
Environment Busy   + +       
Interruptions +          
Task Complicated       +   + 
Hand written prescriptions +  + + + +   + + 
Missing information   +   +     
Team Supervisions     +     + 
Workload distribution       + + +  
Hierarchies    +    + +  
 
 




4.8.4.3.1 Organizational factors 
A number of organizational factors were associated with the errors discussed in the critical 
incident interviews. 
Workload 
According to doctors’ accounts, the clinics were generally busy which meant that doctors 
had little time to prescribe. Hence attention to detail was lacking, which had the potential 
to lead to errors: 
“If you consider the sheer number of patients that we see in (names the consultant) 
unit, something like this is inevitable. And you know sometimes, the medical officer 
may write a prescription and all I do is sign the prescription” (Senior Registrar- 
Critical interview 6) 
Hospital Records 
Hospital records were often incomplete and contained insufficient information about the 
patient. Doctors often needed to contact other departments in order to gather essential 
information required for the safe prescribing of chemotherapy. The below quote illustrates 
this: 
“I thought about the bleomycin cumulative dose¸ so I left the prescription where it 
was and sent a note to the pharmacy to ask for a medication record profile and 
check the cumulative dose of bleomycin. Isn’t that the right thing to do?” (Senior 
Registrar- Critical incident interview 7) 
Clinic Organization 
In five incidents, doctors explained that clinics may run in unofficial areas where there is a 
lack of supportive clinical and administrative staff. Consequently, patient numbers are 
uncontrolled and working hours may extend beyond those allocated:  
“I was in the office and it was crowded as usual. It was just myself and the head of 
unit.  We do some of the work, but he (head of unit) insists on seeing all the patients 
and then gives instructions to writing a prescription or a referral note to 
radiotherapy and such. The patient number is an overload...ok I mean the referral 
clinic is always busy but because it is a planned clinic, all the members of the unit 
are present, which includes the consultants, the registrars and the medicals. But the 
referral clinic is repeated the next day here in the office but without the supportive 




number of staff. There might be two or three doctor’s maximum and we may end 
up staying till after 2 in the afternoon. It can get really busy in this office” 
(Consultant- Critical incident interview 7) 
Resources 
Participants explained that they often faced difficulties when making prescribing and 
treatment decisions, due to inadequate resources. They explained that sometimes 
prescribing decisions are made without appropriate assessment of the patient, mainly 
because important investigations are unavailable at the study hospital. In some instances, 
investigations essential for making sound prescribing decisions are not funded by the study 
hospital and require patients, who mostly have financial difficulties, to pay out of pocket 
expenses. Interviewees felt that the unavailability of essential investigations could lead to 
prescribing errors or expose patients to unjustified risk from chemotherapy. Below are two 
illustrative quotes: 
“the patient came in with an x-ray showing what could be lung mets ... We studied 
everything and it seemed that the patient had a primary lung so I told the patient 
that I can’t decide on treatment without a CT guided biopsy. The patient went to 
find out where they could get the investigation done and it turned out that there is 
one person in the whole of Khartoum who can do it. This one person was on Haj 
pilgrimage. When the guy came from Haj, he did a CT which showed no evidence of 
lung mets. …….. If I had given the patient treatment based on the first radiological 
tests, he would have had side effects...”  (Consultant- Critical incident interview 2) 
 
 “.... we may find a new case (patient) who has financial difficulties. If we need to 
get some more investigations to complete the workup, the patient may not be able 
to afford the cost of a Computed Tomography, Magnetic Resonance Imaging or an 
x-ray... and you went ahead and made a decision without referring to those tests, 
and then you later found liver mets or lung mets. Then here the doctor would have 
made the wrong decision... yep that’s would be an error.” (Consultant- Critical 
incident interview 2) 
Doctors explained that there was a lack of appropriate equipment and resources essential 
for prescribing complex chemotherapy prescriptions: 




“We just need a protocol booklet to check the doses, we need a calculator to 
calculate the doses and we need proper working weighing scales. The ones we have 
don’t work and we have to send patients upstairs to get weighed” (Senior Registrar 
– Critical incident interview 1) 
Culture 
There was a culture of rigid team hierarchies where junior doctors felt that they were unable 
to question their seniors. In five incidents, doctors explained that they were “told” by a 
senior member of the team to write the prescription and felt frustrated that they had to 
obey orders. One doctor explained how she knowingly wrote a wrong prescription under 
direct orders from the senior consultant: 
“...  she (meaning the consultant) wanted me to write the prescription to give the 
patient something. I wrote this prescription knowing full well that the patient won’t 
respond to chemotherapy and that the dose is wrong but I couldn’t convince her 
otherwise and I felt defeated. Honestly, I feel defeated, you know what I mean...  I 
never shout at patients but today I was short-tempered and ended up shouting at 
patients. I re-checked it with her (the consultant) more than once and repeated 0.19 
g or mg and she replied saying just write what I had previously written and please 
go write the prescriptions. I told her the maximum was 12 and normally the dose is 
10mg, she said “I know, just write it as I told you.” (Junior Registrar- Critical incident 
interview 9) 
Doctors tended to obey rules without questioning their senior members of staff, and were 
afraid of offending them if they did otherwise. A doctor explained how this contributed to 
an error, because, under the senior consultant’s orders, she copied the last dose from the 
records without checking its accuracy: 
“The head of unit just told me to write to this patient what he had received before. 
I opened the file and read the last entry and that’s what I wrote on the prescription 
for… I couldn’t question his decision. You know how he can get with us; he can be 
very upset if we question him.” (Senior Registrar- Critical incident interview 7) 
Training  
New members of staff were provided with little training essential to achieve competency 
for prescribing chemotherapy. A junior doctor explained that they “pick up” knowledge in 
their daily tasks, rather than being pre-equipped with the necessary training: 




“the pharmacist contacted me about a prescription, last week, and I told her that I 
wanted to write dexamethasone instead of methotrexate. You see these names 
don’t mean a lot to me, I haven’t come across them before I worked here. I am just 
now starting to pick up the names.” (Junior Registrar- Critical incident interview 
10) 
 
4.8.4.3.2 Managerial Factors 
Two managerial factors provided the latent conditions for the errors discussed in the critical 
incident interviews. 
Procedures  
Procedures for writing prescriptions were not available to doctors and hence doctors would 
prescribe chemotherapy without guidance and hence may sometimes omit to order or 
review essential pre-treatment laboratory parameters.  
A doctor prescribed carboplatin which had a profound effect on lowering the platelets, 
without reviewing pre-treatment platelet levels. He explained that ignoring the platelets 
was a routine violation: 
“You find yourself looking at all these different parameters and as long as the first 
one or two look ok, you just go ahead and sign... Things like the platelets, nobody 
looks at that, I will just look at the haemoglobin and the total white cell count but 
most people just ignore the platelets.” (Consultant- Critical incident interview 3) 
In the second incident, essential laboratory parameters were not ordered before issuing the 
prescription and it was left to pharmacy to identify if the patient required dose reductions: 
“For this patient, I calculated the dose as 140mg cisplatin on day 1 and the 5FU as 
1400mg on days 1,2,3. I asked her (the patient) to go to the lab to get her 
investigations done and then take both the lab results and the prescription to the 
pharmacy. But I wasn’t too happy with this dose because I thought it was too high 
and I thought the patient may not be able to tolerate this dose but the dose was 
correct according to the calculation based on the BSA.” (Senior Registrar- Critical 
incident interview 4) 
 
 






According to doctors’ accounts, team members abandoned their assigned tasks and left 
clinics unattended. A doctor described how he was left on his own to attend the clinic, when 
other members of the team left before clinic times:   
 “It was the end of a busy clinic; I had seen the last patient and the other consultant 
had already left and so had the registrars. I found I was doing all the work and I had 
a couple of new patients.” (Consultant- Critical incident interview 3) 
 
4.8.4.4 Error-provoking Conditions 
Several error-provoking conditions interplayed in causation of the active failures in the 
current study. The error provoking conditions were associated with the patient, the 
individual doctor, the working environment, the prescribing task and the medical team. 
4.8.4.4.1 Patient factors 
Doctors explained that the patient was possibly involved in the occurrence of prescribing 
errors. Patients were usually complex and placed excessive demands on doctors to give 
them chemotherapy treatment.  
Complex patients 
Some doctors felt that oncology patients were challenging because the disease is 
complicated and requires careful decision making. Patients with cancer presented with 
unique disease characteristics and the many options available mean that prescribing 
decisions need to carefully tailored to each patient. Below is a quote illustrating this: 
“You sit in one of those primary medical centres and it’s the same story with every 
patient who comes in. They may have tonsillitis, a chest infection, urine infection, 
malaria, the story is simple but with a cancer patient it’s complicated. Each patient 
is a different story. The choices are very hard and you may want palliative or radical 
treatment. You may want to decide on concomitant radiotherapy or chemotherapy 
followed by radiotherapy or one of these treatment modes without the other, you 
may want to give neoadjuvant. Each patient is a separate entity, and that needs 
time, needs time.” (Consultant- Critical incident interview 2) 
 




Another aspect that complicates the management of oncology patients are the 
considerable changes in the patients’’ clinical status requiring the treating doctor to closely 
monitor the patient and identify how to modify the treatment accordingly. Doctors 
perceived those challenges to pose a risk for errors. 
One example was described by a doctor when a patient arrived to receive their subsequent 
chemotherapy cycle. The doctor prescribed chemotherapy without assessing the patient, 
however, it was discovered later that he patient had a poor performance status and would 
not be fit to receive chemotherapy. It was evident from the doctor’s narrative that this 
practice, although a violation, was common: 
“Most of the time, it’s the co-patient that comes to see us rather than the patient. 
The Prof had a go at me before because I had written a prescription for 
chemotherapy when the patient’s performance status was poor and she wasn’t 
going to tolerate the chemotherapy well.   I had not seen the patient myself but 
relied on the assessment of the co-patient, I asked the co-patient if they thought the 
patient would be able to tolerate the chemotherapy. I had also written in the file, 
“patient not seen”.” (Senior Registrar- Critical incident interview 1)  
Patient demands 
Patients and their relatives were perceived to put unreasonable demands on the doctor to 
write a prescription. These demands resulted in a number of outcomes. For example, one 
doctor felt pressurised to write a prescription without assessing the patient.  
“I know he (Head of department) says we shouldn’t write the drugs without seeing 
the patient, but when the co-patient (relatives or carers) comes and he is asking you 
to do him a favour, then I am forced to write the prescription. I can’t ask him to go 
home and bring the patient to the outpatient clinic.” (Senior Registrar- Critical 
incident interview 1) 
Another example is when doctors prescribe unnecessary chemotherapy because the 
patient demands treatment. One of the junior registrars explained that the chief consultant 
at her clinic would use non-evidence based chemotherapy protocols that to keep patients 
satisfied: 
“We had a patient with renal cancer and the chief consultant wrote bleomycin and 
vinblastine and I really felt sorry for the patient. The disease doesn’t respond to 
chemotherapy but they write the drugs to keep the patient happy. Today, I was 




thinking about this, I thought why don’t they tell the patient that the disease won’t 
respond to treatment anymore.” (Junior Registrar- Critical incident interview 9) 
4.8.4.4.2 Individual Factors 
Knowledge 
Doctors implied that some team members lacked the skills and knowledge or access to 
prescribing resources, essential to prescribe chemotherapy, safely: 
“One of the main reasons in my opinion is not having the knowledge or not having 
access to information sources. If the doctor doesn’t have the right knowledge and 
this could be for any reason. It could be that he hadn’t seen the situation before or 
that the disease is very rare and the doctor hasn’t seen a similar case in a very long 
time. The doctor may also know the regime to be used but doesn’t know the dose, 
ok. So, absence of knowledge is the key to causation of errors.” (Consultant-Critical 
incident interview 2) 
One doctor explained how lack of knowledge about prescribing chemotherapy can lead to 
errors and leads to frustration:  
“I only realized that we give dexamethasone and prophylactic antibiotics with 
docetaxel when a patient asked me to write the supportive care for docetaxel. I 
looked very puzzled and if it wasn’t for x (the porter) I wouldn’t have known. She 
told me what to write and I felt very angry at myself. I was upset at not knowing this 
basic information.”  (Junior Registrar – Critical incident interview 10) 
Professional Responsibility 
In three incidents, two of which were a violation, doctors did not assume professional 
responsibility when prescribing chemotherapy. One example was a doctor who had 
temporary eyesight limitations but continued prescribing the wrong doses: 
“It’s possible that I wrote this prescription when I had keratoconjunctivitis and 
wasn’t wearing my contact lenses...  I can’t wear glasses because they affect the 
shape of the eyes and can cause bags under the eyes.  I had keratoconjunctivitis for 
a month and the doctor had asked me to stop wearing contact lenses. You must 
have noticed that the other interns would laugh at me because I would put my seat 
quite close to the front because I couldn’t see. I also have astigmatism. I couldn’t see 
the words clearly and the letters were swimming in front of my eyes and they would 




ask me to wear the glasses, but I would rather die than go around with eyeglasses 
and ruin the shape of my eyes.” (Junior Registrar- Critical incident interview 10) 
Another example is a consultant that would pre-sign empty prescription forms and leave 
them for junior doctors to fill: 
 “... the boss has a policy; he says we shouldn’t let a patient leave the clinic without 
a prescription in their hand... He even pre-signs some empty prescriptions and the 
empty treatment plans from the patients’ files and leaves them to us or the medical 
officer to fill, saying that he doesn’t want someone to come looking for him for a 
consultant signature.” (Senior Registrar- Critical incident interview 4) 
Stress 
Doctors worked under stressful conditions where they experienced fatigue, expressed in 
not showing interest in their patient. Under the influence of stress and fatigue, doctors 
stated that they felt the need to quickly write a prescription and dismiss the patients: 
“I was left on my own and you know, I am a new consultant. I was tired and had 
seen so many files in front of me and the patient thrust the lab results under my 
nose as I was walking out of the clinic. I wasn’t concentrating on the patient and all 
I wanted was to leave as soon as possible... I just wanted to get rid of the patient, 
so I looked at some of the results and not looked at the others well enough and just 
put a quick signature on the lab results form, saying that it’s ok to go ahead with 
the chemotherapy.” (Consultant- Critical incident interview 3) 
4.8.4.4.3 Environment factors 
The interview participants talked about busy clinics and how they thought this could 
contribute to errors. One doctor explained that he wouldn’t have enough time to review 
the patient’s medical history appropriately before reaching a therapeutic decision. And in 
some instances, he would make a decision that is not appropriate: 
“The outpatient clinic was busy, there were more than 60 people sitting, each one 
of those has a pile of files to look through. I can’t read all the file, I can’t read all the 
information, I can’t go through all the X-rays. Therefore, when I give a decision, it 
may not be tailored to the patient, it may not cover all the aspects in that patient. I 
may have seen a fraction of the things and built a decision on partial information.”        
(Consultant- Critical incident interview 2) 




4.8.4.4.4 Task factors 
Complex tasks 
Doctors explained that the calculations for chemotherapy prescriptions were often complex 
and may rely on others including other healthcare teams to assist in the tasks: 
“The BSA calculation is not straightforward but I always do it. But for example, for 
patients on carboplatin, I wouldn’t write the dose but just the target AUC and such. 
I would order a serum creatinine and rely on the pharmacy to calculate the dose. I 
would never repeat a dose of carboplatin but write the serum creatinine and leave 
the rest to pharmacy.” (Consultant- Critical incident interview 1) 
Handwritten Prescriptions 
Doctors prescribed chemotherapy on empty prescription forms, which required that they 
had to rely on their memory to write down all the different elements of the prescription.  A 
mistake occurred when a new consultant who had no previous experience in the hospital 
wrote a number prescription where he omitted the doses. He was interviewed for one of 
these prescriptions and explained that he omitted the doses because he felt that 
prescription writing was unclear to him: 
“I have just started working here and have just written those few scripts, the ones 
that you see without the doses... You know I have just come back from abroad so I 
don’t know the system very well and I saw that some prescriptions (not written by 
me but written by others) would be sent back by the pharmacy with a note saying 
things like this needs a dose reduction, or the patient may need another alteration 
to the prescription. The pharmacy calculates the surface area, they calculate the 
dose reduction, ok? So, for me, it wasn’t clear what I had to do and thought that if I 
just wrote FAC, they would calculate everything as in the protocol...” (Consultant - 
Critical incident interview 2) 
Unreliable information 
In two incidents, doctors explained that the information required for prescribing 
chemotherapy may be absent or unreliable, contributing to decision errors: 
“We had a patient who was seen by a doctor in one of the large hospitals, she 
referred her for a fine needle biopsy. The results were carcinoma in situ. The patient 
had a lump and she had lymph node involvement. You know that carcinoma in situ 




should be a lump, it could be 2cm or even bigger but it needs to be very localised 
and without mets or axillary involvement.  Because it is carcinoma in situ that hasn’t 
yet gone beyond the basement membrane. We decided on neo adjuvant therapy 
which is the right decision according to the clinical presentation but not according 
to the pathology results. The decision is correct in view of the axillary involvement 
and in view of the local involvement but not in view of the results of the fine needle. 
So, we decided to give the patient a cycle of chemo and then to repeat the 
investigation as true cut. It would have been better in this situation to ask the 
patient to repeat the investigation before starting the chemotherapy.” (Consultant- 
Critical incident interview 2) 
 
4.8.4.4.5 Team factors 
Workload distribution: 
Doctors believed that workload distribution within the team was unfair because some 
doctors were assigned more tasks than others. One registrar explained that, in her unit, the 
consultant was well known to allocate most of the work to junior staff, because she would 
only review the patients she sees in her private clinic: 
“I am the first one who comes to the referral clinic and take most of the files and put 
them on my desk. I usually give the other registrar a smaller pile of files because you 
know he is not capable of reviewing all the files. The consultant doesn’t review any 
file except when the patient is a private patient of hers in the private clinic or it’s a 
patient that she knows otherwise. She won’t waste her time with the rest of the 
patients. So, I know which patients are her private patients and I put their files onto 
her desk.” (Junior Registrar- Critical incident interview 9) 
Team hierarchies seemed to be rigid and, doctors felt unable to ask questions of their senior 
colleagues. Hence, even against their better judgement, doctors would violate normal 
procedure if they had been asked to do so by their consultant, as illustrated below: 
“But the boss is always right, and I can’t overrule his decisions. If he decides that we 
should write a prescription without checking the labs then so be it. This is what we 
will do. I know pharmacy don’t like it and they say that we send the patients without 
checking their labs knowing full well that some of these patients may present with 
poor renal function because of the nature of cancer of the cervix, they may present 




with obstructive nephropathy so I suppose I need to know the serum creatinine 
before prescribing the dose.” (Senior Registrar- Critical incident interview 4) 
Supervision  
Doctors suggested that supervision from senior members of the team was absent in many 
situations, leading junior doctors to continue prescribing drugs without carrying out 
investigations necessary to assess patient’s response to treatment: 
“There are people who just follow the previous dose without doing the calculations 
in case the patient’s parameters have changed. For example, the other day, the 
patient with HD came. He previously had ABVD, six cycles, and then disappeared for 
so many months. He came with recurrence, he hadn’t come since March (9 months 
ago), so my junior colleague re-wrote the same regime. The patient received two 
doses, and was on his third dose, I calculated his cumulative dose and realized that 
he had received his total lifetime dose of doxorubicin. So, I wrote on the file that he 
had completed his cumulative dose.” (Senior Registrar- Critical incident interview 
1) 
Defences 
Doctors relied on pharmacists as a defence against prescribing errors. One consultant 
explained that when he wrote a prescription, he expected pharmacy to identify any 
particular issues that he may have missed and required the prescription to be modified: 
“There may be something that we are not aware of or something that we have 
missed. I expect you (meaning anyone from pharmacy) to send us a note to inform 
us of whether a dose reduction is needed or anything else.” (Consultant- Critical 
incident interview 2) 
“They use regimes and doses out of this world but it’s good that pharmacy manage 
to change most of them.” (Junior Registrar- Critical incident interview 9) 
Other doctors relied on senior members of their unit to check the acuracy of prescriptions: 
“...there are others that I may have forgotten or maybe I can’t recall certain details, 
so, I would ask (names senior member of the medical team). I would ask someone 
for the dose of the protocol.” (Senior Registrar- Critical incident interview 1) 




4.9 Stage four- Focus Group Interviews 
During the collection of data in stage 3, it was evident that interviews were conducted with 
less than one quarter of doctors involved in prescribing errors. The purpose of the current 
stage of the study was to conduct focus groups to explore the opinion of a larger number 
of doctors who were involved in errors. The aim of this focus group study was to acquire 
more insight into the experiences and opinions of doctors, regarding the type, contributory 
causes and management of prescribing errors.  
4.9.1 Development of the focus group schedule 
The focus group schedule (Appendix 4-9) was divided into six sections. The first section was 
an introduction and consisted of welcoming the focus group participants, assuring 
confidentiality anonymity and freedom to withdraw and explaining the aim of the study. 
This section also included technical aspects of the focus group discussion which was a 
discussion of the language to be used and asking the participants to consent to the 
discussion being audio-recorded. The areas to be covered during the focus group were 
discussed in this section as well as a brief introduction and definitions used in medication 
safety research.  
The second section of the focus group discussion intended to probe the safeguards 
participants follow to protect patients against potential harm. The discussion was steered 
to make sure the participants covered; training and CPD, competency and prescribing, 
knowledge about drug, evidence based medicines and how they verify doses and check for 
contraindications, the use of second checks, meetings and grand rounds, patient consent 
and the procedure followed when monitoring patients and following them up, the use of 
abbreviations and lastly recording in patient records. 
The third part, was designed to explore the experiences of the participants with regards to 
errors; if they were involved in an error, if they believe or had witnessed an error  that 
resulted in patient harm and what they perceived were the most common types of errors.  
The fourth part of the discussion aimed to understand the pariticpants perceptions about 
the causes of errors. Each member of the group was given a piece of paper and asked to 
recall an error that they had either witnessed or were involved in and were asked  to write 
down what they had thought the factors contributing to those errors were (Appendix 4-10). 
Disscussions were encouraged to cover the typical areas associated with error prone 




conditions such as workload, interruptions,  patient knowledge, prescriber training and 
knowledge,  availability of resouces necessary for prescribing, patient pressure,  work 
stressors, team work and busy work environment, job satisfaction and work related fatigue. 
The fifth part was designed to identify the types of measures, the doctors use or think can 
be used to manage errors. The doctors were asked to imagine if themselves or a colleague 
were involved in a prescribing error. They were asked to discuss together how they think 
they will manage the error, report, learn from it and how they will manage the patient 
should they be affected.   
The fifth part relied on findings from the first  focusing exercise, where the contributory 
factors were written on a flipchart. Focus group participants were asked to suggest solutions 
to the contributory factors and debate the proposed solutions. The discussion points, were 
steered to cover findings in stage three (in this chapter) and previous medication error 
research and these were; environment factors: organization of the outpatient clinic, task 
based factors:  patient files, design of a pre-printed chemotherapy prescription, patient 
education, pre-clerking clinics, team issues : number of staff, staff mix and work load 
allocation 
The sixth part was a second focusing exercise where a bar chart displaying the frequency 
and nature of prescribing errors identified in stage 2 (of the current chapter) was distributed 
among the focus group participants (Appendix 4-10).  The participants were given 10 
minutes to debate and discuss the high risk areas of prescribing. The focus group facilitator 
steered the discussion to ensure that the following areas were discussed: potential impact 
of prescribing error on patient outcomes, frequency of prescribing errors and high risk 
areas. They were then invited to discuss the priority area and priority interventions to  be 
addressed. Topics were steered to ensure that focus group participants covered the 
prescribing task,  work load allocation, support for prescribers from other staff, how safety 
culture has been used in other areas of high risk to improve safety, how to report and learn 
from errors, blame and accountability. 
The focus group was concluded by thanking participants for taking time to contribute to the 
research and inviting comments and questions. 




4.9.2 Recruitment of research participants 
Purposive sampling was used to recruit doctors in this study. At the time of the study, 42 
medical doctors were authorised to prescribe chemotherapy and all had been involved in 
prescribing errors as identified in stage 2 of the current chapter. During the course, of the 
study, a number of doctors participated in various exercises; 4 were involved in the key 
informant interviews, 10 in the critical incident interviews and 1 in error validation. The 
remaining, 27 doctors had not participated in this research, so far. Doctors were invited to 
participate in three focus groups with each group consisting of 4 members and composed 
of one grade of prescriber; consultant, senior registrar and junior registrar 
Prospective focus group participants were invited in person and each was given a PIL 
(Appendix 4-11) and consent form (Appendix 4-12) to read before agreeing to take part in 
the study. 
4.9.3 Data collection 
Participants were asked to choose a location that was suitably furnished to allow 
participants to see each other’s’ faces and where interruptions would not occur. All 
participants agreed that a lunchtime meeting would be most appropriate where 
refreshments were provided. Focus group discussions were conducted in the medicine 
information department at the hospital and one was conducted in the doctor’s mess. The 
focus group exercise was conducted using the general principles outlined in Chapter 3 and 
guided by the focus group schedule outlined in section 4.9.1 (Appendix 4-9). 
4.9.4 Data entry and management 
Focus group discussions were recorded using a digital recorder (SONY-ICD BX800) and 
transcribed verbatim in Arabic. The verbatim discussions were translated using the 
principles outlined in chapter 2. Translated data were entered into ENVIVO for storage and 
data analysis. The emerging themes regarding contributory factors were analysed using 
Framework analysis based on Reason’s Framework of Human Error (described in section 1.7 
of Chapter 1).  





During focus group discussions, doctors were able to describe their own methods in 
ensuring prescriptions were safe and that errors were reduced. They were able to recall 
incidents when prescribing errors, dispensing errors and administration errors occurred and 
describe situations when patients have experienced harm in consequence. Participants 
from the three focus groups were unaware of patient safety culture and had not heard of 
the term before the exercise was undertaken. Nevertheless, focus group participants were 
able to explain the contributory causes of prescribing errors at the study hospital and 
propose possible solutions. 
4.9.5.1 Examples of patient harm: 
Focus group participants stated that they would only be aware of a patient being harmed 
by a prescribing error if the patient presents at the cancer hospital. However, in most 
situations patients would seek medical care elsewhere.  
“An error that harmed the patient? This depends on whether the patient comes back 
to us with problems. Most of the time the patient doesn’t come back with issues and 
they may go somewhere else”  (Consultant 1- Focus Group One) 
However, each group was able to recall incidents where patients were harmed as result of 
a prescribing error. Two doctors described the consequences of transcription errors: 
“Another problem occurs when the registrar, transcribes the second dose. This 
happens more commonly when prescribing Ifosfamide. We usually give double the 
dose of mesna to ifosfamide, so when the registrar writes the dose, they may 
confuse the doses and write the double dose for the ifosfamide instead of mesna. 
For example, I have a patient who had 8g of ifosfamide, that’s double the dose and 
when I enquired about what happened, the registrar said he didn’t know the dose 
and transcribed it incorrectly. ……. the patient had severe abdominal pain and had 
prolonged neutropenia. Her total white cell count has still not improved even after 
we reduced the dose on the third cycle. When she presented for the fourth cycle her 
white cell count was extremely low and, it’s been over a month now, but we can’t 
give her the fourth dose.” (Consultant 2- Focus Group One) 
“I remember a vincristine dose that was written incorrectly, I don’t know if you were 
working with us at the time, but you know the maximum dose is 2mg and the patient 




was prescribed 8mg instead. The patient survived but he was admitted to the ward 
and stayed for several weeks. He was in pain and constipated and had poor 
sensation on both feet and hands. The drug was prescribed wrongly and was 
dispensed by pharmacy as such and given by the nurse. I mean something like this 
could have been checked by the nurse or the pharmacist.” (Senior Registrar 1 – 
Focus Group Two) 
4.9.5.2 Latent factors associated with errors: 
Focus group participants described the contributory factors associated with prescribing 
errors and situations where patients were harmed. These factors were related to the 
culture, the working environment, the task of prescribing, the individual doctor and the 
patient. 
4.9.5.2.1 Culture  
Focus group participants from the junior prescriber grade were particularly aware of the 
culture at the cancer hospital and described errors that occurred because they felt unable 
to question their superiors. 
“We are junior doctors so we just do what we are told most of the time. I will give 
you an example. I had a patient with colorectal cancer and the consultant wrote on 
the plan for gemcitabine and taxol. I just stared at the file in utter disbelief…we all 
know that this regimen has no role in that specific malignancy and ok so the patient 
had no response to other first line drugs but that doesn’t mean that they should be 
given chemotherapy for the sake of it. So, I wrote the prescription and yes pharmacy 
contacted me to clarify the regimen but I couldn’t say anything. I think that I asked 
them to refer the query to the consultant” (Junior Registrar 2- Focus Group Three) 
In one situation, a patient experienced a fatal AE because her consultant prescribed a dose 
of 5-Fluoruracil administered over 4 days, rather than the recommended 21 days. The junior 
doctor questioned the prescription but she felt unable to act because the consultant had 
insisted to proceed with the treatment: 
“What can you do when you know for sure that this will kill the patient. He wrote 
the dose and I questioned it but he said its ok and he has tried it before and you 
know the rest...yes the patient died two weeks later with neutropenic sepsis, 
dehydration and severe mucositis” (Junior Registrar 1- Focus Group Three)  




4.9.5.2.2 Environmental factors 
Doctors prescribed chemotherapy in outpatient clinics that were not appropriately 
organized. The clinics were crowded and patients attended in no particular order. 
Furthermore, clinics were inadequately furnished and lacked equipment pertinent to 
conducting appropriate patient examination. 
“But some patients just attend clinic for no reason, you see them at each clinic, the 
first clinic and the one at the end of the week. The patient may see one doctor and 
instead of leaving, they go to see another doctor in the unit, they have no control on 
the movement of patients in the outpatient department.” (Consultant 2- Focus 
Group One) 
“The building itself barely qualifies as a health care institution, there are no 
designated areas for washing hands, no ceiling fans or air conditioners, the 
ventilation is very poor. If the building is in a good state and is made to be more 
suitable, we can see more than the number of patients we do at the moment.” 
(Consultant 1- Focus Group One) 
Poor organization of the clinics meant that doctors faced a number of interruptions and 
consequently lost their concentration. The patient usually presented to the clinic without 
the necessary investigations and hence the doctor often had to interrupt the consultation 
to obtain those. Below is an illustration of this: 
“The clinics are usually crowded and patients come and go. So, the patient may 
come in and I would ask them to go back and get their investigations, when they get 
the investigations, I may discover that the weight isn’t done, so I have to send them 
again to get weighed. By the time, I want to write the prescription I may forget my 
intentions and say I was supposed to prescribe allopurinol but I would have 
forgotten by that time. After the patient, has left and at the end of the day, I might 
remember what I was supposed to prescribe. These things happen a lot…the 
environment doesn’t help.” (Junior Registrar 3- Focus Group Three) 
 
 




4.9.5.2.3 The Task of prescribing 
Discussions during focus group exercises revealed that doctors were faced with a number 
of difficulties during the prescribing process. Access to essential information was usually 
hampered by incomplete patient files or one that were disorganized.  
“The files are always in a mess. If you need to look for something, you have to search 
the whole file, you have to look for the last page of entry. You may want to read the 
last follow up and finding the specific page takes a long time. This is a problem in 
the outpatient department specifically as it is very busy. We always have to ask the 
patient about the last follow up because you are never sure where it was recorded” 
(Senior Registrar 2- Focus Group Two) 
Furthermore, doctors sometimes felt unable to carry out a thorough assessment of their 
patient. This presented difficulties with calculating doses when the necessary investigations 
were not available or were only available at extra cost to the patient 
“I just want to say that some investigations are very costly and they may not 
available at the hospital or are not free of charge. I mean mainly liver function tests 
they are too expensive for the patient and most of the time, they can’t get those 
done.” (Senior Registrar 1- Focus Group Two) 
 
4.9.5.2.4 The Individual Doctor 
During focus group discussions, doctors stated that errors may occur if the individual doctor 
has poor knowledge or may have the knowledge but does not follow best practice. 
“…Some of the registrars start on the chemotherapy prescribing without having the 
knowledge. A lot of those doctors haven’t seen chemotherapy before and have no 
idea about prescribing.….” (Senior Registrar 2- Focus Group Two) 
“Another test which is always ignored are the baseline ECHO investigations which 
are required to be done before giving anthracycline therapy for patients over the 
age of 50. I have seen one patient who was receiving her first cycle of ABVD. The 
nurses called me to the chemotherapy day ward because the patient developed 
chest pain. I ordered ECG and echocardiogram which showed reduced ejection 
fraction and obvious signs of cardiomyopathy. You know what? The echo report 
stated that the cardiomyopathy was due to chemotherapy. But that wasn’t true 
because she had just had a tiny fraction of 25 mg and it’s not possible to develop 




such advanced cardiomyopathy so soon and after such a small dose. The patient has 
been admitted for observation and today when the consultant was made aware of 
this issue, asked that no anthracycline therapy should be started in any future 
patient without carrying out baseline echo. Sometimes when a problem happens, 
we realise that these things are important and are meant to be done for specific 
reasons.” (Senior Registrar 3- Focus Group Two) 
Some doctors believed that errors occurred because some members of the nursing team 
did not possess the necessary skills and knowledge to administer the chemotherapy, 
properly. One doctor described how a patient was harmed by an administration error, 
despite the prescriber giving appropriate instructions: 
“they gave the patient the vinorelbine dose via the intramuscular route. She called 
the pharmacy to say that she had given the patient folinic acid and the patient 
started screaming, when the pharmacist arrived on the ward, she discovered it was 
vinorelbine. The patient was prescribed vinorelbine but the nurse was not able to 
read the prescription or the administration instructions. We couldn’t find an 
antidote anywhere but the patient was admitted and was given supportive care.” 
(Junior Registrar 3- Focus Group Three) 
4.9.5.3 The patient 
It was revealed during focus group discussions that the patient could also contribute to an 
error. Patients presenting for chemotherapy were usually very ill and had little information 
about their disease and chemotherapy. This may lead to harm. 
 “Some patients experience harm because they don’t follow the doctor’s 
instructions. Especially those that use traditional medicines. Problems happen when 
the patient combines these with chemotherapy. I mean the patient may get better 
using the chemotherapy but if they are using herbal medicines or any traditional 
medicines, they would attribute the benefits to that… We had a patient, I think he 
was with Dr D unit’s, he had lymphoma, no CML, he was taking……. Glivec and then 
started to take that new herb, what is it called…Oh yes moringa. So, he started 
taking the moringa and he felt that he had improved and stopped taking the 
glivec……he came back for his six months’ review but it was too late……. there was 
nothing to do because he was in blast and it was too late to help him” (Senior 
Registrar 2- Focus Group Two) 




Patients were often complex and required close monitoring and if the doctor failed to 
monitor the patient appropriately, errors may occur. Below is an illustration of this: 
“Our patients are usually very ill and may lose considerable weight during treatment 
and if the doctor doesn’t check the weight regularly then there will be a problem.” 
(Consultant- Focus Group One) 
4.9.5.4 Defences and error management 
During discussions, doctors listed a number of system defences that they personally used 
to prevent errors from occurring. These defences were focused on error management and 
error prevention.  
In situations where the doctors were busy, they usually relied on other members of the 
healthcare team to rectify errors.  
“I think that may be due to the fact that a lot of times we would prescribe the 
chemotherapy without looking at the pre-chemo investigations. We rely mainly on 
pharmacy to check those doses when the investigations come through………. So, we 
will send the patient to be weighed but that usually takes a long time so we ask 
them to go to pharmacy with their new weight. They will usually calculate the 
creatinine clearance and they know the dose reductions. We know they will give us 
the correct and appropriate dose for the patient.” (Senior Registrar 2-Focus Group 
Two) 
 According to participant’s accounts, errors were managed by informing the person involved 
to bring their attention to the matter and prevent repetition.  
“If this happens to me, I would always call the doctor involved and explain to them 
that it needs to be done this way rather than the way it was done in. I wouldn’t 
punish them but I would let them know about the error so that it is not repeated.” 
(Consultant 2-Focus Group One) 
Doctors proposed solutions to the issues discussed. They thought that clinic re-organization 
was an important issue to be prioritised, in order that patients are seen in less disorganized 
environments. 
“Usually, there are four of us in one room and each doctor has one patient and a 
number of relatives with them. I mean if each room has a maximum of one 




consultant and one registrar and patients can come in one by one, then we would 
be able to concentrate better.” (Junior Registrar 3- Focus Group Three) 
Members of focus groups revealed that they thought pharmacists were important in 
verification of prescriptions and prevention of error. It was proposed that closer liaison with 
pharmacy would reduce chemotherapy related prescribing errors.  
“one of the best solutions in my opinion is to keep a close contact with the pharmacy 
when prescribing, I meant the unit should have direct access to pharmacy... this is 
important.” (Consultant 3- Focus Group One) 
A further solution proposed by a participant in one focus group, was a change to the system 
followed in prescribing and administration of chemotherapy 
“…on the paediatric ward, we had to do some changes to our prescribing so that 
more than one nurse is involved and if an error occurs, more than one person can 
spot the error. We divided the long doses each into four doses. So instead of putting 
the whole dose into one iv bag and infusing it over 24 hours, these are now split into 
four bags, each over 6 hours. That way we make sure that the patient has the drug 
over the required time and again if there was a dose error, it may be spotted. 
Another thing that we noticed was that nurses don’t know how to calculate the 
dose, so instead of prescribing just the dose we would write instructions for the 
nurse on how to reconstitute the dose, so we would write for example to be 
reconstituted with this many cc’s of normal saline and remove this many cc’s of drug 
and add to the bag and so forth” (Senior Registrar 2-Focus Group Two) 
 
4.10 Discussion 
The current study identified that one out of ten prescriptions (219 in 2194) contained at 
least one error, of which most (88%) had the potential to cause serious/ significant harm or 
life-threatening harm. Errors were caused by a number of error and violation provoking 
conditions and influenced by several interlinked latent factors. These factors were 
embedded in the culture and organization of the study hospital. Errors were frequent and 
repeated and prescribing of chemotherapy took place in under resourced environments 
where error defences were absent. Although to our knowledge, all the prescriptions with 
errors identified in stage 2 of the current chapter were rectified before reaching the patient, 




evidence from focus groups (stage 4 of the current chapter) revealed that patients had been 
harmed as a result of prescribing errors and one fatality was described.  
This is, to our knowledge, the first mixed methods study that identified prescribing errors 
and their contributory causes in a cancer hospital in the EMRO region. Medication safety 
research is not commonly undertaken in developing countries (Wilson et al., 2012) with very 
little research concerning medication errors associated with chemotherapy prescriptions 
(Oberoi et al., 2014). However, prescribing errors in cancer chemotherapy are common in 
both developing countries (Oberoi et al., 2014, Mathaiyan et al., 2015) and developed 
countries (Gandhi et al., 2005a, Elsaid et al., 2013).  
Similar to the methods employed in this study, the most frequently used research method 
for detection of prescribing errors was through routine pharmacist prescription screening 
(Lewis et al., 2009, Tully et al., 2009). A review of 65 studies focused on prescribing errors 
in general medicine, paediatric and mental health settings identified that pharmacist 
routine screening of prescriptions was the most common (40%) among prescribing errors 
studies (Lewis et al., 2009). Likewise, most prescribing error research in chemotherapy 
involved pharmacist screening of prescriptions (Alcácera et al., 2001, Díaz-Carrasco et al., 
2007, Gandhi et al., 2005a, Garzás-Martín de Almagro et al., 2008, León Villar et al., 2008, 
Markert, 2009, Nerich et al., 2010, Ranchon et al., 2011, Slama et al., 2005).  It is worthwhile 
that routine screening of prescriptions by pharmacists serves as a useful resource for the 
identification of process-based errors (Lewis et al., 2009).  A small number of studies have 
used other methods (Ford et al., 2006, Huertas Fernandez et al., 2006, Walsh et al., 2009, 
Oberoi et al., 2014). For example, a study exploring prescribing errors associated with oral 
chemotherapy collected data from record review and patient/carer interviews (Oberoi et 
al., 2014).  
The causes prescribing errors have been explored using qualitative methods (Tully et al., 
2009). A review of 16 prescribing error studies, focusing on identifying causative factors, 
revealed that almost all employed qualitative methods which included semi-structured 
interviews, structured interviews and observational methods. The current study employed 
the CIT used previously in similar research in general medicine (Dornan et al., 2009). Doctors 
from UK based hospitals were invited for an interview within 96 hours of a prescribing 
incident, and the interview data were analysed using Reason’s Human Error Theory 
(Reason, 1990). This was similar to design of the current study design but poor response 
meant that, unlike similar research (Dornan et al., 2009), only ten doctors were interviewed. 
Nevertheless, analysis revealed a number of error and violation provoking conditions which 




were common to most of the conditions when the prescribing error occurred. Although the 
doctors needed prompting to remember the error, most were able to give detailed accounts 
of the associated conditions and factors. For example, doctors remembered the incidents 
once they heard the patient’s or saw the actual prescription. Similar prompts were used in 
previous prescribing error research (Franklin et al., 2011;Dornan et al., 2009).  
4.10.1 Cancer distribution 
Cancer distribution in this study was different to the data published in Sudan because data, 
in the current study, was extracted from patients who presented for day case chemotherapy 
and excluded patients requiring in-patient treatment. Statistics from Sudan show that 
breast cancer is the most common presentation among cancer patients, followed by 
leukaemia, lymphoma and prostate cancer (Saeed et al., 2014). Cancer distribution among 
patients who presented for day case chemotherapy during data collection was also highest 
for breast cancer but leukaemia patients were not included in the sample, in this study, 
because the disease is commonly managed in inpatient settings. The proportion of patients 
with prostate cancer was also fewer than expected, although it is the second most common 
cancer among Sudanese men (Saeed et al., 2014). This would be expected because drug 
management of the disease mainly involves oral hormonal therapy. Only a small minority 
of patients, who develop hormone resistant disease (Chan et al., 2007), would be managed 
using chemotherapy administered in the chemotherapy day unit.   
4.10.2 Frequency and potential clinical significance of prescribing errors  
The frequency of prescribing error in the current study (10%) was comparable to those 
reported in previous studies (Lewis et al., 2009). For example, a review of 65 prescribing 
error studies identified that the average prescribing error rate was 7% (2-14%). 
Unfortunately, the authors did not include a list of the medications studied and hence it was 
not possible to identify if chemotherapy drugs were included in the reviewed studies. 
However, when compared with errors in chemotherapy prescribing, a number of challenges 
are encountered. The reported chemotherapy prescribing error rate varied (0.31% - 100%) 
for a number of reasons:  study aims and objectives, study design, different definitions for 
errors, different settings, and use of oral or intravenous chemotherapy (Gandhi et al., 
2005b;Ranchon et al., 2012;Ranchon et al., 2011). For example, Huertas-Fernandez and 
colleagues (2006) reported an error rate of 100% in manually written prescriptions in 




comparison with computerized prescribing, most of which were omission errors (83%). 
However, in this study setting, doctors were never required to write the pre-medication, 
hydration, rate of administration or final concentration, because these details are included 
in the standardized administration template where the pharmacists transcribed the 
prescription details. Hence in current study omissions of these details were not considered 
an error but have been in other studies (Huertas Fernandez et al., 2006). 
When compared with other research in chemotherapy prescribing, errors which have the 
potential to cause adverse events were found to be 12-50% (Díaz-Carrasco et al., 
2007;Oberoi et al., 2014;Walsh et al., 2009), lower than findings in the current study. One 
study further classified the potential ADEs and found those that would have had a serious 
impact on patient wellbeing to be 26% (Gandhi et al., 2005a). However, a true comparison 
with these studies and others in general medicine is problematic because tools for 
assessment of severity were not standardised. However, one study which modified the NCC 
MERP tool, similar to the current study, found that 60% of errors had the potential to cause 
serious/significant – life-threatening harm (Lisby et al., 2005). Nevertheless, Lisby and 
colleagues (2005) studied errors occurring in general medicine and in comparison, with the 
current study, differences in the patients’ clinical conditions and the drugs used in 
treatment of cancer would be expected. 
None of the published studies included a prediction of the potential clinical outcome in 
patients if pharmacists had not intervened to stop errors. Clearly, the disease is the most 
powerful predictor of patient outcome but patients with cancer are more likely to suffer 
iatrogenic injury caused by the inherent nature of the drugs used, or medication errors 
(Vincent et al., 1998). Findings from the current study revealed that prescribing errors have 
the potential to cause considerable impact on clinical outcome of patients. In many 
instances, the potential clinical sequelae of a prescribing error included a number of 
potential adverse events, mainly because cytotoxic chemotherapy is non-specific, affecting 
several organs at once (Ajani et al., 1990;Oken et al., 1982) .  
The most common potential adverse outcome among errors was bone marrow suppression, 
leading to neutropenic sepsis, bleeding or anaemia (36.5%, n=80). Generally, patients with 
cancer who receive chemotherapy are four times more likely to develop bone marrow 
suppression when compared with those who are not exposed to these drugs (Nurgalieva et 
al., 2011). The risk of bone marrow suppression with chemotherapy is increased with the 
use of certain cytotoxic chemotherapy agents such as anthracylines (Du et al., 2002), which 
are among the most common drugs (17%) prescribed in the current study. Prescribing errors 




can increase this risk further and may lead to preventable and unnecessary hospitalization. 
Nearly 5% of the errors identified in the current study had the potential to cause life-
threatening complications, with one error having the potential to lead to death. For 
example, one patient involved in the potentially life-threatening error had advanced disease 
and presented with severe anaemia and severely impaired renal function. Although the use 
of end of life chemotherapy has been established and can lead to prolonging life and 
reducing pain (Simmonds, 2000), patients should be selected carefully. This is because in 
the presence of advanced morbidity and severe organ impairment, chemotherapy may, 
impair quality of life, increase suffering and hasten death (Prigerson et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, focus group discussions revealed that patients suffered harm requiring 
prolonged hospitalisation and one patient died as a result of a prescribing error. The 
evidence for patient harm and death due to chemotherapy errors have been reported in 
the literature (Mehta et al., 1998). A review of the US Pharmacopeia Medication Error 
Reporting Program identified that 21% of patients died as a consequence of receiving the 
wrong medicine or the wrong dose. The article included an analysis of 40 incidents and 
reported that patients suffered permanent disability due to receiving an overdose of 
cytotoxic chemotherapy. Similar to findings from the current study, patient harm was 
associated with prescribing a higher than the intended dose or prescribing the 
chemotherapy over a longer period than that intended. 
4.10.3 Classification of errors 
The commonest errors identified in the current study were dose errors (34%) and evidence 
from focus group participants indicate that they have caused patient harm. Dose errors 
have been commonly reported in pervious prescribing error research in general medicine 
(Lewis et al., 2009) and cancer (Díaz-Carrasco et al., 2007;Gandhi et al., 2005b). The 
prescribing of cytotoxic chemotherapy involves the careful calculation of body surface area 
(BSA) or the use of specific equations such as the Calvert equation (Kaestner et al., 2007a). 
Dosage calculations that vary by more than 5% have the potential to be either sub-
therapeutic or toxic (ASHP, 2002;NPSA, 2010b).  
More than half of the dose errors in the current study were due to miscalculations. 
Calculation errors are commonly seen in medication safety research (Lesar, 1998) and in 
studies involving chemotherapy in adults (Bonnabry et al., 2006;Ranchon et al., 2012;Sano 
et al., 2005) and paediatrics (Rinke et al., 2007), leading to infection, impaired organ 
function and death  (Fyhr et al., 2012). Analysis of 60 medication error incidents reported 




to the Swedish national error reporting system identified that nearly half were dose errors 
and involved miscalculation of the BSA or misapplication of the Calvert equation (Fyhr et 
al., 2012). Interviewees in the current study admitted that they had difficulties calculating 
some doses, specifically carboplatin, and preferred to simply write the desired dosage range 
(expressed as Area Under the Curve) and allocated the task to pharmacists.  
A statistically significant association between errors and prescribing cisplatin (chi-square 
test p <0.001) or carboplatin (chi square test <0.05) was identified, in the current study, and 
were mainly caused by inappropriate dose adjustments according to renal function. Both 
drugs are widely used in cancer chemotherapy (Tsang et al., 2009), however, their broad 
spectrum of activity means they can cause several ADRs, including; mucositis, bone marrow 
toxicity, nausea, vomiting and neuropathies (Miller et al., 2010). These drugs are entirely 
cleared by the kidneys and have the potential to cause, renal impairment and failure, with 
renal toxicity being dose limiting (Miller et al., 2010). Hence dose adjustment in renal 
impairment is imperative to ensure that patients do not suffer undue and prolonged ADRs 
(Kalyn et al., 2011). Both drugs have been reported in the literature to be associated with 
cytotoxic medication errors (Harris et al., 2005a). Furthermore, dose errors for patients with 
renal impairment accounted for 14% of prescribing errors in a Nigerian hospital 
(Ajemigbitse et al., 2013b).  As found in the current study, the doctors interviewed admitted 
that they experienced difficulties when adjusting drug doses in renal impairment 
(Ajemigbitse et al., 2013b). This was also confirmed by findings from focus group in the 
current study, where doctors relied on pharmacy to calculate dose adjustments. 
Pharmacists were able to identify and intercept three prescriptions which contained a 
tenfold overdose of three different drugs. Tenfold errors have been identified in other 
studies associated with chemotherapy (Fyhr et al., 2012) and general medicine (Lesar, 
2002). A study of nearly 4000 prescriptions at a US hospital revealed that tenfold dose errors 
occurred with a frequency of 5% (Lesar, 2002). This is higher than the findings of the current 
study, mainly because of the different settings. Lesar (2002) studied adults, paediatrics and 
neonates, and described that tenfold errors were associated with misplacement of decimal 
points or where the dosage range was wide. In the current study, the tenfold errors were 
not due to misplacement of decimal points but addition of a zero to the dose. The 
considerable patient risk presented by the tenfold errors, in the current study, led to their 
classification as having the potential to cause life-threatening harm.  
The second most commonly detected prescribing error type involved the prescribing of a 
contraindicated drug (28%), usually in a patient who had organ impairment that precluded 




the use of chemotherapy. Medication errors caused by the use of a contraindicated drug 
are not common in prescribing error research, in western countries (Lewis et al., 2009). The 
use of a contraindicated drug was found to be 1% among prescriptions errors identified 
among junior doctors from eight hospitals in Scotland, relatively lower to findings from the 
current study (Ryan et al., 2014). However, research conducted in the EMRO region has 
reports of errors caused by prescribing of contraindicated drugs. In a study conducted in 
Bahrain among infants treated in 20 health centres, 16.1% in 5754 prescriptions contained 
a contraindicated drug that was not licensed for use in infants (Al Khaja et al., 2007). The 
authors of the study stated that published literature showed possible patient harm from 
use of these contraindicated drugs in infants but the potential or actual clinical harm was 
not reported (Al Khaja et al., 2007). In contrast, contraindicated prescriptions identified in 
this study had the potential to cause severe harm to patients. For example, the use of 
anthracyclines in patients who have exceeded the lifetime cumulative dose of these drugs 
(450-900mg/m2) can lead to considerable cardiac toxicity (Kalyn et al., 2011). In the current 
study, this was identified in 2% of prescriptions with errors. Cancer and chemotherapy 
guidelines specify clearly that patients’ blood parameters and, where relevant, liver, renal 
and cardiac function, should be monitored, before initiating chemotherapy treatment and 
before each cycle of treatment (ASHP, 2002;Kalyn et al., 2011;NPSA, 2010b). Monitoring is 
essential to ensure that patients can tolerate treatment and to reduce the severity of ADRs. 
Each chemotherapy treatment protocol has clear limits for these parameters, below which 
the treatment is contraindicated, and may need to be delayed or stopped (Reed, 2008).  
Other common errors identified in the current study were scheduling errors (11%) and 
inaccurate length of therapy (10%). Scheduling errors were the least common error 
identified in comparable medication research (Nerich et al., 2010). They are akin to 
frequency errors which have been reported in prescribing error research carried out in 
general medicine in both high income countries (Lewis et al., 2009) and countries from the 
developing world (Agalu et al., 2011;Al-Dhawailie, 2011;Al-Jeraisy et al., 2011) . The 
importance of scheduling chemotherapy doses every 14-21 days is based on bone marrow 
recovery after use of these drugs (Skeel et al., 2007) Variations in chemotherapy intervals 
by up to 3 days is permitted within some protocols (Williamson, 2010), however, when 
chemotherapy is prescribed outside these variations, the possible impact on patients’ 
health may be severe. This was demonstrated in this study, where all prescriptions 
prescribed out of schedule, but one, had the potential to cause serious/significant harm to 
patients. 




4.10.4 Causes of prescribing errors 
Reason’s (1990) model of accident causation allowed a detailed analysis of the types of 
active failures discussed in the critical incident interviews. The errors were further analysed 
to identify latent causes and error-provoking conditions using Vincent’s (1998) adaptation 
of Reason’s error causation model (1990). As a result, active failures were associated with 
a number of interlinked error-provoking conditions which were influenced by several 
common latent managerial and organizational factors. 
4.10.5 Types of active failures 
 The ten errors (active failures) included in the critical incident interviews were caused by 
slips, knowledge based mistakes or rule based mistakes and violations. The findings 
indicated that slips and violations were more common than mistakes. Comparison with 
work conducted in chemotherapy, or with medication errors in developing countries in 
similar settings such as the countries of AFRO/EMRO regions, is difficult because none of 
the published studies used this particular framework for error analysis. However, when 
compared with findings published in a review of research conducted mainly in the UK, US 
and Canada, the results were interesting (Tully et al., 2009). The commonest types of active 
failures reported in the review undertaken by Tully et al (2009) were mistakes and violations 
were less common. This may be explained by difference in the grade of prescriber involved, 
where the hospitals included in the review were mostly general medicine hospitals where 
junior doctors were likely to be responsible for most of the prescribing and hence are more 
likely to have little knowledge about the drugs they prescribe (Coombes et al., 2008). In 
comparison, with the cancer hospital under study, all prescribers are either fully qualified 
doctors or registrars undergoing further specialist training.  
The violations identified in this study were due to both routine violations and exceptional 
violations. Errors caused by violations have been reported elsewhere, and occurred in the 
current study because of conscious decisions by the prescriber to ignore written protocols, 
informal rules and common sense or professional responsibility. All four errors identified 
due to violations had the potential to cause significant harm in patients. Routine violations 
occurred when doctors failed to confirm or carry out essential routine monitoring required 
for cancer chemotherapy. Doctors confirmed this finding during focus group exercises 
where they attributed violations to failure in monitoring patients before prescribing 
chemotherapy, resulting in patient harm. Reports of failure in therapeutic monitoring have 




been published in prescribing error research conducted in the EMRO region of the WHO (Al-
Hajje et al., 2012). One fifth of prescriptions with errors in a Lebanese hospital were 
prescribed without ordering the appropriate monitoring, leading to one patient suffering 
harm (Al-Hajje et al., 2012). Monitoring patients before and during cytotoxic chemotherapy 
is an essential requirement (Reed, 2008). Both doctors involved in the errors stated that 
they were aware that this was a requirement written in the chemotherapy protocols at the 
study hospital but admitted that they routinely failed to check certain laboratory values 
before prescribing chemotherapy. Protocols in chemotherapy are important to standardize 
practice and improve patient outcomes (ASHP, 2002). However, doctors have been 
reported to deviate from clinical practice guidelines and treatment protocols (Oxman et al., 
1995). In Sudan doctors commonly deviate from national and WHO treatment protocols for 
management of childhood infections, leading to unnecessary prescribing of antibiotics and 
in other events treatment failure (Elfaki, 2009;Salih et al., 2014;Taha et al., 2014). Many 
possible causes for these deviations have been reported, including inadequate guideline 
implementation (Oxman et al., 1995) and doctors’ attitudes and beliefs (Wahabi et al., 
2012). 
4.10.6 Error-provoking conditions and latent factors 
The active failures identified in this study occurred because a number of latent errors 
combined with error provoking conditions to provide the necessary environment for 
prescribing errors.    
4.10.6.1 Latent factors 
In the current study, the most common latent factors causing errors was clinic organization, 
culture, and lack of training and procedures. 
The effect of clinic organization on errors has not been previously reported in medical error 
research (Dornan et al., 2009;Tully et al., 2009). However, a number of errors included in 
the critical incident interviews took place in ‘makeshift’ clinics, where doctors reviewed 
patients and prescribed chemotherapy in doctors’ offices or the doctors’ tea room. Doctors’ 
accounts identified that these areas lacked essential elements necessary for smooth 
running of an outpatient clinic such as ancillary staff, adequate access to medical records 
and equipment necessary for calculation of chemotherapy dosing. Furthermore, clinic 
inadequacies were not limited to these ‘makeshift’ clinics but were also present in the 
official outpatient clinic. During interviews, doctors expressed frustration with the design of 




clinics and attributed error to damaged and deficient equipment. These views were also 
expressed during the focus group discussions, where doctors felt that poor clinic 
organization contributed to errors. Poor design of treatment areas, clinics and medicine 
storage areas is common in Sudanese hospitals where financial resources are generally 
limited (Cheraghali et al., 2009). A study conducted in a number of hospitals in the capital 
Khartoum, showed that more than 40% of drug storage facilities were poorly equipped for 
purpose (Cheraghali et al., 2009).  
The second most common latent condition involved in error causation was culture, where 
junior members of staff were not able to question senior members of the team. A culture 
of speaking up and reporting areas of concern is an important factor in establishing a patient 
safety culture, in both industry and healthcare (Blegen et al., 2010;Sexton et al., 2006 
;Sexton et al., 2000) . In contrast, a culture where junior doctors are unable to question their 
superiors has been directly linked to prescribing errors and risk to patient safety (Dean et 
al., 2002a;Tully et al., 2009). 
During both critical incident interviews and focus group discussions, the doctors admitted 
there were occasions where they had safety concerns when writing a prescription. 
However, they proceeded on direct orders from a senior member of staff and were either 
too afraid to speak up or were reproached when they raised concerns. On all occasions, the 
doctors disclosed that such situations were common but they felt obliged to obey orders 
without question. Such attitudes were regarded as intimidation among junior doctors in a 
Nigerian general medicine hospital (Ajemigbitse et al., 2013b).  Intimidation towards junior 
staff may be regarded as an element of disruptive behaviour, an issue which is known to 
contribute to a poor safety culture where errors are not intercepted (Leape et al., 2012) and 
has been reported in both studies from high income countries (Rosenstein et al., 2008) and 
developing countries (Ogunsemi et al., 2010). Leape (2012) explained that disruptive 
behaviour affects patient safety because it has both short term and long term implications. 
In the short term, it can contribute to low morale, anger and frustration, sentiments that 
were expressed by one interviewee in the current study. Furthermore, it influences the 
person’s ability to think clearly, thus contributing to errors when performing tasks. This was 
demonstrated in the current study where two doctors wrote prescriptions as a response to 
direct orders from an intimidating senior consultant, each leading to a tenfold dose error. 
In the long term this type of behaviour may lead to loss of communication, poor teamwork 
relationships, patient dissatisfaction and errors (Rosenstein et al., 2008). 




Two common managerial latent factors identified were lack of procedures and lack of 
training. During focus group discussions and the critical incident interviews, doctors stated 
that they were new to the centre and were asked to start prescribing chemotherapy but 
were unaware of existing procedures and prescribing processes. Lack of training has been 
associated with prescribing errors in previous research in general medicines in countries of 
high income (Coombes et al., 2008;Dornan et al., 2009;Tully et al., 2009) and in AFRO 
countries (Ajemigbitse et al., 2013a;Awad et al., 2007). It has also been identified as a cause 
in chemotherapy-associated adverse events (Mehta et al., 1998).Training in general is 
essential for reducing prescribing errors (Celebi et al., 2009)  improving quality control of 
processes (Woodman et al., 1996) and is a component of organizational cultures that foster 
patient safety(Singer et al., 2009a). It is a key requirement for prescribing of chemotherapy, 
and should be the responsibility of both management and the individual HCW (NPSA, 
2010b). Chemotherapy guidelines state that doctors should be offered training at induction, 
with a requirement for regular updating and maintenance of relevant records to ensure 
ongoing competence (NPSA, 2010b). Furthermore, the implementation and dissemination 
of SOPs are necessary to ensure standardization of practice (Gilmore et al., 1998) and 
essential for  reduction of chemotherapy errors (Muller, 2003). 
4.10.6.2 Error-provoking conditions 
In the presence of latent factors and weak defences, a number of error-provoking 
conditions contributed to errors. These were categorised into the individual prescriber, 
their work environment, the broader healthcare team, the prescribing task and the patient. 
The findings of this study confirm reports from other prescribing error studies that multiple 
error-provoking conditions contribute to errors and are sometimes common to a number 
of errors (Coombes et al., 2008;Tully et al., 2009).  
Errors related to the task were most the most commonly identified, in the current study. 
For example, handwritten prescriptions contributed to a number of identified errors in this 
study. The findings from the current study showed that nearly a quarter of prescriptions 
had various omissions, either the name or other essential prescriptions details were 
missing. Similarly, previous chemotherapy error research has shown that handwritten 
prescriptions contained a number of errors (Ford et al., 2006;Oberoi et al., 2014;Slama et 
al., 2005), were higher in comparison with computerized prescriptions (Huertas Fernandez 
et al., 2006) and were mainly associated with omissions (Mathaiyan et al., 2015). A study 
conducted in a developing country (North Indian region), where chemotherapy 




prescriptions were handwritten, identified that 7.4% (total sample 289) contained an error 
(Oberoi et al., 2014). Although Oberoi and colleagues (2014) studied oral chemotherapy 
prescriptions, their research confirmed that handwriting of chemotherapy prescription is a 
complex task and may be a contributory cause of errors because doctors are likely to forget 
doses, supportive therapy and instructions for administration (ASHP, 2002;Dinning, 2005).  
Patient factors also contributed to errors in the current study. Doctors felt that they were 
obliged to meet patients’ demands and hence might  issue a prescription that did not meet 
the necessary pre-requisites, or prescribe chemotherapy when not indicated. For example, 
a doctor prescribed chemotherapy for a patient without reviewing pre-treatment 
laboratory investigations. The effect of patient demands on prescribing decisions was 
reported in Sudan (Yousif et al., 2011). A questionnaire survey among 155 doctors working 
in primary care centres showed that over half (52.5%) prescribed unnecessary drugs under 
patient demands (Yousif et al., 2011). Studies have shown that patient demand is a 
recognised and important contributor to the prescribing decision (Bradley, 1991) and has 
contributed to irrational prescribing of antibiotics (Radyowijati et al., 2003). It has been 
recognised that training is essential to enable prescribers to manage unreasonable patient 
demand (Barber, 1995). 
Active failures identified in the current study were also associated with the individual 
prescriber. In  three incidents, doctors appeared to show poor professional responsibility 
and have a casual attitude to the prescribing task, similar to that identified previously 
(Coombes et al., 2008). Similar to published prescribing error literature, doctors in the 
current study attributed errors to stress, and inability to ask questions (Tully et al., 2009).  
In the broader team context, new doctors at the study hospital often prescribed 
chemotherapy under inadequate supervision. Furthermore, failures in communication with 
both senior members of the team and other colleagues were common. Team work and 
effective communication have been highlighted as important factors in establishing a 
culture of safety (Sexton et al., 2000). Team work failures have been identified in previous 
medical research (Sexton et al., 2000),and were found to have a considerable impact on 
patient safety in low-income countries (Aveling et al., 2015), highlighting an assumption that 
human factors are likely to be shared across cultures.    
Although the current study highlighted that organizational factors were responsible for 
creating an inadequate work environment, where hectic conditions were common. This was 




confirmed in the doctors’ accounts where, similar to finding from previous research, doctors 
in the current study attributed errors to busy work environments and interruptions. 
4.10.7 System defences 
In the presence of human factors, systems function because defences are placed to prevent, 
intercept and mitigate errors (Reason, 1997). In the absence of procedures, induction 
training, and in a poorly designed work environment, participants in the current study 
revealed that they relied on pharmacists to identify and intercept prescribing errors. Cancer 
chemotherapy guidelines recommended that prescriptions should be verified by both 
pharmacists and nurses, to ensure errors are identified before reaching patients (Cohen et 
al., 1996). Generally, the inclusion of pharmacists in medical teams had a positive effect on 
reducing the incidence and severity of errors (Palmer, 2013). Furthermore, evidence has 
shown that junior doctors, in particular, relied on pharmacists to correct their doses and 
felt safe that errors would be intercepted before reaching patients (Dornan et al., 2009).  
However, the efforts of pharmacists in intervening to rectify errors would be partly effective 
because, in the absence of an error reporting system, learning from errors might not take 
place and errors may be repeated and may lead to harm (Reason, 1997). Evidence from 
doctors’ accounts during the current study have indicated the prescribing errors repeatedly 
occur and have resulted in harm. Reporting of errors is essential to patient safety and has 
been recommended as an important safety measure when using chemotherapy (Harris et 
al., 2005b). Feedback from such errors is useful to inform and tailor standard operating 
procedures, specific to each healthcare setting, and to ensure chemotherapy prescribing is 
standardised and delivered in a safe manner (Harris et al., 2005b) . 
A number of other interventions shown to reduce prescribing errors associated with  
chemotherapy include the use of pre-printed prescription templates (Dinning, 2005) and   
computerized prescribing (Voeffray et al., 2006). The effect of pre-printed prescription 
templates has been demonstrated when these were introduced in a US cancer centre, 
leading to the removal of prescribing errors (5% to 0%) (Dinning, 2005). The use of 
standardised prescription templates in the current settings, has the potential to reduce 
errors. They may potentially reduce nearly a quarter of errors associated with the omissions 
of drug, drug doses and prescription details.  
Additional benefits can be achieved through CPOE, a well-known intervention for reducing 
medication error generally (Bates et al., 1999b). The introduction of CDSS has added more 




benefit because it was designed to provide decision support features (Gandhi et al., 2005b). 
In a US based 700 bed cancer hospital, implementation of a CPOE, with CDSS, resulted in a 
significant reduction of prescribing errors (Elsaid et al., 2013).The authors revealed that 
prescribing errors before the implementation of computerized prescribing were 17.8 errors 
per 1000 doses which was reduced to 7.9 errors per 1000 chemotherapy doses (Elsaid et 
al., 2013).More importantly, such systems have in-built alarms which would alert the 
prescriber to higher than usual doses and prevent tenfold doses (Nerich et al., 2010). 
However, there are a number of disadvantages to the use of CPOE, such as the requirement 
for intensive training and additionally, error cannot be entirely eliminated (Small et al., 
2008). In the US, as part of a quality improvement initiative, changes to the prescribing 
systems at a cancer hospital were made gradually, first by introduction of pre-printed 
prescription templates and then by introduction of CPOE (Meisenberg et al., 2014). The 
authors appointed a pharmacist to review every 10th chemotherapy prescription against 
national prescribing standards. Prescriptions were reviewed for a 12-month period, before 
introduction of pre-printed prescriptions, after introduction of pre-printed prescriptions 
and after introduction of CPOE. A total of more than 10,000 chemotherapy prescriptions 
were reviewed and the error rate was 4.2% with handwritten prescriptions, 1.5% with pre-
printed prescriptions and 0.1% with CPOE.  The use of pre-printed prescriptions resulted in 
elimination of some prescribing errors associated with drug name legibility, abbreviation of 
drug names, confusion of dosage units, omission and duplication errors. In addition, 
computerized prescribing eliminated errors in patient details entry, dose calculations and 
dose adjustments according to renal function. However, it was shown that changes made 
to the CPOE by doctors which were meant for one chemotherapy cycle may inadvertently 
continue, resulting in either unintended dose escalations or dose reductions (Meisenberg 
et al., 2014).  
4.10.8 Limitations of the current study  
The current study has several limitations. The study design was intended to be process 
based rather than outcome based and hence patient harm was not identified. However, 
identification of medication errors which have the potential to cause ADEs is valuable in 
identifying gaps in the safety of medical services (Gandhi et al., 2000;Morimoto et al., 2004). 
Furthermore, The use of centralized pharmacist screening of prescriptions has a number of 
limitations, primarily the variation in clinical skill amongst pharmacists, some errors may go 
unnoticed and lastly that pharmacists based in the pharmacy have no access to patients and 




hence are likely to have limitations in evaluating the clinical condition of the patient fully 
(Lewis et al., 2009). However, in the current study, to ensure minimal variations associated 
with individual pharmacists’ prescription screening skills, all those involved during data 
collection underwent standardized training and assessment before the study began.   
Moreover, it is unlikely that a significant number of errors would have been overlooked 
using this method because previous prescribing error research had shown that the vast 
majority of errors are intercepted in the pharmacy (Dornan et al., 2009).  In general, 
prescription screening by pharmacists has been shown to be more effective when 
conducted on wards rather than in the dispensary where there is no access to patients’ 
notes and other information gained from the medical and nursing teams (Tully et al., 2009). 
However, in the current setting, the chemotherapy prescription was sent to the pharmacy 
accompanied with the patient’s notes. Hence pharmacists were in a better position to make 
sound clinical judgements because they were able to review the patient’s medical records 
and laboratory investigations. Consequently, relative to traditional dispensary prescription 
screening, the pharmacists in the current setting may be more capable of identifying errors.  
The measure of severity used in the current study was based on a scale used to assess actual 
harm rather than predict potential harm. The NCC MERP scale was used by a number of 
other prescribing error studies and found to have good reliability and validity when 
compared with other scales (Garfield et al., 2013) 
One important limitation of this study was the relatively small number of doctors involved 
in the critical incident interviews, in comparison with the total number of doctors associated 
with prescribing errors. The working patterns of the doctors at the study meant that most 
interviews could only be conducted 96 hours, after the prescribing error, which would have 
affected recall and introduced bias into the study. In order to involve more doctors in the 
current study, focus groups were arranged with three prescriber grades. Findings from both 
groups were consistent and doctors in focus group discussions were able to recall incidents 
where patients have been harmed. Furthermore, the themes which emerged from analysis 
of both studies were common among most of the participants, which contributed to 
confirmation of the contributory causes of errors. 
4.11 Conclusions  
In the current study the prescribing error rate was found to 10%, the majority (78%) of 
which had the potential to cause serious harm to patients and 10% had the potential to be 
life-threatening. Furthermore, findings from focus group discussions identified that patients 




have been harmed as a consequence of prescribing errors. These are serious findings which 
could lead to significant numbers of patients being harmed unless the situation changes. 
Most errors were caused because the prescriber had miscalculated doses or had not carried 
out the necessary patient monitoring before writing the prescription. Interviewees 
suggested that the practice of not regularly monitoring patients was common and 
chemotherapy prescription writing was not given due importance. There was a culture of 
submissive behaviour in the centre, where junior doctors wrote prescriptions knowing that 
they were wrong but did so because they felt intimidated by their superiors. Senior 
members of staff routinely ignored best practice when prescribing chemotherapy. Other 
factors involved in errors were a lack of training for new doctors, lack of procedures and 
poor organization of clinics. In the study hospital, doctors relied extensively on pharmacists 
to intercept errors and rectify prescription deficits. 
There has been a noticeable increase in patients presenting with cancer over the last decade 
in Sudan (Saeed et al., 2014). Although the use of chemotherapy is supported by well 
documented clinical trial evidence, which has shown improved quality of life and survival 
with chemotherapy, substantial harm to patients can occur (Nurgalieva et al., 2009). Due to 
the inherent risks associated with the use of  chemotherapy, healthcare institutions where 
these drugs are used should have the necessary support in terms of human resources, 
infrastructure and drugs (Anderson et al., 2008). These drugs are now available on the EML 
of low income countries  (WHO, 2007a) and should be prescribed in environments that are 
carefully tailored to optimise patient safety (WHO, 2008b).  
In the light of the findings from the current study, further research is required to identify 
the impact of errors on patients and how adverse events are managed.  
  





5  FREQUENCY, TYPES AND CAUSES OF CHEMOTHERAPY 
PREPARATION AND ADMINISTRATION ERRORS 
 
  





The WHO predicts a 50% increase in the number of cancer patients by 2020, mostly in 
developing countries such as Sudan (WHO, 2005c). This has been reflected in the extensive 
list of cytotoxic chemotherapy agents included in the most recent WHO list of Essential 
Medicines (WHO, 2007a). A continued rise in the use of these cytotoxic agents in healthcare 
is expected, which, given the toxicity profile of many of these agents, may increase the risk 
of adverse consequences among cancer patients. Furthermore, the International Agency for 
Research in Cancer (IARC) has classified 30 cytotoxics as carcinogens or possible carcinogens 
(IARC, 2012). Handling these agents in unprotected environments is associated with ill 
health effects (Dranitsaris et al., 2005), as a number have been classified as irritants 
(Allwood et al., 2002) and many have long term effects such as teratogenicity (Briggs et al., 
2011).  
5.1.1 The effect of occupational exposure to cytotoxic chemotherapy  
When cytotoxics are prepared in areas without appropriate ventilation, these agents can be 
detected in the air and the environment  (deWerk et al., 1983). It is thought that these 
agents enter the systemic circulation of nurses through accidental ingestion, aerosol 
inhalation  (Hirst et al., 1984)  and via dermal transfer (Fransman et al., 2004;Bos et al., 
1997). For example, significant amounts of the cytotoxic cyclophosphamide were detected 
by swab testing of the hands, forearms and foreheads of nurses preparing these drugs and 
handling patients’ excreta (Fransman et al., 2004). This is not surprising because work 
surfaces are often contaminated (Fransman et al., 2004;Connor et al., 1999;McDevitt et al., 
1993) even in areas far from the handling site (McDevitt et al., 1993) and significant 
amounts of these drugs are excreted in patient’s  urine (Falck et al., 1979) and faeces (Yuki 
et al., 2013). It is feasible that these drugs have the potential to harm personnel exposed to 
them. Unfortunately, the evidence on actual harm in HCWs is contradictory and scanty, and 
is based on data from nearly 40 years ago, at a time when guidelines for personal protection 
where not yet established (Anderson et al., 1983).  
The mutagenic effects of these agents have been confirmed in a number of studies 
(Anderson et al., 1982;Falck et al., 1979). The first evidence documenting that nurses were 
exposed to cytotoxics was provided by Falck and colleagues (1979).  They collected urine 
samples from nurses and patients exposed to cytotoxic chemotherapy , nurses who had just 
completed a weekend break and other staff who were not handling these drugs (Falck et 
al., 1979). The urine samples of the four groups were tested for potential to induce 




mutagenicity on Escherichia Coli and Salmonella Typhimurium species. Unsurprisingly, 
mutagenicity was found to be dose dependent, being higher in patients who had received 
cytotoxic chemotherapy , lower in nurses occupationally exposed to these drugs and very 
much  lower in nurses after a duty free weekend and non-existent in personnel not directly 
handling cytotoxics  (Falck et al., 1979). This finding has been confirmed by others (Sessink 
et al., 1994;Anwar et al., 1994). Patients who received chemotherapy had a seven-fold risk 
of developing secondary haematological malignancies (Rosner et al., 1978). More recently 
a study confirmed these findings in a 9-year follow up study of a cohort of  1,545 women 
who received chemotherapy for the management of breast cancer (Crump et al., 2003). Ten 
of these women developed secondary leukaemias, thought to be caused by anthracycline-
induced chromosomal aberrations (Crump et al., 2003). Lassila and colleagues (1980) 
argued that this effect may not have direct health consequences on nurses exposed to the 
drug, because in their study there was no evidence of the immediate effects on the immune 
system (Lassila et al., 1980). However, the authors of this study did not consider that 
substantially higher blood concentrations of these drugs are required to affect the immune 
system. Nonetheless, the evidence of documented carcinogenicity of these agents is 
substantial and their effect on exposed personnel warrants special consideration. 
A number of studies conducted to examine the effects of handling cytotoxic chemotherapy 
on the unborn foetus of pregnant women revealed some evidence of teratogenicity. A case 
control study conducted among 650 nurses preparing and administering cytotoxic 
chemotherapy  in 17 Finnish hospitals found a significant association between foetal loss 
and exposure to these agents  (Selevan et al., 1985). Further studies revealed spontaneous 
abortions (Dranitsaris et al., 2005) and infertility (Martin, 2005) and a possible effect on the 
germ line (Valanis et al., 1999).  A review of 14 studies conducted across western countries, 
examining the health effects due to occupational exposure to cytotoxics, found that 
significant exposure to these drugs when a nurse is pregnant does have the potential to 
pose a health risk to the unborn foetus, principally spontaneous abortion (Dranitsaris et al., 
2005). 
5.1.2 Protection from occupational exposure to cytotoxics 
This body of evidence prompted health and safety agencies around the world to develop 
guidelines for handling and safe disposal of cytotoxics. The Control of Substances Hazardous 
to Health (COSHH) guidelines were published in 1988 by the UK Health and Safety Executive 
and have been updated to provide new guidance specific to handling of cytotoxics (HSE, 




2003). These, as well as other guidelines, require that workplace risk assessments are 
conducted to identify substances which are hazardous to health and hence provide 
protection to employees. Guidelines were developed by the governments of the US, UK, 
Ireland, Denmark, Germany, Finland, Sweden and Australia, as well as the European 
Community and the WHO (Carrington et al., 2010b;Jacobson et al., 2009;Allwood et al., 
2002;HSE, 2003;Frontiers et al., 1999).  Some of these guidelines provide detailed advice on 
the requirements when dealing with cytotoxics during transport, storage (ISOPP, 2007a) 
prescribing (NPSA, 2010b), dispensing, preparation (ISOPP, 2007a), administration, 
monitoring of patients (Jacobson et al., 2009) and disposal of waste (Frontiers et al., 1999). 
A European Directive specifies the three levels of hierarchical protection against cytotoxic 
agents (ISOPP, 2007a): 
1- Substitution with less toxic drugs 
2- Containment of the toxic drug 
3- Use of engineering and technology via biological safety cabinets and ventilation to 
reduce risk of exposure 
Since substituting cytotoxic chemotherapy  with less toxic drugs is currently not feasible, 
the second and third hierarchical levels of protection have been recommended (ISOPP, 
2007a). These agents should only be handled while wearing PPE which includes gloves, 
gowns and eye protection for everyone preparing or administering these drugs and the use 
of specialised masks for use when cleaning cytotoxic spills and dealing with powdered drug 
formulations (Allwood et al., 2002). In addition, routine preparation of cytotoxics  should 
be carried out in a centralized pharmacy under a High Efficiency Particulate Air filter (HEPA) 
filtered vertical laminar flow isolator or cabinet by HCWs who are trained and whose aseptic 
technique is regularly assessed (NPSA, 2010b). These guidelines have become legislation in 
some countries where non-adherent employers run the risk of legal action (Eisenberg, 
2012;HSE, 2003;HSE, 2002). The guidelines are certainly an important safety measure 
ensuring HCW protection while handling cytotoxics. 
Advances in the technology of preparing cytotoxics have evolved during the last decades 
and have certainly reduced occupational exposure. Worldwide, the preparation of 
cytotoxics on wards has been largely abandoned by most cancer hospitals, to become a 
centralized pharmacy service. Early work has shown that centralization of cytotoxic 
chemotherapy  reconstitution has resulted in a number of improvements to previous 
practice, principally improvements  to safety of both patients and nurses and a decrease in 




cytotoxic waste (Anderson et al., 1983). Preparation in pharmacy departments is mainly 
conducted within the confines of ventilated biological safety cabinets which operate under 
vertical laminar flow  (Allwood et al., 2002). Isolator technology provides further reduction 
to both personal exposure and surface contamination (Crauste-Manciet et al., 2005). 
Surface contamination is not easy to eliminate because spills are likely during manipulation 
of intravenous medicines, using needles (Crauste-Manciet et al., 2005). Furthermore, 
certain cytotoxics  such as cyclophosphamide can vaporise (Connor et al., 2002) and the 
surface of vials are often contaminated when delivered to the pharmacy (Sessink et al., 
2011). The use of closed systems has emerged to reduce spills during manipulations, and 
reduce vapourisation of drugs (Allwood et al., 2002).  Closed system devices are drug 
transfer devices that are designed to mechanically stop the transfer of liquids or gases to 
the outer environment of a drug vial and do not allow contamination to enter vials (Yoshida 
et al., 2009). The combined use of closed system devices and biological safety cabinets have 
demonstrated a much lower reduction in the level of surface contamination and absorption 
of cytotoxics  by personnel (Connor et al., 2002).  Connor and colleagues (2002) collected 
wipe samples of ifosfamide from the surfaces of a pharmacy where nearly 20g of the drug 
were prepared daily. Analysis of the wipes showed that surface contamination has been 
reduced by at least 3 times the level previous to introduction of the closed system method. 
The finding that occupational exposure cannot be eliminated was also confirmed by Wick 
and colleagues (2003).  Nevertheless, these technological advances do substantially reduce 
occupational exposure to cytotoxics  and have been recommended to be used during 
compounding of cytotoxics  by international oncology bodies (ISOPP, 2007a). 
The implementation of these guidelines should greatly reduce occupational exposure to 
cytotoxics. However, there is still evidence of teratogenicity from the literature. The 
evidence of spontaneous abortion secondary to chemotherapy exposure was provided by 
a systematic review conducted by an expert panel for Cancer Care Ontario (Green et al., 
2009). The authors reviewed 16 studies that examined the pregnancy outcomes of HCWs 
occupationally exposed to cytotoxics before 1985 and after 1985 and found that the risk of 
spontaneous abortion was still evident although less than before implementation of the 
legislation but no conclusive evidence was found of these drugs causing malformations in 
children born to these mothers.   
The benefits of using cytotoxic chemotherapy in patients outweigh their extensive risks but 
HCWs are at risk from continuous low levels of exposure. Since no single method has been 
shown to confer complete protection against occupational exposure to these drugs, care 




and diligence must be exercised by both HCWs and employers to ensure minimal 
occupational exposure to these agents. Guidelines from the Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE) England specify that since a safe level of exposure to cytotoxic chemotherapy  is not 
possible, pregnant mothers should either completely avoid exposure or reduce it to the 
lowest practical level (HSE, 2002). It is, hence, without doubt that occupational exposure to 
these drugs should be reduced in HCWs, more specifically those who are pregnant or 
planning a pregnancy. Handling of these agents should be limited to personnel who have 
been given the correct training (ISOPP, 2007a), ideally to certification level (Fischer et al., 
1996) and their competence regularly assessed (NPSA, 2010b).  Preparation of cytotoxics 
should be limited to pharmacies under appropriate environment and preparation in clinical 
areas should be minimised (ISOPP, 2007a;NPSA, 2010b). Guidelines have been developed 
by a number of western countries to ensure safety to both operators and patients (Green 
et al., 2009), and more specifically targeting the reduction of occupational exposure and 
ADEs (Jacobson et al., 2009). One example is reducing the vesicant effect of cytotoxics.  A 
large number of cytotoxics  are vesicant or irritant (Allwood et al., 2002) and sequencing of 
administration is important to ensure that a neutral agent is injected into the patient’s vein 
before completion of the administration process. Because of their vesicant properties, 
these drugs can cause substantial damage to the area around the administration site if they 
extravasate (Bertelli, 1995). Hence, nurses should have the necessary training and skills 
required to reduce the incidence of extravasation and manage patients appropriately if this 
occurs.  
The importance of personal diligence cannot be underestimated and HCWs should take the 
responsibility of adhering to guidelines and following standard practice and procedures 
during the preparation and administration of cytotoxic chemotherapy.  
5.1.3 Administration errors involving intravenous administration of cytotoxic 
chemotherapy   
The administration of medicines in many countries is regulated by standards and legal 
directives. Central to these standards are the five rights of medication administration; right 
medicine,  right dose, right patient, right route, right time (Westbrook et al., 2010). A 
number of authors proposed seven and nine rights of medication, adding verification of 
medication, documentation, use of aseptic technique during preparation and review of 
patients after completion (Crimlisk et al., 2009;Pape, 2003).  




Equally important to patients’ receiving the right medication, Michelle Cook, a US nurse, 
argues that there are six rights that nurses should be afforded to execute the process 
appropriately (Cook, 2006). These are :1) the right to a complete and clearly written 
prescription, 2) The right to have the correct drug dispensed, 3) the right of access to drug 
information, 4) The right to have clearly written policies and procedures for medication 
administration, 5) The right to administer medicines in a safe setting and where they can 
identify weaknesses in the system and lastly 6) the right to stop, think and be vigilant when 
administering medicines (Cook, 2006). These rights ensure that nurses have the appropriate 
environment and tools to administer medicines safely.  
Nurses are historically known to be the main HCW involved in the administration of 
medication in hospitals and can also be to varying extent involved in the dispensing of 
medicines, such as crushing tablets and drawing up injections (Hughes et al., 2008). There 
is evidence of administration errors where HCWs other than nurses have been involved 
(Wirtz et al., 2003), but most reported errors have involved nurses (Phillips et al., 2001). 
Much of the evidence available regarding the incidence, nature and causes of 
administration errors is from early work regarding patient safety in western countries. Early 
medication error research has shown that one third of medication errors that resulted in 
patient harm were caused by an administration error (Barker et al., 2002b;Leape et al., 
1995). The common reasons for administration errors that led to fatalities were wrong drug, 
wrong dose and wrong route (Phillips et al., 2001). 
In one of the largest observation studies, Barker and colleagues (2002) investigated 
administration errors in 36 health care facilities from two states in the US. They observed 
3,216 doses prepared and administered by nurses, of which 19% contained an error, mostly 
wrong time errors. Others were omission errors, wrong dose and administration of a drug 
that was not prescribed (Barker et al., 2002b).  
Medication administration errors occurred more commonly when administering bolus 
injections or drugs that require multiple steps during administration (Taxis et al., 2003b). In 
their study, Taxis and Barber (2003) observed the preparation and administration of 430 
intravenous doses in ten wards from two UK hospitals. Almost half of all the doses were 
associated with at least one preparation or administration error, a rate much higher than 
the US study (Barker et al., 2002a). A higher rate of errors was found in another European 
multi-centre study that collected data from Germany, France and the UK (Cousins et al., 
2005). The authors observed the preparation and administration of nearly 700 intravenous 




doses from six departments from the three countries. Rates of error differed by country, 
where, 49% of doses were either not labelled or labelled incorrectly, in UK hospitals. Unlike 
Barker et al’s (2002) findings, the most common administration error was giving the drug 
either too quickly or too slowly. Major deviations in aseptic technique were also reported 
because nurses in the UK hospitals under study never wiped the surface preparation surface 
or washed hands before starting the preparation of intravenous medicines. Similar 
deviations in aseptic technique were observed in UK based paediatric hospitals (Ghaleb et 
al., 2010). Ghaleb and colleagues (2010) observed 161 nurses administering over 1500 
doses across five paediatric hospitals in the UK. The medication administration error rate 
was 19.1%, the commonest being preparation errors (20.7%), followed by wrong rate of 
administration (19.8%) and dosing errors (9.3%). A review of ten studies conducted in 
western countries revealed that the most common type of error was during reconstitution 
of intravenous drugs, contributing to nearly 21% of all preparation and administration 
errors (McDowell et al., 2010). A number of reasons were attributed to the cause of these 
errors, including poor training, poor labelling of medicines, inadequate medicine storage 
facilities, insufficient staffing levels, fatigue and distractions (McDowell et al., 2010). One of 
the main sources of distractions in western studies were interruptions. An observational 
study involving the preparation and administration of more than 4000 doses in two 
Australian hospitals revealed that preparation errors increase by 12% in the presence of 
interruptions (Westbrook et al., 2010). 
Although published research is limited in the EMRO/AFRO region, intravenous medicine 
preparation and administration errors are common. A survey of 779 nurses across 22 
Jordanian hospitals revealed that each nurse was aware that they were personally 
responsible for an average of 2.2 errors. Nurses attributed errors to poor labelling of 
medicinal products, confusion over the use of infusion devices and distractions (Mrayyan et 
al., 2007). Unlike reports from western countries (McDowell et al., 2010), preparation errors 
(33.4%) were less common than administration errors (66.4%). An observational study, 
conducted in an ICU unit in Iran, which involved 500 medication administrations, reported 
that 9.4% errors occurred among 4040 opportunities for error (Fahimi et al., 2008). 
Similarities to western studies were reported in the type of administration errors where 
bolus (Barker et al., 2002b) injections contributed 43.4% to total error rates. 
Little work has been done to identify the magnitude of administration errors associated 
with cytotoxic chemotherapy. However, these errors tend to be more serious and common, 
occurring in most workplaces (Schulmeister, 1999). They are specified as a ‘never event’ in 




the NRLS Framework (NPSA, 2010a). ‘Never events’ are medical incidents that are 
preventable and can cause serious harm to patients (NPSA, 2010a). A survey of 1240 US 
based Oncology Nursing Society nurses revealed that a cytotoxic drug error occurred in 63% 
of workplaces, mostly involving the administration of drugs.  Another survey confirmed this 
finding and revealed that nearly half (41%) of all errors involving cytotoxic chemotherapy  
in a community oncology hospital in the US were associated with the administration of the 
drug (Ford et al., 2006). An analysis of the MEDMARX database in the US revealed that 43% 
of errors associated with chemotherapy were due to errors in the administration. However, 
the authors reported administration errors occurring in paediatrics with oral, intravenous 
routes and other routes (Rinke et al., 2007). 
Handling of cytotoxics can be a source of risk to both HCWs and patients. Although very few 
studies were identified in the literature, focused on identifying and exploring intravenous 
cytotoxic chemotherapy administration errors, the available reports show they are 
common. 
5.2 Aims and objectives 
The overall aim of this study was to identify the incidence, nature and potential causes of 
medication errors during the chemotherapy administration process at a cancer hospital in 
Sudan. 
 Objectives: 
• To describe the systems used to prepare and administer chemotherapy to patients 
attending a cancer hospital within Sudan  
• To design and implement a system to capture medication errors made during the 
preparation and administration of chemotherapy 
• To classify the preparation and administration errors detected  
• To describe and analyse the potential causes of both preparation and 
administration errors 
 
Traditionally, medication error research has been conducted using retrospective review of 
medical records (Baker et al., 2004;Bates, 1999;Bates et al., 1995b;Brennan et al., 
2004;Classen et al., 1997;Cullen et al., 1997;Gandhi et al., 2003;Gawande et al., 1999;Leape 
et al., 1991;Vincent et al., 2001). However, researchers conducting the Africa and Eastern 




Mediterranean Adverse Events study, a study directed by the WHO and in which Sudan 
participated, reported incompleteness of medical records (Wilson et al., 2012).  These 
countries are classified as data poor because of incomplete record keeping and hence 
research utilizing record review would produce deficient results. The WHO have 
recommended that other methods would be more robust in these situations; such as 
observational research and prospective review of the records (WHO, 2010). Consequently, 
this study adopted a prospective mixed methods approach using observations and the 
critical incident technique. The purpose of the mixed method design was to both quantify 
and characterise the types of errors and also to gain a perspective of nurses’ experiences 
when errors occur and their views about the cause of these errors.  
The following section explains how the methods were developed and conducted to achieve 
the specific objectives, listed above. 
5.3 Study design and methods 
This project was conducted in three interlinked stages (see Figure 5-1): 
Stage One- An exploratory study using key informant interviews with the aim of describing 
the workflow in the chemotherapy day ward. Findings informed the development of a data 
collection tool used in stage two. 
Stage Two- An observation study to classify the types and frequency of medication errors 
occurring during preparation and administration of chemotherapy. Incidents identified in 
this stage were used in stage three 
Stage Three – A qualitative study using the Critical Incident technique to explore the 
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Figure 5-1 Flow diagram showing study design 
 




5.4 Stage one: Description of the preparation and administration process 
The aim of this study was to obtain a description of the chemotherapy preparation and 
administration process in order to inform the design of an observation tool to be used in 
the second stage. While researching patient safety culture (see Chapter 3), it became 
evident that written SOPs were not used routinely, and hence a description of work 
processes was not readily available. This stage of the study used key informant interviews 
to establish how nurses prepare and administer chemotherapy. 
5.4.1 Sampling and sampling technique 
Purposive sampling method was used because the views of experienced nurses were 
important to provide valuable input into describing work practices in the chemotherapy 
ward.  
In the study hospital, the supervisory nursing team consisted of two matrons and four senior 
nurses, who were identified as potential participants. Both matrons were educated to at 
least university level and three of the four senior nurses were educated to diploma level. 
After discussions with the research supervisors, it was decided to approach both matrons 
and invite them to participate in the project and in the event of either or both declining to 
participate the university-educated senior nurses would be approached. Nurses were given 
a PIL (Appendix 5-1) and consent form (Appendix 5-2) to read and sign prior to the 
interviews. 
5.4.2  Development of the Interview Schedule 
The interview schedule was developed using the principles outlined by Spradley (1979), 
using grand tour and mini tour questions.  
Interviews were designed to last between 30-45 minutes in order to avoid interview fatigue 
and minimize the impact on service delivery. The schedule covered six topics; introduction 
to assure consent and confidentiality, questions around the workflow in the chemotherapy 
administration area, the process of chemotherapy preparation and administration, the skill 
mix in the day ward, types and causes of medication errors, preventative action taken 
against medication errors and interview closure (Appendix 5.3). Prompts were used 
throughout the interview to encourage the interviewee to increase the richness and depth 




of the information provided and to support dialogue between participant and researcher.  
Prior to administration of the interview schedule, the content and wording were repeatedly 
reviewed by the supervisory team and changes were made to remove ambiguity and 
irrelevant questions.  
5.4.3 Stages of Preparation and Administration as identified by key informant 
interviews 
The findings from the key informant interviews were categorised and summarized to 
provide steps for the workflow in the chemotherapy day ward. The steps identified, 
comprised; receipt of chemotherapy in the day ward, preparatory work, preparation of 
chemotherapy and supportive drugs and administration of chemotherapy supportive drugs 
(Table 5-1).  
The findings from this stage were used to inform the development of an observation 
checklist similar to ones used in previous medication error research (Taxis et al., 2003a;Taxis 
et al., 2003b). Methods used to develop the check list are detailed in the next section. 
5.5 Stage Two 
A review of the methods adopted in the investigation of medication errors has shown that 
observation methods were able to identify patient harm, active errors, latent causes and 
contributory factors to errors (Michel, 2003). Observation is defined as: 
“a research method in which the investigator systematically watches, listens to and 
records the phenomenon of interest” (Bowling 2005 p 605) 
Observation allows the investigator to gather data without the direct involvement of 
participants and hence doesn’t suffer from response bias, recall bias or the need for 
complete records. 
Observation methods have since become the standard for assessment of administration 
errors (Tissot et al., 2003;Wirtz et al., 2003;Taxis et al., 2003a). They are superior to incident 
reports and questionnaires which only identify less than one tenth of those identified by 
observation methods (Barker et al., 2002a). The reliability of the results of observational 
methods can be confirmed by using a two-step process where an expert panel reviews the 
errors to confirm their validity (Dean et al., 2001).  




Table 5-1 Stages of preparation and administration of chemotherapy and supportive medicines 
Process Description 
Receipt of 
chemotherapy on the 
ward 
Patients wait in their beds before the arrival of the nurse. 
Chemotherapy medicines are sent by a porter from 
pharmacy, who places the medicines bag next to the patient 
on their bed. 
 
Preparatory work Nurse arrives on ward and starts to gather equipment 
necessary for preparation of intravenous medicines 






Nurse reads patient prescription and verifies that the correct 
medicines have been sent from the pharmacy. 
The pre-medication which consists of anti-emetics and other 
supportive drugs is prepared for all patients on the ward 
Each patient’s intravenous chemotherapy is prepared, 





Supportive medicines and pre-medication is administered to 
patients. Chemotherapy is administered to the patients 
according to guidelines in the administration sheets, which 
details the infusion rate and dictates which medicine is 
infused first  
The last step is flushing the line with sodium chloride 0.9%. 
Disposal Vials of cytotoxics are disposed in allocated plastic bags. 
Sharps are disposed in allocated sharps disposal units. 
 
There were early concerns about the “Hawthorne effect” where HCWs may be affected by 
overt observation to change their behaviour (Patton, 1990). However, Barber and Dean 
(2001) confirmed that these concerns were unfounded because, during a study of 
administration errors in a UK hospital, there were no differences between omission errors 
in the observed wards versus the non-observed wards. In their study, Barber and Dean 
(2001) offered partial explanations to the nurses regarding the true purpose of the study, a 




method that has been criticised (Armitage, 2005). Armitage (2005) argued that in order for 
medication error research to achieve its optimum targets and appropriate research ethics, 
participants should be consented and fully informed of the true purpose of the study 
(Armitage, 2005). Observation methods, however, have other limitations, namely cost and 
time and the need for careful training of the observer.  
Two methods for observation have been used in healthcare; participant and non-participant 
observation. The latter will be used in this current study because participant observation is 
more suited to qualitative research. Non-participant observation is more commonly 
undertaken during quantitative research (Smith, 2002), where  
“the observer is independent of the setting” (Smith 2002 p 82) 
The process of non-participant observation requires that the data collector be present in 
the research setting to record daily events according to a pre-determined agenda (Smith, 
2002). Non-participant observations have been used in previous medication research to 
identify the incidence of intravenous preparation errors in hospital clinical areas (Crowley, 
2006) and in identification of medication administration errors in hospital wards (Taxis et 
al., 2003b).  
For the purposes of data collection, a research team consisting of two pre-registration 
pharmacists were recruited and trained in observational methods. The following section 
explains the recruitment and training procedures followed regarding the research team. 
5.5.1 Research Team 
After obtaining approval from the chief pharmacist at the study hospital, two pre-
registration pharmacists, towards the end of their training, were approached and briefed 
on the background to the study.  
5.5.1.1 Training of Research Team 
The data collectors were trained in patient safety research, chemotherapy day ward 








Patient safety research 
The research team were instructed on the principles of medication error research using a 
WHO training package which provided principles of patient safety illustrated by a video that 
detailed the RCA of an error involving the injection of intrathecal vincristine (WHO, 2008a). 
The video was narrated by Sir Liam Donaldson and contained a description of patient safety 
research and findings to date. The intention of this step was to educate the data collectors 
on patient safety issues, in preparation for data collection. 
Day ward orientation 
Both data collectors shadowed a ward-based clinical pharmacist for a week to observe the 
organization of the day ward, workflow, patient/HCW interaction and the processes 
followed for preparing and administering chemotherapy in the day ward. This was to 
familiarize the data collectors with work flow in the day ward and the procedures followed 
during preparation and administration of chemotherapy. 
Preparation and administration of intravenous chemotherapy 
In order to ensure that the data collectors are aware of the appropriate steps to be followed 
when preparing intravenous preparation, they were shown a video on the preparation and 
administration of chemotherapy developed by ASHP.  The principal researcher was present 
throughout the video session to respond to queries and comments. 
Practical training on the preparation of intravenous medicines followed, to ensure the data 
collectors had a sound knowledge of appropriate procedures. The hands-on training 
involved aseptic manipulation of intravenous doses which comprised reconstitution of vials 
and ampoules and the addition of medicines to intravenous fluids. This was observed by the 
principal researcher to ensure accuracy of the procedures followed. 
For the purposes of improving knowledge regarding chemotherapy preparation and 
administration, data collectors shadowed a senior nurse on the ward to observe the 
procedures followed. In addition, data collectors studied the NRLS procedure for 
administration of chemotherapy (Pan London, 2011) because it was possible that the senior 
nurse may have drawn on the practices commonly followed at the study hospital rather 
than being guided by best practice. 
Direct observation 
The last step necessitated training the data collectors in methods of direct observation, a 
method adopted by researchers in medication error studies (Barker et al., 2002b). They 




were given a draft data collection sheet to record their observations of nurses on the day 
ward with the principal researcher conducting separate observations on the same nurse. 
Observation records were compared at the end of each day to identify any discrepancies 
that occurred. Further training was then provided to rectify any identified issues. This 
process was continued for three days until it was affirmed that the data collectors were able 
to identify all actions during the nurse observations in a reliable and valid manner. 
Both data collectors were present at all the training sessions in order to ensure that 
consistency was maintained in their observations.  
5.5.2 Development of the observation tool 
The initial draft observation tool (Appendix 5-4) was informed by key informant interviews, 
previous medication error research (Crowley, 2006;Taxis et al., 2003a;Allwood et al., 2002) 
and the injectable medication audit (Appendix 5-5) developed by the NRLS (2007). In 
addition to the processes stated by the NRLS (2007), it was important to record errors of 
aseptic procedure because patients on chemotherapy are more likely to have poor 
immunity, making them more prone to developing infections. An additional component to 
be observed was staff protection because chemotherapy is potentially carcinogenic, 
mutagenic and teratogenic and hence operator protection was an important aspect. The 
draft observation tool was divided into three sections, comprising the main processes 
involved in cytotoxic chemotherapy administration; preparation, administration of dose 
and safe disposal. 
Each section was further subdivided into steps according to information obtained from the 
literature (Joshi, 2007;ASHP, 2002;Allwood et al., 2002) Appendix 5-5. The observation tool 
was revised by the supervisory team for inconsistencies and errors which were corrected 
prior to the piloting stage. 
5.5.2.1 Pilot Study 
After completion of training, the researchers were asked to pilot the data collection tool by 
observing nurses prepare and administer chemotherapy on the outpatient chemotherapy 
day ward. The objectives of the pilot were as follows: 
• Testing, refining and validating the observation tool. 
• Quality assurance for assessing the observation skills of the research team.  




Piloting of quantitative research tools has been undertaken in medication error research 
using a sample of 50  (Dean et al., 1999). In the study hospital, each nurse would prepare 
chemotherapy for 3-4 patients each requiring 1-7 intravenous medicines. Hence a 
chemotherapy day ward nurse may prepare an average of 60 items per week. It was decided 
that the pilot could be conducted on 50-60 doses or until there were no more alterations to 
be made on the tool. Alterations to the final data collection tool (Appendix 5-6) were carried 
out after daily meetings with the principal researcher and comprised the following changes: 
1- The   final draft observation tool was to include observations for three medicines 
rather than one medicine per sheet to reduce observer fatigue. 
2- Changes were made on the preparation of dose stage where a step for addition to 
intravenous fluid was added. 
3- Changes were made to the disposal section to record disposal into the 
chemotherapy bin and disposal of sharps separately. 
 
5.5.3 Recruitment of research subjects 
Convenience sampling is a technique used to recruit research participants who are 
accessible and willing. It is the least costly sampling strategy, but is less rigorous than others 
and may introduce bias into research (Marshall, 1996).  However, this was the most 
appropriate sampling strategy in the current study because it was identified while carrying 
out the research in Chapter 3 that nurses at the study hospital showed reluctance when 
approached to participate in focus group discussions. Furthermore, selection bias would be 
reduced because all the nurses working at the chemotherapy day ward were involved in the 
same activities (preparing and administering cytotoxic chemotherapy) in the same 
environment. There was a total of 19 nurses working on the chemotherapy day ward, of 
whom 14 were female nurses who run 7 female rooms, and the others are males 
responsible for running the 5 male rooms. 
After obtaining permission from the hospital administration and the matron, all nurses were 
invited to attend two separate meetings, one for each gender. An oral presentation was 
delivered that included a synopsis of the project as follows: 
1- General aims and objectives of the project. 
2- The intended observation procedure that required a data collector to shadow a 
nurse throughout the day. 




3- Nurses’ activities and errors would be recorded maintaining confidentiality and 
anonymity. 
4- Nurses involved in errors may be invited to take part in an interview. 
Each nurse was given a project information leaflet (PIL) that contained written information 
on the above and issues of confidentiality as well as the principal researcher’s telephone 
number to contact if they had any enquiries (Appendix 5-7). They were all asked to read the 
leaflet and if they agreed to participate to contact the principal researcher. After one week, 
no phone calls were received and hence a repeat visit was made to the ward to enquire if 
the contents of the PIL were understood and to directly ask the nurses if they were willing 
to participate. On the female ward, eight nurses expressed willingness to participate and 
four nurses from the male ward. 
Each nurse was then given a consent form to read and sign (Appendix 5-7), prior to data 
collection. Consent was obtained from participants verbally or as outlined in the ethics 
section in chapter 2 and were informed that data collection would start the following week. 
5.5.4 Data Collection 
Observations were carried out in periods of 6 days (one working week) using the 
observation tool (Appendix 5-7). Dean and colleagues (2001) used a similar time period and 
showed that it increases the validity of the study and allowed the observers to record actual 
behaviour. 
On the day of observation, the data collectors were introduced to the nurse who was also 
shown the data collection tool. Data collectors had a data collection tool on a clipboard 
which allowed them to follow the nurse around the ward. Observations were made on 
doses prepared rather than patients because during the pilot it was revealed that, in some 
instances, more than one nurse may be involved in preparing the medicines for one patient. 
Hence, it was decided to focus on the doses prepared by one nurse because it would have 
been impractical to observe more than one nurse at a time,  
On days of data collection, data collectors were instructed to be present and ready on the 
ward at 8:30 am regardless of the times that the nurses arrived. On arrival of the nurse, they 
would start data collection by following the nurse and recording the procedures involved. 
Data collectors were instructed not to intervene in unimportant activities; for example, 
inappropriate disposal of cytotoxics vials or inaccurate. However, in situations where the 




patient would be likely to be adversely affected, they were instructed to discreetly 
intervene. These instances were: 
1- The wrong medicine was chosen. 
2- The medicine was not diluted using the correct dilution volume and there were 
visible powder particles in the vial. 
3- The wrong calculation for dose volumes was performed. 
4- The volume withdrawn was inaccurate. 
5- An essential medicine was missed. 
6- The infusion rate was inaccurately adjusted with paclitaxel and cisplatin. 
7- The nurse neglected flushing the intravenous line with sodium chloride 0.9% after 
injecting a vesicant medicine. 
8- The nurse was seen to discard sharps in areas where patients and hospital staff 
would be at risk of injury. 
A medication administration error was defined as follows: 
“A deviation in the preparation or administration of a medicine from a doctor’s 
prescription, the hospital IV policy or the manufacturer’s instructions” (Taxis and 
Barber 2003b p 344) 
Explicit categorisation of medication administration errors was adapted from NRLS (2007) 
standard operating procedure for the prescribing, preparation and administration of 
injectable medicines (Appendix 5-5).  
After completion of two weeks (10 working days) of observations, the data collectors moved 
to a separate ward to complete the observations on a different nurse. 
5.5.5 Analysis of observation results 
Quantitative analysis was undertaken for findings from the observation study. In addition, 
the risk of error and microbial contamination of each observed drug was assessed as 
explained in the following sections. 
5.5.5.1 Risk assessment of injectable medicines 
As all the observed intravenous medicines, were prepared on open benches, it was 
necessary to assess their risk for error and bacterial contamination.  Beaney (2010) 
developed an intravenous product risk assessment tool, for use within the UK NHS, that 




used weighting for certain items to aid risk scoring of medicines (see Table 5-2). The purpose 
of the risk assessment tool was to identify intravenous medicines that have a high risk of 
error or bacterial contamination during ward-based manipulations (Beaney, 2010) and 
recommended that high risk intravenous medicines (those with a score of more than 6) 
should be prepared in a centralized setting such as a pharmacy aseptic unit, rather than on 
open benches on wards. 
An expert panel was formed comprising two clinical oncology pharmacists and a senior 
pharmacist responsible for stock rotation and procurement. Each pharmacist was given the 
frequencies of error associated with observed drugs during the preparation and 
administration of chemotherapy one week before the meeting of the expert. 
A meeting was held with members of the expert panel where points of concern were 
clarified. The objectives of the meeting were as follows: 
• Present the aims and objectives of the project. 
• Explain the findings of the observation study and the purpose of the activity. 
• Identify the medicines with highest risk to prioritise when designing an intervention 
to reduce the error rate at the hospital in the future. 
• Present the method for risk assessment of the medicines involved in the 
observation period as described by Beaney (2010) 
During the meeting, each of the pharmacists was given copies of the manufacturer’s 
recommendation for the reconstitution of each medicine. 
The expert panel discussed the above tool and it was decided to modify it as follows: 
1- Category F was replaced by extravasation risk. Chemotherapeutic agents have 
additional administration concerns; mainly their ability to cause necrosis when 
extravasation occurs during intravenous administration. A previous undergraduate 
research project showed that the rate of extravasation at the study hospital was 
15% (Mohammed, 2006), more than double the range identified in the literature  
(Ener et al., 2004). Risk of harm from extravasation depended on the effect of 
chemotherapeutic medicine on human tissue. Therefore, the medicines were 
grouped and classified into: neutral, inflammatory, irritant, exfoliant or vesicant 
according to published literature (Ener et al., 2004;Allwood et al., 2002). It was 
decided to give a different weighting to each class depending on the severity of 




potential damage, as follows: Neutral=0, inflammatory=1, irritant=2, exfoliant=3 
and vesicant= 4.  
2- Category K was removed because the observation study didn’t involve recording 
the patient’s co-morbidities. 
3- An extra category involving the requirement for adjusting the rate of administration 
was added to the tool because this was necessary for some cytotoxic medicines 
such as paclitaxel where a fast rate can cause cardiac side effects (Summerhayes et 
al., 2003). 
Table 5-2 Risk Assessment of intravenous medicines (Beaney, 2010 p1572) 
Code Risk Weighting 
A Number of manipulations 1 each 
B Calculations 2 each 
C Part usage vials and ampoules 1 





E Nature of material e.g.  teratogenic, mutagenic 3 
F Nature of material e.g. microbiological contamination 3 




H Duration of administration 7-day device 3 
24-hour infusion 2 
Other infusion 1.5 
Slow IV 1 
IV/IM/SC bolus 0.5 
I Unfamiliar Process (defined as less than 6 amps/vials 
used in 12 months 
2 
J Special needs patient e.g. neonate, renal failure, 
immunocompromised, ITU patient, fluid restricted 
1.5 
K Dangerous practice e.g. unlabelled syringes pre-
prepared 
1.5 




The new risk assessment tool was further revised to ensure consistency and that there are 
no inaccuracies (see Table 5-3). 
Table 5-3 Modified risk assessment tool for parenteral products prepared in clinical areas 
Code Risk Weighting  
A Number of manipulations 1 each 
B Calculations 2 each 
C Part usage vials and ampoules 1 





E Nature of material e.g.  teratogenic, mutagenic 3 








H Duration of administration 7-day device 3 
24-hour infusion 2 
Other infusion 1.5 
Slow IV 1 
IV/IM/SC bolus 0.5 
I Unfamiliar Process (defined as less than 6 amps/vials 
used in 12 months 
2 
J Special needs patient e.g. neonate, renal failure 
immunocompromised, , ITU patient, fluid restricted 
1.5 








5.5.5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Quantitative analysis was used to present the results collected during the observations. 
Observations were coded and entered into statistical software SPSS v 22.0 for storage and 
analysis. Data cleaning was undertaken to detect and correct data entry errors, manage 
missing data and rectify any coding errors. 
Descriptive statistics were used to analyse the results and percentage frequencies of 
categorical values.  Percentage frequencies of drugs observed were calculated and 
displayed together with the drug risk scoring according to section 5.5.5.1. Percentage 
frequencies, percentage median and the interquartile range for opportunities for errors 
according to drug, nurse and stage of the administration process were calculated and 
displayed. In addition, Pearson Chi square test was used to find to identify if the gender, 
level of experience of the nurse was associated with errors. A chi square result of <0.05 was 
considered a significant association. 
5.5.6 Results:  
5.5.6.1 Characteristics of drugs observed 
The preparation and administration of 378 cytotoxic medicines and supportive drugs were 
observed over an eight-week period, representing 12772 opportunities for error. An 
overwhelming number of errors occurred during each observation. A total of 8684 (68%) 
errors were recorded for eight different groups of medicines observed during the study 
period, representing 19 chemotherapy agents and 10 medicines used in supportive care 
(see Table 5-4). The most commonly observed medicines were the antiemetics (115; 30.4%) 
among supportive medicines and antimetabolites (55; 14.6%) among cytotoxics. 
The medicines involved in the observation period were assessed using the risk scoring 
system outlined in the analysis of results section 5.5.5.1.  The injectable drug risk 
assessment scoring identified that all of the observed cytotoxics and all of the medicines 
used in supportive care scored above 6 (Table 5-4). Beaney (2010) proposed that 
intravenous medicines that have a score of more than 6 are high risk medicines that should 
be prepared in a centralised pharmacy under aseptic conditions. Hence, all observed 
medicines were categorised as high risk. 
 
 




Table 5-4 Characteristics of drugs observed 





Individual Drug Frequency 







55 (14.6) 5-Fluorouracil 45 (11.9) 15.75 
Gemcitabine 7 (1.9) 31.5 
Methotrexate 2 (0.5) 15.75 
Cytosine-Arabinoside 1 (0.3) 15.75 
Platinums 43(11.4) Cisplatin  33 (8.7) 15.75 
Carboplatin 10 (2.6) 15.75 
Alkylating 
agents 
37(9.8) Cyclophosphamide 22(5.8) 31.5 
Ifosfamide 7(1.9) 31.5 
Dacarbazine 8(2.1) 31.5 
Anthracyclines 32(8.5) Doxorubicin 23(6.1) 15.75 
Epirubicin 7 (1.9) 15.75 
Dactinomycin 1 (0.3) 31.5 
Taxanes  25(6.6) Docetaxel 18 (4.8) 31.5 
Paclitaxel 7 (1.9) 31.5 
Vinca alkaloids 18(4.8) Vincristine 13(3.4) 15.75 
Vinblastine 4(1.1) 15.75 
Vinorelbine 1(0.3) 15.75 
Other 
cytotoxics 
15 (4.0) Bleomycin 8(2.1) 31.75 
Etoposide 5(1.3) 15.75 
L-Asparaginase 1(0.3) 30 
Supportive Medicines 
Anti-emetics 115 (30.4) Dexamethasone 61(16.1) 9.75 
Ondansetron 54(14.3) 9.75 
Electrolytes 20(5.3) Magnesium Sulphate 10(2.6) 14.25 




18(4.8) Mesna 8(2.1) 22.5 
Chlorphenamine 2(0.5) 9.75 
Folinic Acid 5(1.3) 9.75 
Ranitidine 2(0.5) 9.75 
Mannitol 1(0.3) 11.25 










5.5.6.2 Errors associated with cytotoxic chemotherapy and supportive medicines 
None of the medicines prepared during the study period were observed to be correctly 
prepared or administered. Observers recorded 8684 (68%) errors, (percentage median 
67.6%, IQR= 11.6%) of total opportunities for errors (Table 5-5). Each observed dose 
represented a maximum of 38 and a minimum of 31 opportunities for error and each was 
involved in a minimum of 15 errors up to a maximum of 32 errors. Interestingly, the number 
of errors was inversely associated with the number of opportunities for error per dose 
(p=0.003, chi square test).  The highest frequency of errors occurred with vinca alkaloids 
(percentage median error rate 75%, IQR=11.8) and the lowest frequency of errors occurred 
with alkylating agents (percentage median error rate 63.2%, IQR=5.3%). 
5.5.6.3 Characteristics of nurses observed and associated errors 
A total of 8 nurses gave consent to participate in the study, representing an equal number 
from each gender, all were staff nurses with varied lengths of experience (see Table 5-6). 
Nurses were observed to be involved in errors in the majority of doses. The highest 
frequency of errors was recorded (percentage median error rate 79.1% IQR=6.5%) with a 
nurse who had 1-5 years of experience and the lowest frequency of errors (median error 
rate 58.1%, IQR= 8.4%) were observed with a nurse who had more than 5 years’ experience. 
Although there was no significant association between staff gender and the total number 
of errors made per dose (p-=0.74, Chi- square test), a significant statistical association was 
seen between length of service and the number of errors (p<0.000, Chi-square test) where 
staff with less than 5-years’ experience were more likely to be involved in errors than those 
who had more than 5- year experience.  
 






Table 5-5 Analysis of dose error per drug 
Drug Group Total opportunities for error Frequency of error (%) %Median(IQR) 
Antimetabolites 1860 (14.6) 1229(66.1) 64.7 (71.7-60.6) 
Platinums 1450 (11.4) 972 (67.0) 66.7 (70.6-60.6) 
Alkylating Agents 1376 (10.8) 894 (65) 63.2 (65.8-60.5) 
Anthracyclines 1084 (8.5) 748 (69.0) 67.6 (75.8-63.6) 
Taxanes 935 (7.3) 608 (65.0) 64.9 (70.3-57.9) 
Vinca 612 (4.8) 456 (74.5) 75.0 (82.4-70.6) 
Other Cytotoxics  532 (4.2) 368(69.2) 64.9 (77.9-62.0) 
Antiemetics 3699 (30) 2548(68.9) 68.8 (71.9-62.5) 
Electrolytes 648 (5.1) 458(70.7) 71.2 (78.1-63.4) 
Other Supportive Medicines 576 (4.5) 403 (70.0) 68.2 (74.8-65.6) 













Table 5-6 Analysis of error per nurse observation 
Observation  
(8weeks) 





Frequency of observed 
opportunities for error  
Frequency of errors 
(%) 
%Median (IQR) 
1 F 1-5 years 64 2153 (16.8) 1397 (64.9) 64.1 (69.8-61.5) 
7 M More than 5 years 64 2112 (16.5) 1526 (72.2) 71.2 (75.8-68.8) 
5 M More than 5 years 63 2105 (16.5) 1239 (58.8) 58.1 (62.5-54.1) 
2 F Less than 1 year 52 1783 (14.0) 1395 (78.2) 79.2 (84.8-73.4) 
3 F Less than 1 year 41 1411 (11.0) 878 (62.2) 62.2 (64.7-59.4) 
6 M 1-5 years 35 1191 (9.3) 778 (65.3) 65.6 (68.8-62.0) 
8 M 1-5 years 30 1028 (8.0) 814 (79.1) 79.2 (82.4-75.9) 
4 F Less than 1 year 29 989 (7.7) 657 (66.4) 66.7 (70.6-63.2) 
Total   378 12772 8684 (68%)   




5.5.6.4 Types of errors during preparation of cytotoxic medicines 
The data obtained from the observation of dose preparation was analysed according to 
subs-stages. Preparation of cytotoxics and the supportive medicines involved six stages 
each composed of several sub-stages (see Figure 5-2). An overwhelming number of errors 
were recorded during observations of each preparation sub stage. 
While preparing cytotoxic and supportive medicines, on the ward, none of the nurses wore 
goggles or protective footwear required for personal protection against occupational 
exposure to cytotoxics. On a minority of occasions nurses did not wear a protective coat 
(8%) or gloves (3.6%). Major deviations from aseptic procedure were also observed as, on 
all occasions, nurses never washed their hands or cleaned work surfaces or swabbed the 
drug vials with alcohol and never adhered to non-touch technique, an important 
requirement for preparation of intravenous doses (Beaney, 2010).  
Observers recorded that more than one third (39%) of all doses were calculated incorrectly 
and during preparation of the vast majority of doses (97.6%), a second check on calculation 
was not obtained. The observer intervened in all cases to prevent errors reaching the 
patient. Observers recorded that even after correcting the calculation, 16.9% of dose 
volumes were removed inaccurately, requiring further intervention from observers to 
correctly adjust the volume. In the majority of occasions, the drug was added to the 
intravenous fluid without obtaining a second check (90%).  
Observers identified that labelling requirements were never followed as none of the 
prepared medicines contained information relating to the route of administration, the time 
prepared, the final concentration or the initial of the nurse involved in the manipulation. 
Essential information was absent in the majority of cases, for example; the patient name 
was not included in 99%, of doses; the drug name was not recorded in 85% of cases; and 
















































Wash hands (378; 100%) 
Gloves (11;2.9%) Accurate calculation 
(147; 38.9%) 









2nd  check  





• Patient name (375; 99.2%) 
• Drug name (323; 95.4%) 
• Dose (367;99.5 %) 
• Route (378; 100%) 
•  Concentration (378; 100%) 
•  Signature (378;100%),   










Closed toe shoes 
(378;100%) 
Clean work 
surface         
(378; 100%) 
Checked final preparation (229, 60.6%) 






























Figure 5-2 Errors at each sub-stage of drug preparation 




5.5.6.5 Types of errors during administration of observed medicines 
Administration of both cytotoxics and supportive medicines involved ten sub stages and 
their disposal involved two sub stages (see Figure 5-3). A substantial number of errors 
occurred during administration of medicines. In all cases nurses failed to record the details 
of medication administered in the patient’s notes, and failed to confirm the patient’s allergy 
status. Nurses failed to verify the patient’s name in the majority of observations (90%) and 
did not read the prescription details on the medication chart before administering the 
medicine in nearly half (41%) of observations.  In a little more than a quarter (26%) of 
occasions, the nurses started to administer medicines using an incorrect administration 
sequence and incorrectly adjusted the infusion rate for over half the medicines (56%).  
During the infusion of 56% of observations, nurses left the patient unattended and failed to 
monitor the infusion site and the flow of the infusion. Observers intervened to correct 
administration sequence and infusion rate. 
5.5.6.6 Errors per stage 
Further analysis was then undertaken to investigate the frequency of error during each 
whole stage. The observation of medication administration process (preparation, 
administration and disposal of waste), involved 8 stages. A considerable number of errors 
occurred at all stages of the medication administration process. Two thirds of the doses 
(59.1%) were incorrectly administered (percentage median 55.6%, IQR=26) and the 
incorrect calculation process was followed in more than two thirds of the doses (68.3%). 
Almost all nurses consistently breached aseptic technique with 99.4% of the steps either 
inaccurately performed or not undertaken (percentage median 100%, IQR=0), and omitted 
essential information during the labelling of 99.4% of doses (percentage median 100%, 
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Figure 5-3 Frequencies of errors at each sub-stage of medication administration 




Table 5-7 Analysis of errors per stage 
Stage errors Total 
opportunities 





Administration of dose 3542 (27.7) 2093(59.1) 55.6 (70.0-44.4) 
Labelling of final product 2646 (20.7) 2586(97.7) 100 (100.0-100.0) 
Aseptic technique 1890 (14.8) 1878(99.4) 100 (100.0-100.0) 
Personal Protective Equipment 1512 (11.8) 799(52.3) 50 (50-50) 
Preparation of dose 1509 (11.8) 647 (42.9) 50 (50.0-25.0) 
Calculation 756 (5.9) 516(68.3) 50 (100.0-50.0) 
Disposal of vials and sharps 617 (4.8) 88 (14.3) 0.0 (0.0-0.0) 
Diluent 300 (2.3) 77 (25.7) 25 (25.0-25.0) 
  12772 8684        
 
 
5.6 Stage Three 
In the current study, direct observation (stage 2 of the current chapter) collected critical 
incidents from the eight nurses at the chemotherapy ward. The critical incident here was 
defined as a preparation or administration error, categorised in Appendix (5-5).  
5.6.1 Interview Schedule  
The CIT was used to develop an interview schedule (Appendix 5-8). Flanagan (1974) 
provided detailed instructions on data collection and proposed that this could be done using 
either observations or interviews.  The interviews are required to be worded in a specific 
way so as to prevent inferences from research participants and to encourage actual 
accounts of the critical incident (see Chapter 4). Research participants were asked to focus 
on a specific incident with questions probing the behaviours involved. To ensure that recall 
would not be compromised, research participants were interviewed within 96 hours of an 
error taking place. The interview schedule (Appendix 5-9) was designed to last between 30-
45 minutes and consisted of the following: Introduction, a description of the environment 
at the time of the incident, a description of the preparation and administration process, a 




detailed description of the nature of the incident, Identify the effective/ ineffective actions, 
needs, and a closure. 
5.6.2 Recruitment of research participants and selection of critical incidents 
Research participants were recruited into this study after identification of a critical incident. 
Although they had previously consented to take part in the observation study, research 
participants were approached separately for the interviews. Initial findings from the study 
indicated that nurses were involved in multiple errors each day and hence it was discussed 
with research supervisors that repeated interviewing would not be constructive; hence the 
critical incident interview focused on one critical incident per nurse. The critical incident in 
this situation was the first error committed on the day of data collection. All research 
participants were asked to separately provide consent to this study, but refused to provide 
written consent. Hence verbal consent was audio-recorded before the start of each 
interview, following the principles outlined in Chapter 2 of the current thesis. 
5.6.3 Data management and analysis 
Data was recorded using digital recorder SONY (ICD-BX800), and verbatim answers were 
transcribed in Arabic. The transcribed interview was translated using methods outlined in 
the Chapter 2.  
Translated data were entered into NVivo for storage and data analysis. Framework analysis  
based on Reason’s Framework of Human Error (described in previous sections) was used for 
the analysis (Reason, 1990). The critical incidents were classified into categories of human 
error: slips, lapses, violations and mistakes. Critical behaviours were categorised using 
Reason’s Framework as organizational processes and pre-conditions for errors. 
Further interpretation of the data were undertaken using Reason’s culpability tree (Reason, 
1997) (see Figure 5-5) because it was necessary to take   nurse accountability into 
consideration when discussing the results of this study. HCW accountability in relation to 
medication errors is a necessary component of a just culture (Wachter et al., 2009;Khatri et 
al., 2009).  
 





Figure 5-4 A decision tree for determining culpability of unsafe acts (Reason p 209) 
 
5.6.4 Results  
During the 8-week study period, eight nurses were observed, each for a whole week, 
preparing and administering cytotoxic chemotherapy to cancer patients attending the day 
unit at RICK. The observers identified that none of the doses were appropriately prepared 
because in no case did the nurse follow the required aseptic procedure during preparation.  
Eight critical interviews were conducted within 48 hours of completing the data collection, 
to discuss one error or one critical incident. Figure 5-6 below provides detail of the errors 
discussed.  
5.6.4.1 Categories of unsafe acts  
Following analysis of interviews using Reason’s Human Error framework the errors were 
classified into violations, slips or mistakes. The analysis revealed that there were 3 
violations, 3 mistakes and one slip (Figure 5-6).   This analysis was based on theme emerging 
from nurse critical incident interviews. 

















































6 Withdraw wrong vincristine 
volume 
 




1 Omitted to administer Paclitaxel pre-
medication 
2 Withdrew wrong Docetaxel volume  
3  Withdrew wrong cyclophosphamide 
volume  







4 Administered 5-fluorouracil at 
the wrong rate 
5 Withdrew the wrong volume of 
ondansetron 
8 Inappropriate management of 
doxorubicin spillage 
 
Figure 5-5 Categories of unsafe acts discussed 




5.6.4.2 Contributory causes of errors 
A number of latent factors and error-provoking conditions were described by nurses during 
the critical incident interviews. Conditions associated with medication errors were analysed 
using Vincent’s adaptation of Reason’s error framework (Table 5-7) 
5.6.4.2.1 Latent factors 
A number of latent factors associated with errors emerged from critical incident interviews. 
These were categorised into organizational and managerial factors.   
Organizational Factors 
During critical incident interviews, the organizational factor which was associated with most 
errors was lack of training.  
Training 
During the critical incident interviews, it was apparent that nurses showed poor knowledge 
in re-constituting cytotoxics and following aseptic technique. The nurses reported that they 
never received training targeting drug calculations, reconstitution and handling of 
cytotoxics. Lack of training was responsible for 5 out of the 8 critical incidents discussed in 
these interviews. Below is a typical quote: 
“I mean the taxotere is a very difficult medicine to handle and the best way to deal 
with future errors is to avoid working with the medicine and give it to someone else 
to prepare. I am sure that if I was trained properly, I won’t have problems preparing 
the medicine and it would be ok for me to do it but it would be better for someone 
else to do it.” (Nurse Critical incident interview 2) 
Nurses seemed to learn the skills required for preparation and administration of cytotoxics 
from other nurses on the ward.  
“during the training period, you just have to come in and observe those who are 
there, they do the training, we just watch and copy them later.”                                                                    











Table 5-8 Contributory causes of active failures 




slips Mistakes Routine violations 
6 1 2 3 7 4 5 8 
Latent 
factors 
Organizational Training   + + + +   + 
Managerial Resources   + + +   + 
Staffing +   +  +   




Individual New member of staff    +   +  
Knowledge gaps  + + + +   + 
Culture of short cuts       + + 
Environment Busy +        
Interruptions +        
Task Complicated   + + +    
Team Supervision  + + + +  + + 
 




Nurses’ accounts revealed that training is not offered to new members of staff who are 
expected to improvise while undertaking tasks involving the preparation and administration 
of cytotoxics. A new nurse described this in the quote below: 
“... well I came in and it was my first day and the matron told me that the other 
nurses on the ward were going to train me and that I have to go straight to the ward 
and start working. So, I came in and of course, we haven’t seen or heard of 
chemotherapy since we graduated from school because we worked in normal 
general hospitals... She told me that I would be trained as I am working, so I started 
my work and started making up chemotherapy. It didn’t seem very strange because 
I had prepared some drips and intravenous injections before, but the names were 
strange to me and I had to keep asking her (the other nurse) about how to dissolve 
the medicines and the volume needed and such. But on this first day, there was so 
much work and I wasn’t concentrating because the other nurse was doing most of 
the work and I was mainly assisting her. When I came in yesterday... I had to wait 
for a whole half hour before the matron arrived, by which time the ward was full of 
patients and they all had their medicines bags and they were all waiting to have 
their doses...So really it was my second day at work and I hadn’t   yet learnt the 
names of the medicines, because really the first day, I was just assisting the other 
nurse on the ward. On that day, she hadn’t yet arrived so I went to the matron and 
told them that the other nurse hadn’t arrived yet and that I needed another nurse 
to help me. The matron instructed me to try my best to cover all the patients and if 
I needed any help, she would be there. She also said that she was going to come and 














A number of managerial factors were identified during critical incident interviews. These 
were, deficient resources, lack of policies and procedure and staffing and workload 
Resources 
Nurses worked in conditions where many resources necessary for the safe preparation of 
cytotoxics were unavailable. These included PPE, syringes, labels, pens and calculators. One 
very important finding was the re-use of previously used disposable syringes. Although 
nurses were aware of the infection risks associated with sharing syringes between patients, 
they had little option in most cases but to resort to this practice. Below is a quote that 
illustrates this: 
“At the same time, we don’t have the right equipment but sometimes have to use 
one syringe to work on five different patients. I know this is wrong, I know it. But I 
am doing this because the syringes provided are not enough. Sometimes, I have a 
patient who says they cannot afford to buy any syringes. What can I do? I may go 
to pharmacy and they usually say they don’t have any. What do you want me to do? 
Then they say improvise! I have to improvise with what I have. I will rinse the ones I 
have used for other patients and re-use them” (Nurse Critical incident interview 4) 
Nurses explained that they did not have access to PPE such as masks and goggles. 
Furthermore, each nurse is provided with a set number of gloves regardless of the 
requirements of the task. Below are quotes illustrating this: 
“(looking at the data collection check list) I wouldn’t consider not wearing goggles 
and covered shoes an error because they are not even provided. I don’t even have 
enough gloves and not a single mask is provided for us... If I don’t have a mask, when 
I am making the taxol, I can feel it in my head. By God, I am speaking the truth, I can 
smell it and feel the medicine. Taxol, taxotere and etoposide have a very powerful 
smell and it penetrates into my head. When I make up so many taxols, it would give 
me a headache.” (Nurse Critical incident interview 4) 
 
“I get given 5 pairs of gloves to work on three patients. Each patient! can you 
imagine the number of drips they have, if it’s a cisplatin patient, he would have 
cisplatin, fluids, potassium and magnesium, dexa and ondal and mannitol. You can 
imagine that I would have to prepare all of these infusions using only five pairs of 




gloves for my three patients and I can easily take infection from one and pass it onto 
the other. The problem is that this is a simple matter and its solution is simple, 
they(management) should just provide the equipment” (Nurse Critical incident 
interview 4) 
Policies and procedures  
Moreover, the nurses had no awareness of policies and procedures necessary for guidance 
in daily tasks and relied on instructions from others. Below is a typical quote: 
“No, I wasn’t aware of that before and I used to use the same drip line for all the 
medicines, for 4 years, until Dr A (one of the ward pharmacists) told us that we need 
to change the drip line. I said to my colleagues that I have been working this way for 
the last 4 years and it must be something new, something that they have just come 
up with now. Anyway, I started doing so, changing the drip line between medicines” 
(Nurse Critical interview 2) 
Nurses were unaware of the appropriate procedure to remove air from vials without 
causing spills. As a result, while re-constituting cytotoxics, spills would occur and 
contaminate the environment, exposing themselves, patients, patient relatives and other 
HCWs to harm. The quote below illustrates this: 
“but some medicines such as cisplatin have a lot of air in the vials and when you 
insert the needle of a syringe, the medicine spills out contaminating the gloves with 
chemotherapy and then you are forced to remove those gloves or sometimes you 
may have to wear two pairs of gloves.” (Nurse Critical incident interview 5) 
 
Staffing and workload 
Three nurses explained that they were sometimes expected to work on their own covering 
a ward or a number of wards which would usually require more than one nurse. Nurses felt 
overworked and were not able to concentrate on their given tasks as illustrated in the quote 
below: 
“sometimes I work with 10 patients and they want me to cover another nurse on 
another ward and I keep going between two rooms to do my job and they want me 
to work with quality in my mind. I won’t be able to do it. They want me to change 
one patient’s intravenous drip and change the drip set for another patient and 
straight after that a patient shouts out that their medicine has finished. If I have two 




patients, then I can do my job properly. Now with three patients I can still work well 
but they give me 6 patients in a room and all the patients’ drips stop at the same 
time. That causes problems. I won’t be able to concentrate with these patients. I put 
in the cannula and then I remove another patient’s cannula and then I change the 
medicine on the other side of the room and then I will be running about”  (Nurse 
Critical incident interview 4) 
On one occasion, a nurse who was covering the ward on her own was interrupted while 
preparing a vincristine dose and, instead of drawing up 0.4ml, she drew up 2ml which would 
have resulted in an overdose for the patient. The result was a slip, as illustrated below: 
“Maybe I was stressed out because I was on my own… usually there are two of us 
working but yesterday… I had to prepare everything on my own, one of the other 
nurses came and gave me gloves but they were barely enough for the day. I couldn’t 
find a mask and even the gloves were not enough and I had to go search in the other 
wards to find gloves and equipment. I had to prepare everything on my own; I had 
to put in the cannulas and prepare the medicines and administer them to the 
patients and all. I had no problem with all the other medicines except for the 
vincristine.”     (Nurse Critical incident interview 
6) 
5.6.4.3 Error-provoking conditions 
In the presence of the previously discussed latent factors, a number of error provoking 
conditions were identified from nurses’ accounts. These were related to the individual 
nurse, the task of preparing and administration of chemotherapy, team factors and 
environmental factors.  
Individual Factors 
 As a result of absent policies and procedures and where training was deficient, there was 
evidence from five nurse interviews that they had knowledge gaps. Mistakes were mainly 
caused by nurses who were unaware of the correct procedure, and hence KBMs were 
common among the discussed errors.  On one occasion, a nurse received on the spot 
training from the observer in order to enable her to reconstitute the drug docetaxel 
appropriately. The drug was supplied from the manufacturer in a concentrated oil-based 
form with an alcohol diluent. The addition of the diluent to the drug should be carried out 
slowly while rotating the vial carefully in order to avoid frothing and seepage of the drug 
through the septum (Allwood et al., 2002). The nurse was observed to push the diluent 




quickly into the drug vial, resulting in significant seepage of drug which led to loss of drug 
volume. Therefore, it was not possible to remove the accurate volume required from the 
vial. Instead of ordering a new vial, the nurse was observed to proceed to add the incorrect 
volume of drug to an intravenous infusion bottle. Consequently, the observer intervened 
and asked for a replacement from the pharmacy. The nurse explained that she frequently 
had issues when making up docetaxel and had received no training in its reconstitution 
procedure, as illustrated in the following quote:  
“We are very familiar with filling up the intravenous bottles (reconstituting cytotoxic 
chemotherapy and adding it to intravenous infusions) with medicines but that 
particular medicine (meaning docetaxel) is specifically hard to draw up and until X 
(observer) showed me how, I always struggled with it and when I reconstitute it, it 
starts to foam and a large amount spills out from the vial across the bench. 
(Laughing apologetically)” (Nurse Critical incident interview) 2 
In the second incident, the nurse failed to read the instructions on the medication 
administration chart carefully before administering the chemotherapy drug paclitaxel and 
proceeded to give the drug without administering ranitidine as premedication. Ranitidine is 
required to reduce side effects of paclitaxel  (Allwood et al., 2002), however, the nurse was 
unaware of this information, as illustrated below: 
“I don’t know why I didn’t look at the prescription chart or why I wasn’t paying 
attention to administering everything on the prescription. And to tell you the truth, 
I don’t ever remember seeing this injection (ranitidine) before. But these days, with 
IB (the observer) being on the ward, he is giving us new instructions and telling us 
things we didn’t know before”  (Nurse Critical incident interview 1) 
Nurses had difficulties with dose volume calculations as discussed during critical incident 
interviews. During one of the interviews, a nurse was asked to describe the procedure he 
followed when drawing up a 1200mg dose of cyclophosphamide from three 500mg vials. It 
was clear from his description that he had no knowledge of the correct procedure to 
calculate intravenous doses. The diluent volume he described was incorrect because 
cyclophosphamide powder should be dissolved in 25mL of diluent, rather than 20mL. 
Furthermore, the final volume he described would remove 1250mg, rather than the 
intended 1200mg, as illustrated below: 




“They sent me 3 vials (500mg each) and I added 20cc of normal saline to each of the 
cyclophosphamide vials to dissolve the powder. I then removed the contents of two 
whole vials and 10cc from the third vial and this is what makes the 1200mg dose” 
(Nurse Critical incident interview 7) 
Nurses committed three violations which were discussed in the critical incident interviews. 
These violations were caused because it appeared that nurses commonly used a number of 
short cuts and improvisations during their daily tasks. 
One of the female nurses described how she managed a cytotoxic spill. She noticed an 
intravenous drip was leaking onto the floor. Instead of discontinuing the leaking intravenous 
drip, she decided to get a basket to collect the spilled drug but continued infusing a patient 
using the open intravenous drip, as illustrated in the quote below: 
“Then I noticed there was some water no I mean drug on the outside of the giving 
set. OK? and when I went to look at the drip, I found on the outside on the top of the 
thingy (drip septum) there was a pool of drug. At the top, it looked there was a 
reservoir which has a flat top and that’s where I found the drug pool. I then went 
and got a waste bucket and placed it under the drip” (Nurse Critical incident 
interview 8)  
During the interview, it appeared that one of the senior nurses intentionally pierced the 
drip septum to deflate the bottle and allow the drug to flow quickly. This is contrary to best 
nursing practice but it seemed that nurses routinely performed this procedure in order to 
save time: 
“I don’t know but I have a suspicion that the sister, who works with me, deflates the 
drip using a needle, so she deflates the drip with a needle that she sticks in to the 
side of the drip. Mostly she would do that with the adriamycin, yeah, she likes to do 
that to...  When you are using adriamycin in the drip, the drip gets too full and it 
flows very slowly through the giving set unless you deflate the drip bottle. I don’t 
know but maybe she (sister working on the ward) found the drip stuck and not going 
through, so she decided to deflate it. Yeah that is my suspicion.” (Nurse Critical 
incident interview 8) 
 
 




Another incident involved giving the patient the wrong dose of ondansetron because the 
nurse did not empty the contents of the medicines bag appropriately, resulting in giving the 
wrong dose of ondansetron. The nurse appeared to routinely empty the contents of the bag 
onto the patient’s bed and picked up what fell out: 
“I didn’t forget that vial or anything like that, but it was at the bottom of the carrier 
bag and when I took out the medicines, it was hiding in a place where you can’t get 
to it. These bags, even when you shake them empty, they still hold on to the 
medicine specially the ondal (ondansetron) because it is the same colour as the bag” 
(Nurse Critical incident interview 5) 
A third violation occurred because the nurse was given instructions which he thought were 
not practical and explained that he intentionally altered the infusion rate of intravenous 
infusions: 
 “I will not adjust the rate of 5FU according to that stated because sometimes it says: 
Give 5FU in 30 minutes which means how much? Ha! It means 330 drops in the 
minute. This is impossible to count and however much I try and look at those drops; 
I won’t be able to adjust them because my eyes won’t focus. Also, the 500ml drip 
will never finish in 30 minutes, however hard we try!” (Nurse Critical incident 
interview 4) 
Environmental factors 
Environmental factors were responsible for one critical incident. The nurse was busy and 
while preparing the dose got interrupted by one of the patients.  
“I got distracted by the other patients on the ward and instead of halving the dose, 
I emptied the whole vial into the IV drip.”  (Nurse Critical incident interview 6) 
In this instance, the observer noticed the error after it occurred and asked for a replacement 












The task of administering cytotoxic chemotherapy requires previous knowledge and 
preparedness. Nurses had to remember a number of steps for the safe preparation and 
administration of chemotherapy. One nurse described the process of giving pre-medication 
to patients on paclitaxel chemotherapy:  
“Now I know that if there is a patient that requires Taxol, I will have to give pre-
medication and ranitidine before giving them the medicine. I also have to wait half 
an hour after completing the pre-medication before giving the chemo. I will also 
remember how to use a 20ml syringe to dissolve the ranitidine powder. I also have 
to make sure that I wait between medicines and not to administer one after the 
other.”  (Nurse Critical incident interview 1) 
 
Team factors 
Nurses appeared to work largely unsupervised and unsupported without ensuring their 
competence in the preparation and administration of complex and unfamiliar drugs. One 
particular nurse had to rely on help from a qualified nurse who had been previously 
employed at the study hospital and was accompanying a relative: 
“A nurse came in; she was here with her aunt who was receiving chemotherapy. She 
had worked here before but had left the job and was just coming in as a visitor. So, 
I told her that my colleague hadn’t arrived yet and that I was new without anyone 
to help. I told her I has asked the matron for help and have already inserted in all 
the intravenous cannulas waiting for the matron to send someone to help me. She 
said “let me tell you something, no one is going to come and help you… I am going 
to try and help you a little bit. I will start off by giving the patients their first doses 
and then will leave “. I agreed and she started preparing some of the doses and 
explained about the medicines and what they are used for and made them up and 
left them all on the bench for me. So, I started to look at the patient files and match 
them with the medicines that she prepared.” (Nurse Critical incident interview 3) 
 
 




It was evident during critical incident interviews, that student nurses who were unqualified 
also worked with cytotoxics, unsupervised. One nurse who was a student, illustrated this in 
the below quote and explained one instance where he intentionally violated known nurse 
procedures.  
“Yes, I am still studying to be a nurse and it sometimes may take people more than 
5 years to complete the nursing course... I might forget to look at the file or 
something like that or it may be something like 5 (5fluorouracil) which comes with 
dexamethasone and ondal and you don’t need to look at the file very much because 
the dose is always 1g”  (Nurse Critical incident interview 5) 
 
5.6.4.4 Nurse culpability  
Determination of nurse culpability revealed that five of the critical incidents were caused 
by system failures, and three were caused by nurse reckless behaviours (Table 5-8).  The 
culpability of nurses with regards to the critical incidents was determined using Reason’s 
Culpability tree (Reason, 1990). For example, during the interview for critical incident 2, the 
nurse revealed that she had no previous training in reconstituting docetaxel. Hence, she 
experienced considerable loss of the drug during the reconstitution process which resulted 
in her withdrawing the wrong volume. It was evident that the nurse was not intending to 
cause harm, did not violate known procedures, however, she was likely to repeat the error, 
because she was unaware of the correct procedure. Hence, this error would be classified a 
system error because it was caused by a failure of the organization to provide training and 
clear task related procedures (Figure 5-6). In contrast, during the interview where incident 
1 was discussed, the nurse may be classified as behaving recklessly. The nurse admitted that 
she did not read the instructions and hence omitted the pre-medication required for 
intravenous administration of paclitaxel. Although clear procedures were not available, but 
it is common nursing practice to read the doctors’ instructions before administering 
intravenous medicines. Hence, the nurse in this situation may be regarded as behaving 
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Figure 5-6 Culpability of nurse withdrawing the wrong volume of drug (critical incident 2) 
Figure 5-7 Culpability of nurse omitting drugs as a result of not reading the patient's medication file (critical incident 1) 





Findings from the current study reveal that none of the intravenous drugs observed during 
the study period were correctly prepared or administered. These findings are thought-
provoking because they reveal that patients were at considerable risk of harm from 
medication errors during the study period. Each of the observed drugs were involved in at 
least 15 errors, caused by a number of different error and violation-provoking conditions. 
Observers recorded 12772 opportunities for error of which 68% were performed 
inaccurately. Nurses in the study hospital worked primarily unsupervised and under 
conditions with little access to essential equipment, training and support. Consequently, 
the nurses made many deviations from aseptic technique and good nursing practice, during 
the preparation of all observed intravenous products. In all cases, the doses were prepared 
without the required labeling, nurses started the administration of chemotherapy without 
checking the allergy status of the patient and none of the medication administration details 
were recorded in the patient medication file. In order to prevent errors reaching the patient, 
observers had to intervene and correct many manipulations including dose errors (17%), 
calculation errors (39%) and wrong sequence of administration (56%). It was necessary for 
observers to intervene in such instances, to prevent errors reaching the patient; however, 
a number of other errors were unpreventable because it became evident during the 
research that the nurses were poorly trained and had limited access to essential equipment 
and resources. Consequently, and in discussion with the project supervisors, the study was 
terminated prematurely on ethical grounds and the findings communicated to clinical 
managers. Hospital management decided that these findings may be used to design a 
targeted intervention aimed at improving nursing care and patient safety at the centre. 
Subsequently a multidisciplinary training team was charged with the design of a training 
course that included basic nursing procedures, aseptic manipulations, safety precautions 
and drug calculations. 
The current study is, to our knowledge, the first research which has used mixed methods to 
investigate errors associated with the administration of cytotoxic chemotherapy. Key 
strengths to this study are that it included both observation and CIT to identify the types 
and causes of medication errors which occurred during administration of cytotoxic 
chemotherapy on a chemotherapy day ward, in a developing country.  
Comparison of the results from the study hospital with error rates from other studies should 
be undertaken cautiously as data from those studies may be collected from different 




sources, and may hence have different findings. For example, data from the US analysed 
adverse events obtained from voluntary reporting systems among paediatric cancer 
patients and revealed that administration errors contribute to 15% of adverse events (Rinke 
et al., 2007). Furthermore, comparison with similar research is complicated by more issues. 
Firstly, there is little published research focusing on administration errors associated with 
the use of cytotoxic chemotherapy.  Secondly, study methodologies and settings are 
different. For example, Ford and colleagues (2006) analysed chemotherapy administration 
incident data from nurse incident reporting. In addition, most published research was 
conducted in western countries, where, chemotherapy preparation is undertaken under 
controlled conditions in centralized pharmacy units, and hence nurse preparation errors are 
not reported (Limat, 2001;White et al., 2014). Finally, when comparing with data that 
emerged from EMRO/AFRO region, further difficulties are presented. Studies have used 
different error taxonomies (Tavakoli-Ardakani et al., 2013), different methods (Nwozichi, 
2015) and some studied the administration of oral chemotherapy which involved a different 
procedure to intravenous administration and is primarily undertaken by untrained care-
givers (Oberoi et al., 2014). Nevertheless, findings from this study are disproportionate 
when compared with comparable research conducted in similar conditions. For example, 
findings from an Iranian study, where nurses prepared cytotoxics on open benches, 
reported that the error rate was 32.5% among 8322 opportunities for error involving 554 
doses (Tavakoli-Ardakani et al., 2013). The findings from this Iranian study are half of what 
was observed in the current study. 
Comparisons with findings from observational studies conducted with medicines other than 
cytotoxics are difficult because the published literature shows a wide range of errors (18-
90%) that can be up to 100% when aseptic procedure was assessed (Barker et al., 
2002a;Wirtz et al., 2003;Taxis et al., 2004;Cousins et al., 2005;Alsulami, 2013;Westbrook et 
al., 2011). These wide variations in reported error rates in the literature may be explained 
by the diverse definitions used for administration errors and the settings under study. One 
example, one of these differences is whether or not the researchers studied opportunities 
for error potentially leading to error rates more than 100%. Another example is the inclusion 
of nurse adherence to aseptic technique which has contributed to a greater number of 
medication errors (Kim et al., 2013). 
 




This study combined observation of nursing practice on wards followed by CIT interviews 
focusing on specific errors. Observations of nursing practice during the study revealed 
tangible problems in nursing practice and revealed the frequency and type of preparation 
and administration errors.  It was interesting to note that nurses continued to have 
consistent behavior despite being under observation and despite observers repeatedly 
intervening to correct practice and prevent errors reaching the patient. Hence, it can be 
inferred in this study that the Hawthorne effect had no impact because researcher 
observation did not appear to effect behaviour change (Pope et al., 1995). During CIT, 
nurses on most occasions were prompted to remember the error but on reflection gave 
detailed error accounts and described the error-provoking conditions. 
The direct observation method is primarily used for identification of active errors (Michel, 
2003) and near misses, enabling the design of targeted interventions (Kim et al., 2013). 
Observation is considered the gold standard in conducting research focused on identifying 
medication administration errors. Methods of observation have been previously validated 
in western countries, (Barker et al., 2002b;Taxis et al., 2003a;Wirtz et al., 2003;Keers et al., 
2013b) and continue to be used by researchers in this research area (Dougherty et al., 
2012;Keers et al., 2013b).  However, few such studies were identified in AFRO/EMRO 
countries with similar healthcare settings to the Sudan (Carpenter et al., 2010). A review of 
91 observation studies examining the frequency and causes of preparation and 
administration errors, identifies that most were conducted in western countries, with a 
small number of studies undertaken in Iran, Turkey and Malaysia (Keers et al., 2013b). 
Furthermore, studies that have emerged from the developing reveal little insight into the 
scope of the problem in the region. A review of 23 studies in Africa, Asia and South America 
identified only one observational study that investigated the re-use of syringes and 
inappropriate disposal of sharps in Cambodia (Carpenter et al., 2010). However, more 
recently, a number of studies have been published in the region (Acheampong et al., 
2015;Agalu et al., 2012;Koffuor et al., 2012). For example, Agalu and colleagues (2012), 
investigated medication administration errors in the ICU of a large Ethiopian hospital where 
intravenous medicines (other than cytotoxics) are prepared by nurses on open benches on 
wards, similar to the setting in the current study. Although the error rate (51.8%) was less 
than findings from the current study, it was significantly higher than those reported in ICUs 
in western countries (Tissot et al., 1999).  
The critical incident technique was used to interview nurses to explore specific errors and 
identify their causes. Analysis of these interviews, using Reason’s Error Framework, 




revealed that a combination latent factors and error provoking conditions were associated 
with the errors identified in the current study. The critical incident technique has been used 
recently, to identify potential causes of intravenous administration errors on a general 
medicine ward in the UK (Keers et al., 2015).  Keers and colleagues (2015) interviewed 21 
nurses from a UK NHS hospital using the critical incident technique to discuss medication 
administration errors involving the intravenous route. Similar to the current study, Keers 
and colleagues (2015) analysed findings using Reason’s Error Framework which identified 
that most errors were KBMs with a fewer number of violations. In their study, the causes of 
errors were due to environmental factors such as interruptions and busy work 
environments. Other factors were team related issues where there was lack of supervision 
compounded with poor access to reliable information and resources. This confirms some of 
the findings from the current study, however, more factors were identified to contribute to 
the errors. The main factors identified were lack of resources, an absence of work 
procedures with poor supervision in an environment of a work culture that had poor 
knowledge of safety issues. Such a wide range of latent factors have been reported in a 
study of medication errors occurring in obstetrics in Egypt (Kandil et al., 2012). Kandil and 
colleagues (2012) observed medical and nursing obstetric practice during labour of 10,000 
patients and found that 1976 errors occurred, of which 1222 (60%) were associated with 
administration of drugs. Although the setting was a labour ward rather than a 
chemotherapy day unit, similar latent errors were identified to those observed in the 
current study. The major contributing factors to errors were also poor resources, poor 
knowledge, team factors typified in lack of supervision and a general lack of safety culture.  
5.7.1 Types of preparation and administration errors 
The results from the current suggest that nurses consistently repeated the same 
chemotherapy administration errors regardless of which day of the week it is.  
The first significant finding of the current study was the regular deviations from aseptic 
practices where nurses were observed to touch the surfaces of vials and intravenous fluids 
during all manipulations. To ensure that intravenous medicines are aseptically prepared in 
a manner that minimizes risks of infusate-related bacterial contamination, it is generally 
recommended that a” no-touch” technique should be followed (Beaney, 2010). 
Furthermore, observers recorded complete non-adherence to infection control practices 
typified by lack of hand hygiene. Nurses routinely manipulated drugs and handled patients 




without washing or disinfecting hands before or after the procedure. Poor hand hygiene is 
typical of medical care in Sudan, although reported rates of HCW compliance (40-44%) from 
a tertiary care hospital (Kheder et al., 2011) and three dental units (Ahmed, 2011), are still 
better than the observed practices at the study hospital. More significantly, nurses in the 
current study seemed to only wear gloves over concern for personal safety with regards to 
occupational exposure to cytotoxics and appeared to regard hand hygiene as 
inconsequential. The nurses’ apparent concern over personal safety is comparable with 
oncology nurses in a US hospital where hygiene practices were better post procedure 
(72.1%) than before clinical procedure (41.7%) (Korniewicz et al., 2010). Errors involving the 
aseptic technique during preparation of intravenous drugs were reported in some of the 
early medication safety  research (Cousins et al., 2005), but recent reports show that aseptic 
techniques among nurses have shown improvements in comparison (Ghaleb et al., 2010). 
For example, an early study conducted in three hospitals across the UK, Germany and 
France showed that nurses in the UK hospital never washed hands or cleaned surfaces and 
only wiped vials in 1% of the times when preparing intravenous medicines (Cousins et al., 
2005), whereas work  conducted in a paediatric London hospital (Ghaleb et al., 2010), after 
publication of the NPSA alert 20 on safety of injectable medicines, reported a much lower 
rate of preparation errors, including aseptic technique errors (20.7%).  In contrast, work 
from EMRO/AFRO countries continues to report major deviations from hand hygiene 
practices and aseptic procedure during preparation of cytotoxics. A study conducted on an 
oncology ward in Iran reported that nurses never washed hands during 93% of the 
procedures involved in preparation of cytotoxics (Tavakoli-Ardakani et al., 2013). 
Poor hand hygiene and deviations from aseptic procedure during preparation and 
administration of intravenous medicines has major implications. Both are important 
components of infection control essential in the prevention of Hospital Acquired Infections 
(Allegranzi et al., 2011), prevent cross contamination from residues of cytotoxic 
chemotherapy  (Sessink et al., 1997) and reduce the risk of infusate-related blood stream 
infections (Curran, 2011).  The importance of hand hygiene, in particular, was highlighted 
by the WHO in their first global challenge “Clean Care is safer care” (Pittet et al., 2006). Non-
compliance with hand hygiene is a worldwide issue, particularly in less developed countries 
(Pittet et al., 2009), where the burden of disease takes priority (WHO, 2004a). However, 
little research has been undertaken demonstrating the detrimental effect of poor infection 
control methods during manipulations of intravenous drugs, particularly in resource poor 
countries. It is generally assumed that intravenous products are prepared for immediate 




use hence minimising the risk of infections. Nonetheless, bacteria have been isolated from 
intravenous infusions and injections prepared on wards, leading to fatal blood stream 
infections (Curran, 2011;Moore et al., 2005). The bacteria klebsiella pneumoniae was 
isolated from 65% of the glucose-containing infusions prepared by nurses on the bedside in 
a neonatal ICU in an Egyptian hospital (Moore et al., 2005). This contamination was linked 
to more than 50% of neonatal sepsis incidents at the unit. Subsequently, an intervention 
was designed to train nurses in the procedures and importance of hand hygiene and aseptic 
manipulations. A post intervention assessment after eight months showed zero levels of 
contamination in intravenous fluids, but outcomes on neonates were not reported (Moore 
et al., 2005). The potential risk for patients in the current study setting would be expected 
to be much higher because patients generally present with advanced disease (Hamad, 
2006). Additionally, these patients are more prone to infections due to several factors;  
malnutrition, poor personal hygiene (Pittet et al., 2006), disease and the toxic effects of the 
cytotoxic chemotherapy on the bone marrow (Nurgalieva et al., 2009). Moreover, the 
added risk of nurse exposure to cytotoxics has been demonstrated from  early studies in the 
UK, which showed measurable levels of cytotoxics on work surfaces where these drugs are 
manipulated (McDevitt et al., 1993).   
Another significant finding in the current study was that nurses did not use PPE required for 
prevention of occupational exposure during the manipulations of cytotoxics. Nurses were 
not provided with cytotoxic protection gowns, goggles and in a number of instances did not 
wear gloves or continued to wear torn gloves. The importance of wearing PPE to reduce the 
potential for occupational exposure from these hazardous drugs has been highlighted by 
several international oncology agencies (Carrington et al., 2010b;ISOPP, 2007b;HSE, 2003). 
Protection from occupational exposure to cytotoxics is a shared responsibility between 
employers and HCWs (HSE, 2003). Although the use of PPE is important when handling 
cytotoxics, ultimately, they do not offer best protection against bodily contamination if the 
operator prepares these drugs on open benches on the wards (Fransman et al., 2004). 
Better protection for HCWs has been demonstrated with the use of pharmacy based 
cytotoxic cabinets (Mason et al., 2005) and the use of closed injection systems on wards 
(Clark et al., 2013). As a minimum, international safety organizations recommend that the 
safe handling of cytotoxics requires the use of dedicated cytotoxic cabinets (ISOPP, 2007b). 
Furthermore, risk scoring for the observed medicines indicated that they should all be 
prepared in  a centralized pharmacy (Beaney, 2010).  




Observations revealed frequent disregard of the written instructions on medication 
administration charts. Nurses on 57% of occasions used cytotoxics in the wrong sequence. 
Wrong sequencing of cytotoxic medication has the potential to cause serious side effects to 
patients. For example if vinca alkaloids are administered after antimetabolites there is an 
increased risk of extravasation  (Allwood et al., 2002;Stanback et al., 2007).  Although little 
evidence from published studies identified wrong sequence errors during the 
administration of chemotherapy, a survey of 207 chemotherapy nurses reported that 
sequence errors do occur during chemotherapy administration (Ulas et al., 2015). Unlike 
the current study, only half the respondents reported being involved in sequence errors 
which were caused by heavy workload (Ulas et al., 2015). 
Labelling of the medicines, in the current study, was performed inadequately on all 
occasions. Ambiguous and poor labelling is considered a source of error associated with 
cytotoxics (Franklin et al., 2014). But on most occasions the labelling is performed in a 
centralized pharmacy unit or from manufacturers (Limat, 2001). Inadequate labelling of 
intravenous drugs prepared on wards may be considered an error (Franklin et al., 2009). 
Moreover, appropriate labelling is essential, particularly in the study hospital where the 
intravenous products are prepared beforehand and left on the patient bed to be 
administered later (Beaney, 2010). 
Other observed errors were dose errors (17%), wrong administration rate (40%) and failure 
to carry out an independent second check (92-95%) during intravenous medicine 
preparation. Dose errors and wrong rates of administration represent two of the three 
common error types reported in the literature, the third being wrong administration 
technique (Keers et al., 2013b). They are considered clinical errors with the potential to 
cause serious harm to patients (Westbrook et al., 2011) and hence required intervention 
and correction by the data collectors, in the current study, before they were administered 
to patients.   
5.7.2 Categories of active failures  
Active failures occurred due to KBMs linked to lack of knowledge and training in the use of 
intravenous medicines in general and cytotoxics specifically.  Unlike the evidence in the 
literature, KBMs occurred when nurses were working in familiar environments on routine 
tasks, with very little evidence of distractions. KBMs are commonly reported in medication 
error literature and can contribute to 79% of medication administration errors when 




working with unfamiliar drugs, complex technologies and drawing up small dose volumes 
(Taxis et al., 2003a). It can be argued that although KBMs are commonly associated with 
non-routine tasks, poorly trained HCWs can be involved in such mistakes when performing 
routine tasks because they lack the necessary skills and knowledge and are constantly 
required to identify solutions (McDowell et al., 2009). Findings from the study hospital 
identified only one slip that was associated with interruptions. However, data from 
medication error research show they are more common. A review of 55 administration 
error studies revealed that slips and lapses due to interruptions, high workload and 
confusion of “look-alike, sound-alike” medicines were reported in 53.7% of the studies 
(Keers et al., 2013a). Violations seemed to be common in the hospital under study because 
three of the critical incidents discussed in the interviews were attributed to a violation. For 
example, a nurse admitted that he deliberately flouted instructions on the infusion rate of 
intravenous medicines because he had no access to an infusion pump that allows him to 
accurately adjust the rate of infusions. Violations are common medication administration 
errors and are associated with poor knowledge, poorly designed protocols, lack of staff and 
insufficient supervision (Keers et al., 2013a). In general, violations occur from system errors 
where task-related guidelines are either unsatisfactory or inappropriately implemented and 
monitored (McDowell et al., 2009). 
5.7.3 Error-provoking conditions 
Nurse interviews revealed a number of interlinked factors which provided the environment 
that provoked the observed errors and violations. The majority of preparation errors 
resulted from the lack of resources and working guidelines pertinent to the appropriate 
preparation and administration of intravenous products. Nurses in the current study were 
observed to work under conditions where there was limited access to equipment necessary 
for their daily tasks.  For example, one of the nurses explained that she had a daily quota of 
three pairs of gloves, regardless of the workload. This meant that nurses had no option but 
to re-use gloves and may continue to wear gloves even when torn. Moreover, nurses had 
little access to pens used for labelling and no access to calculators essential for performing 
mathematical calculation required for deciding dose volumes and adjusting infusion rates. 
Although unrelated to the critical incidents discussed, most of the nurses admitted that they 
routinely washed and re-used syringes to reconstitute medicines or add medicines to 
intravenous fluids which are already being infused to patients. They resorted to this 




measure because there were frequent stock shortages of syringes in the pharmacy. 
Medicine and medical equipment stock shortages are common in Sudan and some essential 
medicines can be out of stock for up to 42 days (Cheraghali et al., 2009). In general, the re-
use of injecting equipment in medical practices is well documented and has been implicated 
in 20-40% of HIV in Africa and in the spread of malaria, Lassa virus, hepatitis B and C viruses 
(Simonsen et al., 1999;Schmid et al., 2004;Hauri et al., 2003). Estimates of unsafe injection 
use in Africa is almost 20%, presenting a source of significant public health risk (Hauri et al., 
2003). Interventions proposed by the WHO require national and organization level 
commitment and include promoting safe injection use through campaigns, effecting 
behaviour change and provision of disposable syringes (Kermode, 2004). Although the 
single use of disposable syringes has become a law in many developing countries  the WHO 
recognizes the challenges of this because many hospitals have limited budgets (Kermode, 
2004). Working under such limited resources means that nurses will have difficulty 
complying with good nursing practice essential for patient safety (Aveling et al., 2013). 
Nurses had no knowledge of whether national or hospital based policies and procedures 
were used at the study hospital. They stated that they observed the practice of senior 
colleagues to guide their daily work. This was confirmed in the current study in that 7 of the 
8 critical incidents were associated with poor nursing procedures. In the absence of task 
related policies and procedures, it was reasonable to expect a small degree of violations 
during the study, but the magnitude of habitual violations was unanticipated. Half the 
nurses interviewed admitted they routinely violated known nursing practices. For example, 
one nurse explained that although nurses were aware of the risk of bacterial contamination 
they routinely spiked infusion bottles to allow the intravenous infusion to flow faster. 
Another nurse admitted that he may not read the prescription details before preparing the 
medicines. Inadequate procedures have been linked to medication errors and violations of 
safe medication practices (Taxis et al., 2003a). An early survey of 45 small cancer units,  
conducted in the North East of England in 1993, revealed that nurses in most hospitals 
received no training and had no written instructions on the safe administration of 
chemotherapy (Woodman et al., 1996). Without the presence of task related policies and 
procedures it would be difficult to implement and audit safe practices (Cousins et al., 2005). 
Written policies and procedures are necessary for standardization of practice and the 
delivery of safe cancer care (Jacobson et al., 2009). However, the presence of procedures in 
themselves is not sufficient to ensure that medical care is safe (Cousins et al., 2005). In the 
context of cancer therapy,  the development of task related policies and procedures should 




be accompanied by training of HCWs and annual assessments as an assurance of 
competency (Pan London, 2011).  
Findings from the current study revealed that nurses received little formal training before 
or during their work in the study hospital. For example, a nurse who had no previous 
experience in cancer care was working unsupported with no induction or training on her 
second day of working. Training of HCWs who are charged with preparing and administering 
cytotoxics is essential for safe handling and delivery of safe medical care (Woodman et al., 
1996;Schulmeister, 2006) and is currently a requirement in a number of countries (Pan 
London, 2011;Jacobson et al., 2009). Nurses require knowledge and training to guide them 
in problem solving, judgement and diagnosis of patient issues, the lack of which leads to 
errors in planning and execution of essential patient care tasks (McDowell et al., 2009). 
Moreover, nurses act as the last barrier against errors in the medication process (Walrath 
et al., 2008) and without training, they are ill-equipped to identify and intercept errors 
before they reach the patient. National or local policies regarding nurse education have a 
positive impact on patient safety and nurse confidence and competence. For example, in 
the UK, subsequent to development and implementation of a Department of Health policy, 
improvements in nurse knowledge and confidence have been reported (Verity et al., 2008). 
A questionnaire among 255 nurses from 26 cancer hospitals in London revealed that more 
than 80% have received formal education and 86% have confidence in undertaking their 
assigned tasks (Verity et al., 2008).  
The importance of the latent factors, typified in poor resources, absence of training and 
policies and procedures as discussed by nurses, was confirmed in the findings of the current 
study. Nurses seemed to lack knowledge about performing a number of tasks in five of the 
critical incidents discussed in nurse interviews. An example was the inaccurate calculations 
which were reported in 39% of the observations. During the critical incident interviews, all 
the nurses admitted that they received no formal training in calculations and one nurse 
failed to accurately perform a dose calculation, during critical incident interviews. 
Calculation errors have been commonly reported in medication administration (Keers et al., 
2013a) but a review of the literature on medication administration errors showed no 
association with mathematical skills (Wright, 2010). Wright (2010) reviewed 33 studies and 
5 reviews on nursing administration errors which identified no evidence of a link between 
administration errors and nurses’ calculation and mathematical skill. Nevertheless, 
calculation skills are important because they are necessary for  the accurate preparation 




and administration of medicines (Lavery, 2011). Training in calculation skills are necessary 
for nurses working at the study hospital because they were identified as lacking.  
During three interviews, nurses admitted that they routinely omitted reading the 
prescription before preparing the drugs. This was confirmed in the observation study where 
reading the prescription was not performed in 41% of the observations. This omission may 
be linked to a culture of short cuts evident from nurses’ accounts where they intentionally 
violated written instructions. An explanation for this behaviour may be inferred from the 
uncontrolled work environment where nurses compensated for the defective conditions by 
adopting  a culture of “making do” (Dixon-Woods, 2010).  Nurses are responsible for 
ensuring that the prescribed medicines are appropriate for the patient and that the 
dispensed medicine matches the prescription (NPSA, 2010b). Thus, reading instructions is 
vital and failing to do so may be considered a violation which has implications for patient 
safety and nurse culpability (Weiner et al., 2008).  
It was evident from the nurses’ interviews in this study that team work was inadequate, 
because in five of the critical incidents supervision was apparently lacking. A student nurse 
and a new nurse were allowed to work unsupervised throughout the study period. 
Supervision of nurses during administration of cytotoxics is a  necessary requirement 
identified by standards published by the American Society of Clinical Oncology (ASCO, 2004) 
and  the Clinical Oncological Society of Australia (Carrington et al., 2010b). In UK hospitals a 
register of competent nurses who can work unsupervised is kept (Pan London, 2011). 
Supervisory support  is of particular importance to new and novice staff who have no 
previous experience (Dougherty et al., 2012) because they lack the problem solving skills 
necessary to ensure  patient safety during patient care (Reid‐Searl et al., 2010). Poor 
supervision has been implicated in errors in chemotherapy and non-chemotherapy 
associated administration errors (Keers et al., 2013a;Mehta et al., 1998;Anselmi et al., 
2007).  
5.7.4 Nurse culpability  
In view of the many system and organizational shortcomings identified from nurses’ 
interviews, unsafe acts were analysed using Reason’s culpability tree in order to ascertain 
whether the nurses were culpable for the errors (Reason, 1997). 
Unsafe acts caused by lack of procedures, training and unfavourable conditions and are 
likely to be repeated are due to system errors (Reason, 1997). Nurses on these occasions 




are not culpable for the unsafe acts because they are acting in the best interest of the 
patient (Khatri et al., 2009). On one of the incidents discussed during the critical incident 
interviews, the nurse adjusted the rate of intravenous fluid, inaccurately, because he 
perceived it was not possible for a 500ml intravenous infusion to take place over 30 
minutes. 
Errors where nurses violated standard nursing procedure would make the nurse culpable 
because it was reckless behaviour (Reason, 1997).  On the occasions where the nurse 
“spiked” the septum of an infusion bottle or routinely removed drugs by shaking empty the 
bags, a violation of common nursing procedure was apparent.    
5.7.5 Interventions identified from medication error literature 
In general interventions to correct medication administration errors, are either targeted at 
nurse training or involved the introduction of automation (Berdot et al., 2015). A recent 
review of such interventional studies revealed that many had limitations which included 
bias caused by lack of blinding to outcome assessment. The interventions included 
simulated training, pharmacist led training and automated dispensing systems. However, 
the authors reported that there was no evidence on the impact of interventions on 
improving administration errors (Berdot et al., 2015).  Nevertheless, safety agencies have 
recommended the use of automated systems and more importantly nurse training as a 
prerequisite to undertaking the preparation and administration of cytotoxics (NPSA, 
2010b). Nurse training is essential in any healthcare setting and particularly when handling 
cytotoxics which have the potential to harm both the HCW and patient. Moreover, training 
has been reported as an essential process to increase nurse confidence when dealing with 
these drugs (Verity et al., 2008).  Nurses revealed that educational preparedness and the 
presence of role models dispelled fears associated with cytotoxics (Verity et al., 2008).  
Culture change was possible in healthcare institutions through a multiple modality 
approach consisting of five components; system change, training and education, evaluation 
and feedback, reminders at the work place and institutional safety culture (Allegranzi et al., 
2007). The hand hygiene practices interventions suggested by the WHO in their “Clean Care 
is safer care” have been implemented successfully in a healthcare setting in Sudan (Ahmed, 
2011). One of the key factors driving the implementation of the project included enforcing 
leadership roles using motivation and financial incentives. Although the project author 




assessed change after three weeks of implementation, there was more than 100% 
improvement in hand hygiene from 44% to 94% (Ahmed, 2011).  
 There are no studies evaluating interventions targeting nurse calculation skills for dose and 
rate of infusion errors during medication administration (Berdot et al., 2015). Since nurses 
at the study hospital had no access to calculators, and limited formal knowledge in 
performing those mathematical skills, errors can be expected.  One potential intervention 
to address wrong dose errors identified in 17% of observations in the study hospital would 
be the referral of all drug manipulations to pharmacy. A UK study in an NHS hospital showed 
that pharmacy prefilled injections and infusions were 17 times more likely, to have the 
correct intended concentration of drug,  compared to those prepared by nurses on the ward 
(Adapa et al., 2012).  
5.7.6 Limitations of the current study 
There are several limitations to the methods used in the current study. First, medication 
error data were collected via observation methods with its associated limitations, 
principally the Hawthorne effect (observer effect on changing the behaviour of people 
when observed) and observer error. However, evidence from medication error research has 
shown that this had no significant effect on errors (Dean et al., 2001). Second, to obtain 
information on the causes of medication errors it was necessary to interview nurses, which 
meant that data were not generalizable. However, this was not the intention of the study 
and the exercise revealed that causes of errors are common and shared (Smith, 1998). Both 
methods have been used extensively in medication administration error research (Keers et 
al., 2013a;Keers et al., 2013b). Furthermore, combining both methods provided a more 
comprehensive insight into the aims of the current study.  Third, both the number of nurses 
and drugs observed was small in relation to some medication error studies (Ford et al., 
2006) but sample sizes of 100-1000 have been used in previous work (Keers et al., 2013b). 
Moreover, the sample size included in the current work was sufficient to collect worthwhile 
data. The initial plan was to collect data over a longer period, however the study was 
terminated due to ethical considerations. It would have been unacceptable to continue 
recording errors when it had been identified that both nurses and patients were at 
considerable risk from the factors associated with cytotoxic chemotherapy administration.   




5.8 Conclusions  
In conclusion, findings from the current study indicated that the quality of healthcare 
delivery in the study hospital was unsafe. Comparisons with studies conducted in similar 
settings show that the error rate at the study hospital was considerably higher. Although 
none of the preventable errors reached the patient during the study, this was because of 
interventions from the research team observers. Therefore, this suggests that such errors 
are likely to occur during normal routine work when it is unlikely that other HCWs would be 
present to correct or intervene in such errors.  Chemotherapy errors can be very serious 
(Cousins et al., 1994) and have been targeted as a priority by the UK NHS (NPSA, 2010a). 
The combination of poor nursing technique and the absence of formal guidance mean that 
errors are likely to continue to occur, jeopardizing patient safety, unless there is 
commitment to improved of care.   In general, conscience safe practice may be important 
in reduction of errors, but will not guard against the occurrence of errors, and hence a 
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6.1 Overview of Patient safety at a major cancer centre in Sudan 
The current study has revealed that patients receiving chemotherapy within the local cancer 
unit are at an unacceptable risk of harm as a direct result of the way medicines are 
prescribed and administered. This stems from a lack of patient safety culture within the 
organization. Ensuring that patient safety is seen as the priority in health care institutions 
in the Sudan continues to be a major challenge. Health policy in the country focuses on the 
need to provide equitable access to care (FMoH, 2007a) but it is the patients right that care 
is of sufficient quality and does not cause harm (Edwards, 2005). Harm from iatrogenic 
injury is not limited to any one country because evidence from both developed countries 
(Kohn, 2000) and developing countries has shown that healthcare is associated with 
significant harm to patients and is mostly avoidable (Wilson et al., 2012). The WHO defines 
safety as the prevention of healthcare related errors and adverse events to patients (WHO, 
2015). Research in patient safety has been heightened in the last decades in response to 
evidence of healthcare associated harm from high income countries (Kohn, 2000) and has 
shown that incidents associated with medicines play a significant role (Bates, 1999). 
However, important research gaps still exist; in particular, there is a lack of evidence about 
healthcare systems in developing countries, especially with regards to medication errors. 
This current research programme is among the first to try and address this lack of 
knowledge and has identified serious issues relating to a lack of patient safety culture 
manifesting in unsafe practice that has the potential to harm patients. 
 During the course of this work, three separate studies were conducted. The first examined 
safety culture at a major cancer centre in Sudan, while the second and third studies 
investigated the nature, frequency and causes of prescribing errors and errors associated 
with preparation and administration of cytotoxics.  
During the course of the study, observations, in depth interviews and focus group 
discussions were conducted with a total of 62 HCWs. Members from both the medical and 
nursing teams were the primary focus of this study, but they provided an indication of the 
prevailing culture at the cancer centre. 
Frequent and serious medication errors were identified during two stages of the 
chemotherapy process; prescribing and administration, some of which had the potential to 
cause serious harm if not death. Doctors and nurses of all grades made errors, so 
deficiencies in experience and knowledge can only partially explain the observed behaviour. 
For example, the frequency and severity of prescribing errors in the current study were not 




associated with the doctor’s level of experience, whereas some reports in the literature 
have shown that junior doctors as responsible for most errors (Dean et al., 2002a). The rate 
of administration errors was considerably high and the majority of prescribing errors (88%) 
would have resulted in serious harm to patients had pharmacists not intervened to rectify 
them.  
Interview and focus group participants reported violations and described errors that had 
resulted in patients requiring hospitalisation and extensive medical intervention. They also 
described punitive actions by both senior clinical staff and managers in response to 
incidents. Participants reported poor working environments with a lack of infrastructure 
that often resulted in healthcare staff working in under-resourced environments that 
routinely undermined error defences placing patients and HCWs at increased risk of harm. 
One example was the lack of PPE essential for protecting HCWs from occupational exposure 
to cytotoxics. 
Participant’s accounts indicated that they felt largely unsupported by management and 
senior members of the healthcare team and frequently ill-equipped with the necessary skills 
and training required to deliver high quality care for cancer patients. This was evident from 
the analysis of the psychological basis of the various unsafe acts, included in the critical 
interviews. For example, most of the unsafe acts discussed in the critical incident interviews 
associated with administration errors, were due to violations or KBMs, which is contrary to 
those reported in the literature where skill-based errors such as slips and lapses are more 
common (Keers et al., 2013a). The violations may be linked to poor staff morale, poor 
supervision and failure to reward compliance or sanction non-compliance (Reason, 1995). 
The presence of a relatively large proportion of KBMs in relation to skill based errors can be 
explained by the levels of human performance; skill based, rule based and knowledge 
based.  These hierarchical levels reflect decreasing familiarity with the task and the situation 
(Rasmussen, 1983). Knowledge-based performance occurs in situations which are novel to 
the HCW, requiring problem-solving and reasoning to decide a course of action. Hence the 
KBMs identified in the current study may be associated with limitations of HCWs in problem 
solving and may reflect inadequate training and preparedness to achieve task related goals. 
 Staff working at the study hospital displayed unhelpful professional boundaries and poor 
team working which, as reported by others, represents a clear threat to patient safety 
(Sexton et al., 2000). For example, four of the ten prescribing errors discussed in the critical 
incident interviews were associated with team hierarchies where junior staff are told what 




to do and felt unable to ask questions even when they were concerned that the action was 
wrong.  
Similar to the findings of the current study, these issues have been reported in relation to 
patient safety in literature emerging from developing countries (Aveling et al., 2015). A 
qualitative study involving in depth-interviews with over 50 HCWs from two different East 
African countries revealed that staff attributed their failure to deliver safe care to poor team 
relationships, lack of resources, and inadequate training (Aveling et al., 2015). 
6.1.1 Medication safety incidents 
In order to appreciate the patient safety issues associated with provision of care at the 
cancer centre, it was necessary to have an insight into the activities and processes practiced 
by HCWs during the prescribing, preparation and administration of cytotoxic 
chemotherapy. Accordingly, ethnographic interviews were used to map these processes 
prior to undertaking the studies described in chapters 4 and 5. Findings from these 
qualitative studies revealed inconsistencies among HCWs in the manner in which the care 
process was conducted. Subsequent work, in the current study, identified a number of 
patient safety incidents associated with prescribing and administration of cytotoxics. 
Although all of the incidents identified, were prevented and did not reach the patient, they 
provided an indication of the patient safety systems at the cancer centre.  It has been 
proposed that although incidents that result in harm reveal the patient safety risk in the 
system, identification of prevented incidents reveal the inherent flaws in that system 
(Reason, 1997). This assumption confirms that identification of prevented incidents enables 
the systematic analysis of adverse event causation and reveals the weaknesses “holes” in 
the defence layers against patient harm (Reason, 2000). 
6.1.1.1 Prescription incidents 
The prevented prescribing error rate was 10% (chapter 4), of which more than three 
quarters had the potential to cause serious patient harm. In line with studies in similar 
settings (Alsulami, 2013;Mathaiyan et al., 2015), this thesis revealed that hand-written 
prescriptions were vulnerable to errors. Evidence from the literature has recognised that 
hand written prescriptions depend on the prescriber’s individual ability to recall the many 
elements required to complete a prescription for chemotherapy. This is likely to result in 
individual doctor’s interpretation of complex treatment regimens, transcription errors from 
treatment plans and omission errors (Dinning, 2005). Standardisation of prescribing using 




standard prescription templates can result in a significant decrease in prescribing errors 
(Ranchon et al., 2012). However, the potential harm associated with the errors identified in 
the current study were not comparable to similar published research. For example, in an 
Indian cancer hospital, researchers reported the most common errors were omissions with 
very low potential to cause patient harm (Mathaiyan et al., 2015). Mathaiyan and colleagues 
(2015) analysed 1500 cytotoxic chemotherapy prescriptions issued to cancer patients in a 
day unit of a cancer centre in India. The error rate was over 280% but errors were mostly 
associated with omissions of patient data, the use of brand names and abbreviations. Unlike 
the findings of the current study, only 12% of errors had the potential to cause patient harm 
(Mathaiyan et al., 2015). 
6.1.1.2 Preparation and administration incidents 
Findings from the research presented in this thesis reveal there are substantial flaws in the 
system followed in the preparation and administration of cytotoxics, exposing both patients 
and HCWs to unjustified risks. None of the medicines observed were prepared or 
administered correctly, therefore the error rate for preparation and administration of 
cytotoxics was 100%. Even though, this finding raises considerable concern, it was more 
disconcerting that HCWs involved seemed to have no knowledge of appropriate procedures 
and hence errors were repeated consistently. All the errors which had the potential to harm 
patients were intercepted and corrected by the observers. This may imply that during 
normal working days, errors can go undetected, potentially leading to patient harm. These 
findings are not corroborated by the evidence in the literature, from both high income 
countries (Keers et al., 2013b) and developing countries(Alsulami, 2013). A review of 91 
studies conducted in high income countries revealed that 53% of intravenous doses were 
involved in an error (Keers et al.). Whereas, another review of administration error studies 
undertaken in countries from the EMRO region revealed that up to 50% of medicines 
administered were involved in errors (Alsulami, 2013). 
6.1.1.3 Factors influencing errors 
Respondents, when prompted were able to provide detailed accounts of the working 
environment at the time errors occurred.  Active failures identified in the current study were 
influenced by and interacted with a number of latent failures. Participants reported 
violations and described slips and mistakes that occurred in their workplace. The causes of 
these active failure were complicated by an interplay of multiple factors involving a 
substantial lack of infrastructure necessary for the provision of basic medical care, 




inadequate organizational design, adverse environmental factors, task factors, patient, 
individual HCW and team factors. For example, nurses were not provided with adequate 
resources required for the safe preparation of hazardous intravenous cytotoxic 
chemotherapy. There were consistent shortages of gloves and syringes which meant that 
nurses, re-used gloves and re-used syringes, placing both themselves and the patient at 
considerable safety risks.  The current research identified that professional boundaries and 
poor team work, contributed to errors, an issue previously identified to affect other 
healthcare organizations (Sexton et al., 2000). A survey of more than 1,000 nursing and 
medical staff from 12 hospitals across five countries ( 3 European, USA and Israel), working 
in surgical theatres and  ICUs revealed that half of staff felt that team hierarchies prevented 
disclosure of errors (Sexton et al., 2000). Participants, in the current study, described actions 
by senior members of staff and management which they considered threatening and 
demeaning. Structures of authority and accountability were described by staff as not always 
transparent and hence functioning inadequately. Participants’ accounts demonstrated that 
they were largely unsupported by management and senior members of the healthcare team 
and frequently felt they did not have the necessary skills and training required to deliver 
high quality care for cancer patients. For example, a junior doctor was given the task of 
prescribing cytotoxic chemotherapy with little previous knowledge and with no access to 
information about the names of drugs and the supportive therapy required. Consequently, 
there was low morale among a number of participants and fear of punishment, if they were 
found to be involved in errors. HCWs were working in conditions where a number of 
elements essential for ensuring both their safety and that of patients were absent. 
The current research demonstrates that there are some factors common to other hospitals 
in high income countries.  Although the nature of hazards that threaten patient safety are 
not entirely similar (Bates et al., 2009), it is likely that the origins and solutions to these 
issues is shared whether it is a developing country or developed country (Aveling et al., 
2013). Although detrimental effects on patient safety could in part be attributed to poor 
resources, the study hospital, shared similar problems with other healthcare institutions, 
rooted in human factors, resources, culture and behaviour (Dixon-Woods, 2010). 
6.1.2 Patient safety culture at the cancer centre 
During the course of this study focus groups using the patient safety culture tool (MaPSaF), 
elicited the views of members from the nursing, pharmacy and medical teams about the 




safety culture at the cancer centre. This specific study was important, because there was a 
need to identify the safety systems at the study hospital. However, health care institutions 
in developing countries, including the study hospital, are likely to have inadequate 
information systems (WHO, 2010), and hence conducting quantitative methods such as the 
use of questionnaires would have produced limited results. Moreover, this study provided 
the opportunity to benchmark the safety systems at the study hospital against external 
organizations and to identify areas of concern. Finally, previous research has shown that 
the act of undertaking a safety culture assessment in itself improves the awareness of HCWs 
about patient safety issues (Nieva et al., 2003). Focus group participants consistently rated 
the ten dimensions of the MaPSaF at the lower levels because, according to their accounts, 
there was little priority given to quality, no investment in patient safety training and poor 
communication when an error occurred. In contrast, research in other countries in the 
AFRO/EMRO region (Mayeng et al., 2015;Webair et al., 2015) rated some dimensions of 
patient safety culture as ‘mostly acceptable’ (Mayeng et al., 2015;Webair et al., 2015). A 
study in South Africa, where healthcare resources are inadequate and medical errors are 
common, was undertaken using a modified a questionnaire version of the MaPSaF. The 
questionnaire was distributed among 200 HCWs from different teams and achieved a 72% 
response rate. Unlike the current study, most respondents rated the patient safety culture 
at their hospital as acceptable (42.4%), good or excellent (43.1%) with a minority rating the 
safety culture as poor or failing (14.6%). These differences in perception between 
healthcare staff in South Africa and Sudan, may be attributed to the presence of incident 
reporting systems at the South African study (Mayeng et al., 2015). 
Poor resources, inadequate organizational systems and unsafe environments have an 
undeniable effect on patient safety. Reason (1998) argued that system failures act as traps 
which attract HCWs into repeated patterns of unsafe acts. The presence of these traps is 
necessary for erroneous behaviour but does not provide sufficient explanation for the 
underlying motive. It is argued that the motive for these errors is the poor safety culture of 
the healthcare institution (Reason, 1998). Safety culture is fundamental in providing safe 
health care (Gandhi et al., 2016) and is said to exist when HCWs are informed about the 
level of safety, engaged in reporting errors which are then managed in a just manner. The 
healthcare team hierarchies must be flexible and have the ability to adapt and re-configure 
when dealing with errors and staff should learn from errors, make appropriate conclusions 
and implement changes to prevent those errors in the future (Reason, 1997). 




HCWs from the three professions, in the current study, were aware that errors occurred but 
they generally viewed them as isolated incidents without the realisation of the breadth of 
the problem. Formal incident reporting systems were seemingly absent according to 
respondents’ accounts and when incidents were reported, they followed a sporadic and 
unsystematic manner. The absence of a reporting system meant that HCWs were not in a 
position to learn from their own errors or those of their peers. HCWs were uninformed 
about errors and error prone-situations and hence errors were repeated by all staff 
regardless of the level of experience or education. Many of the doctors and nurses were 
ultimately working hard to deliver highly complex medical care to cancer patients, but it 
was apparent that many had come to think of medical errors as inevitable and potentially 
un-manageable. More significantly, common mistakes that stemmed from small 
incremental deviations from safe practice become normal practice (Hughes et al., 2010). 
This inevitability led to the normalisation of errors where common mistakes became 
acceptable, and consequently such incidents were considered not worthy of reporting 
(Dixon-Woods, 2010). This deviant behaviour is a considerable potential risk to patient 
safety (Ramsay et al., 2014), as confirmed by the high proportion of potential harm 
associated with prescribing errors in one of the studies conducted as part of this research 
(Chapter 4). Similar findings were described in a report by Sir Francis (2013) relating to poor 
quality at the Mid Staffordshire NHS Trust (MSFT Public Inquiry, 2013), as: 
“a culture of habituation and passivity” (Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust 
Public Inquiry 2013 pp26) 
Findings from this study showed that an informed culture where errors are reported and 
learned from was absent. These findings are similar to previous research conducted in the 
AFRO region of the WHO. A questionnaire survey was conducted among 128 nurses in an 
oncology hospital in Nigeria (Nwozichi, 2015) which identified that although nearly 90% of 
nurses had been involved in cytotoxic chemotherapy errors, none were reported to the 
national or hospital incident reporting system (Nwozichi, 2015).  
Moreover, findings from the current study revealed that errors were generally regarded as 
the responsibility of the individual involved and reporting only occurred informally and in 
some instances these were either ignored or the person involved reported and then 
punished by the organization. Furthermore, it was revealed that fear of blame was 
prominent and tangible as respondents explained that disclosure of errors could damage 




professional reputations and lead to retribution. This may also explain the difficulty in 
recruiting participants to the study.  
Participants almost invariably ascribed the causes of errors to other people e.g. nurses, 
junior doctors or managers etc. When seeking to manage errors, respondents found it 
logical to concentrate on people management through re-training, exhortations to be 
careful next time and increasing financial incentives.  It was evident that HCWs at the study 
hospital viewed people as capable of choosing between safe and unsafe acts, thus error 
management was more of a reactive set of activities which focused on the active failure 
rather than the latent conditions. One reason for this, could be “the fundamental 
attribution error” where managers and senior medical staff identify human actions, rather 
than situational or organizational contributions as the cause of errors (Reason, 1997). 
Individuals are seen as having the will and ability to prevent errors. Consequently, errors 
are managed with warnings, threats and sanctions which have little or no effect upon the 
error-producing situations. Hence, errors continue and HCWs are seen as deliberately 
flouting authority, leading to a “blame cycle” (Reason, 1997). It is these factors that combine 
and drive the blame cycle (Figure 6-1). In the presence of the overwhelming culture of 
blame, a just culture was absent. The presence of a blame culture was documented as a 
significant barrier to error reporting in western countries (Aronson, 2009) and countries 
from the AFRO/EMRO region (Mansouri et al., 2014). There has also been documented 
evidence of high punitive actions in response to errors (Aboul-Fotouh et al., 2012). An 
Egyptian survey, using the AHRQ questionnaire, of patient safety culture among more than 
500 HCWs from nursing, pharmacy and medical teams, revealed that 80% of participants 
regarded punitive action to errors as an issue, resulting in perhaps the relatively low score 
(33%) of reporting incidents. Furthermore, patient safety scores for junior members of staff 
were significantly lower than those of senior members (Aboul-Fotouh et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, HCWs in the current study revealed that they felt unable to intervene if they 
observed their senior peers making an error. The participants in this study reported 
incidents where strict team hierarchies were evident. In a number of incidents, the study 
participants felt helpless when observing errors or when forced into erroneous behaviour 
by senior members of their team. Furthermore, they considered that teamwork within their 
unit and across units was not conducive to patient safety.  
 






















6.2 The impact of errors on cancer patients 
The cost implications in providing additional care to patients affected by medical errors is 
substantial (Pronovost et al., 2012;Ranchon et al., 2011). A study conducted in a 1200 bed 
hospital in France, analysed more than 6,000 cytotoxic chemotherapy prescriptions for 
errors, over a course of 12 months. The authors identified an error rate of 5.2%, which was 
in line with other previously published studies (Gandhi et al., 2003). They estimated that 
patients affected by medication errors can require up to 210 extra days of hospitalisation, 
which may cost nearly 100,000 Euros to cover hospitalisation and additional drug 
interventions to manage harm associated with those errors (Ranchon et al., 2011). In Sudan, 
the cost of extra care would likely be a burden on the patient, because once discharged 
Human actions are 
viewed as the least 
constrained causes of 
accidents, and hence 
the most avoidable. 
Why? People are seen 
as free agents, able to 
choose between correct 
and erroneous actions. 
Since errors are 
regarded as partly 
deliberate, they attract 
blame. 
Such measures are 
ineffective and so 
errors continue to 
be implicated in bad 
events. Actions thought to be 
blameworthy are 
dealt with by 
warnings, sanctions 
and demands to be 
“more careful in 
future”. 
Errors are now 
regarded as being 
even more 
blameworthy, since 
they seem to ignore 
warnings, sanctions 
and exhortations. 
Figure 6-1 The elements of the blame cycle (Reason 1997 pp 128) 




from the cancer hospital, most community and secondary care would incur out of pocket 
expenditure, which may in itself act as a barrier to care seeking (Kronfol, 2012). 
Furthermore, patients receiving cytotoxic chemotherapy are at an increased risk for 
suffering harm due to medication errors due to the inherent toxicity of the medicines used. 
The National Cancer Institute Common Toxicity Criteria, lists 750 ADRs caused by the use of 
cytotoxics some of which may require hospitalisation or have the potential to result in death 
(Trotti et al., 2003). This is of particular concern since, at the time of this study, in a country 
of nearly 2,000,000 square kilometres, (FMoH, 2007a) there were only two institutions 
where Sudanese patients could access cancer care, one of which was the study site (Saeed 
et al., 2014). This meant that patients would travel to the city to receive treatment and most 
likely return to their homes which could be isolated with poor access to medical care 
(Ibrahim et al., 2011). It is likely that patients suffering ADEs following a medication error 
might not have access to or might not seek medical care, partly due to a low literacy rate of 
35% (Hammoud, 2006) and poor health education (FMoH, 2007a). Evidence in maternal 
health has shown that care seeking behaviour in Sudanese patients is dependent on level 
of education (Ibnouf et al., 2007) and poor health outcomes are positively linked to illiteracy 
(Ali et al., 2011). The outcome of medication errors associated with cytotoxic 
chemotherapy, in Sudan, is unknown, because evidence has shown that medical records are 
deficient in cases of death and hospital admissions (WHO, 2010;Abdalla et al., 2007). Hence, 
it is likely that harm as a result of a medication error associated with cytotoxic 
chemotherapy in the setting of the current study, would not be reported. Patients affected 
are likely to have little access to healthcare and may suffer serious consequences to their 
health. 
6.3 Implications for practice  
This thesis has identified major obstacles to patient safety which underscore the need for a 
multi-faceted approach that targets active failures, organizational deficiencies and 
institutional infrastructure. In low income countries, the decision-making process during 
planning quality improvements, has to be based on sound local strategies that optimise the 
injection of new resources (Bengoa et al., 2006). However, there is little research in similar 
settings that investigate the effect of the different interventions which have been shown to 
be effective in high income countries (Rowe et al., 2005).  




It is clear that deficiencies existed in the quality of healthcare provided at the cancer centre 
under study. More worryingly, HCWs looked to others to guide them in their daily work. 
Since the prevalent norms were seemingly well below the expected standards of quality 
care, this attitude could lead to important negative consequences (Donabedian, 2002). 
Substandard levels of care will become the norm and HCWs will no longer be able to 
distinguish practices that have the potential to cause AEs (Donabedian, 2002). 
However, it has been recognised that deficiencies in personal performance are permitted 
by a defective system (Donabedian, 2002). Health systems have the ultimate responsibility 
to make care safer for patients because this is both a public health priority and a human 
rights issue (Wilson et al., 2012). The role of leadership in providing safer healthcare systems 
is key to its success. In the report “To err is human- Building safer health systems” the 
authors stated: 
“The committee believes safety must be an explicit organizational goal that is 
demonstrated by clear organizational leadership and professional support as seen 
by the involvement of governing boards, management, and clinical leadership” 
(Kohn 2000 p161) 
 The need for overall improvement cannot be contested and to undertake this effort, one 
needs to adopt a robust evidence based model as a framework. Avedis Donabedian has 
proposed a basic framework in which to consider quality improvement efforts. He proposed 
that quality can be classified under three categories (Figure 6-2); structure, process and 
outcome (Donabedian, 1978). Where structure represents the material resources, human 
resources and organizational structure available at health facilities. Process includes the 
action undertaken to deliver care and comprise the HCWs determining the diagnosis and 
delivering treatment as well as the patient seeking care. Process is seen as having a more 
direct impact on outcomes than structure. Finally, outcome means the effect of care on the 
health of a patient. Although not easy to assess or link outcome to process, it is likely that 
poor processes of care leads to detrimental effects on the health of patients (Donabedian, 
2002). Although it was beyond the scope of the current study to identify the outcomes of 
errors on patients, it was likely that, outside this study, some errors were not prevented, 
and patients were harmed. Figure 6-2 is an illustration of how the identified deficiencies 
impacted on the quality of care at the cancer centre. 
 
















6.3.1 Structure  
Donabedian identified that structure is the major determinant of quality of care and can 
hence be seen as the driving force of process (Donabedian, 2002). Glickman and colleagues 
argued that the attributes of structure are beyond the physical resources in an organization 
but includes organizational capabilities such as leadership, culture and organizational design 
(Glickman et al., 2007). It can hence be deduced that patient safety culture can be regarded 
as an integral attribute of structure. 
In this study setting, structure was reported to be lacking in a number of attributes.  Firstly, 
there were reported inadequate provision of equipment required for delivering a standard 
cancer service. Secondly, the HCWs received minimal training and hence lacked the 
expertise to work in a specialist cancer centre. Thirdly, the organizational structure was 
deficient in safety requirements such as the lack of clearly written procedures of work. 
Finally, the apparent absence of incident monitoring, learning from incidents, poor team 
work and the use of punitive action when dealing with errors, meant there was a lack of 
patient safety culture. Hence, the substantial deficiencies in structure at the cancer centre, 
























• Quality  
• Error 
reduction 
Figure 6-2 Quality of care provided at the cancer centre based on Donabedian model (adapted from Glickman et al 
2007 p 342) 




6.3.1.1 Provision of resources 
Few of the barriers to patient safety identified by staff can be overcome without the 
engagement of leadership from government, to provide resources and to re-enforce 
obligation towards staff well-being and patient safety (Aveling et al., 2015). Although, not 
sufficient on their own, additional resources are fundamental to achieve patient safety 
improvements at the cancer centre. However, the economic and political perspective of the 
country must be considered. Similar to its neighbours, Sudan is classified as a low-middle 
income country and the proportion of public spending on health is among the lowest at 
6.5% (WHO, 2013b). Hence, there is a need for sourcing or re-allocating extra funding to the 
healthcare section. Additional funding is traditionally obtained from partnerships with high 
income countries, international health agencies and the global fund who usually work with 
countries to improve the health outcomes of their citizens. Funding from the global fund to 
poor countries such as Rwanda, have achieved substantial infrastructure improvements 
which have contributed to a reduction in mortality associated with communicable diseases 
such as malaria, HIV and Tuberculosis by up to 90% (Farmer et al., 2013). However, the 
political scenario in Sudan is a deterrent to accessing these resources. The country is 
controlled by a military dictatorship and has been identified, by the US government as a 
supporter of international terrorism and consequently sanctions were imposed in 1997, as 
a means to exert pressure on the government to abide by international law (Hamid, 2012). 
Sanctions were used in the post- cold war era as an alternative to military action but have 
extended in this situation beyond military embargos and currently restricts both economic 
trade and humanitarian aid. Consequently, the economy of the country has been adversely 
affected with a direct impact on health expenditure. Furthermore, pharmaceutical 
companies, in alliance with the US, have ceased trading with Sudan and hence cannot 
extend their corporate responsibility to the country. The consequent disruption in 
procurement of drugs and equipment necessary for provision of health has led to severe 
degradation of the health services including cancer care (Hamid, 2012). The politics involved 
in imposing sanctions have so far not succeeded in their goals, and may hence be considered 
ineffective and immoral, particularly when the effects touch the lives of the most 
vulnerable; the sick (Smith, 2004). Given the current circumstances, there is no doubt that 
the solution requires internal efforts. Mainly, relocation of funds is necessary to procure 
equipment required for patient care, improve the skills of both management and HCWs to 
achieve improvements in patient safety. However, attention must also be directed to 
improving the staff working conditions and morale. Similar countries in the region have 




prioritised healthcare expenditure and increased public spending in health to 20% of Gross 
Domestic Product, achieving better health infrastructure (Farmer et al., 2013).   
6.3.1.2 Culture 
Current thinking, regarding the concept of patient safety, places the prime responsibility for 
adverse drug events on deficiencies in organizational factors such as flaws in system design 
and processes rather than individuals (Khatri et al., 2009). The current study has identified 
a need for a culture change, when dealing with errors. The fundamental component of this 
culture change is the willingness to openly discuss concerns about the delivery of care in a 
manner that identifies failures and leads to appropriate conclusions regarding their 
management (Frankel et al., 2003). In order to achieve this, two issues must be addressed, 
incident reporting and action towards errors. Incident reporting provides an opportunity to 
analyse errors, identify their causes and design strategies to eliminate or mitigate those 
errors. The benefits on patient safety, of incident reporting regarding medication errors 
associated with the use of chemotherapy can be illustrated by one example.  Vincristine 
chemotherapy is commonly used and has been associated with a number of fatal events 
when administered intrathecally rather than intravenously. UK policy was changed so that 
vincristine should now be prepared as a minibag infusion rather than in a syringe. This 
simple design solution, along with improved labelling, provides an additional step to alert 
healthcare professionals that vincristine should only be administered via the intravenous 
route (Noble et al., 2010). To date, no vincristine deaths associated with intrathecal 
administration have been reported to the Department of Health since this policy change 
(Franklin et al., 2014).  
The WHO recommends that incident reporting is integrated into healthcare and there is 
evidence that this has been addressed in Sudan (Wilson et al., 2012). However, there appear 
to be issues with implementation of incident reporting because this was not seen at the 
study hospital. The national scheme proposed by the WHO, could be augmented by a local 
incident reporting system at the cancer centre. An example of a simple, low cost system 
was described by Womer and colleagues (2002) during early safety improvements at a 
major cancer centre in the US. They designed an incident reporting form and asked HCWs 
to report errors by filling the forms and dropping them into specifically designated boxes 
placed around the hospital (Womer et al., 2002). The authors reported an increase in 
incident reporting by more than 100% over one year, which they attributed to ease of use 
of the system, anonymous reporting and non-punitive reporting. Findings from this early 
work, confirms the importance of a blame free culture in response to errors.  




Most errors observed in the current study, were errors committed by well-meaning HCWs, 
best dealt with by focusing on improving systems rather than people (Bradley et al., 2012). 
However, during the course of this study, violations to best medical practice and some 
reckless behaviour that would inevitably result in patient harm, were observed and 
described by participants. For example, the nurse who neglected to dispose of syringes and 
sharps in designated containers, may be held accountable for their actions. Failure to 
comply with simple safety measures such as not sharing syringes, adhering to 
chemotherapy guidelines and writing prescriptions after appropriate review of laboratory 
data, may not be appropriately managed using the no blame approach. In most healthcare 
settings, finding the right balance between accountability and no blame is challenging and 
even more so in the current setting, where political power dictates who takes decisions, 
hindering the legitimacy and accountability of the organization (Bradley et al., 2012). Hence 
the question is not how to punish the nurse who throws sharps on the floor, but what 
happens when they wilfully and habitually ignore safety rules despite education, system 
improvements and training in clearly written procedures (Wachter et al., 2009). Therefore, 
the management of these situations must be just.  
Implementation of a low cost intervention such as incident report monitoring has the 
potential to impact positively on safety culture at the cancer centre. This is supported by 
qualitative work conducted by Abdallah (2011) in a cardiac hospital in Sudan. The author 
implemented the WHO surgical safety checklist in cardiac surgery, which resulted in better 
teamwork, increase in HCW perception of patient safety  and improved patient safety 
culture (Abdallah, 2011). 
6.3.1.3 Specialist equipment for preparation of cytotoxics 
One of the major findings of the current research was the significant error rate observed 
when nurses prepared and administered chemotherapy. It is of concern that without the 
presence of observers, all these errors would have reached patients and it is likely that these 
errors continue to occur. Furthermore, nurses and other hospital workers not directly 
involved in the preparation of these drugs were put at increased risk for harm from spills of 
cytotoxics. This area had been previously identified as a priority for service development by 
the pharmacy department, at the study hospital. Through concerted efforts and advocacy, 
three positive pressure isolators were procured, however, they are currently only used to 
prepare high dose chemotherapy for paediatrics. The use of centralised pharmacy 
preparation of chemotherapy has been described in the last quarter of the twentieth 




century (Anderson et al., 1983) and is recommended as a risk management tool by 
international oncology bodies (ISOPP, 2007b). Centralisation of preparation of cytotoxics 
has achieved many benefits, with reduction in risk to both patients and staff (see Chapter 
5). The controlled environment in pharmacies provides the appropriate conditions to 
prepare cytotoxics which reduces the risk of error in comparison to the clinical environment 
of wards (Anderson et al., 1983;Beaney, 2010). Furthermore, the use of these systems has 
achieved lower environmental contamination and personnel exposure in comparison with 
preparation on open benches (Connor et al., 2002). However, a large investment is required 
for the running of an appropriate clean room facility is not achievable in Sudan. In Kenya, 
an oncology pharmacy department has reached a compromise by installing cytotoxic 
cabinets in secure rooms without the recommended and costly aseptic environment 
(Strother et al., 2012).  The authors described a multifaceted intervention that included 
standardisation of chemotherapy protocols using cost effective methods, bulk purchasing 
of drugs, training staff and safe disposal. Although, they have not published quantitative 
data of the impact of their intervention on patient and staff safety, they did report that 
immediate benefits were achieved in reduced occupational exposure to staff and patients, 
reduced cost and controlled waste disposal (Strother et al., 2012). Hence, a pragmatic 
decision must be reached by pharmacy and hospital managers, at the study hospital, to 
optimize the current equipment in preparation of cytotoxics. 
6.3.1.4 Standardisation of prescriptions 
Another target for intervention identified by the current study, and one that may be 
achieved at relatively low cost, is the use of pre-printed prescription templates. Although 
CPOE has been adopted by a significant number of cancer centres in developed countries, 
it is not entirely without faults (Meisenberg et al., 2014;Huertas Fernandez et al., 2006;Kim 
et al., 2006;Kozakiewicz, 2005;Voeffray et al., 2006). However, it has the potential to reduce 
errors and harm significantly. A study carried out in a cancer centre in the USA has shown 
that introduction of CPOE reduced prescribing errors by more than a half and serious errors 
likely to cause harm by one quarter (Meisenberg et al., 2014). Such interventions must be 
contextualised according to the capabilities of the setting (Bates et al., 2009). CPOE requires 
substantial capital investment (Doolan et al., 2002) which is lacking in cash strapped 
countries such as Sudan. A simple intervention which has a proven record of success and is 
low cost, is the use of pre-printed prescription templates. Pre-printed prescriptions ensure 
that the content of prescriptions are comprehensive and the format is consistent, legible 
and standardised (Ehringer et al., 2008 ). Their use in cytotoxic chemotherapy has shown 




benefits associated with error reduction, particularly those related to omission errors 
(Dinning, 2005).    
6.3.2 Processes 
A further target for intervention, identified by participants, was the lack of work based 
procedures and guidelines. Furthermore, the types of errors were common and were 
committed by members of all teams regardless of their experience or training. It is likely 
that staff committed errors in many instances because they had no formal guidance on how 
to perform the process of care. Procedures and guidelines based on best evidence and 
essential for standardisation of care were not accessible at the study hospital. 
Consequently, staff appeared to improvise and use their own knowledge which may have 
been outdated. The lack of access to guidelines and procedures has been reported in 
another Sudanese hospital (Siddiqi et al., 2012). An assessment based on the WHO Patient 
Safety Friendly Hospital Initiative in a teaching hospital in Sudan, revealed that although a 
number of SOPs have been developed, they were not implemented and hence they were 
not accessible to staff (Siddiqi et al., 2012).   
A simple strategy to improve the quality of the process of care is to introduce routinization 
which could be achieved by introduction of policies, procedures and guidelines 
(Donabedian, 2002). SOPs are an essential requirement for the provision of cancer care and 
the prescribing and administration of cytotoxic chemotherapy (ASHP, 2002;Carrington et 
al., 2010a) . The development of SOPs and guidelines can significantly reduce errors 
(Carrington et al., 2007), but they have to be accompanied by intensive training and auditing 
(Rowe et al., 2005). Findings from studies conducted in Sudan and other countries of low 
income have shown that simple dissemination of guidelines is ineffective (Salih et al., 2014). 
In their survey of 218 children diagnosed with pneumonia, at a children’s hospital in Sudan, 
Salih and colleagues (2014) identified that although WHO pneumonia guidelines had been 
adopted by the Sudanese Paediatrics Association, a low adherence , less than 20%, was 
observed.  However, in a neighbouring country (Kenya), a study investigating the feasibility 
of implementing family planning guidelines, revealed that guideline implementation was 
possible through multifaceted dissemination that included, face to face training, training of 
trainers, provision of printed materials and supervision from trained leaders from the 
ministry of health (Stanback et al., 2007). Improvements in process can be achieved at 
relatively low financial input, through the commitment and concerted efforts from the 




ministry, hospital leadership and those involved in direct patient care i.e. doctors, nurses 
and pharmacists to undertake development, implementation and monitoring of local 
guidelines and procedures.  
6.4 Recommendations 
The findings from this research and the conclusions made, strongly support the following 
recommendations. These recommendations are a set of short term and long term 
interventions made with a view to influence hospital leadership, HCWs and policy makers, 
in terms of service development and the integration of patient safety systems. The UK 
Medical Research Council guidance for the development of complex interventions in 
healthcare advocates the use of theory in intervention design (Craig et al., 2008).One such 
theoretical framework, the Behaviour Change Wheel (BCW), has been specifically 
developed to inform the design of interventions in healthcare (Michie et al., 2011).It 
consists of three layers (Figure 6-3). At the core of the BCW is a model of behaviour known 
as the COM-B, and thought to inform behavioural targets for intervention. This model 
hypothesizes that the interaction between an individual or group’s capability (C), 
opportunity (O) and motivation (M) influences behaviour (B)- COM-B (Michie et al., 2014). 
The capability of an individual or a group of people may be physical e.g. skills or 
psychological e.g. the knowledge or psychological skills. Opportunity, on the other hand, 
may be physical such as the resources or environments necessary for the behaviour or social 
such as the cultural norms that influence patterns of thought. Motivation maybe reflective 
such as self-conscious intentions or automatic such as impulses and reflexes. Surrounding 
this core, is a layer of nine intervention functions, most likely to achieve behavioural change 
or a specified intervention strategy. The outer layer consists of seven types of policy that 
can be used to deliver the identified intervention functions.  
The BCW has been widely used to design healthcare interventions in both the western world 
(Sinnott et al., 2015) and in developing countries (English et al., 2009). 





Figure 6-3- The Behaviour Change Wheel (Michie et al, 2014 p. 18) 
 
The current thesis has identified the problems that had the potential to cause identified 
medication errors. Evidence from research literature reviewed within the current thesis, 
clearly identifies the behavioural targets (interventions) required to reduce medication 
errors and improve patient safety. These behavioural targets or interventions will form the 
basis of the recommendations and will be linked to the COM-B model. 
The findings of the current work point to four interventions that are required to reduce the 
risks associated with cytotoxic chemotherapy. These are; centralisation of chemotherapy 




preparation, standardisation of chemotherapy prescribing, incident reporting and 
standardisation of care. Using the COM-B model, these interventions have been inked to 
intervention functions and policy categories (Table 6.1).  
The first intervention is based upon reducing the risk of unsafe preparation of cytotoxic 
chemotherapy. The findings strongly indicate that preparation of chemotherapy on the 
wards constitutes a safety hazard for patients, nurses and other HCWs in the cancer 
hospital. Therefore, on the basis of these findings, an intervention to reduce this risk is a 
priority which requires immediate attention. Hence, the first intervention to centralise the 
preparation of cytotoxics in the pharmacy department. Using the COM-B model, this 
intervention was coded as opportunity and capability and linked to intervention functions; 
environmental restructuring, enablement and training (Table 6-1).  In order to avoid the 
prohibitive cost of building an aseptic clean room, a pragmatic approach may be adopted, 
which optimises the use of the currently available isolators (Physical Opportunity). The 
isolators are placed in a safe locked room, with uncontrolled air inflow but with a high level 
of cleanliness aiming for Grade D EU GMP standards (ISOPP, 2007b). It is envisaged that the 
process of centralisation of all intravenous cytotoxic chemotherapy preparation would 
require retraining and increasing the current pharmacy workforce (Physical Capability). In 
order to ensure the success of this intervention, short term and long term policy changes 
are required. Hence, the MoH are required to deliver the financial support and technical 
support required to set up the unit, train some of the available staff and create new jobs to 
provide the necessary workforce to operate the cytotoxic preparatory unit (Service 
Provision). In the long term, sustainability of this intervention can be assured by legislating 
the handling of hazardous substances within healthcare settings (Legislation) and the 
introduction of guidance that regulate the practice of healthcare staff dealing with cytotoxic 
chemotherapy (Regulation). 
The second set of interventions relate to the prescribing process and are targeted at doctors 
responsible for prescribing cytotoxic chemotherapy. The findings from the current study, 
revealed a large proportion of prescribing errors with the potential to cause serious/ 
significant harm to patients and some with the potential to cause life-threatening harm. The 
prescribing process was not standardised and the majority of these errors may be 
eliminated if the doctor had access to a specific set of information pertinent to safe 
prescribing of cytotoxic chemotherapy. Hence, it is recommended that chemotherapy 
prescribing is standardised. Using the COM-B model, this intervention was coded to 
opportunity and capability and linked to intervention functions; restrictions, training and 




persuasion (Table 6-1). Handwriting of chemotherapy should be restricted by means of 
creating a set of comprehensive standard prescription templates (Restrictions). The 
purpose of these templates is to standardise prescribing and provide doctors with the 
necessary information. For example, the prescription template would contain the pre-
requisite laboratory investigations for prescribing chemotherapy, their limits and 
recommended dose modifications in situations where the patient has developed toxicities. 
Hence, doctors would be able to quickly identify laboratory values beyond the acceptable 
limits and modify chemotherapy doses accordingly. To enable this intervention, both the 
clinical and administrative leadership at the hospital are required to develop competency 
based training packages that provide both new and existing doctors with the necessary 
information required for prescribing chemotherapy (Training).  Implementation of the 
intervention requires that doctors who are given the task of prescribing cytotoxic 
chemotherapy are encouraged to complete training aimed at improving their prescribing 
and to ensure they are competent to achieve the tasks given (Persuasion). The success of 
this intervention can be achieved by regulating the practice of HCWs involved in prescribing 
chemotherapy through the introduction of a policy that limits prescribing to competent 
staff (Regulation). 
The third intervention is concerned with incident reporting systems at the cancer hospital 
and is targeted at the hospital administration, HCWs in direct contact with patients and the 
MoH. This research clearly identified that errors were common and repeated by all 
healthcare teams at all levels of experience and knowledge. The extent, nature and possible 
solutions to these errors are not shared with members of the healthcare team, and hence 
errors recur. It is therefore, recommended that in the short term, an anonymous incident 
reporting system is developed. Using the COM-B model, this intervention was coded to 
behavioural functions; capability and opportunity and linked to intervention functions; 
coercion, training, and incentivisation (Table 6-1). This would involve development of a 
simple pre-printed form available at nurse stations, doctors’ offices and the pharmacy. 
These forms should be composed of tick boxes which would enable HCWs to complete 
without fear of disclosure and hence ensures anonymity (Coercion). Staff should be trained 
to complete a form by hand and place them in designated boxes situated in patient care 
areas, in the event of an error or and AE (Training). However, the presence of an incident 
reporting system requires an accompanied feedback mechanism to be established 
(Incentivisation). Healthcare teams are required to create a feedback mechanism where a 
nominated member of staff collects the incident reporting forms, analyses the content and 




presents them at periodical meetings (monthly or quarterly), which may initially be 
arranged according to individual healthcare teams (nurses, doctors and pharmacists). HCWs 
at all levels would be encouraged to attend these meetings in order to discuss solutions to 
the errors. It is envisaged that implementation of this anonymous system would support 
development of a mature patient safety culture at the cancer hospital. In order to achieve 
a patient safety culture, this intervention should be scaled up to the national level, whereby 
future MoH policy requires the creation of an independent body that collates, analyses and 
reports on patient safety incidents (Guidelines). 
Finally, the last intervention is related to standardisation of care, and is directed, in the short 
term, at the administrative and clinical leadership of the study centre and in the long term 
at the MoH. The findings of this study showed that there were considerable variations in 
the processes followed during the delivery of care at the cancer hospital. Pharmacists, 
nurses and doctors were unaware of the presence of SOPs at the cancer centre, a factor 
which may have contributed to the errors identified in the current study. Hence, a 
multidisciplinary team should be created to develop the SOPs required to deliver care 
during the chemotherapy process. Using the COM-B model, standardisation of care can be 
coded to psychological capability and linked to intervention function reflective motivation, 
enablement and modelling. In order, that SOPs are effective, they should be accompanied 
by a multi-modal implementation process (Grimshaw et al., 1993;Stanback et al., 2007). 
Hence, the SOP development team is charged with the dissemination of material required 
to inform staff about SOPs (Modelling). The effectiveness of SOPs and their modification 
relies on auditing of practice (ASHP, 2002). Hence, a multidisciplinary team responsible for 
auditing and regular updating of SOPs should be appointed (Enablement).    In the long term, 
the MoH would be required to create a body which monitors the implementation of SOPs 
(Legislation).




Table 6-1- Linking COM-B components to intervention functions 
Intervention 
strategy 







 Design an EU-GMP grade D room for preparation 
of cytotoxic chemotherapy 
Physical opportunity Legislation: 
 Introduce legislation on the safe handling of 
hazardous materials 
Service provision:  
Provide financial resources required for design of 
chemotherapy preparation unit 
Enablement: 
 Increase staff numbers  
 
Physical capability Service Provision: 
Create jobs for pharmacy staff 
Training: 
 retrain pharmacists in preparation of cytotoxic 
chemotherapy 
Physical capability Regulation:  
Regulate the practice of staff handling and dealing 
with cytotoxic chemotherapy 
Enablement: 









Table 6 1- Linking COM-B components to intervention functions (ctd) 
Intervention 
strategy 








Design standard pre-printed chemotherapy 
templates and restrict the use of hand written 
prescriptions 
Physical Opportunity Regulation: 
 Introduce policy which regulates prescribing of 
chemotherapy and limits the process to competent 
healthcare worker 
Training:  
develop competency based training packages 
that provide both new and existing doctors with 




 Encourage doctors to complete training aimed at 










Table 6 1- Linking COM-B components to intervention functions (ctd) 
Intervention 
strategy 
Intervention function Behavioural targets 
using COM-B 
Policy categories 
Incident reporting  Coercion: 
Anonymous incident reporting forms 
Physical Opportunity Guidelines:  
Create a national body to monitor patients 
safety incidents and share information on 
safety risks 
Training: 




Analysis of incident reporting 
Social Opportunity 
Incentivisation: 




Reflective Motivation:  





Create a body to oversee the 
implementation of healthcare based SOPs 
Modelling: 
 Distribution of SOPs among HCWs 
Enablement: 
 Guidelines for auditing of SOPs 





6.5 Limitations to the study 
This study has limitations as it was conducted in one cancer hospital in Khartoum, and the 
extent to which the findings are generalizable could not be tested within the scope of the 
current study. The study site, however, is one of two cancer centres in the country and is 
unlikely to be atypical in terms of structural characteristics or patient safety risks. Given the 
national funding problems, many of the issues relating to the procurement of equipment 
and staff training are likely to apply to other healthcare facilities. 
The use of qualitative methods has inherent weaknesses as discussed in chapters 3, 4 and 
5. However, methods used in developed countries based on patient records cannot be 
employed in a data poor country such as Sudan where the WHO has recommended, 
prospective qualitative methods as a means to study patient safety (WHO, 2010). 
Another limitation to the study was the recruitment of a small number of participants in the 
critical incident interviews. The recruitment process was hampered by staff fears of possible 
retribution if they discussed errors. The study was explorative and the results were not 
intended to be generalisable, but a larger number of participants would have allowed 
deeper analysis. 
Finally, members from the hospital administration and the ministry were not included in 
the current study. This would have allowed some of the assumptions made, following the 
views of HCWs in direct patient contact, to be confirmed. This was not possible at this stage, 
due to the oppressive nature of management at the time of the study. Furthermore, parallel 
research in developing countries has been based on the views of HCWs in direct contact 
with patients (Aveling et al., 2015). 
6.6 Further work 
This thesis has highlighted the risks associated with prescribing, preparation and 
administration of cytotoxic chemotherapy at one cancer centre and suggested 
recommendations and interventions to improve patient safety. The acceptability of 
interventions may be assessed through consultations with other stakeholders such as senior 
management, clinical team leaders and members from the MoH. The process of behaviour 
change identified in the current study can be achieved and sustained through the 




aggregation of small changes. Once, the interventions are shown to be acceptable, a series 
of pilot work can be used to implement each intervention in a stepwise fashion. Scaling-up 
of each intervention would require the consideration of the local context and health policy 
before widespread implementation. Hence, future work could revolve around assessing the 
impact of such the recommended interventions on patient safety. A number of future 
studies can emerge from this work. 
Firstly, the incident reporting scheme could be evaluated using root cause analysis to 
identify contributory causes to errors and provide a feedback to staff. Secondly, the 
implementation of SOPs may be assessed using auditing and focused interviews to assess 
acceptability and identify factors contributing to instances of non-adherence. Finally, the 
study may be repeated to investigate the impact of these interventions on patient safety 
culture and medication errors. 
6.7 Summary 
Patients receiving cytotoxic chemotherapy at a major cancer centre in Sudan were at 
considerable risk of being harmed due to their treatment. The risks in patient safety at the 
hospital are manifested in the lack of patient safety culture, the occurrence of common 
medication errors in both prescribing and administration of chemotherapy and the high 
potential clinical significance of those errors. 
It is envisaged that implementation of some of the low-cost solutions outlined in the 
recommendations would be financially and technically feasible and would dramatically 
improve patient care. Behaviour change is a lengthy process but is possible through the 
commitment of frontline staff and those responsible for both administrative and clinical 
leadership. The recommendations, described in this thesis have the potential to improve 
patient safety culture at the study hospital and hence improve the medication error rate 
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Appendix 1-  Approved list of chemotherapy protocols at study hospital 
 
Chemotherapy Protocols Approved for use at RICK 
Breast Cancer Protocols: 
Anthracycline Based Therapies-  FEC- 5Fluorouracil, Epirubicin, 
Cyclophosphamide 
 FAC- 5Fluorouracil, Doxorubicin, 
Cyclophosphamide 
 AC- Doxorubicin, Cyclophosphamide 
Taxane Based therapies- AC-T, Paclitaxel x 4 followed by Doxorubicin, 
Cyclophosphamide x4 
TEC- Docetaxel, Epirubicin, Cyclophosphamide, 
TAC- Docetaxel, Doxorubicin, 
Cyclophosphamide 
Single Agent Therapies-  Vinorelbine, Docetaxel, Carboplatin, Paclitaxel, 
Gemcitabine 
CMF- Cyclophosphamide, Methotrexate, 
5Fluorouracil D1 and D8 
Gastrointestinal- 
Fluoropyrimidine based therapies- De-gramont- 5fluorouracil, Folinic Acid over 48 
hours, FolFox- 5 Fluorouracil, Folinic Acid over 48 
hours, CapeOx- Capecitabine, oxaliplatin, 
GemOx- and 5Fluorouracil, mitomycin. 
Gemcitabine combination Gemcitabine, Oxaliplatin 
Cisplatin Combination Paclitaxel, Cisplatin, 5Fluorouracil 
 ECF- Epirubicin, Cisplatin, 5Fluorouracil 
Single agent Oxaliplatin, Gemcitabine, 5 Fluorouracil 
Head and Neck- 
Cisplatin combination- Cisplatin, 5Florouracil  
Cisplatin, docetaxel, 5Fluorouracil 
Cisplatin, docetaxel 
Gynaecologic Cancers 
Cisplatinum Combination-  5FU Cisplatin, Cisplatin Paclitaxel, BEP: 




Taxane Platinum doublet-  Paclitaxel carboplatin 
Single agent-  Cisplatin, Paclitaxel 
Others Choriocarcinoma trial 
Haematological Malignancies 
Lymphoma protocol ABVD: Doxorubicin, Bleomycin, Vinblastine, 
Dacarbazine D1 and D15 
CHOP: Cyclophosphamide, doxorubicin, 
vincristine, prednisolone 
COP: Cyclophosphamide, vincristine, 
prednisolone 
Lung Cancer 
Platinum Doublet carboplatin vinorelbine and carboplatin 
gemcitabine 
Cisplatin combination cisplatin gemcitabine, and Paclitaxel Cisplatin 
Taxane doublet Paclitaxel gemcitabine and docetaxel 
gemcitabine 
Taxane Platinum doublet Paclitaxel Carboplatin  
Single agent Carboplatin 
Sarcoma 
Ifosfamide combination AIM -Doxorubicin, Ifosfamide, Mesna 
MAID- Doxorubicin, Ifosfamide, mesna and 
Dacarbazine 
Cisplatin combination   Doxorubicin and cisplatin  
Single Agent Gemcitabine 
Urological Cancers -  
Single agent-  Docetaxel and prednisolone 
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 ytefaS tneitaP retsehcnaM-erutluC ytefas tneitap otni yduts yrotarolpxe nA
 krowemarF
 
  الالتزام الشامل للتقدم المستمر -1
 كل فى مجالات الممارسة المثلى.الا توجد أى مداخلات مستثمرة فى التعرف على المش -A
              ان وجدت اى مراجعة ينقصها الهيكلة وليس هناك استجابة .                                                                         
 ت بروتوكولات أو أى انظمة فهى تخدم مصلحة المؤسسة فقط ولا يوجد تحديث لهذه البروتوكولات والسياسات.اذا وجد  
 وفرق الرعاية الصحية فى الهيئة. الادارة يتم  تجاهل الرعاية النوعية الضعيفة وهذا المفهوم يطلق على مستوى 
  
تحدث المراجعة فقط  ن خلال الزيارات التفتيشية .أو م يطور الاطار العام للتقدم المستمر استجابة لتوجيهات محددة -B
استجابة لحادثة محددة وبتوجيهات من السلطات الوطنية ولا تعكس الاحتياجات المحلية. وهناك محاولات غير واقعية تتم 
 استجابة لنتائج أي مراجعة.
لا يتم مراجعة هذه السياسات الا استجابة لحادثة يوجد الحد الادنى من البروتوكولات والسياسات وجميعها قديمة وغير مستخدمة و
 معينة.
 تطوير بروتوكولات وسياسات جديدة يحدث استجابة لحادثة معينة أو ردا على شكاوى واردة. 
 
 نشاط ادارى يقاد من خلال خطوط خارجية.ى عملية التقدم وهم ينظرون اليها كلعاملين فى الخطوط الامامية ليس لهم دور فا -C
لكثير من عمليات المراجعة ولكن ينقصها ربط الاسترتيجية العامة مع الاحتياجات المحلية والتنظيمية. يتحمل العاملون يحدث ا
 والتى تراجع وتحدث بانتظام، ولكن نادرا ماتنفذ.كبيرا مع البروتوكولات والانظمة  عبئا
 ة حقيقية. رة أكثر من كونها مشاركك خدمة ظاهلالمشاركة فى مواضيع الجودة ولكن تيجوز للمرضى والجمهور ب
 
من أجل التقدم المتواصل. كما هو معروف بأن التقدم المتواصل هو  المؤسسهانحاء هنالك رغبة وحماس حقيقين فى جميع  -D
 مسئولية الجميع وبأن المنظمة بكاملها والتى تشمل المرضى والعامة معنيين بهذه المسئولية.
 ة ادائها مع المراكز الاخرى.كزمتميزة يتم مقارنتكون مرا تهدف هذه الهيئات أن
تضمين الاطباء الممارسين وملكيتهم لعملية المراجعة يؤدى الى التقدم المتواصل. تطوير البروتوكولات والسياسات ومراجعتها 
-قرارات الداخليةتتم من قبل العاملين ويتم استخدامها كاساس فى الرعاية  والخدمات. يشارك المرضى والجمهور فى اتخاذ ال
 وهذا مما يجعلها مراكز خدمية تركز على المرضى.
 
 اساس اتخاذ القرار على كل المستويات. وهو المؤسسه  غرس ثقافة التقدم المتواصل داخل  -E
وم الفرق وتعتبر المؤسسة مركز للاداء المتميز نتيجة للتقييم المتواصل للاداء مقارنة بمثيلاتها داخل وخارج الخدمة الصحية. تق
 بتصميم اجراء المراجعة بالتركيز على الناتج وبالتعون مع المرضى والجمهور.
يكون العاملون فى يقظة تامة لاحتمال وجود مخاطر على السلامة.وهذا يعنى تقليص الحوجة للبروتوكولات والانظمة مع مرور 
الى أن سلامة المريض تكون دائما ذات اولوية فى  الزمن عندها تصبح الممارسة المبنية على البرهان هى عامل طبيعى اضافة







  الاولوية للسلامة -2
 
 تعطى اولوية بسيطة للسلامة -A
يجيات واللجان ولكن بدون مردود حقيقى. المؤسسة لا تعطى المخاطر الخاصة هناك بعض انظمة ادارة المخاطر مثل الاسترات
 لها حيث يعتقدون أنه فى حالة وقوع أى حادثة تهدد سلامة المريض فان شركات التأمين سوف تكفلهم.
 
عدا اللايفاء تصبح السلامة ذات أولوية فقط عند وقوع حادث ولكن فى بقية الوقت تكون الخدمة مجرد حديث فى الموضوع  -B
 بالمتطلبات القانونية
هناك اثبات ضعيف فى تنفيذ استراتيجية ادارة المخاطر .تناقش السلامة فى مجلس المؤسسة بعلاقتها بوقوع حادثة معينة كل 
 الاجراءات هدفها الحماية الذاتية وليس حماية المريض.
 
تتكامل مع منظور المريض) فى مكان الحماية.لكن  السلامة لها أولوية مرضية وهنالك انظمة عديدة (وتشمل تلك التى -C
هذه الانظمة ليست معممة على العاملين ولا تراجع. وتفتقر المرونة فى الاستجابة للاحداث غير المرئية وتفشل فى 
 التفاعل مع الامور المعقدة.
 ثقافة مفروضة  مسئولية ادارة المخاطر تستثمر فى شخص فردى لا يضمنها فى الهيئة الواسعة. مما يجعلها
 
ترتقى السلامة داخل الهيئة ويكون العاملين فيها نشيطين فى الاشتراك فى أمور السلامة وعملياتها. المرضى والجمهور  -D
والهيئات الاخرى يشاركون فى ادارة المخاطر ومراجعتها. التدابير المتخذة تهدف لحماية المرضى ولا تهدف للحماية 
لى نحو استباقى باستخدام تقييم المخاطر المنظورة واتخاذ الاجراءت اللازمة لاداراتها.هنالك الذاتية.يتم تحديد المخاطر ع
حدود واضحة للمسائلة وحتى حين يأخذ أحد الافراد الريادة فى فى سلامة المرضى فى المؤسسة، وهذا هو الجزء 
 الاساسى فى دور كل الاداريين.
 
 
وينظر لمسؤلية السلامة كجزء من دور كل الافراد ويشمل ذلك المرضى السلامة لها الاولويه القصوى فى المؤسسة  -E
 والجمهور. يقيم العاملون المخاطر وينظرون للتقدمات الممكنة.سلامة المريض من الامور الساخنة 
لديهم فى كل المؤسسة وتغرس فى ممارسات كل  العاملين ابتداءا من مجلس الادرة والمدراء الى فرق الرعاية الصحية الذين 
احتكاك يومى مع المرضى، وذلك يشمل موظفى الدعم واشتراك المريض فى امور سلامة المريض ومراجعته لها مؤسس بطريقة 
 مثلى. 
 
 أخطاء النظام والمسئوليات الفردية -3
 يتم النظر الى الحوادث بأنها سوء حظ وخارجة عن سيطرة المؤسسة، وتحدث نتيجة لاخطاء العاملين أو سلوك المرضى. -A
 توجد ثقافة لوم قوية فى المؤسسة ويعرض الافراد لاجراءات توبيخية ولوم.
 
 
تنظر المؤسسة الى نفسها كضحية للظرف. وينظر للافراد كسبب ويكمن الحل فى اعادة التدريب والاجراءت الجزئية.  -B
 عند وقوع الحادثة ليست هناك محاولة لدعم الجهات المعنية بما فى ذلك المرضى وأقاربهم.
 
 
هناك اعتراف بأن الانظمة تساهم فى الاحداث وليس الافراد فقط.وتقول الؤسسة بأن لها ثقافة الانفتاح العادل ولكن  -C
العاملين لا يشعرون بهذا.بروتكولات الانفتاح والانغلاق كتبت للتأكد من أن العاملون والمرضى وراعو المرضى 




من المقبول أن الحوادث هى عبارة عن مزيج من أخطاء الافراد والانظمة. الؤسسة لها سياسة انفتاح تعاونية.  ويتبع  -D
حادثة تهدد سلامة المريض، تحليل للانظمة لاتخاذ القرار بشأن عوامل الانظمةوالافراد والتى لها علاقة تساهمية مثل 
قرار الحدث.وهذه العملية تخدم اتخاذ القرارات. عند توقيف العاملين وهناك نهج عادل وثابت فى التعامل .........شجرة 
مع أمور الموظفين بعد وقوع الحوادث. الؤسسة صريحة ومنفتحة مع المرضى ومقدم رعاية المرضى عند وقوع حادثة 
 انواع الحوادث. الحاق أذى أدت  الى الحاق أذى جسيم أو موت، ولكنها لا تناقش كل
 
يتم ملاحظة فشل النظام ويكون الموظفين على دراية تامة بمسؤلياتهم الشخصيةفيما يتعلق بالاخطاء والتبليغ بذلك. تمكن  -E
 الانظمة المتكاملة فى تحليل الحوادث التى تهدد سلامة المريض والشكاوى والدعاوى القضائية
  لهم دعم من بداية الحادثة. المؤسسة لها مستوى عالى من الانفتاحالعاملون والمرضى وأقربهم يتعاونون بنشاط و   
والثقة. المؤسسة أيضا منفتحة ومخلصة مع المرضى ومقدمى الرعاية نحو جميع أنواع حوادث المرضى بغض النظر عن مستوى 
 الضرر الواقع.
 
  تدوين الحوادث وأفضل السبل لذلك -4
الؤسسة فى حالة جهل تام الا فى حالة وقوع حادثة خطرة أو استلام توجد أنظمة مخصصة للتبليغ عن الحوادث ولكن  -A
 رسائل من المحامين.
 تسود المؤسسة ثقافة اللوم العالية حيث يتعرض الافراد للاجراءات التأديبية ويصبحون ضحية للنظام.
معلومات دقيقة ولكن لا يتم هنالك نظام تبليغ للحوادث غير ناضج، ولكن الموظفين لا يشجعون للتبليغ عن الحوادث. تجمع  -B
 تحليلها.
هناك ثقافة لوم وعليه يكون الموظفين مترددين فى التبليغ عن الحوادث. عندما تقع الحوادث، ليست هناك محاولة لدعم الذين 
 يشملهم الحادثة.
. هناك محاولات يوجد نظام مركزى للتبليغ عن الحوادث من غير الحاجة الى معرفة المبلغ ويركز على تعبئة الاستمارات -C
بغرض تشجيع الموظفين والمرضى للتبليغ عن الحوادث (ويشمل ذلك الحوادث التى منعت أو التى منعت أو التى لم تؤدى 
الى أى أضرار) على الرغم من ذلك فان الموظفين لا يشعرون بالامان والمرضضى لا يشعرون بالارتياح عند التبليغ عن 
صادر أخرى لمعلومات السلامة جنبا الى جنب مع تقارير الحوادث (مثل المراجعات هذه الحوادث.   تعتمد المؤسسة م
 والشكوى).
 
التبليغ عن حوادث سلامة المريض على كل المستويين المحلى والوطنى (مثال نظام القومى لتقديم التقارير والتعليم)  -D
 وينظر له كفرص تعليمية. 
 مرضى سهلة، وتسمح اختيار الاتجاهات المختلفة.يوجد أساليب تبليغ ودية للموظفين وال       
الموظفون يشعرون بالاطمئنان عند تبليغ كل الحوادث التى تهدد سلامة المرضى ويشمل الحوادث التى يمكن                    .         
 تجنبها. الموظفون والمرضى ومقدمى الرعاية مدعمون منذ لحظة التبليغ.
المريض عند الموظفين أمر طبيعى( ويشمل ذلك الحوادث التى لم تؤدى الى أضرار أو التى التبليغ عن حوادث سلامة  -E
منعت) وللموظفين ثقة فى عمليةالاستقصاء ويتفهموا قيمة التبليغ لكل من الانظمة المحلية والقومية(مثال النظام القومى 
 لتقويم التقارير والتعليم).
 ؤسسة تعليمية وفيها أنظمة متينة لتدوين الممارسة المثلى ومكملاتها.يشجع المرضى بالتبليغ عن الحوادث. وهى م
 
 تقييم الحوادث والممارسة الجيدة -5
توضع الحوادث والشكوى تحت البساط ما أمكن. ويتم التحقيق فى الحوادث بطريقة سطحية بواسطة صغار المدراء بهدف قفل  -A
ط عدا الاجراء الاداري (المحاكمة على الملأ) ومحاولات الموضوع و تجمع معلومات التحقيق وتخزن ويؤخذ اجراء بسي
 التصدى للاعلام . فى هذه المؤسسة هناك اعتراف ضئيل بسلامة الممارسات الجيدة.
 
توجه التحقيقات بهدف الحد من الاضرار فى المؤسسة وتوزيع اللوم على الافراد. التحقيقات سطحية وتركز على حالة  -B
 معينة وأفعال فردية.






 كبار المدراء يشاركون فى التحقيق والذى يكون فى نطاق ضيق ويتم التركيز فيه على الافراد والانظمة. -C
جراء مفصل لعملية التحقيق، والتى تشمل تعبئة استمارات عديدة ولا يجري التحقيق الى حد ما المحيطة بالحادث. هناك ا       
 لفحص جذور المشكلة ودعم من يشمله الحادث ولكن كاجراء اداري ولاسترضاء المرضى ومقدمى الرعاية.
 الموظفون يحفزوا لمراجعة الاجراءات وكيفية تنفيذها ولكن عملية التعليم متضاربة.
سسة مفتوحة للاستفسارات وترحب بالمشاركة الخارجية للتحقيقات من أجل تحقيق نظرة مستقلة. الموظفون المطورتين المؤ -D
 فى الحوادث يتم شملهم فى التحقيق لتحديد جذور المشكلة والقضايا التى فى الواجهة.
 سع.الهدف من التحقيقات هو الاستفادة والتعلم من الحوادث ونشر النتائج على نطاق وا
تستخدم البيانات منةتقرير الحوادث فى تحليل الظواهر، تحديد النقاط الساخنة ودراسة الاثار المترتبة على التدريب. وهى مؤسسة 
 منفتحة ذات نظرة مستقبلية.  
 المرضى يشاركون فى عملية التحقيق ورؤيتهم وتجربتهم وتوصياتهم مطلوبة.
الصعيدين الداخلى والخارجى وتشمل الموظفين والمرضى المعنيين. وينظر تجرى المؤسسة تحقيقات مستقلة للحادث على  -E
الى التحقيقات فى الحوادث كفرص للتعلم وتركز على التقدم وتشمل توصيات المرضى . تراجع عملية تحليل الحادث 
 بطريقة منهجية ويتم مراجعتها بانتظام بعد التشاور مع الموظفين.
ركة فى جميع انحاء المنظمة وعلى المستوى القومى. هى مؤسسة تعلم كما يتضح من الالتزام التعلم من الممارسة الجيدة مشت
 للتعلم من الحوادث فى جميع المستويات من المجلس وكبار المدراء ومن خلال فرق الرعاية الصحية وموظفى الدعم.
 
 التعلم واحداث التغير -6
 ضها جهات خارجية مثل المساءلات الحكومية.من الحوادث عدا تلك التى تفر لا تبذل محاولات للتعلم -A
الهدف بعد الحادثة هو تغطية التقصير وحماية المؤسسة. وتعتبر المؤسسة أنها قد نجحت عندما تصبح وسائل الاعلام عديمة 
 المعرفة بالحادث. لا يتم أى تعديلات عقب الحادثة بغض النظر عن تلك الموجهة الى الافراد المعنيين.
التنظيمى ولو قليلا وما يحدث يكون ذو علاقة لدرجة الاضطراب الذى تضرر منه كبار الموظفين. وجميع  يوجد التعليم -B
 التعليم مخصص كحادثة معينة.
وكل التغييرات المبادرة عقب حدوث الحادث ليست دائمة بل هى ردود فعل للاخطاء الفردية الملاحظة ويتم وضعها وفرضها 
 ان الحوادث المماثلة من المتوقع تكرارها.من كبار الموظفين. وبالتالى ف
هناك بعض النظم لتسهيل التعلم المؤسسى وهذه قد تشمل وضع وجهة نظر المريض فى الاعتبار الدروس المستفادة لا  -C
 تعمم على المؤسسة. وتحاك بعض التغييرات القصرية ولكنها متصلة مباشرة بحادثة معينة.
اه استحداث التغييرات ولكن عدم تضمين الموظفين  يؤدى لعدم دمج هذه القرارت فى أنماط اللجان والمدراء يتخذون القرارات تج
 العمل.
 يتم شمل المرضى حتى تثبت المؤسسة للمنظمين أن لديها بعض الالتزام نحو مشاركة المريض والجمهور.
 
 ر المريض.للمؤسسة ثقافة تعليمية ولديها عمليات لتشارك فى التعلم مثل التفكير ومشاركة تصو -D
هناك دعم من مجلس الادارة لتغعيل التحقيقات العميقة والدفع لتغيرات تعالج الاسباب الكامنة للحوادث. يشارك الموظفون بنشاط 
 فى العملية وهنالك التزام حقيقى نحو التغيير الدائم فى جميع أنحاء المؤسسة.
لتعلم من تجارب الاخرين. التعلم التنظيمى عقب الخوادث المؤسسة تبعث فى الافق عن الفرص التعليمية وهى حريصة على ا
 يستخدم فى التخطيط للمستقبل. وهى مؤسسة منفتحة ولها ثقة بنفسها.
هى مؤسسة تعليمية. وتتعلم المؤسسة من المعلومات والخبرات الداخلية والخارجية وهى ملتزمة لاشراك من هو خارج  -E
 وداخل المؤسسة فى هذها التعلم.
ة الحوادث التى تهدد سلامة المريض (وهذا يشمل تلك التى منعت) فى محافل مفتوحة حيث يتم تمكين الموظفين فى تتم مناقش
 المشاركة. يتم تقدير التعليم التنظيمى والفردى على حد السواء.
ضى دورا اساسيا فى يحدث التقدم فى الممارسة من دون التأثر بحادث حيث أن الثقافة هى من نوع التقدم المستمر. ويلعب المر




  التواصل فى مواضيع السلامة -7
لتواصل بصفة عامة ضعيف ويبدأ من الأعلى الى الاسفل والموظفين غير قادرين على التحدث الى مدرائهم حول المخاطر  -A
 ويتم الاحتفاظ بالاحداث داخليا ولا يتحدث عنها.
فى الاساس وهنالك تواصل سلبى يرتكز على اللوم ويعطى المرضى المعلومات المطلوبة قانونيا فقط ويعد بذل  المؤسسة منغلقة
 جهد كبير حتى يتاح لهم الوصول اليها.
التواصل عامة توجيهى ويأتى باصدار تعليمات من المدراء والموظفين قادرين فقط فى الحديث الى من يرئسوهم بعد حدوث  -B
اصل غير مخصص ويقتصر على الذين يشملهم حادث معين ويعطى المريض المعلومات التى تشعر المؤسسة بأنها خطأ ما. التو
 مناسبة فى اتجاه تواصل أحادى.
هنالك استراتيجية للتواصل كما توجد سياسات واجراءات تحفظ الكثير من السجلات. هناك الكثير من المعلومات التى يتم  -C
رضى والمؤسسات الاخرى ولكنها ليست مستخدمة بشكل فعال وهذا يؤدى لتكدس المعلومات مما يعنى جمعها من الموظفين والم
أن مأنجز فى الواقع قليل بالمقرنة مع المعلومات الواردة من الموظفبن. ويوجد نظام للتواصل بشأن المخاطر ولكن لا يتحقق أحد 
 من أنه يعمل.
شكل دائم. ويوجد اتصال عبر المؤسسات لتسيير وضع المقاييس بطريقة ذات يخضع نظام الاتصال والسجلات للمراجعة ب -D
 معنى.
 الموظفون من كل المستويات يشاركون وتتاح لهم اليات التغذية الراجعة للمؤسسة.
تتم المشاركة بالمعلومات وهناك محاضرات تقدم بانتظام يشجع فيها الموظفين بتحديد جدول الاعمال. يتم اتصال فعال مع 
 لمرضى والجمعيات بخصوص أمور السلامة.ا
يشارك الجميع فى نقل أمور السلامة ويتعلمون من تجارب الاخرين (الجيدة والسيئة). هى مؤسسة ذات شفافية وتشمل  -F
 مشاركة المرضى فى تطوير سيلسة ادارة المخاطر.
 يتم تشجيع الافكار المبتكرة ويتم تمكين الموظفين لتنفيذها. 
 لممارسة الجيدة للداخل والخارج.هى مؤسسة تنقل ا
 
  ادارة شئون العاملين وأمور السلامة -8    
 ينظر الى العاملين كأجساد ولملئ الوظائف فقط. -A
وعمليات اختيار الموظفين وتوظيفهم عملية بدائية. الاستخدام اللغوى سلبى وينظر الى التدنى الصحى وسجلات الحضور كأداة 
 تأديبية.
أنهم غير مدعومين ويروا شئون العاملين (كالاخر) وليس (كنحن). هناك سياسة موظفين بدائية وليس هناك يشعر الموظفين ب
 برامج تنمية موارد بشرية ولا توجد هناك اى صلات مع الصحة المهنية.
 يتغير الوصف الوظيفى ومستويات التوظيف استجابة للمشاكل فقط، وعليه يكون هنالك اختيار جيد وسياسات -B
 ستبقاء فى الاماكن التى تعرضت فى الماضى للمشاكل.ا
بيئة العمل مفعمة باللوم والعتاب. ودعم الموظفين متاح ولكنه ضئيل ورمزى. توجد سياسة للموارد البشرية متواضعة ولكنها 
 غير مرنة وطورت استجابة للمشاكل السابقة.
 ت. واللغة المستخدمة فى ادارة الموظفين بصفة      توجد اجراءات توظيف واستبقاء ودائما يتم مراجعة المؤهلا -C
 عامة رسمية ومحايدة وتحكمها السياسات والاجراءات.
اليات دعم الموظفين يحكمها الكثير من البروقراطية وخطط العمل. هنالك اجراءات تقييم وتنمية الموظفين والصحة المهنية ولكن 
ئما ما صممت لأجله. ينظر الى هذه الاجراءات من قبل الادارة كأداة للسيطرة يتم تطبيق ذلك بطريقة صارمة وعليه لا تحقق دا
 على الموظفين.
يوجد التزام نحو مجانسة الافراد للوظائف. وهناك محاولات لفهم لماذا يحدث سوء الاداء ويوجد هناك نظام دعم مرن  -D




الموظفين عند الضرر كما يتم اجراء التغيرات اللازمة. هنالك اهتمام حقيقى حول صحة الموظفين تراجع عمليات ادارة شئون 
 ونظام التقييم والمراقبة والمراجعة. 
 يتم السعى بنشاط نحو مساهمة المرضى ومقدمى الرعاية بشأن التوظيف.
التفكير الملئ والمراجعة (سواء كانت ايجابية يستخدم اطار المعرفة والمهارت لتصميم مواصفات الوظيفة ولتمييز الكفاءات.  -F
 أو سلبية) تحدث بطريقة مستمرة وتلقائية.
 المؤسسة لها التزام نحو موظفيها، والجميع لديه الثقة فى اجراءات شئون العاملين والتى تشمل الارشاد والاشراف.
سلامة وقضايا التوظيف. شئون العاملين ليست المرضى والجمهور لهم مشاركة ذات معنى فى وضع وتنفيذ أى سياسات تتعلق بال
 كيانا مستقلا ولكنها جزءا مكملا للمؤسسة.
تستخدم أنظمة التحليل اثر وقوع الحادثة التى تهدد سلامة المريض عند اتخاذ القرارات نحو المساهمة النسبية لعوامل الانظمة. 
رات بشأن توقيف الموظفين وعلى هذا النحو يكون هناك نهج دور الفرد الموظف فى الرعاية الصحية. هذه العملية تخدم القرا
 ثابت وعادل للتعامل مع قضايا الموظفين بعد وقوع الحادث.
 
 تعليم وتدريب الموظفين-9
 التدريب له أولوية ضعيفة. ويقدم فقط التدريب الذى تطلبه الحكومة. -A
قت. وبالتالى لا يوجد هنالك ضبط بشأن النوعية أو صلة تنظر الادارة الى تعليم الموظفين كبرنامج مزعج ومكلف ومضيعة للو
 للتدريب والتعليم المتلقى فيما يتعلق بالتطوير المهنى للموظفين. ينظر الى الموظفين باعتبار أنهم مدربين للقيام بعملهم وعليه لماذا
 يحتاجون لمزيد من التدريب.
ل على المناطق ذات المخاطر العالية حيث يتم ملئ الثغرات. يحدث التريب حيث هنالك مشاكل معينة ولها علاقة بشكل كام -B
 هى مسئولية الفرد أن يقرأ ويتصرف ويقوم بتمويل احتياجاته التعليمية.
يرتكز التعليم والتدريب على زيادة الدخل وحماية ظهر المؤسسة بدلا من التطوير المهنى للموظفين. ليس هناك ميزانية مخصصة 
 لموظفين بصورة............للتدريب ويحدث تقييم ا
يعكس برنامج التدريب الاحتياجات التنظيمية وعليه يدعم التدريب فقط اذا كان يفيد المؤسسة. ولا يوجد تفكير جاد فى اشراك  -C
 المرضى فى التدريب.
سب ولا توجد خطط تنموية شخصية متواضعة بحيث يكون لكل شخص ملفه الخاص. ولكن هذا ليس ذو فعالية ومصدره غير منا
 يعطى أولوية.
معروض عدد كبير من الدورات ولكن ليست كلها ذات علاقة بالتطوير الوظيفى ولا يتوقع أن يستفيد منها الموظفين. ينظر الى 
 التدريب كوسيلة لمنع وقوع الاخطاء وتقييم الموظفين يرتكز حول هذا الامر.
ات الافراد و تناغمها. يتم التخطيط للفرص التعليمية جيدا هنالك محاولات لتحديد احتياجات التدريب للمؤسسة و احتياج -D
 وتسخر لها الموارد وهى متاحة من والى كل الوكالات ذات الصلة. 
 وينظر للتعليم والتدريب كأساس للتطوير الوظيفى للفرد ويرتبط مباشرة بالنظم التنظيمية الاخرى مثل التبليغ عن الحادث.
 ظفين ويتم بنائه على احتياجات الفرد.يركز التقييم الوظيفى على المو
 المحاولات أولية لاشراك المرضى والجمهور فى تدريب الموظفين جارية وبدأت المؤسسة فى فهم الدروس من تجاربهم.
الافراد يتم تمكينهم وحثهم للقيلم أو تولى أمر تحليل احتياجاتهم ومناقشة برامجهم التدريبية. يحدث التعلم بشكل يومى ولا  -E
 تصر فقط على البيئة الصفية.يق
ينظر الى التعلم كأساس للثقافة التنظيمية. النهج المتبع فى التدريب والتعليم مرن وينظر اليه كأسلوب لدعم الموظفين حتى يدركوا 
 امكانياتهم. يبدأ التقييم ويتم ادارته بواسطة الموظفين.
 مريض عن المخاطر والسلامة.يشارك المرضى فى تدريب الموظفين للمساعدة فى فهم تصور ال
 
 العمل كفرق -01




ناس جمعوا يوجد توتر بين أعضاء الفريق وهناك بناء وظيفى صارم مبنى على الرتب. هى أشبه ماتكون مجموعة مجموعة من ال
 تحت توجيه زعيم اسمى.المعلومات لا يتم تبادلها بين أعضاء الفريق. يعمل الفريق بسرية.
 يعمل الناس فقط كفريق اثر الحدث السلبى واستجابة للمطالب الخارجية. والافراد حقيقة غير ملزمين بالفريق. -B
وظيفى للمنظمة ككل. هناك فرق متعددة التخصصات هنالك تسلسل وظيفى مبنى على الرتب فى كل فريق، مطابق للتسلسل ال
ولكن أملى عليهم بأن يعملوا معا، والخدمة المثالية لفريق العمل مجرد حديث فقط. تتوالى العلومات الى أعضلء الفريق عقب 
 كل حادثة. تعمل الفرق بطريقة دفاعية والاعضاء الجدد غير مرحب بهم.
 ض الاستجابة للسياسات الحكومية. ولكن لا توجد وسيلة لقياس مدى فعاليتها.وضعت الفرق متعددة التخصصات مع بع -C
 ينظر الى العمل كفرق من قبل الصفوف الدنيا للموظفين كحديث فقط مبنى على فكرة التمكين.
كار والمعلومات تعطى الفرق كميات من المعلومات المدونة حول الكيفية التى يجب العمل بها. توجد اليات رسمية للمشاركة فى الاف
 داخل وعبر الفرق ولكنها لا تستخدم بطريقة فاعلة.
 فرق العمل تعمل وراء الكواليس ولا تتعدى المؤسسة الواحدة.
 هناك فرق متعددة التخصصات وتسخر الموارد والوقت لتنمية عمليات الفرق. -D
ات الوقت. يوجد تقييم عن فعالية الفريق وتجري التغييرات بنية الفريق سلسة حيث يتناول الناس الادوار بالطريقة المناسبة لهم فى ذ
 عند الحاجة. الفرق متعاونة وقابلة للتأقلم. 
 الفرق منفتحة ومن المحتمل اشراك أعضاء من خارج المؤسسة.
ية. يقدم تدريب دوري ومقيم فى ادارة موارد الفرق للفرق متعددة التخصصات المتكاملة. عضوية الفريق مرنة وبنيتها أفق -F
 مختلف الناس يؤدون مساهمات قيمة عند الحاجة.
 الفرق مبني على التفاهم والرؤية المشتركة بدل من القرب الجغرافى.
 العمل كفريق هو الوسيلة المقبولة فى المؤسسة.
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  الالتزام الشامل للتقدم المستمر -1
 . لا توجد  طرق للتعرف على المشاكل فى مجالات  العمل  -A
 .                                                                                      ينقصها الهيكلة وليس هناك استجابة من المسؤلين  اجعة ان وجدت اى مر
 . اذا وجدت بروتوكولات أو أى انظمة فهى تخدم مصلحة المؤسسة فقط ولا يوجد تحديث لهذه البروتوكولات والسياسات  
 . الرعاية الضعيفة وهذا على مستوى الادارة وفرق الرعاية الصحية فى الهيئةيتم  تجاهل  
  
تحدث المراجعة فقط استجابة لحادثة محددة وبتوجيهات من السلطات الوطنية ولا تعكس . يطور العمل  لاوامر   محددة -B
 . وهناك محاولات غير واقعية تتم استجابة لنتائج أي مراجعة. الاحتياجات المحلية
الحد الادنى من البروتوكولات والسياسات وجميعها قديمة وغير مستخدمة ولا يتم مراجعة هذه السياسات الا استجابة لحادثة  يوجد
 . معينة
 
 . العاملين فى الخطوط الامامية ليس لهم دور فى عملية التقدم وهم ينظرون اليها كعمل ادارى يقاد من الخارج -C
يتحمل العاملون عبئا . لكن ينقصها ربط الاسترتيجية العامة مع الاحتياجات المحلية والتنظيميةيحدث الكثير من عمليات المراجعة و
 . كبيرا مع البروتوكولات والانظمة والتى تراجع وتحدث بانتظام، ولكن نادرا ماتنفذ
 . يقيةيجوز للمرضى والجمهور بالمشاركة فى مواضيع الجودة ولكن تلك خدمة سطحيه أكثر من كونها مشاركة حق
 
كما هو معروف بأن التقدم المتواصل هو . هنالك رغبة وحماس حقيقين فى جميع انحاء المؤسسه من أجل التقدم المتواصل -D
 . مسئولية الجميع وبأن المنظمة بكاملها والتى تشمل المرضى والعامة معنيين بهذه المسئولية
 . مع المراكز الاخرى تهدف هذه الهيئات أن تكون مراكزمتميزة يتم مقارنة ادائها
تطوير البروتوكولات والسياسات ومراجعتها . تضمين الاطباء الممارسين وملكيتهم لعملية المراجعة يؤدى الى التقدم المتواصل
وهذا -يشارك المرضى والجمهور فى اتخاذ القرارات الداخلية. تتم من قبل العاملين ويتم استخدامها كاساس فى الرعاية  والخدمات
 . جعلها مراكز خدمية ترتكز على المرضىمما ي
 
 . غرس ثقافة التقدم المتواصل داخل   االمؤسسه اساس اتخاذ القرار على كل المستويات -E
تقوم الفرق . وتعتبر المؤسسة مركز للاداء المتميز نتيجة للتقييم المتواصل للاداء مقارنة بمثيلاتها داخل وخارج الخدمة الصحية
 . عة بالتركيز على الناتج وبالتعاون مع المرضى والجمهوربتصميم اجراء المراج
وهذا يعنى تقليص الحوجة للبروتوكولات والانظمة مع مرور . يكون العاملون فى يقظة تامة لاحتمال وجود مخاطر على السلامة
ائما ذات اولوية فى الزمن عندها تصبح الممارسة المبنية على البرهان هى عامل طبيعى اضافة الى أن سلامة المريض تكون د
وعلى هذا يكون المرضى والجمهور يتم تضمينهم بطريقة ذات معنى وروتينية فى المشاركة الداعمة والتغذية . أذهان الجميع
 . الراجحة
 
  الاولوية للسلامة -2
 
 تعطى اولوية بسيطة للسلامة -A
المؤسسة لا تعطى المخاطر الخاصة لها . د حقيقىهناك بعض انظمة ادارة المخاطر مثل الاستراتيجيات واللجان ولكن بدون مردو
 . حيث يعتقدون أنه فى حالة وقوع أى حادثة تهدد سلامة المريض فان شركات التأمين سوف تكفلهم
 
تصبح السلامة ذات أولوية فقط عند وقوع حادث ولكن فى بقية الوقت تكون الخدمة مجرد حديث فى الموضوع ما عدا عندما  -B
 . لقانونيهتتدخل السلطات ا






. لكن هذه الانظمة ليست معممة على العاملين ولا تراجع. السلامة لها أولوية كافية وهنالك انظمة عديدة فى مكان الحماية -C
 . مرونة فى الاستجابة للاحداث المخفية وتفشل فى التفاعل مع الامور المعقدةوليس لها 
 مما يجعلها ثقافة مفروضة . مسئولية ادارة المخاطر تستثمر فى شخص فردى لا يضمنها فى الهيئة الواسعة
 
لمرضى والجمهور ا. ترتقى السلامة داخل الهيئة ويكون العاملين متحمسين فى الاشتراك فى أمور السلامة وعملياتها -D
التدابير المتخذة تهدف لحماية المرضى ولا تهدف للحماية . والهيئات الاخرى يشاركون فى ادارة المخاطر ومراجعتها
هنالك . يتم تحديد المخاطر على نحو استباقى باستخدام تقييم المخاطر المنظورة واتخاذ الاجراءت اللازمة لاداراتها. الذاتية
تى حين يأخذ أحد الافراد الريادة فى فى سلامة المرضى فى المؤسسة، وهذا هو الجزء الاساسى حدود واضحة للمسائلة وح
 . فى دور كل الاداريين
 
السلامة لها الاولويه القصوى فى المؤسسة وينظر لمسؤلية السلامة كجزء من دور كل الافراد ويشمل ذلك المرضى  -E
 سلامة المريض من الامور الساخنة . الممكنة يقيم العاملون المخاطر وينظرون للتقدمات. والجمهور
فى كل المؤسسة وتغرس فى ممارسات كل  العاملين ابتداءا من مجلس الادرة والمدراء الى فرق الرعاية الصحية الذين لديهم 
ة احتكاك يومى مع المرضى، وذلك يشمل موظفى الدعم واشتراك المريض فى امور سلامة المريض ومراجعته لها مؤسس بطريق
 . مثلى
 
 أخطاء النظام والمسئوليات الفردية -3
. يتم النظر الى الحوادث بأنها سوء حظ وخارجة عن سيطرة المؤسسة، وتحدث نتيجة لاخطاء العاملين أو سلوك المرضى -A
 . توجد ثقافة لوم قوية فى المؤسسة ويعرض الافراد لاجراءات توبيخية ولوم
 
عند . ظر للافراد كسبب ويكمن الحل فى اعادة التدريب والاجراءت الجزئيةوين. تنظر المؤسسة الى نفسها كضحية للظروف -B
 . وقوع الحادثة ليست هناك محاولة لدعم الجهات المعنية بما فى ذلك المرضى وأقاربهم
 
ملين وتقول الؤسسة بأن لها ثقافة الانفتاح العادل ولكن العا. هناك اعتراف بأن الانظمة تساهم فى الاحداث وليس الافراد فقط -C
بروتكولات الانفتاح والانغلاق كتبت للتأكد من أن العاملون والمرضى وراعو المرضى يحصلون على . لا يشعرون بهذا
 . الدعم عند الحوادث ولكنهم غير ملمين بالمعرفة عنها ولا باستخدامها
  
ويتبع حادثة تهدد سلامة   . يةالؤسسة لها سياسة انفتاح تعاون. الحوادث هى عبارة عن مزيج من أخطاء الافراد والانظمة -D
عند توقيف العاملين وهناك نهج عادل وثابت فى التعامل . وهذه العملية تخدم اتخاذ القرارات. المريض، تحليل للانظمة مثل
الؤسسة صريحة ومنفتحة مع المرضى ومقدم رعاية المرضى عند وقوع حادثة . مع أمور الموظفين بعد وقوع الحوادث
 . ى الحاق أذى جسيم أو موت، ولكنها لا تناقش كل انواع الحوادثالحاق أذى أدت  ال
 
تمكن . يتم ملاحظة فشل النظام ويكون الموظفين على دراية تامة بمسؤلياتهم الشخصيةفيما يتعلق بالاخطاء والتبليغ بذلك -E
 الانظمة المتكاملة فى تحليل الحوادث التى تهدد سلامة المريض والشكاوى والدعاوى القضائية
 المؤسسة لها مستوى عالى من الانفتاح. لعاملون والمرضى وأقربهم يتعاونون بنشاط ولهم دعم من بداية الحادثةا
المؤسسة أيضا منفتحة ومخلصة مع المرضى ومقدمى الرعاية نحو جميع أنواع حوادث المرضى بغض النظر عن مستوى . والثقة
 . الضرر الواقع
 
  تسجيل الحوادث وأفضل السبل لذلك -4
وجد أنظمة مخصصة للتبليغ عن الحوادث ولكن الؤسسة فى حالة جهل تام الا فى حالة وقوع حادثة خطرة أو استلام ت -A
 . تسود المؤسسة ثقافة اللوم العالية حيث يتعرض الافراد للاجراءات التأديبية ويصبحون ضحية للنظام. رسائل من المحامين
 
تجمع معلومات دقيقة ولكن لا يتم . وظفين لا يشجعون للتبليغ عن الحوادثهنالك نظام تبليغ للحوادث غير ناضج، ولكن الم -B
عندما تقع الحوادث، ليست هناك محاولة . هناك ثقافة لوم وعليه يكون الموظفين مترددين فى التبليغ عن الحوادث. تحليلها
 . لدعم الذين يشملهم الحادثة
 
هناك محاولات . ى معرفة المبلغ ويركز على تعبئة الاستماراتيوجد نظام مركزى للتبليغ عن الحوادث من غير الحاجة ال -C
ويشمل ذلك الحوادث التى منعت أو التى منعت أو التى لم تؤدى (بغرض تشجيع الموظفين والمرضى للتبليغ عن الحوادث 
التبليغ عن على الرغم من ذلك فان الموظفين لا يشعرون بالامان والمرضضى لا يشعرون بالارتياح عند ) الى أى أضرار
تعتمد المؤسسة مصادر أخرى لمعلومات السلامة جنبا الى جنب مع .                                                  هذه الحوادث





وينظر ) يم التقارير والتعليممثال نظام القومى لتقد(التبليغ عن حوادث سلامة المريض على كل المستويين المحلى والوطنى  -D
الموظفون يشعرون .  يوجد سبل تبليغ  للموظفين والمرضى سهلة، وتسمح اختيار الاتجاهات المختلفة.    له كفرص تعليمية
الموظفون والمرضى . بالاطمئنان عند تبليغ كل الحوادث التى تهدد سلامة المرضى ويشمل الحوادث الت يمكن  تجنبها
 . مدعمون منذ لحظة التبليغومقدمى الرعاية 
 
ويشمل ذلك الحوادث التى لم تؤدى الى أضرار أو التى ( التبليغ عن حوادث سلامة المريض عند الموظفين أمر طبيعى -E
مثال النظام القومى (وللموظفين ثقة فى عمليةالاستقصاء ويتفهموا قيمة التبليغ لكل من الانظمة المحلية والقومية) منعت
 ). والتعليملتقويم التقارير 
 . وهى مؤسسة تعليمية وفيها أنظمة متينة لتدوين الممارسة المثلى ومكملاتها. يشجع المرضى بالتبليغ عن الحوادث
 
 تقييم الحوادث والممارسة الجيدة -5
ويتم التحقيق فى الحوادث بطريقة سطحية بواسطة صغار المدراء بهدف . توضع الحوادث والشكوى تحت البساط ما أمكن -A
ومحاولات ) المحاكمة على الملأ(تجمع معلومات التحقيق وتخزن ويؤخذ اجراء بسيط عدا الاجراء الاداري . وضوع قفل الم
 . فى هذه المؤسسة هناك اعتراف ضئيل بسلامة الممارسات الجيدة. التصدى للاعلام 
 
ات سطحية وتركز على حالة معينة التحقيق. توجه التحقيقات بهدف الحد من الاضرار فى المؤسسة وتوزيع اللوم على الافراد -B
وبعض . تقترح الحلول السريعة والتى تتعامل مع حادثة معينة ولكنها لا تحتمل أن توجه اذا زالت حدة الحادثة.  وأفعال فردية
 . التحقيقات تظل غير مكتملة
 
 راد والانظمةالاداريون الكبار يشاركون فى التحقيق والذى يكون فى نطاق ضيق ويتم التركيز فيه على الاف -C
هناك اجراء مفصل لعملية التحقيق، والتى تشمل تعبئة استمارات عديدة ولا يجري التحقيق الى حد ما . المحيطة بالحادث       
الموظفون يحفزوا . لفحص جذور المشكلة ودعم من يشمله الحادث ولكن كاجراء اداري ولاسترضاء المرضى ومقدمى الرعاية
 . ة تنفيذها ولكن عملية التعليم متضاربةلمراجعة الاجراءات وكيفي
 
الموظفون المتطورتين . المؤسسة مفتوحة للاستفسارات وترحب بالمشاركة الخارجية للتحقيقات من أجل تحقيق نظرة مستقلة -D
 . فى الحوادث يتم شملهم فى التحقيق لتحديد جذور المشكلة والقضايا التى فى الواجهة
تستخدم البيانات منةتقرير الحوادث فى . والتعلم من الحوادث ونشر النتائج على نطاق واسع الهدف من التحقيقات هو الاستفادة
المرضى .  وهى مؤسسة منفتحة ذات نظرة مستقبلية. تحليل الظواهر، تحديد النقاط الساخنة ودراسة الاثار المترتبة على التدريب
 . بةيشاركون فى عملية التحقيق ورؤيتهم وتجربتهم وتوصياتهم مطلو
 
وينظر . تجرى المؤسسة تحقيقات مستقلة للحادث على الصعيدين الداخلى والخارجى وتشمل الموظفين والمرضى المعنيين -E
تراجع عملية تحليل الحادث بطريقة . الى التحقيقات فى الحوادث كفرص للتعلم وتركز على التقدم وتشمل توصيات المرضى 
 . ر مع الموظفينمنهجية ويتم مراجعتها بانتظام بعد التشاو
هى مؤسسة تعلم كما يتضح من الالتزام للتعلم . التعلم من الممارسة الجيدة مشتركة فى جميع انحاء المنظمة وعلى المستوى القومى
 . من الحوادث فى جميع المستويات من المجلس وكبار المدراء ومن خلال فرق الرعاية الصحية وموظفى الدعم
 
 التعلم واحداث التغير -6
 . من الحوادث عدا تلك التى تفرضها جهات خارجية مثل المساءلات الحكومية ل محاولات للتعلملا تبذ -A
وتعتبر المؤسسة أنها قد نجحت عندما تصبح وسائل الاعلام عديمة المعرفة . الهدف بعد الحادثة هو تغطية التقصير وحماية المؤسسة
 . ك الموجهة الى الافراد المعنيينلا يتم أى تعديلات عقب الحادثة بغض النظر عن تل. بالحادث
 
وجميع . يوجد التعليم التنظيمى ولو قليلا وما يحدث يكون ذو علاقة لدرجة الاضطراب الذى تضرر منه كبار الموظفين -B
 . التعليم مخصص كحادثة معينة
يتم وضعها وفرضها من وكل التغييرات المبادرة عقب حدوث الحادث ليست دائمة بل هى ردود فعل للاخطاء الفردية الملاحظة و
 . وبالتالى فان الحوادث المماثلة من المتوقع تكرارها. كبار الموظفين
 
هناك بعض النظم لتسهيل التعلم المؤسسى وهذه قد تشمل وضع وجهة نظر المريض فى الاعتبار الدروس المستفادة لا تعمم  -C
 . ادثة معينةوتحاك بعض التغييرات القصرية ولكنها متصلة مباشرة بح. على المؤسسة
اللجان والمدراء يتخذون القرارات تجاه استحداث التغييرات ولكن عدم تضمين الموظفين  يؤدى لعدم دمج هذه القرارت فى أنماط 
 . العمل





 . مليات لتشارك فى التعلم مثل التفكير ومشاركة تصور المريضللمؤسسة ثقافة تعليمية ولديها ع -D
يشارك الموظفون بنشاط . هناك دعم من مجلس الادارة لتغعيل التحقيقات العميقة والدفع لتغيرات تعالج الاسباب الكامنة للحوادث
 . فى العملية وهنالك التزام حقيقى نحو التغيير الدائم فى جميع أنحاء المؤسسة
التعلم التنظيمى عقب الخوادث . عث فى الافق عن الفرص التعليمية وهى حريصة على التعلم من تجارب الاخرينالمؤسسة تب
 . وهى مؤسسة منفتحة ولها ثقة بنفسها. يستخدم فى التخطيط للمستقبل
 
هو خارج وتتعلم المؤسسة من المعلومات والخبرات الداخلية والخارجية وهى ملتزمة لاشراك من . هى مؤسسة تعليمية -E
 . وداخل المؤسسة فى هذها التعلم
فى محافل مفتوحة حيث يتم تمكين الموظفين فى ) وهذا يشمل تلك التى منعت(تتم مناقشة الحوادث التى تهدد سلامة المريض 
 . يتم تقدير التعليم التنظيمى والفردى على حد السواء. المشاركة
ويلعب المرضى دورا اساسيا فى . أن الثقافة هى من نوع التقدم المستمريحدث التقدم فى الممارسة من دون التأثر بحادث حيث 
 . التعلم ويساهمون فى عمليات التغيير اللاحقة
 
  التواصل فى مواضيع السلامة -7
لتواصل بصفة عامة ضعيف ويبدأ من الأعلى الى الاسفل والموظفين غير قادرين على التحدث الى مدرائهم حول المخاطر  -A
 . ظ بالاحداث داخليا ولا يتحدث عنهاويتم الاحتفا
المؤسسة منغلقة فى الاساس وهنالك تواصل سلبى يرتكز على اللوم ويعطى المرضى المعلومات المطلوبة قانونيا فقط ويعد بذل 
 . جهد كبير حتى يتاح لهم الوصول اليها
 
قط فى الحديث الى من يرئسوهم بعد حدوث التواصل عامة توجيهى ويأتى باصدار تعليمات من المدراء والموظفين قادرين ف -B
التواصل غير مخصص ويقتصر على الذين يشملهم حادث معين ويعطى المريض المعلومات التى تشعر المؤسسة بأنها . خطأ ما
 . مناسبة فى اتجاه تواصل أحادى
 
لكثير من المعلومات التى يتم جمعها هناك ا. هنالك استراتيجية للتواصل كما توجد سياسات واجراءات تحفظ الكثير من السجلات -C
من الموظفين والمرضى والمؤسسات الاخرى ولكنها ليست مستخدمة بشكل فعال وهذا يؤدى لتكدس المعلومات مما يعنى أن مأنجز 
أنه ويوجد نظام للتواصل بشأن المخاطر ولكن لا يتحقق أحد من . فى الواقع قليل بالمقرنة مع المعلومات الواردة من الموظفبن
 . يعمل
 
ويوجد اتصال عبر المؤسسات لتسيير وضع المقاييس بطريقة ذات . يخضع نظام الاتصال والسجلات للمراجعة بشكل دائم -D
 . معنى
 . الموظفون من كل المستويات يشاركون وتتاح لهم اليات التغذية الراجعة للمؤسسة
يتم اتصال فعال مع المرضى . ا الموظفين بتحديد جدول الاعمالتتم المشاركة بالمعلومات وهناك محاضرات تقدم بانتظام يشجع فيه
 . والجمعيات بخصوص أمور السلامة
 
هى مؤسسة ذات شفافية وتشمل مشاركة ). الجيدة والسيئة(يشارك الجميع فى نقل أمور السلامة ويتعلمون من تجارب الاخرين E
 . المرضى فى تطوير سيلسة ادارة المخاطر
 . مبتكرة ويتم تمكين الموظفين لتنفيذهايتم تشجيع الافكار ال
 هى مؤسسة تنقل الممارسة الجيدة للداخل والخارج
 
  ادارة شئون العاملين وأمور السلامة -8    
الاستخدام اللغوى سلبى وينظر . وعمليات اختيار الموظفين وتوظيفهم عملية بدائية. ينظر الى العاملين كافراد لملئ الوظائف فقط -A
وليس ) كالاخر(يشعر الموظفين بأنهم غير مدعومين ويروا شئون العاملين . الصحى وسجلات الحضور كأداة تأديبية الى التدنى
 . هناك سياسة موظفين بدائية وليس هناك برامج تنمية موارد بشرية ولا توجد هناك اى صلات مع الصحة المهنية). كنحن(
 
 ة للمشاكل فقط، وعليه يكون هنالك اختيار جيد وسياساتيتغير الوصف الوظيفى ومستويات التوظيف استجاب -B
ودعم الموظفين متاح ولكنه ضئيل . بيئة العمل مفعمة باللوم والعتاب. استبقاء فى الاماكن التى تعرضت فى الماضى للمشاكل
 . توجد سياسة للموارد البشرية متواضعة ولكنها غير مرنة وطورت استجابة للمشاكل السابقة. ورمزى
 
 واللغة المستخدمة فى ادارة الموظفين بصفة      . توجد اجراءات توظيف واستبقاء ودائما يتم مراجعة المؤهلات -C
هنالك . اليات دعم الموظفين يحكمها الكثير من البروقراطية وخطط العمل. عامة رسمية ومحايدة وتحكمها السياسات والاجراءات
. هنية ولكن يتم تطبيق ذلك بطريقة صارمة وعليه لا تحقق دائما ما صممت لأجلهاجراءات تقييم وتنمية الموظفين والصحة الم





وهناك محاولات لفهم لماذا يحدث سوء الاداء ويوجد هناك نظام دعم مرن وواضح، . يوجد التزام نحو مجانسة الافراد للوظائف -D
هنالك اهتمام . تراجع عمليات ادارة شئون الموظفين عند الضرر كما يتم اجراء التغيرات اللازمة. تفصيله وفقا لاحتياجات الفرد تم
 . حقيقى حول صحة الموظفين ونظام التقييم والمراقبة والمراجعة
 . يتم السعى بنشاط نحو مساهمة المرضى ومقدمى الرعاية بشأن التوظيف
 
سواء كانت ايجابية أو (التفكير الملئ والمراجعة . معرفة والمهارت لتصميم مواصفات الوظيفة ولتمييز الكفاءاتيستخدم اطار الE
 . تحدث بطريقة مستمرة وتلقائية) سلبية
 . المؤسسة لها التزام نحو موظفيها، والجميع لديه الثقة فى اجراءات شئون العاملين والتى تشمل الارشاد والاشراف
شئون العاملين ليست . ور لهم مشاركة ذات معنى فى وضع وتنفيذ أى سياسات تتعلق بالسلامة وقضايا التوظيفالمرضى والجمه
 . كيانا مستقلا ولكنها جزءا مكملا للمؤسسة
. تستخدم أنظمة التحليل اثر وقوع الحادثة التى تهدد سلامة المريض عند اتخاذ القرارات نحو المساهمة النسبية لعوامل الانظمة
هذه العملية تخدم القرارات بشأن توقيف الموظفين وعلى هذا النحو يكون هناك نهج ثابت . ر الفرد الموظف فى الرعاية الصحيةدو
 . وعادل للتعامل مع قضايا الموظفين بعد وقوع الحادث
 
 تعليم وتدريب الموظفين-9
 . ويقدم فقط التدريب الذى تطلبه الحكومة. التدريب له أولوية ضعيفة -A
وبالتالى لا يوجد هنالك ضبط بشأن النوعية أو صلة . الادارة الى تعليم الموظفين كبرنامج مزعج ومكلف ومضيعة للوقتتنظر 
ينظر الى الموظفين باعتبار أنهم مدربين للقيام بعملهم وعليه لماذا . للتدريب والتعليم المتلقى فيما يتعلق بالتطوير المهنى للموظفين
 . بيحتاجون لمزيد من التدري
 
. يحدث التريب حيث هنالك مشاكل معينة ولها علاقة بشكل كامل على المناطق ذات المخاطر العالية حيث يتم ملئ الثغرات -B
 . هى مسئولية الفرد أن يقرأ ويتصرف ويقوم بتمويل احتياجاته التعليمية
ليس هناك ميزانية مخصصة . نى للموظفينيرتكز التعليم والتدريب على زيادة الدخل وحماية ظهر المؤسسة بدلا من التطوير المه
 ............ للتدريب ويحدث تقييم الموظفين بصورة
 
ولا يوجد تفكير جاد فى اشراك . يعكس برنامج التدريب الاحتياجات التنظيمية وعليه يدعم التدريب فقط اذا كان يفيد المؤسسة -C
 . المرضى فى التدريب
ولكن هذا ليس ذو فعالية ومصدره غير مناسب ولا . لكل شخص ملفه الخاص توجد خطط تنموية شخصية متواضعة بحيث يكون
 . يعطى أولوية
ينظر الى . معروض عدد كبير من الدورات ولكن ليست كلها ذات علاقة بالتطوير الوظيفى ولا يتوقع أن يستفيد منها الموظفين
 . مرالتدريب كوسيلة لمنع وقوع الاخطاء وتقييم الموظفين يرتكز حول هذا الا
 
يتم التخطيط للفرص التعليمية جيدا وتسخر . هنالك محاولات لتحديد احتياجات التدريب للمؤسسة و احتياجات الافراد و تناغمها -D
 . لها الموارد وهى متاحة من والى كل الوكالات ذات الصلة
 . الاخرى مثل التبليغ عن الحادثوينظر للتعليم والتدريب كأساس للتطوير الوظيفى للفرد ويرتبط مباشرة بالنظم التنظيمية 
 . يركز التقييم الوظيفى على الموظفين ويتم بنائه على احتياجات الفرد
 . المحاولات أولية لاشراك المرضى والجمهور فى تدريب الموظفين جارية وبدأت المؤسسة فى فهم الدروس من تجاربهم
 
يحدث التعلم بشكل يومى ولا يقتصر . اتهم ومناقشة برامجهم التدريبيةالافراد يتم تمكينهم وحثهم للقيلم أو تولى أمر تحليل احتياج -E
 . فقط على البيئة الصفية
النهج المتبع فى التدريب والتعليم مرن وينظر اليه كأسلوب لدعم الموظفين حتى يدركوا . ينظر الى التعلم كأساس للثقافة التنظيمية
 . ظفينيبدأ التقييم ويتم ادارته بواسطة المو. امكانياتهم
 . يشارك المرضى فى تدريب الموظفين للمساعدة فى فهم تصور المريض عن المخاطر والسلامة
 العمل كفرق -01
. يعمل الافراد فى الغالب فى عزلة ولكن حينما يكون هنالك فرق فان أفرادها يكونوا أحادي التخصصات مع الاختلال الوظيفى -A
هى أشبه ماتكون مجموعة مجموعة من الناس جمعوا . يفى صارم مبنى على الرتبيوجد توتر بين أعضاء الفريق وهناك بناء وظ
 . المعلومات لا يتم تبادلها بين أعضاء الفريق و يعمل الفريق بسرية. تحت توجيه زعيم اسمى
 
هنالك تسلسل  . والافراد حقيقة غير ملزمين بالفريق. يعمل الناس فقط كفريق اثر الحدث السلبى واستجابة للمطالب الخارجية -B




تعمل الفرق . تتوالى العلومات الى أعضلء الفريق عقب كل حادثة. بأن يعملوا معا، والخدمة المثالية لفريق العمل مجرد حديث فقط
 . لاعضاء الجدد غير مرحب بهمبطريقة دفاعية وا
 
ينظر . ولكن لا توجد وسيلة لقياس مدى فعاليتها. وضعت الفرق متعددة التخصصات مع بعض الاستجابة للسياسات الحكومية -C
تعطى الفرق كميات من المعلومات المدونة حول الكيفية التى يجب . الى العمل كفرق من قبل الصفوف الامامية للموظفين كحديث
فرق العمل . توجد اليات رسمية للمشاركة فى الافكار والمعلومات داخل وعبر الفرق ولكنها لا تستخدم بطريقة فاعلة. بها العمل
 . تعمل وراء الكواليس ولا تتعدى المؤسسة الواحدة
 
الناس الادوار  بنية الفريق سلسة حيث يتناول.  هناك فرق متعددة التخصصات وتسخر الموارد والوقت لتنمية عمليات الفرق -D
.  الفرق متعاونة وقابلة للتأقلم. يوجد تقييم عن فعالية الفريق وتجري التغييرات عند الحاجة. بالطريقة المناسبة لهم فى ذات الوقت
 . الفرق منفتحة ومن المحتمل اشراك أعضاء من خارج المؤسسة
 
. عضوية الفريق مرنة وبنيتها أفقية. ت المتكاملةيقدم تدريب دوري ومقيم فى ادارة موارد الفرق للفرق متعددة التخصصا -F
العمل . الفرق مبني على التفاهم والرؤية المشتركة بدل من القرب الجغرافى. مختلف الناس يؤدون مساهمات قيمة عند الحاجة





















  FINAL ENGLISH VERSION THE MAPSAF 
An exploratory Study into patient safety culture using MaPSaF 
 
Commitment to overall continuous improvement 
A No resources are invested in the identification of problems or areas of good practice. 
If any auditing occurs it lacks structure and there is no response to what is discovered. 
Whatever protocols or policies exist are there to meet the organisation’s statutory 
requirements and are not used, reviewed or updated. 
Poor quality care is tolerated or ignored. This attitude is evident at Board level and 
throughout the organisation in the healthcare teams.  
B A continuous improvement framework is developed in response to specific directives or an 
imminent inspection visit. Auditing only occurs in response to specific incidents and 
national directives and does not reflect local needs. Little attempt is made to respond to any 
audit findings. The bare minimum of protocols and policies exist and these tend to be out-
of-date and unused unless an incident occurs that triggers their review. 
Development of new protocols and policies occurs in response to incidents and complaints. 
C Frontline staff are not engaged in the improvement process and they see it as a management 
activity that is externally driven. Lots of auditing occurs but lacks an overall strategy linking 
with organisational or local needs. Staff are overloaded with protocols and policies (which 
are regularly reviewed and updated) that are rarely implemented. 
Patients and the public may be involved in quality issues but this is empty talk rather than 
real engagement. 
 
D There is a genuine desire and enthusiasm throughout the organisation for continuous 
improvement. It is recognised that continuous improvement is everyone’s responsibility and 
that the whole organisation, including patients and the public, need to be involved. 
Such organisations aim to be centres of excellence and compare their performance against 
that of others. Clinicians are involved in, and have ownership of, the auditing process which 
leads to continuous improvement. Protocols and policies are developed and reviewed by 
staff and are used as the basis for care and service provision. Patients and the public are 
formally involved in internal decisions – making it a patient centred service. 
 
E A culture of continuous improvement is embedded within the organisation and is integral to 
decision making at all levels. The organisation is a centre of excellence, continually 
assessing and comparing its performance against others both within and outside the health 
service. Teams design and conduct their own outcome focused audit programme, in 
collaboration with patients and the public. 
Staff are alert to potential safety risks. This means that over time the need 
for protocols and policies is reduced as evidence-based practice is second 
nature and patient safety is constantly on everyone’s mind. Patients and 
the public are involved in a routine, meaningful way with ongoing 










[Priority given to safety 
A A low priority is given to safety. There are some risk management systems in place, such 
as strategies and committees, but nothing is actually delivered. 
This is an organisation unaware of their risks, believing that if a patient safety incident 
occurs, insurance schemes can be used to help out. 
B Safety becomes a priority once an incident occurs, but the rest of the time only empty talk 
is paid to the issue apart from meeting legal requirements. 
There is little evidence of any implementation of a risk management strategy. Safety is only 
discussed by the Board in relation to specific incidents. Any measures that are taken are 
aimed at self-protection and not patient protection. 
In order to meet financial constraints or government set targets, risks are taken. 
 
C Safety has a fairly high priority and there are numerous systems (including those 
integrating the patient point of view) in place to protect it. However, these systems are 
not widely disseminated to staff or reviewed. They also tend to lack the flexibility to 
respond to unforeseen events and fail to capture the complexity of the issues involved. 
Responsibility for risk management is invested in a single individual who does not integrate 
it within the wider organisation. It is an imposed culture. 
 
D Safety is promoted throughout the organisation and staff are actively involved in all safety 
issues and processes. Patients, the public and other organisations are also involved in risk 
management systems and their review. Measures taken are aimed at patient protection 
and not self-protection. 
Risks are proactively identified, using prospective risk assessments, and action is taken to 
manage them. There are clear accountability lines and while one individual takes the lead 
for patient safety in the organisation, it is a key part of all managers’ roles. 
 
E Safety is the top priority in the organisation, and responsibility for safety is seen as being 
part of everyone’s role including patients and the public. Staff constantly assess risks and 
look for potential improvements. 
Patient safety is a high profile issue throughout the organisation and is embedded in the 
activities of all staff, from the Board/senior managers through to healthcare teams who 
have day-to-day contact with patients, including support staff. 
















System errors and individual responsibility 
A Incidents are seen as ‘bad luck’ and outside the organisation’s control occurring as a result 
of staff errors or patient behaviour. There is a strong blame culture with individuals 
subjected to persecution and disciplinary action.   
 
B The organisation sees itself as a victim of circumstances. Individuals are seen as the cause 
and the solution is retraining and disciplinary action. 
When incidents occur there is no attempt to support those involved, including the patients 
and their relatives.  
 
C There is a recognition that systems contribute to incidents and not just individuals. The 
organisation says that it has an open and fair culture but it is not perceived in that way by 
staff. 
Being open/open disclosure protocols have been written to ensure that staff and 
patients/carers receive support following an incident do exist, but they are not widely 
known about or used.  
 
D It is accepted that incidents are a combination of individual and system faults. The 
organisation has an open, fair and collaborative culture. 
Following a patient safety incident, a systems analysis is carried out and used to make 
decisions about the relative contribution of systems factors and the individual. This 
process informs decisions about staff suspensions and so there is a consistent and fair 
approach to dealing with staff issues following incidents. The organisation is also open and 
honest with patients and/or their carers when a patient safety incident occurs that led to 
severe harm or death, but does not discuss all types of incidents. 
 
E It is accepted that incidents are a combination of individual and system 
faults. The organisation has an open, fair and collaborative culture. 
Following a patient safety incident, a systems analysis is carried out and used to make 
decisions about the relative contribution of systems factors and the individual. This 
process informs decisions about staff suspensions and so there is a consistent and fair 
approach to dealing with staff issues following incidents. The organisation is also open and 
honest with patients and/or their carers when a patient safety incident occurs that led to 
















Recording incidents and best practice 
A Purpose designed incident reporting systems are in place but the organisation is largely 
in ‘blissful ignorance’ unless serious incidents occur or solicitors’ letters 
are received. There is a high blame culture, with individuals subjected to persecution 
and disciplinary action. No learning can occur. 
 
B There is an embryonic incident reporting system, although staff are not encouraged to 
report incidents. 
Minimal data on the incidents is collected but not analysed. There is a blame culture, so 
staff are reluctant to report incidents. When incidents occur, there is no attempt to 
support any of those involved. 
 
C A centralised anonymous reporting system is in place with a lot of emphasis on form 
completion. Attempts are made to encourage staff and patients to report incidents 
(including those that were prevented or led to no harm) though staff do not feel safe 
and patients do not feel comfortable reporting them. 
The organisation considers other sources of safety information alongside incident 
reports (e.g. complaints and audits). 
 
D Reporting of patient safety incidents at both a local and national level 
is encouraged and they are seen as learning opportunities. Accessible, ‘staff and patient 
friendly’ reporting methods are used, allowing trends to be readily examined. 
Staff feel safe reporting all types of patient safety incidents, including those that were 
prevented. Staff, patients and/or their careers are supported from the moment of 
reporting. 
 
E It is second nature for staff to report patient safety incidents (including those that led 
to no harm or were prevented) as they have confidence in the investigation process and 
understand the value of reporting to both local systems and nationally. 
Patients are actively encouraged to report incidents. It is a learning organisation and 











Evaluating incidents and best practice 
A Incidents and complaints are ‘swept under the carpet’ if possible. Incidents are superficially 
investigated by a junior manager with the aim of ‘closing the book’. 
Information gathered from the investigation is stored but little action is taken apart from 
disciplinary action (‘public executions’) and attempts to manage the media. In this 
organisation there is little recognition of good safe practice. 
 
B Investigations are instigated with the aim of damage limitation for the organisation and 
apportioning individual blame. Investigations are cursory and focus on a specific event and 
the actions of an individual. Quick-fix solutions are proposed that deal with the specific 
incident, but may not be instigated once the ‘heat is off’. Some investigations are not 
completed. 
 
C Senior managers are involved in the investigation, which is narrow and focuses on the 
individuals and systems surrounding the incident. There is a detailed procedure for the 
investigation process, which involves the completion of multiple forms – the investigation is 
conducted for its own sake and to placate patients/carers rather than examine root causes 
and support those involved. 
Staff are motivated to review procedures or how the procedures are implemented, but 
learning is variable. 
 
D The organisation is open to inquiry and welcomes external involvement in investigations in 
order to gain an independent perspective. The staff involved in incidents are involved in 
their investigation to identify root causes and interface issues. The aim of investigations is 
to learn from incidents and disseminate the findings widely. 
Data from incident reports are used to analyse trends, identify ‘hot spots’ and examine 
training implications. It is a forward-looking, open organisation.  
Patients are involved in the investigation process and their perceptions, experience and 
recommendations sought. 
 
E The organisation conducts both internal and external independent incident investigations 
that include the staff and patients involved. Incident investigations are seen as learning 
opportunities and focus upon improvement and include patient recommendations. The 
incident analysis process is systematically and regularly reviewed following consultation 
with all staff. 
Learning from best practice is shared across the organisation and nationally. It is a learning 
organisation as evidenced by a commitment to learn from incidents throughout all levels – 









Learning and effecting change 
A No attempts are made to learn from incidents unless imposed by external bodies 
such as public enquiries. The aim after an incident is to protect itself – the 
organisation considers that is has been successful when the media do not become 
aware of incidents. No changes are instigated after an incident apart from those 
directed at the individuals concerned. 
B Little, if any, organisational learning occurs and what does take place relates to the 
amount of disruption that senior staff have experienced. All learning is specific to 
the particular incident. 
Any changes instigated in the aftermath of an incident are not sustainable as they 
are knee-jerk reactions to perceived individual errors and are devised and imposed 
by senior managers. Consequently, similar incidents tend to recur. 
 
C Some systems are in place to facilitate organisational learning and this may include 
consideration of the patient perspective. The lessons learned are not disseminated 
throughout the organisation. Some enforced local changes relating directly to the 
specific incident are made. 
Committees and managers decide on any changes to be introduced, but lack of staff 
involvement leads to them not being integrated into working patterns. 
Patients are only involved so the organisation can prove to regulators that they have 
some commitment to patient and public involvement. 
 
D The organisation has a learning culture and processes exist to share learning, such 
as reflection and sharing patient points of view. There is Board/senior management 
support for in-depth incident investigations, and changes instigated address 
underlying causes (e.g. systems factors). 
Staff are actively involved in the process and there is a real commitment to 
sustainable change throughout the organisation. 
The organisation ‘scans the horizon’ for learning opportunities and is keen to learn 
from others’ experiences. Organisational learning following incidents is used in 
forward planning. It is an open, self-confident organisation. 
 
E It is a learning organisation. The organisation learns from internal and external 
information and experience and is committed to sharing this learning both within 
and outside the organisation. 
Patient safety incidents (including those that led to no harm or were prevented) are 
discussed in open forums where all staff are empowered to contribute. Both 
individual and organisational learning is evaluated. 
Improvements in practice occur without the trigger of an incident as the culture is 
one of continuous improvement. Patients play a key role in learning and contribute 







Communication about safety incidents 
A Communication in general is poor; it comes from the top down and staff are not able to 
speak to their managers about risk. Events are kept in-house and not 
talked about. 
The organisation is essentially closed. What communication there is, is negative, with a 
focus on blame. Patients are only given information which must be legally provided and 
only after exerting a lot of pressure on the organisation to give them access. 
 
B Communication in general is directive with managers issuing instructions. Staff are only 
able to speak to their managers after something has gone wrong. Communication is 
purpose designed and restricted to those involved in a specific incident. The patient is 
given the information the organisation feels is appropriate in a one-way communication. 
 
C There is a communication strategy. Policies and procedures are in place, and lots of records 
are kept. There is a lot of information collected from staff, patients and other organisations 
but it is not effectively utilised. This leads to an information overload meaning that little is 
actually done with the information received by staff. A risk communication system is in 
place, but no-one checks whether it is working. 
 
D The communications system and record keeping are fully audited. There is communication 
across organisations facilitating meaningful benchmarking. All levels of staff are involved, 
and there are robust mechanisms for them to feedback to the organisation. 
Information is shared, there are regular briefing sessions where staff are encouraged to 
set the agenda. Effective communication regarding safety issues is made with patient and 
public involvement. 
 
E Everybody communicates safety issues and learns from the experiences of others (good 
and bad). It is a transparent organisation and includes patient participation in risk 
management policy development. 
Innovative ideas are encouraged and staff are empowered to implement them. 













Personal Management and safety issues 
A Staff are seen just as bodies to fill posts. Recruitment and selection processes are 
rudimentary. The language used is negative and poor health and attendance records 
are seen as disciplinary matters. 
Staff feel unsupported and see Personnel as ‘them’ and not ‘us’. There is an 
underdeveloped staff policy, no structured HR development programme and no 
links with occupational health.  
B Job descriptions and staffing levels change only in response to problems, so there 
are good selection and retention policies in areas where the organisation has been 
vulnerable in the past. The atmosphere is of blame and punishment. Staff support is 
available, but is minimal and tokenistic. 
There is a very basic HR policy, but it is inflexible and developed in response to 
problems that have already been experienced. 
C Recruitment and retention procedures are in place and qualifications are always 
checked. The language used to manage staff is generally formal and neutral and 
guided by policies and procedures. 
Mechanisms for staff support are governed by a lot of paperwork and policies. The 
procedures on appraisal, staff development and occupational health are there but 
are inflexibly applied, and so do not always achieve what they were designed for. 
These procedures are seen as a tool for management to control staff.  
D There is some commitment to matching individuals to posts. There are 
attempts to understand why poor performance occurs, and visible, flexible support 
systems exist tailored to the needs of the individual. 
Personnel management processes are reviewed and changes are made when 
necessary. There is genuine concern about staff health, and good systems of 
appraisal, monitoring and review. Patient/carer input on safety and staffing issues is 
actively sought. 
There is demonstrable evidence of proactive measures taken in some areas.  
E Job specifications are designed to identify competencies using a Knowledge and 
Skills Framework. Reflection and review (both positive and negative) occur 
continuously and automatically. 
The organisation is committed to its staff, and everyone has confidence in the 
personnel management procedures that include mentorship and supervision. 
Patients and the public have meaningful involvement in the development and 
implementation of any policies related to safety and staffing issues. Personnel 
management is not a separate entity but an integral part of the organisation. 
Following a patient safety incident, a systems analysis is used to make decisions 
about the relative contribution of systems factors and the individual healthcare 
professional. This process informs decisions about staff suspensions and as such 







Staff Education and Training 
A Training has a low priority. The only training offered is that required by government. 
Staff education is seen by management as irritating, time consuming and costly. There are 
consequently no checks made on the quality or relevance of any 
education or training given with regards to career development of staff. Staff are seen as 
already trained to do their job, so why would they need more training? 
 
B Training occurs where there have been specific problems and relates almost entirely to high 
risk areas where obvious gaps are filled. It is the responsibility of the individual to read, act 
upon and fund their own educational needs. 
Education and training focus on maximising income and covering the organisation’s back 
rather than the career development of the staff. There is no dedicated training budget and 
staff appraisals occur for specific purposes.  
 
C The training programme reflects organisational needs so training is supported only if it 
benefits the organisation. No thought is given to actively involving patients in training. 
Basic Personal Development Plans are in place so everyone has their own file. However, 
these are not very effective as they are not properly resourced or given priority. There are a 
large number of courses on offer, however not all of these are relevant to the career 
development of the staff expected to make use of them. Training is seen as the way to 
prevent mistakes and appraisals are focused around this. 
 
D There is an attempt to identify the training needs of the organisation, and of individuals, and 
to match them up. Educational opportunities are well planned and resourced and are 
available from and for all relevant agencies. 
Training and education are seen as integral to the career development of individuals and are 
linked directly to other organisational systems, such as incident reporting. Appraisals are 
staff centred and are built around the needs of the individual. Preliminary attempts to involve 
patients and the public in staff training are underway and the organisation is starting to learn 
lessons from their experiences. 
 
E Individuals are empowered and motivated to undertake their own training needs analysis 
and negotiate their own training programme. Learning is a daily occurrence and does not 
happen solely in a classroom environment. 
Education is seen as being integral to the organisational culture. 
The approach to training and education is flexible and seen as a way of supporting staff in 
fulfilling their potential. Appraisals are initiated and managed by the staff themselves. 















A Individuals mainly work in isolation but where there are teams they are unit-disciplinary 
and dysfunctional. There are tensions between the team members and a rigid 
hierarchical structure. They are more like a collection of people brought together under 
the direction of a nominal leader. Information is not shared between team members. 
The team operates secretively.  
B People only work as a team following a negative event and to respond to external 
demands. Individuals are not actually committed to the team. 
There is a clear hierarchy in every team, corresponding to the hierarchy of the 
organisation as a whole. There are multidisciplinary teams, but they have been told to 
work together, and only empty to the ideals of team working. 
Information is cascaded to team members following an incident. The team operates 
defensively and newcomers are not welcomed. 
 
C Multidisciplinary teams are put together to respond to government policies, but there 
is no way of measuring how effective they are. Teamwork is seen by lower grades of 
staff as empty talk to the idea of empowerment. Teams are given lots of written 
information about how they should function. There are official mechanisms for the 
sharing of ideas or information within and across teams but these are not used 
effectively. 
Teams operate behind the scenes and generally within a single organisation. 
 
D Teams are multidisciplinary and time and resources are devoted to team 
development processes. 
Team structure is fluid, with people taking up the role most appropriate 
for them at the time. There is evaluation of how effective the team is and 
changes are made when necessary. Teams are collaborative and 
adaptable. 
Teams are open and may involve members external to the organisation 
 
E Regular and evaluated team resource management training is offered to fully integrated 
multidisciplinary teams. Team membership is flexible with a horizontal structure. 
Different people make equally valued contributions when appropriate. 
Teams are about shared understanding and vision rather than geographical proximity. 
Team working is the accepted way in the organisation. Teams are totally open, involving 
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 معلومات المشروع البحثى                                             
 
 
 المشروع البحثى؟ماهو الغرض من هذا 
 . المستشفى فى المتبعه المرضى سلامة انظمةهذا المشروع يهدف الى معرفة  •
 
 
 لماذا تم اختيارك للمشاركة فى هذا المشروع البحثى؟
 لقد تم التعرف على اسمك وتم اختيارك  من سجلات العاملين بالمستشفى. •
 
 
 بحثى؟ماهى الاشياء التى تنطوى على المشاركة فى هذا المشروع ال
. المرضى سلامة بخصوص المتبعه الانظمه عن نقاش مجموعات فى المشاركه منك يتطلب •
 النقاط شمولية من والتاكد البحث عملية لاثراء وذلك رقمى مسجل عبر النقاش تسجيل سيتضمن
المشاركة فى هذا المشروع البحثى اختيلرية ولن تؤثر على  عملك  .اانقاش اثناء اثبرت التى
 ى المستشفىوترقيتك ف
 
 
 ماذا أفعل اذا كنت أرغب فى المشاركة؟
اذا كنت ترغب فى المشاركة فى هذا المشروع البحثى فما عليك الا التوقيع فى استمارة الموافقة  •
 وتسليمه لدكتوره علياء فيصل بالصيدلية. 
 
 
 ماذا أفعل اذا لم اكن أرغب فى المشاركة؟
ا المشروع البحثى فما عليك الا  ان ترجع الاقرار اذا كنت اتخذت قرارك بعدم المشاركة فى هذ •
 من غير امضاء. 
 
 
 ماذا أفعل اذا لم اكن متأكدا من المشاركة فى هذا المشروع البحثى؟ 
يمكن الحصول على مزيد من المعلومات حول هذا المشروع البحثى عن طريق الاتصال  •
 بالباحث الرئيسى على رقم التلفون أعلاه.




 هل يجب على المشاركة فى هذا المشروع البحثى؟ 






 كيف يتم الحفاظ على سرية المعلومات والمعاملة بها؟
  -حث اجراءات صارمة لحماية سرية وخصوصية المشاركين وهذه تشمل الاتى:لقد وضع فريق الب
 حفظ المعلومات الشخصية مثل الاسم والعنوان  بمعزل عن بيانات المشروع الاخرى.  •
 لا يتم حفظ البيانات الشخصية للمشاركين فى سجلات الحاسب الالى. •
 فريق البحث فقط.  يقتصرالوصول للبيانات الشخصية للعاملين المختارين لاعضاء •




 من سيكون قادرا على استخدام هذه البيانات؟
الوصول للمعلومات والبيانات الخاصة بهذا المشروع البحثى ستكون متاحة فقط للباحثين الذين  •
الاخلاقية العلمية ، وسوف يتم تحليل نتائج هذا البحث بواسطة الباحث الرئيسى  لديهم الموافقة
 كجزء من مشروع درجة الدكتوراة. 




 شروع البحثى؟ من هو الممول والمسئول عن التنظيم لهذا الم
الباحث الرئيسى لهذا المشروع البحثى طالب فى كلية الملك فى لندن بجانب أنه صيدلى فى  •
 مستشفى الذرة ومحاضر بجامعة العلوم الطبية والتكنلوجيا. 
 ويتم التمويل لهذا المشروع حاليا بالموارد الذاتية وموارد حكومة السودان.
 واسطة لجنة مستقلة لخبراء علميين ووافقت عليه لقد تمت مراجعة هذا المشروع البحثى ب
 لجنة أخلاقيات المهنة بجامعة العلوم الطبية والتكنلوجيا ووفقا للوائح وزارة الصحة فى حكومة السودان. 
 
 
 ماذا لو سارت الامور بطريقة غير مرضية؟ 
ليس من المتصور أن هذا المشروع البحثى سوف يتسبب فى أى ضرر لاى من  .a






 ولمزيد من المعلومات يمكنك الاتصال ب: 
 علياء فيصل المهدى
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 .االانظمه المتبعه للتاكد من سلامة المريضأنا باحثة من جامعة العلوم الطبية والتكنلوجيا. عايزة أعرف 
 
 .د. علياء فيصلالمسؤول من الدراسة دى هى باحثة من جامعة العلوم الطبيه والتكنلوجيا وأسمها 
 
 .تشارك فى مجموعة نقاش عن انظمة سلامة المريض حنطلب منك انك
 
م حاجة عايزاكم تعرفوا انو البيانات حتكون  سرية جدا وماحيطلع عليها زول بدون موافقتكم. الزول وأه 
 كان موافق يمضى هنا............................................................................
 
 وبعد ماشفت وقريت وفهمت الكلام ده أوافق أن اشارك فى الدراسة دى. 
 .................................................................................................... الاسم
 الامضاء.................................................................................................
 مزيد من المعلومات الرجاء الاتصال ب: 




 PARTICIPANT INFORMATION LEAFLET AND 
CONSENT FORM FOR FOCUS GROUPS ON PATIENT SAFETY 
CULTURE – ENGLISH  
 
Participant Information Leaflet 
An exploratory Study into patient safety culture using Manchester Patient Safety Framework 
 
You are being invited to take part in a project that aims to explore patient safety culture at the cancer 
hospital. This project is part of a PhD research project but it intends to help the centre to improve its 
current services and improve patient care. 
Before you agree to take part in this project, it is important for you to understand the purpose of this 
project and what it involves. Please take time to read this information carefully and take home to 
discuss with others. 
If you have any questions, or if you wish to receive more information, please contact Alya Faysal on 
00249912162569 
Thank you for taking the time to consider taking part. We hope that you feel you are able to contribute. 
Your views are very important and will be of great help to improve chemotherapy services at the 
centre. 
 
Alya Faysal Al- Mahdi 
Lead Researcher 
PhD Student, Kings College London 
Lead Clinical Pharmacist 








What is the purpose of this project? 
The current project aims to explore patient safety culture with regards to prescribing, dispensing and 
administration of chemotherapy at RICK. This part of the project will explore the safeguards in place 
to protect patients against patient harm, the potential causes of adverse events and the feasible 
interventions to address when prescribing chemotherapy. 
By analyzing the views of prescribers, researchers identify the potential causes of adverse events 
associated with chemotherapy and how to address them. 
Why have I been chosen for this project? 
Your name has been identified from the doctors/pharmacist list from the Pharmacy Department. 
What does taking part in this project involve? 
Taking part in this project involves answering questions in a focus group which will take approximately 
an hour. The focus group will consist of 4-6 members of the prescribing team. 
What should I do if I want to take part? 
If you want to take part, we ask you to sign the consent form and agree to taking part in the focus 
group discussion. 
What should I do if I don’t want to take part? 
If you have decided that you don’t want to contribute to this project, you are free to turn down the 
request verbally and not sign the consent form. 
What can I do if I am unsure of taking part in this project? 
More details about this project can be obtained by contacting the lead researcher on the number 
shown above. You can also request a face to face meeting at the pharmacy department before the 
focus group date. 
Do I have to take part in this project? 
No, it is entirely up to you if you choose not to participate in this project.  
How will the information be kept confidential? 
The research team has put a number of rigorous procedures in place to protect the confidentiality of 




• Keeping information such as name and other personal details in separate files where they 
will not be linked to the focus group discussions. 
• Not keeping a computer record of personal details of the participants. 
• Access to personal data is restricted to the research team only. 
• Destruction of voice recording after the analysis stage. 
Who will be able to use my information? 
Information from this project will be available only for researchers who have the relevant scientific 
ethical approval. The results will be analysed by the lead researcher as part of a PhD project. 
The results of this project will be published in international and local scientific journals without 
mention of personal details of the participants. 
Who is organizing and funding this project? 
The project is led by a researcher who is a student at King’s College London, a pharmacist at RICK and 
a lecturer at the University of Medical Sciences and Technology. It is being organized by Alya Faysal, 
Cate Whittlesea (King’s College London) and Graham Davies (King’s College London). It is currently 
funded by personal resources. The project has been reviewed by an independent scientific panel and 
approved by UMST ethics Committee in full accordance of the regulations of the Ministry of Health, 
government of Sudan. 
What if something goes wrong? 
It is not envisaged that this project will cause harm to any of the participants. 
Contacts for further information 
If you require any further information you can contact: Alya Faisal Al-Mahdi on: 00249912162569 
Participation in this project is entirely voluntary and your response will not affect your rights in any 
way. 







 CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPATING IN FOCUS 
GROUPS -SAFETY CULTURE 
 
                                                     
CONSENT FORM 
Focus group exercise on patient safety culture 
 
Research Team Lead: Alya Faysal Al-Mahdi (RICK) 
 
You are provided with two copies of this consent form; one is to be returned to the research team 
and the other for you to keep. 
1. I have read and understand the information sheet for the above study and have had the 
opportunity to ask questions. 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time 
without giving reason. 
3. I agree to what I say during focus group discussions and my views can only be used, 
anonymously, in the presentation of the research. 
4. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
If I require a report of the results of this research project, I will contact the lead researcher by phone 
on 00249912162569. 
………………………  …………………………  ……………… 
Name of participant Signature   Date 
 
………………………  …………………………   













 ENGLISH MAPSAF EVALUATION FORM 




Dimension of patient safety culture A B C D E 
1. Commitment to overall continuous improvement  
 
     
2. Priority given to safety 
 
     
3. System errors and individual responsibility 
 
     
4. Recording incidents and best practice      
5. Evaluating incidents and best practice 
 
     
6. Learning and effecting change 
 
     
7. Communication about safety issues 
 
     
8. Personnel management and safety issues 
 
     
9. Staff education and training 
 
     
10. Team working 
 
     






 NOITAULAVE FASPAM CIBARA 
 ( المرضى سلامة تقيم )noitaulavE FaSPaM
 
 
 المرضى سلامة ثقافة ابعاد A B C D E
 الالتزام الشامل للتقدم المستمر .1     
     
  الاولوية للسلامة .2
     
 أخطاء النظام والمسئوليات الفردية .3
 
     
  تسجيل الحوادث وأفضل السبل لذلك .4
 
     
 تقييم الحوادث والممارسة الجيدة .5
 
     
 التعلم واحداث التغير .6
 
     
  مواضيع السلامةالتواصل فى  .7
 ادارة شئون العاملين وأمور السلامة .8     
 تعليم وتدريب الموظفين .9     















Appendix 4.1  Participant Information leaflet and for doctor key informant interviews  
Participant Information Leaflet 





You are being invited to take part in a project that aims to identify the nature and frequency of 
prescribing errors at the cancer hospital. This project is part of a PhD research project but it intends 
to help RICK improve its current services and improve patient care. 
Before you agree to take part in this project, it is important for you to understand the purpose of this 
project and what it involves. Please take time to read this information carefully and take home to 
discuss with others. 
If you have any questions, or if you wish to receive more information, please contact Alya Faysal on 
00249912162569 
Thank you for taking the time to consider taking part. We hope that you feel you are able to contribute. 
Your views are very important and will be of great help to improve chemotherapy services at RICK. 
 
Alya Faysal Al- Mahdi 
Lead Researcher 
PhD Student, Kings College London 
Lead Clinical Pharmacist 













What is the purpose of this project? 
The current project aims to explore the nature, frequency and potential causes of medication 
errors. This part of the project will explore the methods used by doctors in prescribing and 
what steps they take to reduce medication errors. 
By analyzing the views of prescribers, researchers will be able to map out the chemotherapy 
process and identify areas of improvement. 
 
Why have I been chosen for this project? 
Your name has been identified from the prescribing doctors list that is sent to pharmacy. 
 
What does taking part in this project involve? 
Taking part in this project involves answering questions in a face to face interview. The 
interview will take 30-54 minutes.  
What should I do if I want to take part? 
If you want to take part, we ask you to sign the consent form and agree to taking part in the 
interview. 
 
What should I do if I don’t want to take part? 
If you have decided that you don’t want to contribute to this project, you are free to turn down 
the request for interview verbally and not sign the consent form. 
 
What can I do if I am unsure of taking part in this project? 
More details about this project can be obtained by contacting the lead researcher on the 
number shown above. You can also request a face to face meeting at RICK pharmacy 
department before the formal interview date. 
 
Do I have to take part in this project? 
No, it is entirely up to you if you choose not to participate in this project.  
 
How will the information be kept confidential? 
The research team has put a number of rigorous procedures in place to protect the 
confidentiality of participants. These include: 
• Keeping information such as name and other personal details in separate files 
where they will not be linked to the interviews. 
• Not keeping a computer record of personal details of the participants. 




Who will be able to use my information? 
Information from this project will be available only for researchers who have the relevant 
scientific ethical approval. The results will be analysed by the lead researcher as part of a PhD 
project. 
The results of this project will be published in international and local scientific journals without 
mention of personal details of the participants. 
 
Who is organizing and funding this project? 
The project is led by a researcher who is a student at King’s College London, a pharmacist at 
RICK and a lecturer at the University of Medical Sciences and Technology. It is being 
organized by Alya Faysal, Cate Whittlesea (King’s College London) and Graham Davies 
(King’s College London). It is currently funded by personal resources. The project has been 
reviewed by an independent scientific panel and approved by UMST ethics Committee in full 
accordance of the regulations of the Ministry of Health, government of Sudan. 
 
What if something goes wrong? 
It is not envisaged that this project will cause harm to any of the participants. 
 
Contacts for further information? 
If you require further information, please contact: Alya Faysal Al-Mahdi 
On -00249912162569 
 
Participation in this project is entirely voluntary and your response will not affect your 
rights in any way. 















Appendix 4.2 Consent form for doctor key informant interviews  
 
                      
 
CONSENT FORM 






Research Team Lead: Alya Faysal Al-Mahdi (RICK) 
 
You are provided with two copies of this consent form; one is to be returned to the research 
team and the other for you to keep. 
 
1. I have read and understand the information sheet for the above study and have had 
the opportunity to ask questions. 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any 
time without giving reason. 
3. I agree to what I say during interviews and my views can only be used, anonymously, 
in the presentation of the research. 
4. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
If I require a report of the results of this research project, I will contact the lead researcher by 
phone on 00249912162569. 
 
………………………  …………………………  ……………… 
Name of participant  Signature    Date 
 
………………………  …………………………   





Appendix 4.3 Key informant interview schedule – Doctors 






I am Alya Al-Mahdi and I will be conducting this interview to identify the process involved in 
prescribing chemotherapy to patients.  
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study which aims to identify the processes used by doctors 
to prescribe prescriptions and how errors are managed.  I would be grateful if you can give me a verbal 
confirmation that you have read the information sheet and that you have signed the consent form. 
This interview will take 30-45 minutes during which I will be grateful if you explain to me the process 
you use in prescribing chemotherapy and what steps you take to avoid errors. This interview is not 
meant to assess the accuracy of your actions and there are no right or wrong answers to the questions 
below.  
You have the right to withdraw from this interview at any time if you feel you don’t want to continue 
any more. I would like to assure you that all the information, obtained in this interview will remain 
confidential and will only be used for research reasons. Any personal data will be anonymized during 
the analysis, so I will not use your proper name. 
I would like you to explain things to me as if I am a new medical officer who has just joined this centre. 
I may ask for some clarification or examples about the issues you describe. In addition, please feel free 
to stop me if you have a question or clarification. 
I will be taking notes during this interview, however, I will also be using a digital recorder to make sure 
that I capture the whole conversation. I will destroy the recorded data after completing my PhD 













I want you to give me some background information about the clinic where you work: 
How is the outpatient clinic organized?  
We have two clinics 
How does the clinic operate? 
What types of staff are involved? Number of staff and responsibility  
What is your role in prescribing chemotherapy? 
Describe a busy day what happens on a normal day and what happens on a busy day. 
 
Grand Tour questions - The prescribing process 
Now we would like to focus on the prescribing process.  Now look at this patient file and the 
prescription form. 
Can you describe how you use the patient file to aid prescribing? 
Can you please describe the steps you take when you write the prescription? 
Do you use any strategies/ references, equipment to help you prescribe appropriately? 
Under what circumstances would you adopt a different process.  
(prompts e.g. under the direction of a senior, when copying from the file, under the request of a 
patient)  
Mino Tour questions - Training for prescription writing 
Where you give training on how to write prescriptions? (prompts; undergraduate training, house 
officer training, registrar training, RICK training) 
What other learning experience have you used to develop your prescription writing skills? 
Have you modified your prescription writing in response to an error? Please explain further 
Will you say you are more confident now to prescribe than when you first joined RICK. Explain further. 
Grand Tour Questions - Prescription Errors 
International studies have shown that medication errors do occur, tell me about the most common 
type of medication error that occurs with chemotherapy prescriptions. 
In your opinion, which is the most serious error? 
(prompts; overdose, patient not fit, omission errors, failure to give medicines.) 
Are you aware of a prescription error that has led to patient harm? Give me an example of that. 
(prompts; patient had a more severe adverse drug reaction, unexpected hospital admission, 
permanent disability, death) 
What procedure would you follow when a medication error occurs? 




What steps would you take if are notified of a prescription error by a patient? 
Do you think there were any factors that contributed to the errors you describe? (Prompts, phone 
calls, interruptions, busy work environment, demanding patients/ co-patients) 
Conclusion 
 I am very grateful for providing me with information regarding work practice at the chemotherapy 
clinic. 
In your opinion, are there any changes needed to reduce the incidence of medication errors? 
Thank you very much for making time to talk to me. If in the future, I need any more information or 
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Appendix 4.5  Prescription Error Recording Form 
 
An investigation into the nature and frequency of prescription errors- Error Recording Form 
Date: 
Day (Circle as appropriate) 
 
Sun     Mon    Tue      Wed       Thu 










Where did the prescription come from (circle): 






JReg       SReg     FReg    ACont            JCon        SCon 
Type of error Error present 
Please tick box 
or circle N/A 
Wrong chemotherapy drug/regimen  □ 
Patient IS NOT fit to receive chemotherapy  □ 
Protocol INAPPROPRIATE to the disease histopathology  □ 
Body Surface Area INCORRECTLY calculated (EXCEPT for carboplatin)  □ 
Doses INCORRECTLY calculated (Check below according to protocol and where appropriate)  
INACCURATE calvert calculation for carboplatin □              
INACCURATE calculation according to BSA for other drugs than 
carboplatin 
□              
According to renal function □               
According to hepatic Function □               
cumulative / maximum dose reached □               
Prescribed an appropriate diluents/infusion □ 
Prescribed an appropriate route   □ 
DID NOT prescribe appropriate supportive therapy (Check below according to protocol)   
Anti-emetics  □ 
Pre-medication for taxanes □               
Intravenous fluids  □              
Electrolytes  □              
Others (e.g. mesna, leucovorin, atropine, mannitol) □              
Prescribed a drug, dose or route that is not that intended  □ 
Writing illegibly   □ 
Writing a drug’s name using non standard abbreviations   □ 
Omitting the route of administration of a drug that can be given by more than one route   □ 
Omission of the length of infusion  □ 
Transcribing a medication order incorrectly from the patient original plan  □ 
Write milligrams when micrograms are intended  □ 




Appendix 4.6  Participant Information Leaflet for Critical Incident Interviews - Doctors 
 
You are being invited to take part in a project that aims to identify the nature and frequency of 
prescribing errors at the cancer hospital. This project is part of a PhD research project but it intends 
to help RICK improve its current services and improve patient care. 
Before you agree to take part in this project, it is important for you to understand the purpose of this 
project and what it involves. Please take time to read this information carefully and take home to 
discuss with others. 
If you have any questions, or if you wish to receive more information, please contact Alya Faysal on 
00249912162569 
Thank you for taking the time to consider taking part. We hope that you feel you are able to contribute. 
Your views are very important and will be of great help to improve chemotherapy services at RICK. 
 
Alya Faysal Al- Mahdi 
Lead Researcher 
PhD Student, Kings College London 
Lead Clinical Pharmacist 




Participant Information Leaflet 
Exploratory Study to identify the frequency, nature and causes of 
prescription errors 




What is the purpose of this project? 
The current project aims to explore the nature, frequency and potential causes of medication errors. 
This part of the project involves identifying prescription errors and their causes. If you are identified 
as a doctor who was involved in a prescription error, you will be asked to attend a critical incident 
interview that focuses on the causes of the error. By analysing the views of prescribers, researchers 
will be able to identify common causes of errors and their possible solutions 
Why have I been chosen for this project? 
Your name has been identified from the prescribing doctors list that is kept in the pharmacy 
department. 
What does taking part in this project involve? 
Taking part in this project involves answering questions in a face to face interview. The interview will 
take 30-54 minutes. The interviews will be taped using a digital recorder to allow a more 
comprehensive analysis of the issues discussed. 
What should I do if I want to take part? 
If you want to take part, we ask you to sign the consent form and agree to taking part in the interview. 
What should I do if I don’t want to take part? 
If you have decided that you don’t want to contribute to this project, you are free to turn down the 
request for interview verbally and not sign the consent form. 
What can I do if I am unsure of taking part in this project? 
More details about this project can be obtained by contacting the lead researcher on the number 
shown above. You can also request a face to face meeting at RICK pharmacy department before the 
formal interview date. 
Do I have to take part in this project? 
No, it is entirely up to you if you choose not to participate in this project.  
How will the information be kept confidential? 
The research team has put a number of rigorous procedures in place to protect the confidentiality of 
participants. These include: 
• Keeping information such as name and other personal details in separate files where they 
will not be linked to the interviews. 
• Not keeping a computer record of personal details of the participants. 
• Access to personal data is restricted to the research team only. 




Who will be able to use my information? 
Information from this project will be available only for researchers who have the relevant scientific 
ethical approval. The results will be analysed by the lead researcher as part of a PhD project. 
The results of this project will be published in international and local scientific journals without 
mention of personal details of the participants. 
Who is organizing and funding this project? 
The project is led by a researcher who is a student at King’s College London, a pharmacist at RICK and 
a lecturer at the University of Medical Sciences and Technology. It is being organized by Alya Faysal, 
Cate Whittlesea (King’s College London) and Graham Davies (King’s College London). It is currently 
funded by personal resources. The project has been reviewed by an independent scientific panel and 
approved by UMST ethics Committee in full accordance of the regulations of the Ministry of Health, 
government of Sudan. 
 
What if something goes wrong? 
It is not envisaged that this project will cause harm to any of the participants. 
 
Contacts for further information 
If you require any further information, please contact: Alya Faysal Al-Mahdi on: 00249912162569 
 
Participation in this project is entirely voluntary and your response will not affect your rights in any 
way. 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet which is yours to keep. 
 




Appendix 4.7 Consent Form for critical incident interviews 
 
    
 
Research Team Lead: Alya Faysal Al-Mahdi (RICK) 
You are provided with two copies of this consent form; one is to be returned to the research team 
and the other for you to keep. 
1. I have read and understand the information sheet for the above study and have had the 
opportunity to ask questions. 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time 
without giving reason. 
3. I agree to what I say during interviews and my views can only be used, anonymously, in the 
presentation of the research. 
4. I agree to take part in the above study. 
If I require a report of the results of this research project, I will contact the lead researcher by phone 
on 00249912162569. 
 
………………………  …………………………  ……………… 
Name of participant  Signature    Date 
 
………………………  …………………………   
Name of researcher  Signature     
CONSENT FORM 
Exploratory Study to identify the causes of cytotoxic chemotherapy 
 prescribing errors 
 




Appendix 4.8 Critical Incident Interview Schedule 
Interview schedule for the assessment of medication errors 
 
My name is Alya Al-Mahdi and I am the principle researcher on a research project exploring types and 
causes of chemotherapy errors which is part of a PhD study based at King’s College. 
I am grateful for your participation in this research project. I am interested to find out what happened 
and how it happened and NOT that you were involved in an error. All the information provided will be 
treated as strictly confidential and cannot be traced to the source. Participating in this interview is 
entirely voluntary and you may withdraw at any point. This information will not affect your 
employment in this hospital. 
This interview is concerning the medication incident ............................................which occurred on 
.................................when you prescribed chemotherapy.  I want you to describe how and why the 
incident occurred. I may stop you during our conversation to clarify any unclear points. 
 
1. Explain how the error occurred. 
 
2. Can you describe the steps you took when writing this prescription? 
 
 
3. Describe the working environment when this incident occurred (prompts: busy, interruptions, 
distractions, patients). 
 
4. In your opinion, which factors do you think contributed to this incident? 
 
 
5. If you were to repeat this prescription, what steps would you take to prevent this error? 
 
6. Do you have any equipment needs relating to prescribing medicines? 
Thank you for taking the time to talk to me about this incident. I may want to come back to you if I 
need more clarification. 
 




Appendix 4.9 Schedule for Focus Groups – Doctors  
 
Focus Group Schedule 
 




Good morning and welcome. Thank you for taking the time to take part in this discussion on the nature 
and potential causes of adverse events related to chemotherapy use. I am here today in my capacity 
as a researcher from King’s College London working on a PhD project to identify areas which affect 
patient safety in the chemotherapy department 
Aim of the study 
As part of my PhD project, we identified areas of common prescribing adverse events and their 
potential causes. This discussion is to obtain your opinions and experiences with regards to issues 
associated with prescribing of cytotoxics in this hospital. 
Confidentiality 
I am interested to hear your opinions and experiences with regards to issues with prescribing 
chemotherapy. There are no right or wrong answers and your views will be treated as strictly 
confidential. The data will be anonymised during analysis and anyone outside this room will not be 
able to link the views expressed by the participants to this discussion. I would like to ask you to freely 
express your views or add comments about your experiences, however, you should not feel under 
pressure to say anything if you don’t have a contribution. You have the right to leave this discussion 
at any time if you feel you don’t want to continue. 
Recording the discussion 
I will be taking notes and using a digital recorder during this discussion to make sure that I 
capture all the issues you raise. I will destroy the recorded data after completing my PhD 
studies. My assistant Sara will be taking most of the notes and will not take part in the 
discussions. I would like to ask you not to talk when others are speaking so that I will be able 
to identify all the points raised. 
Language of discussion 
I will ask the questions in English and you can answer in either English or Arabic or whichever mix you 
are comfortable with. If you want me to repeat the question in Arabic, please ask. 
Areas to be covered 
The following areas will be covered during the discussion: 
 
 




1. The safeguards in the system to ensure safe prescribing of chemotherapy to protect patients 
from harm 
2. Factors contribute to prescribing errors 
3. Intervention or systems which could further safeguard patients. 
Just to repeat again; I am only interested to hear your views and opinions and there are no right or 
wrong answers. 
If you have any questions at this point, I will be happy to answer them before we progress with the 
discussion. 
Introduction 
First, I am going to set the digital recorder running before we start on the introductions. I am going to 
distrbute a piece of paper to help me differentiate voices on the recorder. ( at this point each 
participant will be handed a piece of paper stating: I am participant number (1,2,3,4,5,or 6) and I am 
consenting to this focus group discussion). 
Please read what is in front of you in your normal voice. 
( allow the participants to complete the exercise and thank them before staring on an 
indtroduction of the topic to be discussed) 
There are many definitions to prescribing errors and for the sake of this research we will adopt 
the following definition: 
A prescription error occurs when- 
“as a result of a prescribing decision or prescription writing process, there is an unintentional 
significant: 
  (1) reduction in the probability of treatment being timely and effective or 
 (2) increase in the risk of harm when compared with generally accepted practice (Dean 
2000) 
The following are the common types of prescribing errors: 
• Incomplete prescription 
• Use of non-standard abbreviations 
• Incorrect dose 
• Incorrect frequency 
• Illegible prescription 
• Incorrect rate of infusion 
• Incorrect route 
• Transcription error 
• Inappropriate choice of medication 




(pass around a handout of a definition of the above categories) 
 
Safeguards to protect patients against potential harm 
I am going to ask you in turn to  to describe for me the process that you follow when you see a 
patient who is due to receive a chemotherapy prescription. 
What are the formal and informal safeguards to protect patients against harm in case of a 
prescribing error in chemotherapy? 
Encourage discussion in the group and ensure the following areas are covered: 
• Training and CPD 
• Competency and Prescribing privilegs 
• Knowledge about drug 
• Evidence based medicines and protocols 
• Checking dose and contraindications 
• Second checks 
• Meetings and grand rounds 
• Patient consent  
• Monitoring patients and Follow up 
• Use of abbreviations 
• Writing in patients records 
 
( handy phrases: do you think?, What is your opinion on? What are your thoughts on that? How 
do you feel about…? what do think the impact of …….is?) 
 
Types of prescribing errors 
What are the most common types of prescribing errors in your opinion? 
Are you aware of any prescribing errors that have resulted in actual patient harm? 
(Encourage participants to tell stories of errors they have witnessed) 
Ensure the following are covered: 
• Dose errors 
• Route  and frequency errors 
• Legibility and completeness of prescriptions 
• Choice of medication 
• Transcription errors or mishearing of orders 




( handy phrases: have you ever been involved in? can you give me an example? What was your 
experience? What happened to the patient? What happened to the healthcare staff? ) 
 
 
Factors contributing to the occurrence of a prescribing error 
Focusing exericse 1 
• Bearing in mind some of the experiences some of you have described,on the piece of 
paper in front of you, write down the factors that you think may contribute to prescribing 
errors. 
( Allow participants time to write this down) 
• Ask participants if they have completed this exercise 
• Encourage discussion among the group 
• Ensure discussion covers the following points: 
o Workload 
o Interruptions 
o Patient knowledge 
o Prescriber training and knowledge 
o Availability of equipment necessary for prescribing- references, weight and height 
machines, calculators 
o Patient pressure 
o Work stressors 
▪ Work allocation within the prescribing team 
▪ Busy work environment 
▪ Job dissatisfaction 
▪ Burnout 
▪ Stress 
(Write the contributory factors on a flip chart) 
( Handy phrases: how do you feel about that? Tell me more…., do you think…..? what about….? ) 
 
How are prescribing errors managed? 
We will now move on to management of prescribing errors. 
If you were aware that either yourself or a colleague were involved in a precirbing error, what steps 
would you take to manage that error? 
(encourage debate and discussion) 




Ensure the following points are covered 
• Reporting errors 
• Patient management  
• Learning from errors 
(Encourage stories of how errors were previously managed) 
( handy phrase: what would you do if……? Are you aware…..? would you….?) 
Interventions that could be designed to reduce the factors contributing to prescribing errors 
On a piece of paper in front of you, please write down what strategies could be developled to address 
the contributory factors listed on the flipchart? 
(Encourage the group to debate the suggested solutions) 
What other strategies could be used to improve the prescribing process? 
Ensure the discussion covers the following points: 
• Workload allocation 
• Organisation of outpatient clinic 
• Patient files 
• Design of a pre-printed chemotherapy prescription  
• Patient education  
• Pre-clerking clinics 
• Number of staff 
• Staff mix 
( write on the flip chart the solutions) 
( handy phrases- what do you think..? what about…..? what are your thoughts on….?) 
What are the high risk areas  to be addressed? 
(focusing exercise 2 – distribute a handout of a bar chart that displays the frequency and nature of 
prescribing errors as identified in the prescription review project) 
Now we are going to idenfity the high risk areas of prescribing errors as identified in  my research. 
Please examine the bar chart in front of you and tell me your opinion. 
Allow the participants 10 minutes to debate and discuss  
Ensure the following points  are covered: 
• Potential impact of prescribing error on patient outcomes 
• Frequency of prescribing errors 
• High risk area 
( handy phrases- why do you think…..? what about…? Do you think…?) 
 





What contributory factors are priority areas to be addressed? 
What do you think are the most important factors contributing to chemothera prescribing errors in 
our hospital? 
 
In your opinion what are the priority interventions? 
We would now like to prioritise the likely intervention that will address these prescribing errors. 
 (Allow the participants 10 minutes to debate and discuss) 
• Using a new sheet on the flip chart, note down the interventions suggested in the 
order they were mentioned during the discussion. 
Get the group to prioritize the interventions in terms of clinical importance and feasibility. Ensure the 
following points are covered: 
• Pre-printed prescriptions 
• Workoad allocation 
• Comptency based programs 
• Support for prescribers from other staff 
In high risk industries such as aviation, safety has been improved dramatically by application of a safety 
culture. What is your opinion on that and its possible implication in our setting? 
 Ensure the following points are covered: 
• The high risk nature of healthcare 
• Reporting and learning from errors 
• Blame and accountability 
( handy phrases: what is your opinion…? That’s interesting, how can we develop this further? Does 
anyone have a different view…?, have you come across ?) 
 
Conclusion 
We are coming to a close to our discussion. Does anyone have anyhting more to say? 







































Potential causes and solutions to prescription errors associated 
with chemotherapy 
Focus Group Exercises 




Categories of prescription errors 
Category Description 
Schedule 6. Continuation of drug for a longer duration than necessary e.g. extra cycle 
prescribed/ Prescribing a protocol for inaccurate length of therapy 
7. No indication for drug prescribed 
8. Duplication of therapy/ prescribing therapy with increased frequency 




10. Prescription of drug to which patient has significant allergy 
11. Prescription of drug to which patient has clinical contra-indication such as low 
hematology parameters, renal failure or liver impairment 
12. Continuing a drug in the event of a clinically significant adverse drug reaction 
13. Prescription of drug that is contra-indicated due to drug interaction 
14. Prescription of anthracyclines in a patient who has an ejection fraction less 
than 30%. 
15. Prescription of chemotherapy when neutrophil count <1.5x106//ml or 
haemoglobin <6g/dl or platelets <150x106/ml 
16. Prescription of chemotherapy when ECOG performance score is>2 (Oken et 
al., 1982) 
17. Prescription of a taxane when liver function tests: bilirubin 5x upper limit of 
normal or liver transaminase level >10x upper limit of normal 
18. Prescription of cisplatin when renal function in below 30ml/min 
Choice of drug 3. Prescription of a protocol/ drug that was not intended 
4. Prescription of a protocol that is not recommended for management of the 
specific  
Wrong dose 8. Exceeding the maximum cumulative lifetime dosage for anthracylines and 
similar drugs 
9. Dose/rate mismatch for infusions 
10. Overdose/underdose by more than 5% due to inaccurate calculation of Body 
Surface Area. 
11. Overdose/underdose by more than 5% due to inaccurate application of 
Calvert equation for carboplatin 
12. Overdose by more than 5% due to low renal function or increased liver test 
13. Choosing a dose more/less than 5% of that specified by the chemotherapy 
protocol 
14. Wrong dose calculation according to renal and liver function 
Administration 
of drug 
1. Wrong route 
2. Wrong formulation 
3. Administration times incorrect or not specified 
4. Instructions for IV administration incorrect  
5.  Start date or days of chemotherapy incorrect or not specified 
Prescription 
details 
1. Product or formulation not specified 
2. Strength or dose not specified 
3. Route not specified 
4. Prescription not signed 
5. Prescription with missing patient name 
6. Prescription with missing date 
7.  Drug written using inaccurate spelling or abbreviations 































































































































Appendix 4.11 PIL for Focus Groups on Prescribing errors 
Participant Information Leaflet 
Potential causes and solutions to preventable adverse events associated with 
chemotherapy prescribing 
 
You are being invited to take part in a project that aims to identify the nature and frequency of adverse 
events associated with prescribing chemotherapy at the cancer hospital. This project is part of a PhD 
research project but it intends to help the centre to improve its current services and improve patient 
care. 
Before you agree to take part in this project, it is important for you to understand the purpose of this 
project and what it involves. Please take time to read this information carefully and take home to 
discuss with others. 
If you have any questions, or if you wish to receive more information, please contact Alya Faysal on 
00249912162569 
Thank you for taking the time to consider taking part. We hope that you feel you are able to contribute. 
Your views are very important and will be of great help to improve chemotherapy services at the 
centre. 
 
Alya Faysal Al- Mahdi 
Lead Researcher 
PhD Student, Kings College London 
Lead Clinical Pharmacist 










What is the purpose of this project? 
The current project aims to explore the nature, frequency and potential causes of adverse events 
associated with prescribing chemotherapy. This part of the project will explore the safeguards in place 
to protect patients against patient harm, the potential causes of adverse events and the feasible 
interventions to address when prescribing chemotherapy. 
By analyzing the views of prescribers, researchers identify the potential causes of adverse events 
associated with chemotherapy and how to address them. 
Why have I been chosen for this project? 
Your name has been identified from the prescribing doctors list that in the Pharmacy Department. 
What does taking part in this project involve? 
Taking part in this project involves answering questions in a focus group discussion which will take 
approximately an hour. The focus group will consist of 4-6 members of the prescribing team. 
What should I do if I want to take part? 
If you want to take part, we ask you to sign the consent form and agree to taking part in the focus 
group discussion. 
What should I do if I don’t want to take part? 
If you have decided that you don’t want to contribute to this project, you are free to turn down the 
request verbally and not sign the consent form. 
What can I do if I am unsure of taking part in this project? 
More details about this project can be obtained by contacting the lead researcher on the number 
shown above. You can also request a face to face meeting at the pharmacy department before the 
focus group date. 
Do I have to take part in this project? 
No, it is entirely up to you if you choose not to participate in this project.  
How will the information be kept confidential? 
The research team has put a number of rigorous procedures in place to protect the confidentiality of 
participants. These include: 




• Keeping information such as name and other personal details in separate files where they 
will not be linked to the focus group discussions. 
• Not keeping a computer record of personal details of the participants. 
• Access to personal data is restricted to the research team only. 
• Destruction of voice recording after the analysis stage. 
 
Who will be able to use my information? 
Information from this project will be available only for researchers who have the relevant scientific 
ethical approval. The results will be analysed by the lead researcher as part of a PhD project. 
The results of this project will be published in international and local scientific journals without 
mention of personal details of the participants. 
Who is organizing and funding this project? 
The project is led by a researcher who is a student at King’s College London, a pharmacist at RICK and 
a lecturer at the University of Medical Sciences and Technology. It is being organized by Alya Faysal, 
Cate Whittlesea (King’s College London) and Graham Davies (King’s College London). It is currently 
funded by personal resources. The project has been reviewed by an independent scientific panel and 
approved by UMST ethics Committee in full accordance of the regulations of the Ministry of Health, 
government of Sudan. 
What if something goes wrong? 
It is not envisaged that this project will cause harm to any of the participants. 
Contacts for further information 
 
If you require any further information you can contact: Alya Faisal Al-Mahdi on: 00249912162569 
Participation in this project is entirely voluntary and your response will not affect your rights in any 
way. 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet which is yours to keep. 
 
 




Appendix 4.12 Doctors consent form- focus groups 
 
                                                     
CONSENT FORM 
Potential causes and solutions to preventable adverse events associated with 
chemotherapy prescribing 
 
Research Team Lead: Alya Faysal Al-Mahdi (RICK) 
 
You are provided with two copies of this consent form; one is to be returned to the research team 
and the other for you to keep. 
5. I have read and understand the information sheet for the above study and have had the 
opportunity to ask questions. 
6. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time 
without giving reason. 
7. I agree to what I say during focus group discussions and my views can only be used, 
anonymously, in the presentation of the research. 
8. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
If I require a report of the results of this research project, I will contact the lead researcher by phone 
on 00249912162569. 
………………………  …………………………  ……………… 
Name of participant Signature   Date 
 




 Participant Information Leaflet for Key Informant Interviews- Nurses 
Participant Information Leaflet  
Exploratory Study to identify the process used by nursing staff to prepare and 
administer cytotoxic chemotherapy 
You are being invited to take part in a project that aims to identify the nature and frequency of 
prescribing errors at the cancer hospital. This project is part of a PhD research project but it intends 
to help RICK improve its current services and improve patient care. 
Before you agree to take part in this project, it is important for you to understand the purpose of this 
project and what it involves. Please take time to read this information carefully and take home to 
discuss with others. 
If you have any questions, or if you wish to receive more information, please contact Alya Faysal on 
00249912162569 
Thank you for taking the time to consider taking part. We hope that you feel you are able to contribute. 
Your views are very important and will be of great help to improve chemotherapy services at RICK. 
 
Alya Faysal Al- Mahdi 
Lead Researcher 
PhD Student, Kings College London 
Lead Clinical Pharmacist 


















What is the purpose of this project? 
The current project aims to explore the nature, frequency and potential causes of medication errors. 
This part of the project will explore the methods used by nurses in preparing and administering 
cytotoxic chemotherapy and what steps are taken to reduce errors. 
By analysing the views of nurses, researchers will be able to map out the chemotherapy process and 
identify areas of improvement. 
 
Why have I been chosen for this project? 
Your name has been identified from the nursing staff list that are kept at human resources. 
 
What does taking part in this project involve? 
 
Taking part in this project involves answering questions in a face to face interview. The interview will 
take 30-54 minutes. The interview will be taped using a digital recorder in order to ensure 
comprehensive analysis of the issues raised. 
What should I do if I want to take part? 
If you want to take part, we ask you to sign the consent form and agree to taking part in the interview. 
 
What should I do if I don’t want to take part? 
If you have decided that you don’t want to contribute to this project, you are free to turn down the 
request for interview verbally and not sign the consent form. 
What can I do if I am unsure of taking part in this project? 
More details about this project can be obtained by contacting the lead researcher on the number 
shown above. You can also request a face to face meeting at RICK pharmacy department before the 
formal interview date. 
Do I have to take part in this project? 
No, it is entirely up to you if you choose not to participate in this project.  
How will the information be kept confidential? 
The research team has put a number of rigorous procedures in place to protect the confidentiality of 
participants. These include: 
• Keeping information such as name and other personal details in separate files where 
they will not be linked to the interviews. 
• Not keeping a computer record of personal details of the participants. 
• Access to personal data is restricted to the research team only. 




Who will be able to use my information? 
Information from this project will be available only for researchers who have the relevant scientific 
ethical approval. The results will be analysed by the lead researcher as part of a PhD project. 
The results of this project will be published in international and local scientific journals without 
mention of personal details of the participants. 
Who is organizing and funding this project? 
The project is led by a researcher who is a student at King’s College London, a pharmacist at RICK and 
a lecturer at the University of Medical Sciences and Technology. It is being organized by Alya Faysal, 
Cate Whittlesea (King’s College London) and Graham Davies (King’s College London). It is currently 
funded by personal resources. The project has been reviewed by an independent scientific panel and 
approved by UMST ethics Committee in full accordance of the regulations of the Ministry of Health, 
government of Sudan. 
What if something goes wrong? 
 
It is not envisaged that this project will cause harm to any of the participants. 
Contacts for further information 
 
If you require any further information, please contact: Alya Faysal Al-Mahdi on: 00249912162569 
 
Participation in this project is entirely voluntary and your response will not affect your rights in any 
way. 












 Consent Form for Nurses to participate in study 
 
                                    
 
 
CONSENT FORM  
Exploratory Study to identify the process used by nursing staff to prepare and 




Research Team Lead: Alya Faysal Al-Mahdi (RICK) 
 
You are provided with two copies of this consent form; one is to be returned to the research team 
and the other for you to keep. 
 
1. I have read and understand the information sheet for the above study and have had the 
opportunity to ask questions. 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time 
without giving reason. 
3. I agree to what I say during interviews and my views can only be used, anonymously, in the 
presentation of the research. 
4. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
If I require a report of the results of this research project, I will contact the lead researcher by phone 
on 00249912162569. 
 
………………………  …………………………  ……………… 
Name of participant  Signature    Date 
 
………………………  …………………………   
Name of researcher  Signature     
 




  Key Informant Interview Schedule – Nurses 




Draft interview schedule for an exploratory study to identify the work process involved in 
administration of chemotherapy 
Introduction 
I am Alya Al-Mahdi and I will be conducting this interview to identify the process involved in 
administration of chemotherapy to patients.  
This interview will take up to about one hour during which I will be grateful if you explain to me the 
details of the steps taken in administration of chemotherapy and what steps you take to avoid errors. 
This interview is not meant to assess the accuracy of your actions and the information provided will 
be treated as strictly confidential. 
I may ask for some clarification about the processes you describe. Please feel free to stop me if you 
have a question of clarification. 
Background 
I want you to give me some background information about the chemotherapy day ward where you 
work: 
• The organisation of the ward 
• How does the ward operate? 
• What types of staff are involved? 
• Describe a busy day 
• Describe the patient journey when they present for chemotherapy 
Grand tour questions 
 
Now we would like to focus on the administration process. 
Can you describe how a chemotherapy order is received on the day ward? 
Can you describe how medications are delivered and received on the day ward? 
Now please describe the stages that a medication goes through before being administered to the 
patient. 
What steps do you take to administer the medicine to the patient? 
 
Mini tour questions 
What types of staff are involved in the medication administration process? 
What happens if a medication error is detected? 




Tell me about the training you were provided with before starting to make or administer 
chemotherapy? 
Do you have any concerns when administering chemotherapy? 
Grand Tour questions 
International studies have shown that medication errors do occur, tell me about the most common 
type of medication error that occurs during the preparation and administration of chemotherapy. 
In your opinion, which one would you consider serious and has anyone been exposed to harm while 
receiving chemotherapy? 
What do you think are the contributing factors to each of the incidents you describe? (Prompts, phone 
calls, interruptions, busy work environment, demanding patients/ co-patients) 
Conclusion 
 I am very grateful for providing me with information regarding work practice at the chemotherapy 
day ward. 
Do you think that you may have any more experiences that you think are relevant to this study? 
In your opinion, what changes are needed to reduce the incidence of medication errors? 
Thank you very much for making time to talk to me. If in the future, I need any more information or 















 Draft Chemotherapy Administration Observation Tool 
Data Collection Form for observations on chemotherapy administration (circle where appropriate) 
Date: 







Item prepared   
Protection from cytotoxic drug Wearing gloves Yes                  no 
Wearing goggles Yes                  no 
Wearing closed toe shoes Yes                  no 
Wearing protective overcoat Yes                  no 
Aseptic procedure: Wash hands Yes                  no 
Clean surface of work Yes                  no 
Swab vials Yes                  no 
Removal of syringe from wrapping Yes                  no 
Using non touch technique Yes                  no 
Drug calculations  Accurate calculation Yes                  no 
Obtain second check Yes                 no 
Diluent Correct diluents Yes                 no 
Volume Yes                 no 
Obtain second check Yes                 no 
Removal of dose Correct volume Yes                 no 
Obtain second check Yes                no 
Labeling Patient name Yes                 no 
Drug name Yes                 no 
Dose Yes                no 
Route Yes                no 
Concentration/ final volume Yes                no 
Time prepared Yes                no 
Signature Yes                no 
Appearance of final product Checked and acceptable Yes                no 
Drug administration Checked Patient name Yes               no 




Checked Prescription details Yes               no 
Checked Allergy status Yes                no 
Changed the giving set Yes               no 
Checked Venous access Yes               no 
Aseptic technique used at all times Yes               no 
Infusion rate (where applicable) Yes               no          n/a 
Followed order of administration Yes               no 
If last drug- washed out the line Yes              no          n/a 
Monitored patient Yes               no 
Recorded administration of drug in 
patient notes 




















 Categorisation of administration errors according to NRLS 
Categories of intravenous medicines error based on NRLS injectable medicines audit  (2007) with 
definitions (NPSA, 2007a) 
Medication error Definition 
Wrong dose or frequency • The volume of medicine withdrawn doesn’t correspond with the 
prescription.  
• Giving a chemotherapy medicine in discordance with the doctor’s 
advice either giving the medicine too frequently or less 
frequently. 
Omitted medicine or dose The patient didn’t receive a prescribed medicine even though it was 
supplied from the pharmacy 
Mismatching medicine and 
patient 
The medicine is prescribed correctly for one patient but given 
incorrectly to another 
Wrong route Giving the medicine by other than the route prescribed on the 
prescription 
Wrong method of 
preparation 
Preparing an injectable medicine in discordance with the 
manufacturer’s recommendations/ hospital policy. 
Wrong label • Attaching an incorrect label to a correctly prepared injectable 
solution. 
• Attaching a correct label to an incorrectly prepared injectable 
solution 
• Not attaching a label to an injectable medicine 
Other • Adjusting the rate of infusion in discordance with hospital 
protocol. 
• Administering multiple chemotherapy medicines in the incorrect 
order according to hospital protocol. 
• Not adhering to aseptic technique. 
• Operator not wearing necessary protection 
• Disposal of chemotherapy used vials, syringes, bags and 
intravenous lines in bins not dedicated to chemotherapy 
medicines 












 Final Chemotherapy administration observation tool (Circle Where 
Appropriate) 
Date: 




Matron                          Sister                              Nurse                                           Doctor 
 
Other (please specify) ………………………. 




 gloves Yes                no Yes             no Yes                no Yes                 no 
goggles Yes                no Yes              no Yes                no Yes                 no 
 closed toe shoes Yes                no Yes                no Yes                no Yes                 no 
 protective overcoat Yes                no Yes                no Yes                no Yes                 no 
Aseptic 
procedure: 
Wash hands Yes                no Yes                no Yes                no Yes                 no 
Clean surface of work Yes                no Yes                no Yes                no Yes                 no 
Swab vials Yes                no Yes                no Yes                no Yes                 no 
Removal of syringe 
from wrapping 
Yes                no Yes                no Yes                no Yes                 no 
Using non touch 
technique 
Yes                no Yes                no Yes                no Yes                 no 
Drug 
calculations  
Accurate calculation Yes                no Yes                no Yes                no Yes                 no 
Obtain second check Yes                no Yes                no Yes                no Yes                no 
Diluent Correct diluents Yes    no      n/a Yes    no      n/a Yes    no      n/a Yes    no      n/a 
Volume Yes     no     n/a Yes     no     n/a Yes     no     n/a Yes     no     n/a 
Obtain second check Yes                no Yes                no Yes                no Yes                 no 
Wait for drug to 
dissolve 
Yes    no     n /a Yes    no     n /a Yes    no     n /a Yes    no     n /a 
Removal of 
dose 
Correct volume Yes                no Yes                no Yes                no Yes                 no 
Obtain second check Yes                no Yes                no Yes                no Yes                no 
Labeling Patient name Yes                no Yes                no Yes                no Yes                 no 
Drug name Yes                no Yes                no Yes                no Yes                 no 
Dose Yes                no Yes                no Yes                no Yes                no 
Route Yes                no Yes                no Yes                no Yes                no 
Concentration/ final 
volume 
Yes                no Yes                no Yes                no Yes                no 




Time prepared Yes                no Yes                no Yes                no Yes                no 





Yes                no Yes                no Yes                no Yes                no 
Drug 
administration 
Checked Patient name Yes               no Yes               no Yes               no Yes               no 
Checked Prescription 
details 
Yes               no Yes               no Yes               no Yes               no 
Checked Allergy status Yes                no Yes                no Yes                no Yes                no 
Changed the giving set Yes               no Yes               no Yes               no Yes               no 
Checked Venous access Yes               no Yes               no Yes               no Yes               no 
Aseptic technique used 
at all times 
Yes               no Yes               no Yes               no Yes               no 
Infusion rate (where 
applicable) 
Yes               no          
n/a 
Yes               no          
n/a 
Yes               no          
n/a 
Yes             no          
n/a 
Followed order of 
administration 
Yes               no Yes               no Yes               no Yes             no 
washed out the line 
after the last drug 
Yes              no          
n/a 
Yes              no          
n/a 
Yes              no          
n/a 
Yes             no          
n/a 
Monitored patient Yes               no Yes               no Yes               no Yes             no 
Recorded 
administration of drug 
in patient notes 
Yes               no Yes               no Yes               no Yes             no 
Safe disposal  Cytotoxic drug Yes              no Yes              no Yes              no Yes             no 
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 ni srorre noitacidem fo sesuaC dna ycneuqerF eht fo noitagitsevni nA
 yparehtomehc
 
 معلومات المشروع البحثى                                             
 
 
 ماهو الغرض من هذا المشروع البحثى؟
 هذا المشروع يهدف الى معرفة الاسباب التى تؤدى لحدوث الاخطاء الدوائية. •
 
 
 لماذا تم اختيارك للمشاركة فى هذا المشروع البحثى؟
 شفى.لقد تم التعرف على اسمك وتم اختيارك  من سجلات العاملين بالمست •
 
 
 ماهى الاشياء التى تنطوى على المشاركة فى هذا المشروع البحثى؟
رصد تحركاتك فى المستشفى فور حدوث خطأ دوائى ، ستتم مقابلتك بشكل سري وخاص  •
 لاثراء وذلك رقمى مسجل عبر النقاش تسجيل للتحقق من اسباب حدوث هذا الخطأ. سيتضمن
المشاركة فى هذا المشروع  .اانقاش اثناء اثبرت تىال النقاط شمولية من والتاكد البحث عملية
 البحثى اختيلرية ولن تؤثر على  عملك وترقيتك فى المستشفى
 
 
 ماذا أفعل اذا كنت أرغب فى المشاركة؟
اذا كنت ترغب فى المشاركة فى هذا المشروع البحثى فما عليك الا التوقيع فى استمارة الموافقة  •
 الصيدلية. وتسليمه لدكتوره علياء فيصل ب
 
 
 ماذا أفعل اذا لم اكن أرغب فى المشاركة؟
اذا كنت اتخذت قرارك بعدم المشاركة فى هذا المشروع البحثى فما عليك الا  ان ترجع الاقرار  •
 من غير امضاء. 
 
 
 ماذا أفعل اذا لم اكن متأكدا من المشاركة فى هذا المشروع البحثى؟ 
هذا المشروع البحثى عن طريق الاتصال  يمكن الحصول على مزيد من المعلومات حول •
 بالباحث الرئيسى على رقم التلفون أعلاه.




 هل يجب على المشاركة فى هذا المشروع البحثى؟ 
 فى هذا المشروع البحثى. لا وان الامر متروك لك تماما فى عدم المشاركة •
 
 




 كيف يتم الحفاظ على سرية المعلومات والمعاملة بها؟
  -لقد وضع فريق البحث اجراءات صارمة لحماية سرية وخصوصية المشاركين وهذه تشمل الاتى:
 حفظ المعلومات الشخصية مثل الاسم والعنوان  بمعزل عن بيانات المشروع الاخرى.  •
 صية للمشاركين فى سجلات الحاسب الالى.لا يتم حفظ البيانات الشخ •
 يقتصرالوصول للبيانات الشخصية للعاملين المختارين لاعضاء فريق البحث فقط.  •




 من سيكون قادرا على استخدام هذه البيانات؟
لمعلومات والبيانات الخاصة بهذا المشروع البحثى ستكون متاحة فقط للباحثين الذين الوصول ل •
لديهم الموافقة الاخلاقية العلمية ، وسوف يتم تحليل نتائج هذا البحث بواسطة الباحث الرئيسى 
 كجزء من مشروع درجة الدكتوراة. 




 من هو الممول والمسئول عن التنظيم لهذا المشروع البحثى؟ 
الباحث الرئيسى لهذا المشروع البحثى طالب فى كلية الملك فى لندن بجانب أنه صيدلى فى  •
 مستشفى الذرة ومحاضر بجامعة العلوم الطبية والتكنلوجيا. 
 ذا المشروع حاليا بالموارد الذاتية وموارد حكومة السودان.ويتم التمويل له
 لقد تمت مراجعة هذا المشروع البحثى بواسطة لجنة مستقلة لخبراء علميين ووافقت عليه 
 لجنة أخلاقيات المهنة بجامعة العلوم الطبية والتكنلوجيا ووفقا للوائح وزارة الصحة فى حكومة السودان. 
 
 
 بطريقة غير مرضية؟ ماذا لو سارت الامور 
ليس من المتصور أن هذا المشروع البحثى سوف يتسبب فى أى ضرر لاى من  .b






 ولمزيد من المعلومات يمكنك الاتصال ب: 
 علياء فيصل المهدى
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 .اسباب الاخطاء الدوائيهأنا باحثة من جامعة العلوم الطبية والتكنلوجيا. عايزة أعرف 
 
 .د. علياء فيصلكنلوجيا وأسمها المسؤول من الدراسة دى هى باحثة من جامعة العلوم الطبيه والت
 
 حنطلب منك انك تجاوب على اسئلة.
 
وأهم حاجة عايزاكم تعرفوا انو البيانات حتكون  سرية جدا وماحيطلع عليها زول بدون موافقتكم. الزول  











 لمزيد من المعلومات الرجاء الاتصال ب: 
 جامعة العلوم الطبية والتكنلوجيا. -د. علياء فيصل 









 Critical Incident Interview Schedule on Administration Errors 
Interview schedule for the assessment of causes of chemotherapy administration errors 
 
My name is Alya Al-Mahdi and I am the principle researcher on a research project exploring types and 
causes of chemotherapy errors and is part of a PhD study based at King’s College. 
I am grateful for your participation in this research project. I am interested to find out what happened 
and how it happened and NOT that you were involved in an error. All the information provided will be 
treated as strictly confidential and cannot be traced to the source. Participating in this interview is 
entirely voluntary and you may withdraw at any point. This information will not affect your 
employment in this hospital. 
This interview is concerning the medication incident ............................................which occurred on 
.................................when you were administering chemotherapy.  I want you to describe how and 
why the incident occurred. I may stop you during our conversation to clarify any unclear point. 
1. Describe the working environment when this incident occurred (prompts: busy, interruptions, 
distractions, patients). 
 
2. In your opinion, which factors do you think contributed to this incident? 
 
 
3. Can you describe the steps you took when you were preparing/ administering the medicine? 
 
4. Explain how the error occurred. 
 
 
5. If you were to repeat this prescription, what steps would you take to prevent this error? 
 
6. Do you have any needs relating to administration of medicines (prompts, training, equipment, 
staff)? 
Thank you for taking the time to talk to me about this incident. I may want to come back to you if I 
need more clarification. 
 
 
 
